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1 
1 
Introduction

The law of evidence is a fascinating blend of practical and academic issues. 
It is practical because it is the law which is applied in the courts every day 
to determine, inter alia, whether evidence ought to be admitted, the use 
which may be made of evidence once it has been admitted, and the way in 
which witnesses may be questioned. It is a body of law which must be 
known and understood thoroughly by any advocate (particularly those 
who practise in the criminal courts) as he or she may need to make 
submissions on a question of evidence or related procedure at very short 
notice. But this does not mean the law of evidence is no more than a body 
of rules to be learnt by rote. Far from it. The law of evidence is a discipline 
which ought to be studied at an academic level and this is as true for the 
prospective advocate as it is for any other student of the subject. Much of 
the law of evidence is indeterminate, and the student or advocate will be 
able to support his or her submissions on what the law is, or on what it 
ought to be, only if the principles and considerations of policy which 
underpin the subject are appreciated. For example, one can comprehend 
the law of criminal evidence only if something is known of the rights-based 
theories of jurisprudence, of concepts such as `logical relevance' and 
`proof', and of the weaknesses and prejudices which are an inextricable 
part of the human psyche. 
The law of evidence, criminal evidence in particular, is a dynamic body 
of flexible discretionary powers and inflexible rules of somewhat uncertain 
scope which have evolved out of (and continue to be influenced by) 
considerations of public policy, common sense, logic, psychology, 
philosophy and legal principle. An important consequence is that, unlike 
other branches of the law, decided cases do not usually amount to binding 
precedents to be slavishly followed by judges in subsequent cases. More 
often than not a case on the law of evidence will provide no more than an 
illustration of how logic and certain well-established principles or 
considerations of policy have been applied to a particular factual scenario. 
For example, the fact that a man charged with committing an act of gross 
indecency on a boy was found to have photographs of naked boys in his 
home, and that such evidence was held to have been properly admitted at 
his trial, does not set a precedent to the effect that incriminating articles of 
this sort are prima facie admissible against a man charged with a sexual 
offence against another male. Nor does a case where indecent photographs 
in the accused's possession were held to have been wrongly admitted at his 
trial for indecently assaulting a woman provide any precedent for the 
inadmissibility of such evidence. To understand decisions of this sort 
requires an understanding of the particular circumstances of the case, the 
context in which the logical relevance and weight of the evidence were 
determined. But it is also necessary to understand the factors which would 
2 Evidence 
have militated against the admission of the evidence, the principles and 
considerations of public policy which would have justified excluding the 
evidence, for it will be seen that much of the law of evidence is concerned 
with concealing relevant evidence from the jury. 
The fact that logically relevant evidence can quite properly be excluded 
from the trial process in a given case is the practical outcome of a conflict 
which lies at the heart of the law of evidence ± a conflict between the 
`principle of free proof' on the one hand and countervailing considerations 
of public policy on the other (Figure 1.1). The principle of free proof 
demands the admission of all available evidence which is logically relevant 
to a disputed issue of fact, for example the accused's guilt or innocence, on 
the ground that the exclusion of any relevant evidence encourages the jury 
to determine the issue on a false basis, thereby increasing the possibility 
that they will reach an erroneous verdict. The problem with this analysis is 
that it ignores the fallible nature of the human fact-finding tribunal. An 
item of evidence may well be logically relevant to the determination of a 
disputed issue of fact, but its admission may distract the jury from other 
more valuable evidence, or engender in them a feeling of hatred for the 
accused, or lead them along a path of logical reasoning which would 
exaggerate the true worth of the evidence. Other evidence may simply be 
too unreliable to leave to the jury notwithstanding the high value it would 
have if true. Somewhat paradoxically, then, relevant evidence may be 
excluded to reduce the possibility that the jury will reach the wrong 
verdict. In practice the exclusionary considerations tend to militate against 
the admission of prosecution evidence rather than evidence tendered by 
the accused because of the importance attached to the desirability of 
acquitting the innocent. The conflict between the principle of free proof 
and countervailing considerations of policy is often, therefore, a conflict 
between free proof and the principle that the accused should receive a 
fair trial. 
Great weight is attached to the `fair trial principle', but it is not the only 
reason for excluding logically relevant evidence. In other words, the law of 
evidence is not solely concerned with ensuring that the right decision is 
reached at the end of the trial. An example is provided by s. 76(2)(a) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which renders any confession 
inadmissible (as a matter of law) if it has been obtained in consequence of 
oppressive conduct. A confession obtained by oppression is inadmissible 
even if it is demonstrably true, regardless of the nature of the crime 
committed. The underlying policy is that the rights and dignity of the 
suspect must be protected if this country is to regard itself as a free and 
democratic society, even if the result is that the occasional criminal should 
go unpunished (the `protective principle'). 
Logically relevant evidence may be excluded on the ground that it is 
unreliable, for example where the evidence comprises a witness statement 
made by a proven reprobate who is unwilling to face cross-examination. 
Conversely, of course, it may be more difficult to justify the exclusion of 
demonstrably reliable evidence. In other words, the `reliability principle' 
may add cogency to the principle of free proof or detract from it. For 
Introduction 3 
FREE PROOF 
Admit any 
logically 
relevant evidence 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
FAIRNESS 
Exclude relevant prosecution 
evidence to ensure the accused 
receives a fair trial; e.g. because its  
unduly prejudicial effect would 
outweigh its probative value (or 
because it is unreliable). 
UNRELIABILITY 
Exclude relevant prosecution or 
defence evidence which is 
inadmissible as a matter of law for 
falling within a class of generally 
unreliable evidence; e.g. hearsay 
evidence. 
PROTECTON 
Exclude relevant prosecution 
evidence to prevent suspects from 
having their human rights violated by 
the police; e.g. confessions obtained 
as a result of oppression. 
UTILITARIANISM 
Exclude relevant prosecution or 
defence evidence if the needs of the 
many outweigh the needs of the 
individual; e.g. where evidence is 
covered by legal professional 
privilege or it concerns the security 
of the state. 
PRAGMATISM 
Exclude relevant prosecution or 
defence evidence if its probative 
value is too slight when weighed 
against competing considerations 
such as expense, delay and the 
need to prevent the jury from being 
overburdened with superfluous 
evidence. 
VEXATION 
Exclude relevant prosecution or 
defence evidence if its probative 
value is too slight when weighed 
against the vexation it would cause a 
party or witness. 
Figure 1.1 The law of criminal evidence 
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example, if the police break into the accused's home and unlawfully 
remove a diary containing incriminating statements, the principle of free 
proof and the reliability principle would work together in favour of 
admitting that evidence. Its admission would not have an unfair effect on 
the trial itself, although it might be regarded as unfair to admit evidence 
which has been obtained by police impropriety. In order to exclude such 
evidence another principle would need to be found, such as the desirability 
of not bringing the criminal justice system into disrepute by admitting the 
fruits of police misconduct (the `integrity principle') or the importance of 
protecting citizens from unlawful interference in their private affairs. It 
has already been seen that even a demonstrably reliable confession will be 
excluded if it has been obtained by oppression, a case of the reliability 
principle being trumped by the integrity and/or protective principles. 
Demonstrably reliable evidence may also be excluded on purely 
pragmatic grounds if its probative value would be too low to justify the 
expense, delay or vexation its admission would bring; or if it would not be 
in the public interest to allow the evidence to be revealed (the utilitarian 
policy of `public interest immunity'). However, even highly sensitive 
information may need to be revealed if its admission would be necessary to 
ensure that the accused receives a fair trial. 
Many of the considerations which justify the exclusion of evidence in 
criminal proceedings are of only marginal importance in civil proceedings 
tried by a professional judge sitting alone. Judges are thought to be better 
able to assess the reliability and weight of evidence, and to disregard any 
personal prejudices they might have; so much evidence which would be 
excluded in criminal proceedings is freely admitted in civil proceedings. 
Furthermore, the evidence gathering process which precedes the civil trial 
is usually undertaken by private individuals rather than the police, so the 
protective and integrity principles are of less importance, particularly as 
the judge may penalise improper conduct by an appropriate order for the 
payment of costs. The governing principle in civil proceedings is that of 
free proof. The risk of unreliability is generally an insufficient reason for 
the exclusion of evidence: unreliability goes to weight rather than 
admissibility. That said, some aspects of the law of evidence apply equally 
to civil and criminal proceedings. Evidence may be excluded if it is 
insufficiently probative to make its admission worthwhile or if it would be 
in the public interest to suppress it (for example because it concerns the 
security of the state). 
It is also important to understand that the law of evidence developed in 
the context of jury trials where there is a sharp division between the 
respective roles of the judge and the jury. Questions of law, including the 
admissibility of evidence, are for the judge alone. The jury's role is limited 
to deciding whether disputed issues of fact have been proved (they 
therefore comprise the `tribunal of fact'). The judge (`the tribunal of law') 
will consider the evidence and if it is excluded the jury will never hear 
about it. If the evidence is admitted the judge will direct the jury on the 
limited use which may be made of it, and warn them against impermissible 
or prejudicial reasoning and/or any factors which might render the 
Introduction 5 
evidence unreliable. Accordingly much of the law of evidence is irrelevant 
to civil proceedings and of only limited significance in proceedings before 
magistrates, although in theory the law is the same whether the accused is 
tried summarily or on indictment. 
The purpose of the trial is, of course, to give the claimant or prosecution 
the opportunity to prove an allegation which has been made against the 
civil defendant or criminal accused. The law of evidence regulates the 
admission of evidence and the use which may be made of it during the 
trial, with appropriate directions from the judge in jury trials, but it also 
establishes who should prove disputed issues of fact and the degree of 
likelihood which has to be met before a fact can be said to have been 
`proved'. In the context of a trial the term `proof' must be treated with 
caution, however. Very little, if anything, can be proved with certainty so 
all that can be hoped for is a sufficiently high probability that the assertion 
of fact is true or false (as the case may be). As Lord Simon said in DPP v. 
Shannon [1974] 3 WLR 155 (HL) (at p. 191): 
`The law in action is not concerned with absolute truth, but with proof 
before a fallible human tribunal to a requisite standard of probability in 
accordance with formal rules of evidence (in particular, rules relating to 
admissibility of evidence).' 
The function of the tribunal of fact ± the criminal jury in particular ± is 
therefore somewhat similar to that of the historian, trying to piece 
together a picture of what happened in the past from fragments of 
evidence which may be of uncertain (and unascertainable) reliability. The 
task of the professional historian is arduous enough, but the jury's 
difficulties are exacerbated by the exclusionary rules which prevent them 
from seeing much relevant (and even highly probative) evidence, their own 
`amateur' composition, and the very nature of the English adversarial 
system. The evidence presented by each side may have been subjectively 
selected by the parties to support their respective cases. The defence will 
withhold anything which undermines the accused's case; the police may 
intentionally or negligently lose or fail to gather some evidence or perhaps 
even withhold evidence from the prosecution. Then there is the question of 
the witnesses' credibility ± mistaken observations, misremembered details, 
confusion, bias, lies, self-interest, self-delusion, self-preservation and so 
on. All these human failings tend to undermine the jury's search for 
`objective truth'. The seemingly credible witness may in reality be a 
dishonest and skilled hypocrite; the convincing eye-witness may be 
honestly mistaken or have his own interests to serve; and the jury itself, 
as a disparate group of individuals, will have their own personal 
preferences and prejudices. 
A case in point, with horrendous consequences for the accused, is that 
of Mr Mahmoud Mattan. In July 1952, M, a Somali, was tried for the 
murder of a shopkeeper, V, sentenced to death and executed in September 
of that year. V had had her throat cut by someone on the evening of 
6 March 1952. The case against M depended almost entirely on the 
6 Evidence 
identification evidence of one man (W) who claimed that he saw M leave 
V's shop at 8.15 p.m. on that evening. W's witness statement to the police 
made on 7 March differed materially from the evidence he gave from the 
witness box, but it had not been disclosed to the defence. W's statement 
described the person he had seen as a Somali with a gold tooth, but M had 
no such tooth and W did not repeat that part of his description during the 
trial. W's identification evidence was also demonstrably flawed in other 
respects. Furthermore, W had received a reward from the police, but that 
fact had not been disclosed. Nor had the defence been informed that four 
other witnesses who had seen a man near V's shop at or about the time of 
the murder had failed to pick M out at an identification parade. One 
witness had even told the police that M was not the man she had seen. A 
witness statement which supported M's alibi was withheld, as was 
evidence that another suspect, also a Somali, had admitted being near the 
shop at the time of the murder. That suspect (who had a gold tooth) was 
subsequently tried for a separate murder by stabbing in 1954 and found 
not guilty by reason of insanity. M's conviction for the murder of V was 
quashed in 1998 (R v. Mattan (Deceased) (1998) The Times 5.3.98 
(97/6415/S2) (CA)). Rose LJ, having noted that there had been many 
changes in the law since 1952, said: 
`The case has a wider significance in that it clearly demonstrates five 
matters. First, capital punishment was not perhaps a prudent 
culmination for a criminal justice system which is human and therefore 
fallible . . . Fourthly, no-one associated with the criminal justice system 
can afford to be complacent. Fifthly, injustices of this kind can only be 
avoided if all concerned in the investigation of crime, and the 
preparation and presentation of criminal prosecutions, observe the 
very highest standards of integrity, conscientiousness and professional 
skill.' 
2 
7 
Preliminaries

2.1 Facts in Issue and the Ultimate Probandum 
The `facts in issue' are the disputed issues of fact which the prosecution or 
claimant must prove in order to succeed, along with the issues of fact 
which the accused or civil defendant must prove in order to establish his 
defence. The term `ultimate probandum' is sometimes used to represent 
what the prosecution or claimant must ultimately prove in order to 
succeed. The party who is obliged to prove a particular fact in issue is said 
to bear the `burden of proof' on that issue (15.1 post). The nature and 
number of the facts in issue depend on the substantive law and what, if 
anything, has been `formally admitted' by the parties. The substantive law 
identifies the facts in issue for the type of case before the court, but once a 
fact has been formally admitted it ceases to be in issue and need not 
(indeed cannot) be proved by the adduction of evidence (see 15.6.3 post). 
Take, for example, a charge of murder. The ultimate probandum is that 
it was the accused who murdered the person named as the deceased on the 
indictment. In the absence of any formal admission by the accused, the 
prosecution must prove the following facts in issue: (i) that the person 
named on the indictment as the deceased is indeed dead; (ii) that his death 
was caused by a particular injury; (iii) that the accused caused that injury; 
and (iv) that the accused had the intention to kill or seriously injure him. 
The prosecution bear the burden of proof on all these issues and the 
accused must be acquitted if they are unable to prove any of them (Figure 
2.1). If the accused were formally to admit that he killed the deceased it 
would no longer be necessary for the prosecution to prove the first three of 
those facts. They would merely need to prove that the accused had the 
mens rea for murder at the time he killed the deceased. If, however, the 
accused were to raise the partial defence of provocation there would be 
additional facts in issue to address, that is, the elements of that defence. 
The prosecution would then have to prove the non-existence of any one of 
those facts in issue, in addition to the accused's mens rea. 
The Ultimate Probandum 
(D murdered V) 
Fact in issue (i) Fact in issue (ii) Fact in issue (iii) Fact in issue (iv) 
(V is dead) (V died of X) (D caused X) (D had requisite 
mens rea) 
Figure 2.1 The ultimate probandum 
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2.2 Proving Facts in Issue 
To prove a fact in issue it is necessary for evidence to be adduced or elicited 
during the trial. If, for example, the accused is on trial for murder it may be 
possible to prove his guilt by calling a witness to give oral evidence that he 
saw him viciously stabbing the deceased to death. Oral evidence which has 
been given by a witness in court is known as `testimony' and if, as is usually 
the case, the witness states what he directly perceived he is said to give 
`direct testimony' or `direct oral evidence' (2.2.1 post). 
There are, however, some facts in issue which can never be proved by 
direct testimony, either because there is no available witness or because it 
is impossible for a person directly to perceive what is in issue. In the latter 
category would be the accused's state of mind at the time he allegedly 
committed the actus reus of the offence charged. Witnesses cannot give 
direct testimony of what another man is thinking, so the accused's mens 
rea must be proved in some other way. In the present example the eye-
witness to the stabbing would be able to give direct oral evidence that the 
accused caused the deceased's death, but the prosecution would not be 
able directly to prove the accused's intentions at that time on the basis of 
that oral evidence. The accused's state of mind would have to be inferred 
from his conduct as proved by the witness's direct oral evidence. The 
witness's description of the frenzied nature of the attack could allow the 
jury to infer that the accused intended to kill the deceased. An item of 
evidence from which a fact in issue may ultimately be inferred is known as 
an `evidentiary fact' or a `fact relevant to a fact in issue' or (more 
commonly) as `circumstantial evidence' (2.2.2 post). Circumstantial 
evidence allows a fact in issue to be proved inferentially rather than 
directly, so it is `indirect' evidence. An item of circumstantial evidence may 
be established by direct oral evidence, as in the murder example, or by 
drawing an inference from other circumstantial evidence. If no-one saw 
the deceased being stabbed, it would be necessary to infer the accused's 
mens rea from circumstantial evidence, the existence of which would 
possibly have to be inferred from other, even more remote, circumstantial 
evidence. For example, it might be possible to infer the accused's mens rea 
from the evidentiary fact that he had a motive to kill the deceased; yet the 
existence of that evidentiary fact might have to be inferred from even more 
remote evidentiary facts such as the accused's earlier threat to kill the 
deceased and a life insurance policy found in his house showing that he 
would profit from the deceased's death (see Figure 2.2). 
Finally, there is a class of evidence ± `real evidence' ± which comprises 
things which are directly perceived by the jury, for example a closed-circuit 
television recording which has been played in open court (2.2.3 post). 
2.2.1 Testimonial Evidence 
There are two types of testimonial evidence: `testimony' and `admissible 
hearsay'. It will be remembered that testimony is the oral evidence of a 
witness in court, and if that evidence concerns matters directly perceived 
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The Ultimate Probandum 
(D murdered V) 
Fact in issue (iv)

(D had requisite mens rea)

Evidentiary fact 
(D had motive to kill V) 
[inference] 
[inference] 
[inference] Evidentiary fact 
(D stabbed V in the neck) 
Evidentiary fact 
(D hated V) 
[inference] 
Testimony from W1 
Evidentiary fact 
(D had recently threatened to kill V) 
[inference] 
Testimony from W2 
Evidentiary fact 
(D believed he stood 
to profit from V's death) 
[inference] 
Evidentiary fact Insurance document exhibited 
(life insurance policy as an item of real evidence 
found in D's possession) 
Testimony from W3 
Figure 2.2 Circumstantial evidence 
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by the witness it is direct oral evidence (direct testimony). Oral evidence is 
admissible to prove the truth of the matters stated by the witness, the 
weight of the evidence being dependent on the truthfulness and accuracy 
of the person who provides it. Witnesses give oral evidence (`evidence in 
chief') in support of the party calling them during their `examination-in-
chief' (16.4 post); they are then `cross-examined' by the opposing party or 
parties so that any weaknesses in their evidence or their credibility can be 
revealed, or so that evidence favourable to the cross-examining party's 
case can be elicited (16.5 post). 
`Hearsay' is any out-of-court statement tendered for the purpose of 
proving the truth of the matters stated (5.1 post). Generally speaking, 
hearsay is inadmissible in criminal proceedings because witnesses are 
expected to appear in court to give direct oral evidence and face cross-
examination on what they perceived. There are, however, many exceptions 
to this general exclusionary rule and if a hearsay statement is admissible 
by virtue of any such exception it is admissible evidence of the truth of the 
matters stated. In this sense it may be regarded as equivalent to testimony 
and thus a form of testimonial evidence. If the maker of the hearsay 
statement directly perceived the matters referred to his evidence is said to 
be `first-hand hearsay' (equivalent to direct testimony ± the word `direct' is 
limited to non-hearsay evidence). The maker may have written down what 
he saw and subsequently died, in which case his first-hand hearsay 
statement will be adduced in documentary form, or he may have told 
another person what he saw, in which case that person will appear in court 
as a witness to repeat the deceased's oral first-hand hearsay. If the maker 
(M2) of the hearsay statement did not directly perceive the matters 
referred to, but merely repeated another hearsay statement made to him 
by another person (M1) who did perceive the matters referred to, M2's 
statement is known as `second-hand hearsay' (while, of course, M1's is 
first-hand). 
An out-of-court statement which is tendered for a relevant reason other 
than to prove the truth of the matters stated ± for example, to prove that a 
person spoke with an Australian accent ± is not excluded by the hearsay 
rule but is admissible as `original evidence' (5.4 post). Original evidence is 
not a form of testimonial evidence because the party tendering it does not 
seek to rely on it to prove the truth of the matters stated. Another type of 
original evidence consists of out-of-court utterances which are incapable 
of being true or false (5.5 post). 
2.2.2 Circumstantial Evidence 
An item of circumstantial evidence is an evidentiary fact from which an 
inference may be drawn rendering the existence (or non-existence) of a fact 
in issue more probable. The fact in issue is not proved by a witness relating 
what he directly perceived, so circumstantial evidence is `indirect' 
evidence. Examples of circumstantial evidence include disposition, motive, 
knowledge, opportunity, capacity, suspicious behaviour, silence, lies, 
preparatory acts, and so on. The term covers any admissible evidence from 
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which it would be possible to draw an inference going some way towards 
proving a fact in issue. 
The public perception seems to be that circumstantial evidence is in 
some way an inferior form of evidence. One sometimes hears persons who 
have been convicted of an offence, or their relatives or solicitors (who 
should know better), affirm their intention to appeal against a conviction 
as the evidence was `only circumstantial'. Students of evidence should 
disabuse themselves of this myth: `It is no derogation of evidence to say 
that it is circumstantial' (R v. Taylor (1928) 21 Cr App R 20 (CCA)). 
Circumstantial evidence may be highly probative or even compelling 
evidence of what happened on a particular occasion. Indeed, so long as the 
possibility of fabrication can be discounted, circumstantial evidence may 
be more reliable than direct testimony. 
An individual item of circumstantial evidence taken by itself may or 
may not be particularly probative of the accused's guilt in criminal 
proceedings. Much depends on the nature of the evidence in question. 
Some types of circumstantial evidence are inherently cogent, whereas 
other types may have very little probative value. If the only evidence 
identifying the accused as the offender is a single item of circumstantial 
evidence then that evidence must of course be sufficiently probative to 
discount the possibility that any other person could have committed the 
offence, for example a sufficiently complete fingerprint (11.4 post) or a  
sufficiently sophisticated DNA profile (11.5 post). In practice, though, the 
prosecution are unlikely to base their entire case on a single item of 
circumstantial evidence. As a general rule the value of circumstantial 
evidence lies in its cumulative effect; that is to say, while a single item of 
circumstantial evidence may only slightly increase the likelihood that the 
accused is guilty, several items taken together may carry enough probative 
force to justify a conviction. 
If identity is in issue circumstantial evidence operates by reducing the 
possibility that anyone else could have committed the offence, and so 
indirectly identifies the accused. A single item of circumstantial evidence, 
`A', will suggest that the offender belongs to a particular group of persons, 
`Group A', which is smaller than society as a whole. A further item, `B', 
will suggest he belongs to `Group B' too, and therefore that he also 
belongs to the even smaller `Group AB' (that is, those persons who belong 
to both Groups A and B). Item `C' will suggest his membership of `Group 
C' and therefore the even smaller `Group ABC', and so on. The more 
circumstantial evidence there is which identifies the accused as a member 
of a whole range of groups of person the greater the probability becomes 
that he, rather than anyone else, is guilty. In R v. Exall (1866) 4 F & F 922 
(Assizes) Pollock CB said of circumstantial evidence (at p. 929): 
`It is . . . like the case of a rope composed of several cords. One strand of 
the cord might be insufficient to sustain the weight, but three stranded 
together may be quite of sufficient strength. Thus it may be in 
circumstantial evidence ± there may be a combination of circumstances, 
no one of which would raise a reasonable conviction, or more than a 
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mere suspicion; but the whole, taken together, may create a strong 
conclusion of guilt . . . with as much certainty as human affairs can 
require or admit of.' 
Take, for example, a case where a woman has been found raped and 
murdered. If there is no direct evidence identifying the offender the 
prosecution will have to rely entirely on circumstantial evidence. This 
could include a footprint in the mud (item A) identifying the offender as a 
man who wears a particular type of footwear (Group A); a tyre print (item 
B) identifying the offender as the driver of a car with particular tyres 
(Group B); a used syringe (item C) identifying the offender as a heroin 
addict (Group C); and semen (item D) identifying the offender as a man 
with a particular sexual disease (Group D1) and a particular DNA profile 
(Group D2). Group A and Group B are fairly large so, standing alone, item 
A and item B would not be particularly probative; but, taken together, 
they would have the cumulative effect of narrowing the group of possible 
offenders to those men who have shoes of that type and a car with tyres of 
that type (Group AB). There may still be thousands of such men, but the 
number of men falling within Group AB and within Group C is likely to be 
very small. Only one man (the accused) in Group ABC may have the 
particular sexual disease and so fall within Group ABCD1, suggesting, 
therefore, that he is the offender. In other words, the cumulative effect of 
several items of circumstantial evidence may be great enough to identify 
the accused, even though each item in isolation would be inherently weak 
evidence of his guilt. The prosecution case could be further strengthened 
by other items of circumstantial evidence pertaining to the accused 
himself. A search of his home might reveal hard core pornographic or 
`snuff' videos showing women being raped and murdered (item E) or a  
collection of newspaper clippings relating to the offence in question (item 
F). Item E would be probative of the accused's guilt by showing that he is 
not revolted by the idea of rape. Both the offender and the accused would 
fall within that group of men (Group E) adding weight to the prosecution 
case. Similarly, both the accused and the offender would fall within that 
group of men (Group F) who are particularly interested in the offence with 
which the accused has been charged, and this too would suggest his guilt. 
Again, standing alone, item F would have little probative value, but in the 
factual context of the other circumstantial evidence it would make the case 
against the accused compelling. 
Item D2 deserves separate consideration. If the prosecution manage to 
obtain a DNA profile of the offender from his semen this will show he 
belongs to a very small group of men, perhaps just four or five persons in 
the country. If an analysis of the accused's DNA puts him within that 
group (Group D2) the prosecution would have a highly cogent item of 
evidence; but, in the absence of any other evidence, it would be insufficient 
to prove his guilt. The prosecution must prove the accused is guilty 
beyond reasonable doubt, and the mere fact he is one of the five men in 
Group D2 who could have committed the offence is insufficient, for it is a 
mere 20 per cent possibility. However, item D2 taken together with any of 
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the other items of circumstantial evidence would almost certainly be 
enough to narrow that group of five down to one person: the accused (see 
11.5 post). 
Circumstantial evidence may be used not only to identify an offender, 
but also to prove mens rea where identity is not in issue, or even that the 
actus reus of an offence has been committed. An interesting example is 
provided by the case of R v. Onufrejczyk [1955] 2 WLR 273 (CCA). The 
accused in that case was charged with the murder of his business partner, 
S, who had disappeared without trace on 14 December 1953, the date on 
which the murder was allegedly committed. The last witness to see him 
other than the accused was a blacksmith who testified that S had visited 
his premises to collect a horse on that date. The accused's defence was that 
on 18 December a large car had driven up to their isolated farmhouse at 
7.30 p.m. and three men had kidnapped S at gunpoint. There was no direct 
evidence that S was dead let alone that he had been killed, but the accused 
was convicted of his murder as both his death and the fact that the accused 
had killed him could be inferred cumulatively from several items of 
circumstantial evidence. First, the accused had had a motive to kill S. He 
had wanted to obtain S's share in the farm but was in dire need of money, 
and S had threatened to put the farm up for sale if the accused could not 
obtain the money to buy him out. (There was also evidence that the 
accused had made threats against S.) Second, the accused's behaviour 
after 14 December suggested that he had been aware that S was already 
dead. On the afternoon of 18 December he had written to an acquaintance 
explaining that S would be going away for a fortnight and that he, the 
accused, had already paid him most of the money; and yet, soon after, the 
accused had gone to London to borrow money from relatives and had got 
a woman to forge documents purporting to be agreements upon which he 
had then forged S's signature. The accused had also written a number of 
letters which suggested that S had gone to Poland and that he would not 
be returning, and had asked a man to impersonate S at a meeting with his 
solicitor. Third, S had not taken any of his clothes or possessions away 
with him. Fourth, the accused had acted in a suspicious manner once the 
police had begun their investigation into S's disappearance. In particular, 
he had gone to the blacksmith to bribe him into saying that S had visited 
him on 17 December. Fifth, minute drops of blood had been found on the 
walls and ceiling of the farmhouse kitchen. 
A further example is provided by R v. Lewis (1982) 76 Cr App R 33 
(CA). The accused in that case faced an allegation that he had indecently 
touched his partner's daughters. He admitted there had been contact but 
said in his defence that it had been innocent touching as part of his 
attempt to be a father figure to the girls. His culpable state of mind could 
be proved, however, by the presence of magazines and other documents 
concerning sexual acts with children. Those articles allowed an inference 
to be drawn that the accused was interested in children as sexual objects, 
which allowed the further inference to be drawn that he had not acted as a 
father figure when touching the girls but had groped them for sexual 
gratification. 
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Circumstantial evidence may be highly probative of the accused's guilt, 
but there is always the possibility that it could have been fabricated. Any 
type of evidence may be fabricated, of course, and one of the reasons for 
cross-examination is to reveal whether witnesses have been lying on oath 
during their examination-in-chief. The problem with circumstantial 
evidence is that its reliability may be unchallengeable. In Teper v. R 
[1952] AC 480 (PC) Lord Normand said (at p. 489): 
`Circumstantial evidence may sometimes be conclusive, but it must 
always be narrowly examined, if only because evidence of this kind may 
be fabricated to cast suspicion on another . . . It is also necessary before 
drawing the inference of the accused's guilt from circumstantial 
evidence to be sure that there are no other co-existing circumstances 
which would weaken or destroy the inference.' 
The final sentence of this dictum is interesting, because it rightly suggests 
that the accused should not be convicted on the basis of a cumulative 
inference drawn from circumstantial evidence if an alternative inference 
could be drawn which would be consistent with a (reasonably possible) 
theory that the accused is not guilty. A similar point was made in R v. 
Onufrejczyk [1955] 2 WLR 273 (CCA) where Lord Goddard CJ said that 
`the fact of death, like any other fact, can be proved by circumstantial 
evidence, that is to say, evidence of facts which lead to one conclusion, 
provided that the jury are satisfied and are warned that it must lead to one 
conclusion only'. Accordingly, it was argued before the House of Lords in 
McGreevy v. DPP [1973] 1 WLR 276 that where the prosecution case is 
based wholly or substantially on circumstantial evidence the judge is duty-
bound to direct the jury to acquit unless they are satisfied that the evidence 
is not only consistent with the accused's guilt but also inconsistent with 
any other reasonable conclusion, in line with the direction given by 
Alderson B in R v. Hodge (1838) 2 Lewin 227 (Assizes). The House of 
Lords rejected this submission, however, being `averse from laying down 
more rules binding on judges than are shown to be necessary', and held 
that the obligation to direct the jury to acquit unless `satisfied of guilt 
beyond all reasonable doubt' was a sufficient safeguard which the jury 
would more readily understand. 
2.2.3 Real Evidence 
Real evidence is the term used to describe evidence which is directly 
perceived or inspected by the court itself. This includes tangible items 
(`exhibits') such as the weapon used in a murder, the goods stolen in a 
burglary, the handkerchief found at the scene of the crime, the closed-
circuit television recording of an offence being committed, a person's 
physical appearance, and so on. Not every tangible object is automatically 
admissible on the ground that it is real evidence, however. If a document 
such as a letter or video-recording is tendered to prove the truth of the 
matters recorded, it will be admissible only if its contents fall within the 
scope of an exception to the hearsay rule as the relevance of the document 
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lies solely in its being a conduit for hearsay. The document would be 
classified as `documentary evidence' (2.7 post) as opposed to `real 
evidence'. Of course, if the letter or video tape is relevant for some other 
reason, because, for example, it bears the accused's bloody fingerprints 
upon it, it will be admissible as real evidence. 
The demeanour and intonation of witnesses is also a form of real 
evidence, as is a particularly unwieldy object which cannot be brought into 
court and so has to be viewed in situ. In  Buckingham v. Daily News [1956] 
3 WLR 375 the plaintiff alleged that he had been injured while cleaning 
the blades of his employers' rotary press on account of their failure to 
provide him with a reasonably safe system of work. During the course of 
the trial the judge, in the presence of counsel, went to the defendant's 
premises, inspected the machine and observed a demonstration by the 
plaintiff of how he had cleaned the blades. The Court of Appeal accepted 
that the judge had been entitled to treat what he had seen as a form of real 
evidence: it is `just as much a part of the evidence as if the machine had 
been brought into the well of the court and the plaintiff had there 
demonstrated what took place'. Similarly, it may be appropriate for the 
court to visit a particular location or site. This may be a simple `view' 
where the court inspects the place ± the `locus in quo' ± where the road 
accident occurred or the alleged murder was committed; or the inspection 
may be combined with a demonstration, where one or more witnesses 
explain their vantage point and what they saw or heard at the material 
time. 
Although it is clear that an out-of-court demonstration, or the out-of-
court inspection of an object which could (in theory) have been seen in the 
courtroom, is regarded as the observation of admissible real evidence, it 
has been said that a simple view of the locus in quo is strictly speaking 
nothing more than an opportunity for the tribunal of fact to understand 
the context of the case so that they can follow the evidence and apply it 
(London General Omnibus Co v. Lavell [1901] 1 Ch 135 (CA) at p. 139, 
Scott v. Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300 (HCA) at p. 313; see 
also Goold v. Evans [1951] 2 TLR 1189 (CA) at p. 1192). It has also been 
said, however, that a simple view is real evidence `in substitution for or 
supplemental to plans, photographs and the like' (Karamat v. R [1956] 2 
WLR 412 (PC) at p. 417; see also Goold v. Evans [1951] 2 TLR 1189 (CA) 
at p. 1191 and Tito v. Waddell [1975] 1 WLR 1303 (ChD) at pp. 1307±8). If 
there is a difference between the status of views and demonstrations, it is a 
distinction which carries little if any significance in practice. 
Recent views of note occurred in R v. Jeffrey Archer (2001) The Times 
(news report) 21.6.01 (CCC), where the court visited Court 13 at the Royal 
Courts of Justice, the locus in quo of the accused's alleged perjury, and in R 
v. Stone (No. 2) (2001) The Daily Telegraph (news report) 19.9.01 (CC), 
where the court observed the secluded copse in Kent where an appalling 
double-murder was committed in 1996. The most noteworthy demonstra-
tion in recent years occurred on 16 February 1999, during the war crimes 
trial which led to the appeal in R v. Sawoniuk [2000] 2 Cr App R 220 (CA). 
In that case the trial court paid a visit to the village of Domachevo (in 
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Belarus) where the Jewish population were slaughtered by Nazi 
sympathisers in 1942, and a prosecution eye-witness was permitted to 
show the jury where he had stood and watched murder being committed 
(see also Ormerod, `A Prejudicial View' [2000] Crim LR 452 at pp. 457±60). 
Because the court is effectively relocating when it inspects a site or 
object, or observes a demonstration, the judge and jury (if there is one) 
should attend together, and the parties or their legal representatives 
should be present (or at least be given the opportunity of being present), 
save that a judge trying a civil case alone is entitled to conduct a general 
view of the locus in quo by himself if it is a public place (Goold v. Evans 
[1951] 2 TLR 1189 (CA) at p. 1191, Salsbury v. Woodland [1969] 3 WLR 
29 (CA)). Similarly, magistrates (including district judges) should not view 
the scene of the alleged criminal offence unless accompanied by the parties 
or their representatives, although it would appear that the limited `general 
view' exception applies in this context too (Parry v. Boyle (1986) 83 Cr 
App R 310 (DC), Gibbons v. DPP (2000) unreported (CO/1480/2000) 
(DC)). That said, because some feature of the locus in quo may have 
changed during the period between the relevant incident (for example, the 
alleged offence) and the trial, or the judge or magistrates may see 
something of consequence, it is `undesirable' that even a general view 
should be conducted in the absence of the parties or their representatives 
(Salsbury v. Woodland [1969] 3 WLR 29 (CA), Parry v. Boyle (1986) 83 Cr 
App R 310 (DC)). In a case tried on indictment, the judge may need to 
warn the jurors against visiting the locus in quo by themselves (R v. Davis 
[2001] 1 Cr App R 115 (CA)). 
2.3 Res Gestae 
Lord Tomlin commented that res gestae ± which means `event' or 
`transaction' ± was `a phrase adopted to provide a respectable legal cloak 
for a variety of cases to which no formula of precision can be applied' 
(Homes v. Newman [1931] 2 Ch 112 (ChD) at p. 120). Broadly speaking the 
term now refers to the gate to admissibility through which two types of 
otherwise inadmissible evidence may be adduced in criminal proceedings, 
the ground being that the evidence in question is inextricably connected 
with the circumstances (of the alleged offence), that is, it `forms part of the 
res gestae'. The first type is evidence of the accused's relevant misconduct 
during the period surrounding the time when he is alleged to have 
committed the offence charged, where that misconduct has not given rise 
to a separate charge in the instant proceedings. It will be seen in Chapter 3 
that evidence of the accused's extraneous misconduct is generally 
inadmissible to prove that he is guilty of the offence charged. There is, 
however, an exception to this exclusionary rule if the extraneous 
misconduct can be said to form part of the res gestae (see 3.3.9 post). 
The second type of evidence comprises out-of-court statements admissible 
under one or more common-law exceptions to the exclusionary hearsay 
rule, the justifications for these exceptions being, first, that statements 
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forming part of the res gestae are more likely to be reliable than other out-
of-court statements and, second, that there may be no other evidence 
available to prove what is in issue (see 6.1.1 post). 
2.4 Collateral Facts 
Collateral facts are not directly related to the proof of facts in issue but 
have an indirect bearing on such proof. The term covers facts which must 
be proved as a condition precedent to the admissibility of certain evidence 
(or the competence of a witness to give evidence), but it is primarily used 
to refer to facts affecting the weight of admissible evidence, especially the 
credibility of witnesses. Thus, evidence may be adduced to prove a witness 
has a reputation for dishonesty, is biased or has a defect which might 
undermine the weight of his testimony (see 16.5.4 post). 
2.5 Relevance, Probative Value and Admissibility 
To be admissible, any item of evidence must be relevant to a fact in issue 
(`relevant to an issue') or a collateral fact such as the credibility of a 
witness (`relevant to credit') or contribute towards an explanation of the 
background to the case. Background evidence aside, to be admissible any 
item of evidence must render more probable or less probable the existence 
of a fact in issue or a collateral fact (see 3.1 post). 
The distinction between relevance to an issue and relevance to credit is 
well established, and underpins one of the exclusionary rules of the law of 
evidence, but it is not based on logic. Evidence which undermines a 
witness's credibility will have the knock-on effect of undermining the value 
of his testimony. If his testimony is relevant to an issue, the evidence 
undermining his credibility will, by undermining the value of his testimony, 
also be relevant to an issue, albeit indirectly so. The difference between 
relevance to an issue (direct relevance to an issue) and relevance to credit 
(indirect relevance to an issue) is therefore one of degree (see 16.5.2 post). 
If an item of evidence is relevant it is admissible unless it falls within the 
scope of an exclusionary rule or a general exclusionary principle, in which 
case it will be admissible only if it also falls within an exception to that rule 
or if its probative value is sufficiently high for the exclusionary principle to 
be overridden by the principle of free proof. The probative value 
(`cogency' or `weight') of an item of relevant evidence is the extent to 
which that evidence affects the probability of the existence of a fact in 
issue or collateral fact. 
2.6 The Discretion to Exclude Admissible Evidence 
In criminal proceedings the court (magistrates or judge) has a general 
discretion at common law to exclude or withdraw admissible prosecution 
evidence on the ground that its probative value would be outweighed by 
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the undue prejudice its admission would cause the accused, and a more 
limited common-law discretion to exclude or withdraw confessions and 
analogous evidence obtained in violation of the accused's privilege against 
self-incrimination (R v. Sang [1979] 3 WLR 263 (HL), 10.1 post). The 
general discretion may be applied to exclude manifestly unreliable 
evidence (R v. Lawson [1998] Crim LR 883 (CA)) or evidence which 
would cast the accused in a particularly poor light and encourage the jury 
to convict him for the wrong reasons (3.3 post). The court also has a 
discretion to exclude prosecution evidence by virtue of s. 78(1) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (`PACE') if its admission `would 
have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the 
court ought not to admit it'. Section 78(1) confers a duty upon the trial 
judge (or magistrates) to consider the exclusion of prosecution evidence, 
where on the evidence and circumstances it is appropriate, regardless of 
whether the question has been raised by the defence (R (Saifi) v. Governor 
of Brixton Prison [2001] 1 WLR 1134 (DC), R v. Foster [2003] EWCA 
Crim 178). Importantly, however, there is no general discretion to exclude 
admissible evidence tendered by the accused, even if the admission of that 
evidence would unduly prejudice the defence of a co-accused. Subject to 
one exception, the accused has an unfettered right to adduce any 
admissible evidence which supports his own defence. This principle was 
developed by Devlin J in R v. Miller (1952) 36 Cr App R 169 (Assizes), and 
has since been applied by the Privy Council and the House of Lords 
(Lobban v. R [1995] 1 WLR 877 (PC), R v. Myers [1997] 3 WLR 552 
(HL)). The exception relates to the discretion under s. 25 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 to exclude hearsay evidence which is prima facie 
admissible under ss. 23 or 24 (6.2.3 post). 
With regard to the exclusion of prosecution evidence, s. 78(1) of PACE 
has pretty much supplanted the court's common-law discretion; and, 
human rights considerations aside, the Court of Appeal or Divisional 
Court will not interfere with the way the statutory discretion was exercised 
unless the trial judge or magistrates acted unreasonably in the `Wednes-
bury' sense (from Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury 
Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) at p. 229). That is to say, so long as all 
relevant factors were taken into account and all irrelevant factors were 
disregarded, the ruling will be upheld on appeal unless it was a decision no 
reasonable judge (or bench of magistrates) could have reached (R v. 
O'Leary (1988) 87 Cr App R 387 (CA), R v. Christou [1992] 3 WLR 228 
(CA), R v. Quinn [1995] 1 Cr App R 480 (CA), R v. Stewart [1999] Crim 
LR 746 (98/2314/Y3) (CA)). It has been suggested that the discretion is 
limited to an assessment of unfairness, and that once it has been concluded 
that the admission of the evidence `would have such an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it' the 
evidence must be excluded (R v. Middlebrook (1994) The Independent 
7.3.94 (CA), R v. Chalkley [1998] 3 WLR 146 (CA)). In R v. Dures [1997] 2 
Cr App R 247, however, the Court of Appeal expressed a clear preference 
for the traditional approach; and in Thompson v. R [1998] 2 WLR 927 the 
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Privy Council, having stated that there was no difference between the two 
approaches, also followed R v. O'Leary and R v. Christou. Where, 
however, it can be shown that the exercise of s. 78(1) during the trial 
interfered with the human rights of one or more individuals, and the 
question of proportionality fell to be considered (2.9 post), the Court of 
Appeal (or High Court) will `assess the balance which the decision maker 
has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or 
reasonable decisions' (R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2001] 2 WLR 1622 (HL) at p. 1635). Now that the Human 
Rights Act 1998 is in force, s. 78(1) provides a vital safeguard to ensure 
that the accused receives a fair trial in accordance with the requirement of 
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (R v. P [2001] 
2 WLR 463 (HL)). 
There is no general common-law discretion to exclude admissible 
evidence in civil proceedings (Bradford City Metropolitan Council v. K 
(Minors) [1990] 2 WLR 532 (FD), Vernon v. Bosley [1994] PIQR 337 (CA) 
at p. 339). However, r. 32.1(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 provides 
judges with the power to `control the evidence' by giving directions as to 
the issues on which evidence is required, the nature of the evidence 
required and the way in which it is placed before the court; and, by virtue 
of r. 32.1(2), the court `may . . . exclude evidence that would otherwise be 
admissible'. This discretion to exclude admissible evidence must, however, 
be exercised in accordance with the `overriding objective' (r. 1.1(1)±(2)) to 
deal with cases justly (Grobbelaar v. Sun Newspapers (1999) The Times 
12.8.99 (CA)). This requires the judge to consider not only the case before 
him but also the wider interests of the administration of justice (Jones v. 
University of Warwick [2003] 1 WLR 954 (CA)). 
Judges (and magistrates) in any proceedings, civil or criminal, have a 
general discretion to exclude any logically relevant evidence on the ground 
that its probative value is too low to justify the problems which would be 
engendered by its admission. This is not regarded as a discretion to 
exclude admissible evidence so it does not conflict with the common-law 
rules recognised in R v. Miller (1952) 36 Cr App R 169 (Assizes) and 
Bradford City Metropolitan Council v. K (Minors) [1990] 2 WLR 532 
(FD). Rather, it is a discretion to hold that the evidence is `irrelevant' and 
therefore inadmissible as a matter of law (Vernon v. Bosley [1994] PIQR 
337 (CA) at p. 339; see 3.1.3 post and Figure 2.3). 
Finally, there is no general inclusionary discretion in either civil or 
criminal proceedings. If evidence is inadmissible as a matter of law it 
cannot be admitted, no matter how reliable or probative it might be (see, 
for example, Sparks v. R [1964] 2 WLR 566 (PC), 5.3 post). That said, the 
exercise of a judicial discretion may be the test for determining whether 
evidence is admissible. In criminal proceedings, for example, the judge 
must apply a discretion to determine whether the accused's bad character 
is admissible evidence of his guilt (3.3.11 post); and in civil proceedings the 
judge has a discretion with respect to the admissibility of previous 
consistent statements (s. 6(2) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995). 
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Figure 2.3 The barriers to the admission of evidence 
2.7 Documentary Evidence and the `Best Evidence Rule' 
Historically a distinction was drawn between the `best' evidence (`primary 
evidence') and any other evidence (`secondary evidence'). Only the best 
evidence that the nature of the case would allow was admissible, so the 
original of any document had to be produced if it was available and not 
merely the testimony of someone who had read it, or a copy of it; the 
original of any object had to be produced if it was available and not 
merely the testimony of someone who had inspected its condition; and 
circumstantial evidence was inadmissible if a witness was available to give 
direct testimony. However, in Kajala v. Noble (1982) 75 Cr App R 149 
(DC) Ackner LJ said (at p. 152): 
`The old rule, that a party must produce the best evidence that the 
nature of the case will allow, and that any less good evidence is to be 
excluded, has gone by the board long ago. The only remaining instance 
of it is that, if an original document is available in one's hands, one 
must produce it; that one cannot give secondary evidence by producing 
a copy. Nowadays we do not confine ourselves to the best evidence. We 
admit all relevant evidence. The goodness or badness of it goes only to 
weight and not to admissibility . . . In our judgment, the old rule is 
limited and confined to written documents in the strict sense of the 
term, and has no relevance to tapes or films.' 
In R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Osman (1988) 90 Cr App R 
281 (DC) a document was said to be available in one's hands if the party 
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has the original of the document with him in court, or could have it in 
court `without any difficulty'. 
In Springsteen v. Masquerade Music [2001] EWCA Civ 563, however, 
the Court of Appeal refused to recognise the continuing existence in civil 
proceedings of the `only remaining instance' of the best evidence rule, 
holding that there is no legal obligation on a party to produce the original 
of a document in evidence. The true position is that, if the party has the 
original document available to him, but nonetheless seeks to adduce a 
copy (or some other secondary evidence) of it, that secondary evidence is 
prima facie admissible but the court will attach no weight to it because of 
the party's inability to account for the non-production of the original, and 
will exclude it for that reason. According to the Court (at para. 85): 
`[T]he time has now come when it can be said with confidence that the 
best evidence rule, long on its deathbed, has finally expired. In every 
case where a party seeks to adduce secondary evidence of the contents 
of a document, it is a matter for the court to decide, in the light of all the 
circumstances of the case, what (if any) weight to attach to that 
evidence. Where the party seeking to adduce the secondary evidence 
could readily produce the document, it may be expected that (absent 
some special circumstances) the court will decline to admit the 
secondary evidence on the ground that it is worthless. At the other 
extreme, where the party seeking to adduce the secondary evidence 
genuinely cannot produce the document, it may be expected that 
(absent some special circumstances) the court will admit the secondary 
evidence and attach such weight to it as it considers appropriate in all 
the circumstances. In cases falling between those two extremes, it is for 
the court to make a judgment as to whether in all the circumstances any 
weight should be attached to the secondary evidence.' 
The party seeking to adduce secondary evidence of a document need not 
show that he has conducted an exhaustive, or indeed any, search for the 
original. The only requirement is that he must provide a reasonable 
explanation for his non-production of the original `in the sense that unless 
he did so the court would almost certainly decline to admit the secondary 
evidence'; and, in the absence of any allegation of bad faith, the ex parte 
Osman `without any difficulty' test is an appropriate yardstick. 
The remaining instance of the best evidence rule in criminal proceedings 
applies if a party wishes to rely on the contents of a document, but it 
relates only to the method by which the existence of the contents may be 
proved. If the party wishes to rely on the contents as evidence of the truth 
of the matters stated he must first find an exception to the hearsay rule, for 
only then does the question of how to prove the contents arise. In truth, 
though, the remaining instance of the rule is of little practical significance 
because of the common-law and statutory exceptions to it; and if a party is 
permitted to adduce secondary evidence pursuant to an exception then, as 
a general rule, `there are no degrees of secondary evidence': the contents 
may be proved by any type of secondary evidence, such as a copy of a 
copy or a witness's testimony as to the contents. 
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Section 27 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 now provides that where a 
statement contained in a document is admissible as evidence in criminal 
proceedings, it may be proved (a) by the production of that document; or 
(b) by the production of a copy of that document (or the material part of 
it) authenticated in such manner as the court may approve. It is 
immaterial how many removes there are between a copy and the original. 
Nor does it matter if the original document is still in existence. Paragraph 
5 of Schedule 2 to the Act defines a document as `anything in which 
information of any description is recorded', a statement as `any 
representation of fact, however made', and a copy as `anything onto 
which information recorded in the document has been copied, by whatever 
means and whether directly or indirectly'. Section 27 is permissive in 
nature and has not affected the common-law exceptions which generally 
allow any type of secondary evidence to be given ± so oral evidence may 
still be given if a common-law exception applies (R v. Nazeer [1998] Crim 
LR 750 (CA)). Moreover, s. 71 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 provides that in criminal proceedings the contents of a document 
may be proved by the production of an enlargement of a microfilm copy 
of that document or the material part of it, authenticated in such manner 
as the court may approve. Again, it does not matter whether the document 
is still in existence. (Section 8 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 is almost 
identical to s. 27 of the 1988 Act and governs the proof of statements 
contained in documents in civil proceedings. Section 13 of the 1995 Act 
defines document and copy in the same terms as the 1988 Act; a statement 
is defined as `any representation of fact or opinion, however made'.) 
There are four common-law exceptions to what remains of the best 
evidence rule. Any type of secondary evidence is permissible if it is proved 
(i) the original document has been destroyed or lost and cannot be found 
after a reasonable search (as in R v. Wayte (1982) 76 Cr App R 110 (CA)); 
or (ii) it would be impracticable or unlawful to produce the original (as in 
Owner v. Bee Hive Spinning [1914] 1 KB 105 (DC) where a fixed notice was 
subject to a statutory requirement preventing its removal) or inconvenient 
(for example, on account of its public nature); or (iii) the original is in the 
possession of a third party who lawfully refuses to produce it (for example, 
on the ground of diplomatic immunity, as in R v. Nowaz [1976] 1 WLR 
830 (CA)); or (iv) the original is in the possession of another party who 
refuses to produce it having been served with a notice to do so. 
As a general rule the party who wishes to adduce a document in 
evidence will also need to prove `due execution', that is, that the writing or 
signature on the document has not been forged. This may be done by 
calling a witness who can give direct testimony in the usual way; or by 
calling a witness who is familiar with the handwriting of the purported 
author or signatory to give his opinion; or by a direct comparison of the 
writing or signature in question with a genuine sample. Section 8 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1865 permits suitably qualified witnesses to give 
their expert opinion on the similarities and/or dissimilarities between the 
genuine sample and the writing in dispute. Proof of due execution may 
occasionally require proof of attestation, that is, proof that the document 
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was executed in the presence of and signed by `attesting witnesses'. Where 
proof of attestation is required it is generally no longer necessary for the 
attesting witnesses to appear in court to give direct testimony. By virtue of 
s. 3 of the Evidence Act 1938 it is sufficient (in any proceedings) if an 
attesting witness's signature is proved to be genuine, although an attesting 
witness should be called (if available) if the document in question is a 
testamentary document such as a will. 
2.8 The Tribunals of Fact and Law 
The law of evidence distinguishes between the `tribunal of law' (which 
determines all questions of law) and the `tribunal of fact' (which 
determines most questions of fact). If the accused is on trial on indictment 
(in the Crown Court) the judge is the tribunal of law, and the jury 
collectively comprise the tribunal of fact. It is the judge who decides all 
questions relating to the substantive criminal law, procedure and the law 
of evidence. In particular, it is the judge who determines whether evidence 
is admissible, whether admissible evidence should be excluded under a 
discretionary power and whether there is sufficient evidence for the case to 
be considered by the jury. If there is a case to answer, the judge will 
summarise the evidence for the jury at the end of the trial, guide them on 
matters of weight, and direct them on the law and evidence. It is the jury's 
role to assess the evidence, in accordance with the judge's directions on the 
law, to determine whether the facts in issue have been proved and 
ultimately to decide whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged. 
All questions of weight and proof at the end of the trial are for the jury 
alone and the judge must make this clear in his summing-up (see 16.8 post). 
The judge's fact-finding role during the trial is limited to the 
determination of any facts which need to be proved as a condition 
precedent to the admissibility of evidence or the exercise of an 
exclusionary discretion; and, exceptionally, to the determination of 
foreign law, which is also a question of fact. For example, a confession 
is inadmissible as a matter of law if there is a reasonable possibility that it 
was obtained by oppression, so the judge may have to hear witnesses, at a 
`trial-within-a-trial' (`voir dire') in the absence of the jury, to determine 
whether the prosecution are able to prove that the confession was not 
obtained by oppression. During a voir dire the judge is the tribunal of both 
fact and law. If he decides (as a question of fact) that the prosecution have 
not been able to prove that the confession was not obtained by oppression, 
it will be excluded (as a matter of law) and the jury will never hear about it 
or the judge's ruling. If, however, the judge is satisfied that the confession 
was not obtained by oppression, the prosecution will be permitted to 
adduce it (although the judge's ruling will not be mentioned). 
Submissions on the law are made to the judge in the absence of the jury 
so that they will never know about evidence which has been ruled 
inadmissible or otherwise excluded. One of the principal functions of the 
law of criminal evidence is to ensure that certain types of relevant evidence 
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are kept from the tribunal of fact, and this object would be defeated if the 
jury were to remain in the court-room during submissions on whether 
evidence should be excluded. Most rulings on the law will never be made 
known to the jury, moreover, because their function is limited to deciding 
whether the facts in issue have been proved; they need only know the law 
which relates to their fact-finding role. The judge must explain the 
substantive criminal law to them, so that they know what the issues are, 
and direct them on whether it is the prosecution or the accused who bears 
the burden of proof in respect of those issues, as well as on the `standard of 
proof' which has to be met. The jury must also be told what use they are 
entitled to make of the evidence which has been admitted. For example, if 
an out-of-court statement has been admitted as `original evidence', they 
must be told not to regard it as evidence of the truth of the matters stated; 
and if the accused's bad character has been revealed solely to undermine 
his credibility as a witness they must be told not to regard it as evidence of 
criminal disposition. 
In the civil courts the vast majority of trials are now conducted without 
a jury, so the judge is in all respects the tribunal of both law and fact. This 
means the judge must exclude from his mind, as the tribunal of fact, any 
inadmissible evidence he has heard as the tribunal of law. This is not 
regarded as problematic. First, the reason for excluding much relevant 
evidence is to ensure that the accused is not wrongly convicted of a 
criminal offence, and this is not a relevant consideration in civil trials. 
Second, if the judge does need to disregard evidence, it is generally 
accepted that his professional experience allows him to do so without too 
much difficulty. Neither of these justifications applies to criminal 
proceedings in the magistrates' courts, however. Magistrates are also the 
triers of both fact and law and are expected to rule on the admissibility of 
evidence (on the advice of their legally-qualified `court clerk') and decide 
whether the facts in issue have been proved at the end of the trial. 
Magistrates may hear submissions on the admissibility of evidence, 
exclude it as a matter of law or in the exercise of their discretion, and then 
carry on and try the case anyway. It is doubtful whether lay magistrates 
are capable of disregarding all such evidence, particularly if it is of an 
unduly prejudicial nature (such as the accused's previous convictions), but 
the present system is justified by its relatively low cost. 
It goes without saying that much of the law of evidence cannot be 
understood without a basic understanding of the context in which it arises, 
namely the trial. The trial process is covered in some detail in Chapter 16 
but, while a full discussion of the topic may safely be left until then, it 
would be unwise to approach the law of evidence without at least a 
rudimentary knowledge of the way in which trials are conducted. 
The most important type of trial (for students of the law of evidence) is 
the trial on indictment where the accused is tried before a judge and jury 
and is usually represented by a defence advocate. The prosecution will 
open their case by giving a brief speech to the jury summarising the 
allegation against the accused, and then proceed to call witnesses and 
tender evidence to prove that allegation. In this context the word `tender' 
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means no more than to submit that an item of evidence is admissible and 
that it ought to be placed before the jury. Much prosecution evidence will 
go unchallenged by the defence, but if they wish to challenge the 
admissibility of any prosecution evidence as a matter of law, or argue that 
it ought to be excluded by the judge in the exercise of his discretion, they 
and the prosecution will make appropriate submissions to the judge in the 
absence of the jury. If the judge rules that the evidence is admissible, and 
that he is not going to exclude it in the exercise of his discretion, the 
prosecution will be entitled to `adduce' it (that is, place it before the jury 
for their consideration). Each prosecution witness will be examined in-
chief by the prosecution (16.4 post). Immediately after each prosecution 
witness has given his evidence in chief he will be cross-examined by the 
defence (16.5 post). Once the prosecution have adduced all the evidence 
the judge has permitted them to adduce, and all their witnesses have been 
examined in-chief and cross-examined, the prosecution case comes to a 
close. 
The next stage of the trial is colloquially known as `half time' because it 
is the point between the close of the prosecution case and the start of the 
defence case. Occasionally the defence will make a submission to the judge 
that the case against the accused ought to be dismissed on the ground that 
the prosecution have failed to place before the jury sufficient evidence of 
his guilt to justify a conviction. A successful `submission of no case to 
answer' will result in the judge directing the jury to acquit the accused 
(16.7 post). If the submission of no case to answer fails, or no such 
submission is made, it is time for the defence case to begin. The procedure 
is essentially the same as the first stage of the trial. The defence will tender 
their evidence, there may be submissions on the question of admissibility, 
and each defence witness (including the accused himself, should he wish to 
testify) will be examined in-chief by the defence and then cross-examined 
by the prosecution. At the end of the defence case the prosecution and 
defence will make their closing speeches to the jury, after which the judge 
will summarise the evidence and direct the jury on the law (16.8 post). 
Following the summing-up the jury will retire to consider their verdict 
(16.9 post). 
2.9 The Right to a Fair Trial 
Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) provides as follows: 
(1)	 In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pro-
nounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all 
or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national 
security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or 
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the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the 
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interest of 
justice. 
(2)	 Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law. 
(3)	 Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following 
minimum rights: 
(a)	 to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands 
and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; 
(b)	 to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence; 
(c)	 to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his 
own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal 
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so 
require; 
(d)	 to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his 
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; 
(e)	 to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court. 
Sections 1 to 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which came into force on 
2 October 2000, provide, inter alia, that primary and subordinate 
legislation must (so far as it is possible to do so) be read and given effect 
in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights set out in 
Schedule 1 to the Act, including Article 6, and that any court determining 
a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right `must 
take into account' any relevant judgment, decision, declaration or 
advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights and any 
relevant decision or opinion of the (now defunct) European Commission 
of Human Rights. The lower courts are therefore no longer bound by 
existing case-law on the interpretation of legislation insofar as the 
construction of the higher courts would lead to a result which would be 
incompatible with Article 6. In the words of Lord Slynn: `long or well 
entrenched ideas may have to be put aside, [and] sacred cows culled' (R v. 
Lambert [2001] 3 WLR 206 (HL) at p. 210). Legislation may therefore 
have to be `read down', or additional words `read in', to ensure that the 
provisions under consideration are compatible with the Convention. Some 
common-law rules of evidence may also need to be modified, insofar as 
their application would lead to a result which would be incompatible with 
Article 6, by virtue of the obligation on the courts not to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention right (s. 6(1) and (3) of the 
1998 Act). 
The Strasbourg jurisprudence on Article 6 does not bind the courts of 
England and Wales in the sense that there are a number of specific rules of 
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European law which must be applied in this jurisdiction. The decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights (and Commission) are case specific, 
focusing on the particular facts of the case at hand and whether in all the 
circumstances, including the pre-trial proceedings and subsequent appeal 
process, the applicant received a fair hearing. In particular, the European 
Court of Human Rights has not laid down any rules on the admissibility 
of evidence, the question being regarded primarily as a matter for 
regulation under national law. That said, it is possible to elicit from the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence a number of fundamental principles relating to 
the demands made by the Convention, and by Article 6 in particular, to 
which the courts in England and Wales are expected to attach great 
weight. For example, the Convention is a `living instrument' to be 
interpreted in the light of present day conditions in a way which will 
guarantee rights which are `practical and effective' (as opposed to rights 
which are merely theoretical or illusory); certain terms in the Convention 
(for example, the meaning of `witness' in Article 6(3)(d)) are to be given an 
`autonomous' meaning, regardless of the position under national law; and 
the fact that a particular approach is adopted in a number of 
contracting states is a relevant consideration when determining whether 
that `generally shared approach' accords with the requirements of the 
Convention. 
Although the Article 6(1) right to a fair hearing or trial is absolute (R v. 
Forbes [2001] 2 WLR 1 (HL) at p. 13), `precisely what is comprised in the 
concept of fairness may be open to a varied analysis' and `the public 
interest may be taken into account in deciding what the right to a fair trial 
requires in a particular context' (Brown v. Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817 (PC) at 
pp. 840 and 859). The requirements inherent in the concept of `fair 
hearing' are not necessarily the same in civil and criminal proceedings, and 
contracting states `have greater latitude when dealing with civil cases . . . 
than they have when dealing with criminal cases' (Dombo Beheer v. 
Netherlands (1993) 18 EHRR 213 (ECtHR) at p. 229); but even in criminal 
proceedings the determination of fairness may require the court to take 
into account the `triangulation of interests' of the accused, the 
complainant and society generally (R v. A (No. 2) [2001] 2 WLR 1546 
(HL) at p. 1560). 
The particular rights set out in Article 6(2)±(3) are those of the accused 
in criminal proceedings, but the list of `minimum rights' in Article 6(3) is 
not exhaustive. Other rights are implicit in Article 6(3) as specific aspects 
of the general right to a fair criminal trial, including the accused's pre-trial 
privilege against self-incrimination and his related right to remain silent in 
the face of police interrogation. Several (if not all) of the express and 
implicit rights in Article 6(2)±(3) are neither absolute nor inflexible (Brown 
v. Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817 (PC), R v. Forbes [2001] 2 WLR 1 (HL), R v. 
Lambert [2001] 3 WLR 206 (HL)). A democratic state is entitled to act in a 
way which prima facie infringes those constituent rights if there is a clear 
and legitimate reason for so acting and the Strasbourg principle of 
`proportionality' is satisfied (Brown v. Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817 (PC), R v. 
Lambert [2001] 3 WLR 206 (HL), R v. A (No. 2) [2001] 2 WLR 1546 (HL) 
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at p. 1577). In other words, a democratic state is entitled to strike a 
balance between the general interests of the community (including the 
rights of witnesses, complainants and victims) and the protection of the 
accused's Article 6(2)±(3) rights, so long as the state does not go beyond 
what is strictly necessary to accomplish its legitimate objective and, where 
relevant, any difficulties caused to the defence are sufficiently counter-
balanced by safeguards which protect the accused's interests. The 
European Court of Human Rights has recognised that each contracting 
state should be permitted a degree of latitude or `margin of appreciation' 
in its approach to the way Convention rights are protected, on the basis 
that national institutions are better placed than the Court to evaluate 
national needs and conditions, so long as the state's approach does not fall 
below a minimum standard of acceptability. A domestic version of this 
doctrine has now been developed in England and Wales to the extent that 
a degree of deference will be paid on democratic grounds to the considered 
view of Parliament as to what is in the interest of the community generally 
(R v. DPP ex parte Kebilene [1999] 3 WLR 972 (HL) at pp. 993±4, Brown 
v. Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817 (PC) at pp. 835 and 842, R v. A (No. 2) [2001] 2 
WLR 1546 (HL) at pp. 1560 and 1567). 
The coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 has had (and will 
continue to have) a significant effect on many aspects of the law of 
evidence. In particular: legislation passed in 1999 to protect complainants 
in sexual offence cases from being cross-examined on their sexual history 
was in effect rewritten by the House of Lords to protect the accused's right 
to a fair trial (17.4 post); some statutory provisions which expressly place 
the burden of proving an issue on the accused have been watered down to 
impose no more than an `evidential burden' because they failed the 
proportionality test (15.2.2.1 post); any provision which permits the 
admission of the accused's self-incriminating answers obtained under 
compulsion must similarly satisfy the proportionality test to be 
Convention-compliant (14.1 post); in cases where the jury are entitled to 
draw an adverse inference from the accused's silence during police 
interrogation they must be given a lengthy and complicated direction to 
safeguard the accused's interests (9.2.2.4 post); a new meaning has been 
given to the term `confession' for the purposes of s. 76 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (7.1.1 post); and it may be that procedures 
will have to be introduced to allow the defence to put questions to a 
witness before the trial if that witness's evidence is to be admitted as a 
hearsay statement with no opportunity during the trial for cross-
examination (6.2.5 post). 
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Relevance, Disposition and 
`Similar Facts' 
3.1 Relevance 
To be admissible any item of evidence must be logically relevant to a fact 
in issue or a collateral fact (or contribute to an explanation of the 
`background' so that the issues can be resolved in their proper context). If, 
as a matter of logic, the evidence is unable to suggest whether an assertion 
of fact is more or less likely to be true it has no probative value and is 
inadmissible. This is uncontroversial, but unfortunately judges (and 
commentators) have sown confusion by using the words `relevant' and 
`irrelevant' in two other ways. First, logically relevant evidence is 
sometimes said to be `irrelevant', meaning that it is insufficiently probative 
to be admissible. In this sense the degree of probative value the evidence 
has (the `weight' or `cogency' of the evidence) is confused with the 
question whether it has any probative value at all. To avoid confusion the 
two concepts should be kept separate. Probative value is a question of 
degree, logical relevance is not. Second, the words have also been used as 
synonyms for `admissible' and `inadmissible' respectively. This too should 
be avoided. Logical relevance is a prerequisite to admissibility, and while 
evidence which has no probative value can never be admissible, highly 
cogent evidence may be inadmissible as a matter of law. 
3.1.1 Logically Relevant Evidence: the General Rule 
Evidence which a party might wish to adduce for consideration by the 
tribunal of fact will be either logically relevant or logically irrelevant to a 
matter which needs to be proved: either the evidence will (to any extent) or 
it will not (at all) affect the probability that some fact in issue or collateral 
fact can be established. Logically relevant evidence may thus be defined as 
evidence which, if accepted: `could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) 
the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue' (s. 55 of 
Australia's Evidence Act 1995) or has `any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence' (r. 401 of 
the United States Federal Rules of Evidence). In England and Wales it has 
been said that evidence is logically relevant if it `makes the matter which 
requires proof more or less probable' (DPP v. Kilbourne [1973] 2 WLR 254 
(HL) at pp. 276±7). 
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If there is a fundamental exclusionary rule of evidence it is that 
irrelevant evidence is never admissible: `Nothing is to be received which is 
not logically probative of some matter requiring to be proved' (Thayer, A 
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) at p. 530). The corollary of this 
rule is that for evidence to be admissible it must at the very least be 
logically relevant to a fact in issue or a collateral fact; and logically 
relevant evidence is, as a  general rule, admissible. This broad inclusionary 
rule embodies the principle of free proof (that is, that the tribunal of fact 
should be permitted to have before them all logically relevant evidence in 
order to reach the correct decision on the issue before them) but it is 
subject to a battery of statutory and common-law exceptions, the origins 
of which lie in considerations of public policy. It is this body of exceptions 
which comprises much of the law of evidence and the substance of this 
book. 
Whether an item of evidence is logically relevant to a matter requiring 
proof is generally determined by the tribunal of law. Once relevance has 
been determined, and the evidence has been admitted, it is for the tribunal 
of fact to determine how cogent it is. Whether an item of evidence is 
logically relevant is determined by the judicial application of logic, 
common sense and the conventional wisdom which comes from human 
experience. General knowledge, experience and inductive reasoning allow 
for the formulation of broad generalisations (for example, infidelity causes 
jealousy, alcohol reduces inhibitions and human behaviour tends to repeat 
itself) which determine whether evidence is logically relevant to a matter 
which needs to be proved. Adopting syllogistic terminology, with the 
generalisation (e.g., `fingerprints are unique') as the major premise and the 
item of evidence (e.g., `D's fingerprints were on the safe') as the minor 
premise, if it is possible for the tribunal of fact to deduce from these two 
premises an inference as to the likelihood of the matter requiring proof 
(e.g., `whether D was the person who ransacked the safe'), then the item of 
evidence is logically relevant to that matter. Consider a male, D1, who is 
on trial for raping M, another male. The prosecution might wish to 
adduce evidence that D1 is a homosexual as circumstantial evidence that 
he committed the offence, but D1 might argue that his sexual orientation 
is irrelevant. To determine whether this evidence is logically relevant the 
judge could construct a syllogism, the major premise being the general-
isation that the sort of person who would rape a man is very likely to be a 
homosexual, the minor premise being the evidence that D1 is a 
homosexual. The judge would conclude that because the jury could 
reasonably infer from these premises that the evidence of D1's sexuality 
contributes to the probability that he is the offender, the evidence is 
logically relevant. To put it another way, D1's sexuality places him in a 
smaller group than male society as a whole, and the likelihood is that a 
person from that smaller group committed the offence. D1's membership 
of that group ± that is, his homosexuality ± must logically be relevant to 
whether he committed the offence. It is of course important to add that the 
large number of homosexual men in male society means that the evidence 
is not particularly probative of D1's guilt, but it does have some probative 
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value nonetheless. Similarly, if a male, D2, is on trial for raping a female 
victim, F, then the fact that D2 is heterosexual is logically relevant to 
whether or not he is the offender. As with the previous example, the 
evidence of D2's sexuality is logically relevant to the issue of his guilt 
because the evidence places him in a group of men which is smaller than 
the entire male population. The difference between the two examples is 
that D1's sexuality is more probative than D2's because there are fewer 
homosexuals than heterosexuals in the general male population. 
Probative value, unlike logical relevance, is a question of degree. The 
weight of an item of evidence which is logically relevant to an issue will lie 
anywhere in the range between `minimal probative value' (as in the case of 
D2's sexuality) to `compelling' (for example where a closed-circuit 
television recording clearly shows the accused's face as he commits the 
offence charged). It is important to be aware, however, that the process of 
inductive reasoning which leads to the formulation of generalisations must 
be based on a sound factual basis and not on unfounded prejudice or 
apocryphal stereotypes. Indeed, where it seems that the generalisation has 
no firm empirical basis it will be open to the opposing party to attack the 
admissibility of the evidence on the ground that the generalisation itself is 
invalid and that logical relevance has not been established. 
3.1.2 Logical Relevance and `Relevance' Distinguished 
The established statutory and common-law exceptions to the general rule 
on the admissibility of evidence, together with the judicial discretion to 
exclude admissible evidence, act as a policy-driven filter to prevent the 
tribunal of fact from being able to consider certain evidence even if it has 
significant probative value. What is not so clearly recognised, however, 
principally because of the ambiguities inherent in the terminology used by 
the judiciary, is that a trial judge may exclude logically relevant evidence 
and rationalise his decision on the ground that the evidence is `irrelevant' 
to any issue in the proceedings. `The expression logically probative may be 
understood to include much evidence which English law deems to be 
irrelevant' (Noor Mohamed v. R [1949] AC 182 (PC) at p. 194). The same 
view was expressed by Fisher J in the High Court of New Zealand in R v. 
Wilson [1991] 2 NZLR 707 (at p. 711): 
`For most people a fact is relevant if to even a minute degree its 
existence would make the fact in issue more or less likely. Whether its 
effect is strong or weak is more usually referred to as the weight or 
probative force of the evidence rather than its relevance. However, to 
understand the authorities it is important to appreciate that relevant is 
often given the secondary meaning of of significant weight. Weight is a 
matter of degree. It is concerned with the strength with which the 
evidence bears upon the likelihood or unlikelihood of a fact in issue.' 
In other words, logical relevance is not necessarily enough for evidence to 
be considered `relevant' by the trial judge. The evidence may also need to 
carry enough probative force to make its admission worthwhile in the light 
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of competing considerations. This point was made by the Supreme Court 
of Victoria in R v. Stephenson [1976] VR 376 (at pp. 380±1): `The logical 
connection between a fact and the issue to be determined may be so slight 
that the fact is treated as too remote and evidence of it as inadmissible. In 
some cases, such evidence is described as being irrelevant.' 
3.1.3 Probative Value and Admissibility 
The principle of free proof may need to give way to policy considerations 
which militate against the admissibility of insufficiently probative 
evidence. A vast amount of evidence may be logically relevant while 
adding little in the way of probative force, and a policy of admitting any 
logically relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value, would 
render the legal system ineffective. Any jurisdiction has a finite number of 
courts, and human beings live for a finite and relatively short period of 
time with a limited capacity for digesting information. It is the reality of 
these constraints, institutional, psychological and physiological, which 
requires a balancing of probative value against competing policy 
considerations to determine whether evidence ought to be considered 
`relevant'. It is in the public interest that trials should be conducted as 
expeditiously and inexpensively as possible, and logically relevant evidence 
of marginal probative value could slow down the proceedings and raise the 
costs to an unacceptable degree while contributing little to the resolution 
of the dispute. Indeed some evidence may be superfluous in the context of 
the other evidence which has been or will be admitted. The desirability of 
excluding logically relevant evidence for such reasons was recently 
acknowledged by the Court of Appeal in R v. Carter (1996) 161 JP 207, 
but the point was made much earlier by Rolfe B in Attorney-General v. 
Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 (CE) (at p. 105): 
`If we lived for a thousand years instead of about sixty or seventy, and 
every case was of sufficient importance, it might be possible and 
perhaps proper . . . to raise every possible inquiry as to the truth of 
statements made. But I do not see how that could be . . .' 
A particularly important consideration is the need to prevent the 
tribunal of fact from being swamped with evidence. The capacity of the 
human mind to receive, analyse and remember information is limited, and 
the admission of too much logically relevant evidence could well be 
counter-productive. The tribunal of fact could end up becoming confused 
and distracted, making a correct decision on the facts in issue less likely. 
The trial judge or magistrates (as the tribunal of law) may also need to 
consider other factors such as the desirability of avoiding breaches of 
confidence or unnecessary embarrassment to litigants or third parties 
(Vernon v. Bosley [1994] PIQR 337 (CA)), considerations which carry 
more force now that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights has to be taken into account. Fisher J summarised the common-law 
position in R v. Wilson [1991] 2 NZLR 707 (NZHC) (at p. 711): 
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`[C]ompeting policy considerations can be taken into account. These 
include the desirability of shortening trials, avoiding emotive distrac-
tions of marginal significance, protecting the reputations of those not 
represented before the Courts and respecting the feelings of a deceased's 
family. None of these matters would be determinative if the evidence in 
question were of significant probative value. But if it is not, the 
proposed evidence can be excluded on the ground of irrelevance . . .' 
This exclusionary discretion has been expressly incorporated into the 
United States Federal Rules of Evidence as r. 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
An important principle in the law of evidence in both civil and criminal 
proceedings is that evidence of a party's character (`disposition' or 
`propensity'), such as his reputation or his conduct on previous occasions, 
should not be admitted for the purpose of proving that he acted in a 
similar way on the occasion which is the subject of the proceedings. The 
issues should (generally) be determined on the evidence directly pertaining 
to the incident in question and not on the basis of what happened on other 
occasions. For example, in civil proceedings: `It is not legitimate to charge 
a man with an act of negligence on a day in October and ask a jury to infer 
that he was negligent on that day because he was negligent on every day in 
September. The defendant may have mended his ways' (Hales v. Kerr 
[1908] 2 KB 601 (DC) at p. 604). Similarly, a party cannot adduce evidence 
of his general good character to disprove an allegation against him 
(Attorney-General v. Bowman (1791) 2 B & P 532n (CE), Attorney-General 
v. Radloff (1854) 10 Ex 84 (CE) at p. 97), although it will be seen that an 
important concession has been made in this respect for the accused in 
criminal proceedings (3.4 post). However, a party's disposition will often 
be logically relevant to an issue because of the generalisation that human 
behaviour tends to repeat itself (that is, that people do not mend 
their ways). 
In civil cases the judge is likely to exclude evidence of disposition simply 
on the ground that it is `irrelevant'. The evidence, while logically relevant, 
is only indirectly related to the matter under inquiry and may raise a 
number of collateral matters which will extend the length of the trial, 
increase costs and lead to further confusion and vexation, particularly if 
the evidence relates to an allegation of earlier conduct which has neither 
been proved nor admitted; there is also the risk, at least in civil jury trials, 
that one of the parties will be unduly prejudiced by its admission. 
In Agassiz v. London Tramway (1872) 21 WR 199 (CE) the plaintiff was 
injured while travelling as a passenger on the defendant's tram and alleged 
that the driver had been negligent. The plaintiff sought to adduce evidence 
that the conductor had told another passenger shortly after the accident 
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that the driver was new, that he had been off the line five or six times that 
day prior to the accident and that his conduct had already been reported. 
This evidence was held to be inadmissible on the ground that it would 
have raised a multiplicity of collateral matters bearing `no relation to the 
question before the jury'. The reasoning behind this judgment is not 
difficult to understand. If such evidence had been admitted the jury would 
have had to examine the driver's experience with the company, determine 
whether or not he had previously been off the lines and reported, and 
would then have had to enter into an inquiry to determine whether he had 
been at fault on the earlier occasions. Further, even if the conductor's 
words were true and the evidence did have a degree of probative value 
with regard to the cause of the accident, the evidence could have unduly 
prejudiced the jury against the driver ± the jury might have attached too 
much weight to the driver's careless disposition and too little to the 
possibility that the accident had been caused by something else. The same 
sort of reasoning explains why evidence of extraneous conduct has been 
excluded in other civil cases. In Hollingham v. Head (1858) 27 LJCP 241 
(CCP) evidence that a guano dealer had contracted on certain terms with 
other purchasers of his product was held to be irrelevant to whether he 
had contracted on such terms with the defendant, even though it was 
logically relevant to the defendant's case in tending to show the dealer had 
been promoting his guano on standard terms; in Holcombe v. Hewson 
(1810) 2 Camp 391 (KB) evidence that the plaintiff brewer had sold good 
beer to third parties was not admissible to show he had supplied good beer 
to the defendant; and in Edmondson v. Amery (1911) The Times 28.1.11 
(KBD) the plaintiff, who was pursuing an action in defamation following 
an allegation that he had been a coward on an occasion during the Boer 
war, was not permitted to call a witness who would have given evidence of 
his courageous character. Even a generally brave man may act in a 
cowardly way on one occasion, and the evidence of the plaintiff's 
character in the last case, though logically supportive of his claim, would 
probably have been given more weight by the jury than it deserved, which 
would have been unfair to the defendant. In Cooper v. Hatton [2001] 
EWCA Civ 623 the claimant and defendant had driven their cars in 
opposite directions along a road with ample space to pass each other, but 
they nonetheless collided. It had been a dry day with good visibility, there 
were no skid marks or eye-witnesses, and neither of the drivers could 
explain the collision. Despite the absence of any such evidence, the trial 
judge found the defendant entirely to blame, having placed considerable 
reliance on the evidence of the claimant's employer that the claimant was 
`an excellent driver' who was `calm, assured' and `never took risks'. The 
defendant's appeal was allowed because the employer's evidence should 
not have been taken into consideration; in the words of Parker LJ, it was 
`completely worthless'. The Court of Appeal noted that even the best 
drivers occasionally have lapses of attention of the type which one or other 
(or both) of the drivers had suffered, and it could not be said on the basis 
of past record that one driver was more likely than the other to have had 
such a lapse. 
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However, where the evidence of a party's disposition is highly probative, 
for example because the similarity between his past conduct and his 
alleged conduct means the possibility of coincidence can be discounted ± 
the probative value of the evidence being proportional to the unlikelihood 
of coincidence in such cases ± the policy considerations militating against 
admitting the evidence carry less force. The evidence of disposition may 
then be regarded as relevant and admissible notwithstanding the collateral 
matters which can arise as a result. In Hales v. Kerr [1908] 2 KB 601 (DC), 
for example, the plaintiff claimed he had contracted a disease (`barber's 
itch') from the razor and/or towel used by the defendant, a barber, and 
sought to adduce evidence that two other persons who had visited the 
defendant's premises at around the same time had contracted the same 
disorder, having been similarly cut and treated by him. This evidence was 
held to be admissible to show that a dangerous practice had been carried 
on in the defendant's establishment. 
Generally speaking, in criminal trials evidence of the accused's 
unpleasant disposition (such as his previous convictions or objectionable 
interests) cannot be admitted for the purpose of proving that he 
committed the offence charged. The policy consideration of most 
significance in this context is the desirability of ensuring that the accused 
receives a fair trial and is not convicted of an offence he did not commit. 
The accused should be judged on the evidence directly pertaining to the 
offence charged and not on what he has done on other occasions. The 
admission of such evidence would in all likelihood unduly prejudice his 
defence in the eyes of the jury; so even though his previous misconduct 
might well increase the probability that he is guilty, the principle of free 
proof must give way. In short, the undue prejudice generated by the 
accused's bad character will usually outweigh its probative value. 
The fair trial principle also underpins many other aspects of the law of 
criminal evidence. Indeed judges in criminal trials have a discretion at 
common law to exclude any relevant evidence tendered by the prosecution 
if its probative value would be outweighed by the risk of unfairness to the 
accused (R v. Sang [1979] 3 WLR 263 (HL)). Alternatively, the risk of 
unfairness to the accused may be overcome by applying the discretion to 
exclude any logically probative evidence (from whatever source) on the 
ground that it is `irrelevant', an approach exemplified by the way the 
Court of Appeal has addressed the admissibility of circumstantial evidence 
of drug-dealing. Take, for example, the situation where the accused is on 
trial for possessing a controlled drug with intent to supply, the evidence 
against him having been discovered during a search of his home and 
comprising a quantity of the drug, a large sum of cash, paraphernalia 
connected with dealing (such as contaminated scales) and a bank savings 
book. The prosecution will need to prove that the drug was controlled, 
that the accused knowingly had it in his possession, and that he intended 
to supply it to another person. The prosecution will of course adduce 
evidence that a quantity of the drug was found in the accused's home, but 
they will also need to adduce evidence from which the jury will be able to 
infer that he had the requisite intent to supply. If the quantity of the drug 
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is large enough, that alone will allow an inference to be drawn that it was 
kept for sale and not personal consumption; but suppose in this case the 
quantity was too small for that inference to be drawn. The prosecution 
will need to argue that the large sum of cash found in his home is logically 
relevant evidence of the accused's intent to supply on the ground that 
dealers tend to work with cash and need a ready sum to buy future 
supplies. In a number of cases the Court of Appeal has held that the jury 
are permitted to regard cash as evidence of intent to supply only if they 
first reject the accused's innocent explanation and conclude, having 
considered all the other evidence, that it indicates his `ongoing' (as 
opposed to entirely past) dealings in the drug. Having concluded that the 
cash is relevant in this way, the jury are then entitled to infer from it that 
the accused intended to supply the drugs found in his home. The trial 
judge is obliged to direct the jury that the cash is irrelevant and to be 
ignored if they conclude that it merely represents the accused's past 
dealings (R v. Grant [1996] 1 Cr App R 73 (CA)). Clearly, a large sum of 
cash is logically relevant to the issue of intent even if it is only evidence of 
past dealings; but such evidence is not considered sufficiently probative to 
be admissible given the risk that its admission would unduly prejudice the 
accused's defence. Evidence of past misconduct is generally inadmissible 
to prove the accused is guilty of the offence charged, so the cash is deemed 
to be `irrelevant' and excluded for that reason. Similarly, the accused's 
bank books showing considerable savings are unlikely to be considered 
relevant to the issue of intent as they would at best be evidence of nothing 
other than past dealings ± but if the accused's explanation for having a 
large sum of cash in his house is that he was nervous about using banks, 
then the savings books will become relevant and admissible to rebut that 
innocent explanation (R v. Gordon [1995] 2 Cr App R 61 (CA)). 
Although the relevance of cash in the possession of alleged drug dealers 
has given rise to a large number of appeals, the admissibility of the sort of 
paraphernalia associated with dealers, such as contaminated scales and 
lists of debtors, was until recently not so vehemently contested, even 
though the argument used to exclude cash can equally be relied on to 
justify the exclusion of such evidence. In R v. Brown [1995] Crim LR 716 
(CA) the point was considered but rejected on the ground that `different 
considerations may apply', but more recently the Court of Appeal has 
accepted that the trial judge should direct the jury not to take such 
evidence into consideration unless they are sure it is relevant to ongoing 
and not just past transactions (R v. Lovelock [1997] Crim LR 821 (CA), R 
v. Haye [2002] EWCA Crim 2476). 
It had been suggested that evidence of an alleged dealer's lavish lifestyle 
would rarely be considered relevant to the issue of intent to supply, and 
never relevant to the issue of possession (R v. Halpin [1996] Crim LR 112 
(CA), R v. Richards [1997] Crim LR 499 (CA)). However, because the 
probative value of circumstantial evidence depends on the particular 
circumstances of the case, it is inappropriate to lay down a blanket ban on 
the admissibility of such evidence, even if the only issue is possession. This 
was recognised by the Court of Appeal in R v. Edwards [1998] Crim LR 
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207 and it is now clear that cash, paraphernalia and lifestyle evidence may 
be considered relevant to either or both issues depending on the facts (R v. 
Guney [1998] 2 Cr App R 242 (CA), R v. Griffiths [1998] Crim LR 567 
(CA)). In R v. Guney, Judge LJ said (at pp. 265±7): 
`The question whether evidence is relevant depends not on abstract legal 
theory but on the individual circumstances of each particular case . . . 
Accordingly, although evidence of cash and lifestyle may only rarely be 
relevant where the charge is simple possession, we are unable to accept 
that as a matter of law such evidence must, automatically, be excluded 
as irrelevant . . . In our judgment where possession with intent is 
charged, there are numerous sets of circumstances in which cash and 
lifestyle evidence may be relevant and admissible to the issue of 
possession itself, not least to the issue of knowledge as an ingredient of 
possession.' 
The facts of that case provide an illustration of how cash or 
paraphernalia might be relevant to mere possession. G's home was raided 
by the police and five kilos of heroin were found in his wardrobe along 
with a loaded handgun and £25,000 in cash. He accepted that the cash was 
his, but claimed that the drugs and gun had been planted by enemies as 
part of a `set-up'. He conceded that the quantity of drugs involved, having 
a street value of £750,000, meant that if his defence was rejected it could be 
inferred that he had had the intent to supply and therefore argued, relying 
on the decision in R v. Halpin [1996] Crim LR 112 (CA), that the cash was 
inadmissible as the sole issue was whether he had knowingly been in 
possession of the drugs. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument. The 
cash and its close proximity to the drugs and gun, and the way all the 
items had been poorly concealed, was relevant to whether G had been 
aware that the drugs were in his wardrobe. 
Cash and paraphernalia in cases of this sort, where the accused is 
charged with possession of drugs with intent to supply, are examples of 
`conditionally admissible' evidence. The jury are entitled to take such 
evidence into consideration at the end of the trial but only if, in the light of 
the other evidence and a direction from the judge, they are satisfied that it 
is relevant to a matter which needs to be proved. Conditionally admissible 
evidence is not therefore an exception to the fundamental rule that 
irrelevant evidence is inadmissible, but it is an exception to the general rule 
that the determination of relevance is a question for the judge. In cases 
where evidence is conditionally admissible it may be necessary for 
relevance to be determined by the jury acting according to the judge's 
directions. The need to admit circumstantial evidence before its relevance 
has been determined is not surprising, given that evidence comes out 
during the trial by degrees and the relevance of circumstantial evidence 
may become apparent only when it has been considered in the context of 
the other admissible evidence. A single item of circumstantial evidence by 
itself is unlikely to be particularly probative, but the utility of 
circumstantial evidence lies in the fact that several items of such evidence 
may have a significant cumulative effect resulting in a compelling body of 
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evidence. Thus, if the relevance of a single item of circumstantial evidence 
were to be determined at the beginning of the trial, before the other 
evidence has been admitted, it might be excluded on the ground of 
insufficient probative value, a problem which can be overcome by the 
evidence being admitted subject to a condition that its relevance will be 
determined subsequently in its proper context. 
Logically relevant evidence may also be excluded on the ground of 
irrelevance if its admission would provide nothing more than a basis for 
conjecture as opposed to real belief, even if the evidence could give rise to 
a reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt, the underlying rationale being 
the desirability of preventing indeterminate collateral matters from 
distracting the jury. 
In R v. Woodward [1995] 1 WLR 375, a case of causing death by 
dangerous driving, the Court of Appeal held that evidence that the 
accused had been seen drinking alcohol at a function shortly before the 
accident was inadmissible as it could do no more than lead the jury to 
speculate as to the amount of alcohol he had drunk prior to driving. 
However, it was also felt that if the evidence had been that the accused had 
drunk enough for it to have adversely affected his driving it would have 
been relevant to the issue of dangerous driving, and therefore admissible, 
as the jury would have had a real basis for believing that his ability to 
drive had been affected (see also R v. Millington [1995] Crim LR 824 
(CA)). A similar approach was adopted by the Supreme Court of Victoria 
in R v. Stephenson [1976] VR 376, a case which was also concerned with a 
fatal road accident. S's vehicle had collided with a Fiat causing the death 
of three of its four occupants, and following his convictions on three 
counts of culpable driving causing death he appealed on the ground that 
he had not been permitted to ascertain whether any or all of the deceased 
had consumed drugs or alcohol prior to the accident, there having been 
evidence that one of them had been the driver. The Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal for two reasons. First, while the way in which the 
driver had handled the Fiat at the time of the accident was relevant to the 
question of S's culpability, and the presence of alcohol or drugs in the 
blood of the Fiat driver would have been a relevant factor when 
determining how the Fiat had been driven, in the context of the evidence 
as a whole the connection of the condition of the Fiat driver with the 
question of S's guilt was extremely tenuous and, notwithstanding its 
logical relevance, such evidence might properly be regarded as insuffi-
ciently probative and thus `inadmissible on the ground of remoteness'. 
Second, as the identity of the driver could not be ascertained, and so any 
evidence elicited as to the condition of one or more of the deceased could 
not be linked to the driver, such evidence was in any event irrelevant 
because the results of the blood tests conducted on the deceased shortly 
after the accident differed widely. 
The leading English authority on conjecture and relevance is the 
notorious case of R v. Blastland [1985] 3 WLR 345. B was convicted of 
buggering and murdering a 12-year-old boy, having admitted that he had 
attempted to bugger him. B denied killing the boy, claiming that he had 
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abandoned his attempt to bugger, and then left, when he saw another 
person, M, near by. At his trial B wished to allege that it was M, a 
homosexual, and not he who had buggered and killed the boy, and sought 
to adduce evidence that before the boy's body had been found M had 
stated that a boy had been murdered. The House of Lords held that M's 
statement had been properly excluded as it was irrelevant to any fact in 
issue at B's trial. M's statement was relevant only to the state of his own 
mind, and M had not been on trial. It was felt that M's knowledge of the 
boy's murder could have come about in a variety of possible ways, only 
one of which was that M rather than B had committed the offence. To 
have placed such evidence before the jury would merely have provided 
them with a basis for speculation as opposed to a rational basis upon 
which they could logically have drawn an inference that it was M rather 
than B who had killed the boy. The reasoning of the House of Lords has 
since been applied by the Court of Appeal. In R v. Akram [1995] Crim LR 
50 the accused had sought to explain that the drugs in his possession 
belonged to another person, B, who had been near by and in possession of 
£432, by seeking to cross-examine police officers on the fact that B had 
given them inconsistent explanations regarding his possession of that cash. 
The Court of Appeal held that the judge had acted properly in excluding 
the evidence (see also R v. Kearley [1992] 2 WLR 656 (HL), 5.6.1.1 post). 
The strict approach to relevance adopted in R v. Blastland [1985] 3 
WLR 345 (HL) prevented the accused from being able to place before the 
jury evidence which might well have engendered in their collective mind a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt, which might be regarded as wrong in 
principle; but it is hardly surprising. In many cases there will be not only a 
body of evidence suggesting the accused's guilt, but evidence implicating 
one or more third parties too, individuals who for one reason or another 
came under suspicion but were not charged. The evidence might be that 
the third party had a motive to commit the offence, or that he shared the 
offender's disposition, or that he was in the vicinity, or even that he 
confessed, but there will be a considerably stronger case against the 
accused. It might be relatively easy for the accused to point to some 
evidence that the offence was committed by a third party, which would 
distract the jury from the prosecution case and raise an unjustified 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. If, for example, the jury hear that a third 
party has confessed, their natural reaction is likely to be that there must be 
a reasonable doubt; but this could be an unwarranted inference, 
particularly if the third party has not been subjected to cross-examination 
on his statement. Confessions are not necessarily reliable, but the jury will 
almost certainly assume that they are unless shown otherwise in open 
court. The truth is that some people do confess to crimes they did not 
commit; indeed it is not uncommon for feeble-minded individuals to 
confess to highly publicised offences because of the notoriety engendered 
by an association with such criminality (see 7.1.2.1 post). It is also quite 
possible for persons other than the accused to know something about the 
crime without being a participant in it, and in the absence of cross-
examination on that knowledge the jury may well jump to the conclusion 
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that there is a doubt as to the accused's guilt without giving enough 
consideration to the body of evidence against him. 
This does not mean that the accused can never adduce evidence of a 
third party's guilt; but it does mean that the evidence he wishes to rely on 
must provide a rational basis for concluding that it was not he who 
committed the alleged offence. For example, if D is charged with the rape 
and murder of V it would be permissible to adduce evidence that the 
rapist's DNA profile, taken from his semen, does not match D's profile; 
or, if it can be shown from a third party's confession or other statement 
that he was aware of peculiar facts which no-one other than the murderer 
could have known, and the possibility of a joint enterprise can be 
discounted, there would be a rational argument for admitting his 
statement as evidence of his knowledge (and guilt) regardless of whether 
he is available for cross-examination (cf. M's state of mind in R v. 
Blastland [1985] 3 WLR 345 (HL)). This was accepted by the Supreme 
Court of South Australia in the not dissimilar case of Re Van Beelen [1974] 
9 SASR 163 (at pp. 229±30): 
`If the third party's confession did substantially conform to known 
facts, it could well have been relevant and important, not for its 
testimonial assertions, but for the esoteric knowledge of details of the 
corpus delicti evidenced by the confession which, in the circumstances, it 
was unlikely that any but the true offender would have been able to 
reveal. In those circumstances, the confession (or the material parts of 
it) could have been admitted . . . as evidence of . . . the intimate 
knowledge of the crime possessed by the declarant.' 
It is to be noted that Blastland's application to the European Commission 
of Human Rights, on the basis that he had not received a fair trial, in 
violation of Article 6(1) of the European Convention, was rejected as 
manifestly ill-founded in Blastland v. United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 528. 
3.1.4 Legal Relevance 
Some writers have propounded a doctrine of `legal relevance' accepting 
the view that there has to be something more than a minimum of 
probative value for admissibility ± and to this extent `legal relevance' could 
be regarded as nothing more than a convenient label. The logical relevance 
of an item of evidence is not of itself sufficient for it to be admissible; it 
must also have sufficient probative value to override competing policy 
considerations. Unfortunately the term has also been used to represent the 
view that past decisions on the determination of relevance should act as 
binding precedents. It is difficult to see how such a doctrine could be of 
any practical use, however. Evidence, particularly circumstantial evidence, 
does not carry within it any inherent degree of probative value, so past 
decisions on what has been held to be relevant are unlikely to be of any 
assistance to a judge who has to reach a decision on entirely different facts. 
The probative value of an item of evidence is dependent on the particular 
issues and on the other admissible evidence before the court ± in fact 
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evidence may only become relevant during the course of a trial as other 
evidence is admitted or new issues arise (see, for example, R v. Bracewell 
(1978) 68 Cr App R 44 (CA)). Similarly, the importance to be attached to 
considerations such as the desirability of avoiding delay, expense and 
vexation will vary from case to case. Past decisions on relevance can be of 
only limited importance in respect of certain types of evidence where other 
considerations render the context immaterial, or where the substantive law 
has been delineated by the appellate courts to the extent that certain 
evidence must be regarded as relevant (or irrelevant) to a particular issue 
(for example the accused's characteristics which should, or should not, be 
taken into consideration when he is relying on the defence of provocation 
or duress). A doctrine of relevance based on precedent cannot provide a 
workable theory for the general assessment of what is admissible as 
relevant evidence in the vast majority of factually unique situations which 
come before the courts. It is also difficult to see how legal relevance could 
even be defined, and yet the success of the doctrine would depend on a 
workable definition which judges would be able to apply in practice. The 
preferable position must be that there is vested in all trial judges a 
discretion to ensure the proper administration of justice. The judge must 
weigh the utility of admitting logically probative evidence against 
competing policy considerations, with past decisions playing only a 
secondary role by making explicit the policy goals which judges should 
consider (or, exceptionally, laying down a rule of law in respect of certain 
types of evidence). 
3.2 Similar Fact Evidence ± Civil Proceedings 
It has been seen that evidence of the disposition of a party to civil 
proceedings, such as evidence that a party behaved in a particular way on 
certain occasions in the past, is generally inadmissible if the only reason 
for admitting it is to show that that party acted in a similar way on the 
occasion which is the subject of the proceedings. This, it will be 
remembered, is because its probative value is usually outweighed by 
competing policy considerations. It follows that evidence of this sort 
should be admissible if its probative value, in the context of the particular 
case, is high enough to override such considerations. 
Evidence of a party's disposition is invariably (if not somewhat 
misleadingly) referred to as `similar fact evidence' because the classic 
examples involve the use of the defendant's misconduct on other occasions 
to prove that he acted in a similar way on the occasion which is the subject 
of the instant proceedings. The term `similar fact evidence' is misleading 
for two reasons. First, the evidence of a party's relevant disposition may 
be something other than that he acted in a similar way on other occasions, 
for character can be proved in a variety of other ways. Second, the term 
does not identify whether the evidence is admissible or inadmissible. It is 
merely a label which has been used for many years, and which will no 
doubt be used for many more, to indicate that the evidence concerns the 
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character or disposition of a party and that the reason why the opponent 
wishes to adduce it is to prove that that party acted in a particular way 
(consistent with his disposition) at the material time. 
The principles which underlie the admissibility of similar fact evidence 
have been developed by the judiciary over the past two centuries. Much of 
the case law concerns criminal proceedings where the courts have sought 
to strike a balance between the need to ensure that the jury are not unduly 
prejudiced against the accused by his past misconduct and the desirability 
of allowing the jury to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of an 
objective appraisal of all the available evidence (see 3.3 post). In civil trials, 
where an experienced professional judge is usually the tribunal of fact, the 
risk of engendering undue prejudice is not so important a consideration 
and there is a more relaxed approach to the admissibility of such evidence, 
the test essentially being one of probative value (Mood Music Publishing v. 
De Wolfe [1976] 2 WLR 451 (CA)). In other words, the question of 
admissibility is governed by the exercise of the judge's preliminary 
discretion for determining whether evidence is `relevant' (Vernon v. Bosley 
[1994] PIQR 337 (CA) at p. 340). The judge may accept that evidence of a 
party's previous conduct is logically relevant to an issue, but will need to 
determine whether that evidence is sufficiently probative to justify the 
collateral matters, delay, expense and trouble that its admission would be 
likely to raise. Needless to say, where a civil case is tried before a jury the 
judge will also have to consider the risk of undue prejudice as in criminal 
trials (Thorpe v. Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1989] 1 
WLR 665 (CA)). This risk was indeed a consideration which influenced 
the civil courts in the nineteenth century when jury trials were the norm 
(Agassiz v. London Tramway (1872) 21 WR 199 (CE) at p. 200, 
Hollingham v. Head (1858) 27 LJCP 241 (CCP) at p. 242). 
In determining the probative value of a party's extraneous conduct in 
relation to the instant proceedings much will depend on the extent to 
which the possibility of coincidence can be discounted by the judge, and 
this in turn may depend on the number of examples of extraneous conduct 
and the peculiar similarities between that conduct and the conduct in 
issue. In Mood Music Publishing v. De Wolfe [1976] 2 WLR 451 the 
defendants raised a defence of coincidence to an allegation that they had 
been in breach of the plaintiffs' copyright, and the plaintiffs were 
permitted to adduce evidence that the defendants had been in breach of 
copyright on other occasions. The Court of Appeal held that while 
reproducing music which was the subject of copyright could have been a 
coincidence if done only once, the fact the defendants had done the same 
thing four times discounted that possibility so the evidence had been 
properly admitted. Lord Denning MR felt that similar fact evidence was 
admissible in civil proceedings if the evidence was `logically probative . . . 
provided that it is not oppressive or unfair to the other side; and also that 
the other side has fair notice of it' (see also Berger v. Raymond Sun [1984] 1 
WLR 625 (ChD) at p. 632). 
In Moore v. Ransome's Dock Committee (1898) 14 TLR 539 one of the 
issues was whether the defendants, the proprietors of a dock, had known 
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of its dangerous condition and had therefore been negligent in failing to 
remedy its defects. The Court of Appeal held that evidence of complaints 
and drownings on earlier occasions was admissible to demonstrate their 
knowledge and negligence. In Joy v. Phillips Mills [1916] 1 KB 849 (CA) a 
stable boy had been found dying with a halter in his hand next to a horse. 
Evidence that he had previously teased the horse with a halter was held to 
be admissible as it tended to prove that the horse had kicked him to death 
because of his teasing on that occasion, and therefore that he had not died 
in the course of his employment as alleged by the plaintiff (see also Hales 
v. Kerr [1908] 2 KB 601 (DC), 3.1.3 ante). 
In Sattin v. National Union Bank [1978] 122 SJ 367 it was alleged that 
the defendant bank had negligently lost the plaintiff's jewellery. The 
plaintiff therefore sought to adduce evidence that the bank had lost 
jewellery belonging to another person on an earlier occasion. The Court of 
Appeal, stating that the test in civil proceedings was the same as that in 
criminal trials, held that the evidence should have been admitted as similar 
fact evidence. However, to say that the test is the same whether the 
proceedings are civil or criminal is to distort the true position. The risk of 
undue prejudice will be much lower in civil proceedings and, so long as the 
similar fact evidence is logically probative, it will be prima facie admissible 
(which is contrary to the general position in criminal proceedings). The 
judge will then consider his discretion to exclude the evidence on the 
ground of irrelevance, taking into consideration factors such as oppres-
sion, unfairness or surprise (R v. Isleworth Crown Court ex parte Marland 
(1997) 162 JP 251 (DC) at pp. 257±8). The key issue should therefore be 
whether the tribunal of fact is a jury or a professional judge, not the nature 
of the allegation. However, no doubt mindful of the fact that justice 
should be seen to be done, it seems the criminal rule of prima facie 
inadmissibility will be applied if the civil proceedings are quasi-criminal in 
nature, even if there is no jury (Creighton v. Creighton (1997) unreported 
(CCRTF 97/1212/G) (CA)). 
An interesting recent example of evidence of disposition and extraneous 
misconduct being admitted in civil proceedings is provided by the case of 
Irving v. Penguin Books and Lipstadt (2000), reported by Penguin as The 
Irving Judgment (QBD). David Irving, a right-wing historian, sued the two 
defendants on the ground that he had been libelled by accusations in their 
book, Denying the Holocaust, that he was a Nazi apologist who had 
distorted facts and manipulated historical documents in support of his 
right-wing views. The defendants responded with the defence of 
justification, claiming that Irving had indeed falsified the historical record 
in relation to what had happened to the Jewish people during the 
Holocaust. In support of this defence the trial judge permitted the 
defendants to adduce evidence to suggest that Irving was an anti-Semite 
and in other respects racist, the argument being that this disposition 
provided a motive for his deliberate falsification of the historical record. 
Accordingly, although no allegation of racism or of anti-Semitism was 
levelled against Irving in Denying the Holocaust, evidence was admitted to 
the effect that Irving had associated with right-wing extremists, made a 
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number of racist comments and composed a racist ditty for his young 
daughter. 
Occasionally it may be necessary to adduce evidence of a third party's 
character to prove a fact in issue. In Hurst v. Evans [1917] 1 KB 352 
(KBD) the issue was whether one of a shopkeeper's employees had been 
involved in the theft of jewellery from his shop (as his insurance policy did 
not cover inside jobs). The underwriters were allowed to call evidence that 
one of the employees, Mason, had been in earnest conversation with three 
highly-skilled safe-breakers two days before the assured's safe was blown. 
Mason's association with such persons of ill repute was evidence of a 
dishonest character and allowed an inference to be drawn that he may 
have been involved in the theft. Lush J said (at p. 355): 
`I doubt whether the evidence would have been admissible in a criminal 
prosecution, not because it was irrelevant, but because in a criminal case 
evidence is frequently rejected which tends to prejudice the defendant 
and prevent a fair trial. I admitted the evidence because, although taken 
by itself its weight is slight, I cannot say that it is irrelevant in this case, 
where the whole question is whether Mason was acting dishonestly and 
in complicity with the actual thieves.' 
3.3 Similar Fact Evidence ± Criminal Proceedings 
In criminal proceedings the term `similar fact evidence' is generally taken 
to mean evidence of the accused's unpleasant disposition (that is, evidence 
of his general propensity to act or think in a particular unpleasant way) 
which is directly relevant to whether he committed the crime with which he 
is charged (as opposed to having an indirect bearing on his guilt, in the 
sense that it undermines his credibility as a witness). The unpleasantness 
may be evidenced by criminal conduct on extraneous occasions (occasions 
unrelated to the alleged offence), or by morally culpable conduct at the 
fringes of criminality or by lawful conduct which many people might 
nonetheless find morally reprehensible; but it might just as easily be 
demonstrated by the accused's possession of certain articles, such as child 
pornography or a book on cracking safes, or by the accused's criminal 
associations or even by his own admission. Thus, similar fact evidence 
may not in fact be `similar' to anything else, but (if admitted) it will have a 
direct bearing on whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged. The 
general rule is that evidence of the accused's extraneous misconduct or bad 
character is admissible evidence of his guilt only if its probative value is so 
great that it would be just to admit it, bearing in mind the unduly 
prejudicial effect its admission might have on the jury. 
3.3.1 The Probative Value of Similar Fact Evidence 
Evidence of the accused's disposition may be logically relevant to an issue 
in the proceedings because of the general tendency for human behaviour 
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to repeat itself or the general tendency for people with particular beliefs to 
behave in accordance with them. Where the identity of the offender is in 
issue but it can be surmised that he has a peculiar disposition which the 
accused shares, that disposition must be logically probative of the 
accused's guilt. He and the offender share a peculiar character trait and 
that means he is more likely to be guilty than otherwise. In this sense the 
evidence of disposition can help to identify an unknown offender by 
placing both the offender and the accused within the same sub-group of 
society as a whole. If the accused's disposition is relied on to identify him 
as the unknown offender then, in the absence of any other evidence 
implicating him, the probative value of his disposition will depend on its 
peculiarity, that is, on the unlikelihood of coincidence. In isolation, a 
commonplace character trait will have little probative value because of the 
large number of other persons sharing it who might just as easily have 
committed the offence. So, for example, it would not be possible to convict 
D of burglary merely on the basis that he has previous convictions for the 
same offence ± the sub-group comprising burglars is too large to discount 
the possibility that the offender was someone else. A bizarre or strikingly 
peculiar character trait will be far more probative because of the smaller 
number of persons falling within the particular sub-group of people 
sharing it. The more peculiar the character trait, the fewer the number of 
persons there will be in the sub-group and the greater will be the probative 
value of the similar fact evidence as evidence identifying the accused as the 
offender. In an extreme case the disposition might be so rare that it will 
place the offender and the accused in a sub-group of just a few persons. By 
itself this would be insufficient to convict the accused, but with some other 
circumstantial evidence identifying him as the offender the overall effect 
could be compelling (see R v. Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 (CCA), 3.3.4 post). 
Of course where there is additional circumstantial evidence identifying the 
accused as the offender the probative value of his disposition will depend 
on the strength of the other evidence and may have considerable probative 
force in the absence of any striking peculiarity. If, for example, a sexual 
offence was committed by a male offender on a boy on Friday and the 
offender arranged to meet that boy at an isolated spot on the following 
Monday, evidence of the accused's enjoyment of pederasty would be only 
slightly probative of his guilt in the absence of other evidence; but that 
same evidence would be highly probative of his guilt if he happened to 
turn up at the rendezvous on Monday (see Thompson v. R [1918] AC 221 
(HL), 3.3.4 post). 
Where identity is not in issue the evidence of the accused's disposition 
may still be relevant, but in a different way. It might establish that the 
accused had the mens rea for the offence charged, if his conduct could be 
construed as either innocent or criminal depending on his frame of mind 
at the time; or it might show that the actus reus of the alleged offence 
occurred if this is disputed. If it has been established that the accused 
committed the actus reus of an offence but his defence is absence of mens 
rea, the probative value of his disposition will depend on how closely 
related it is to the state of mind which the law requires for guilt. Intimate 
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physical contact between a man and his child may be accidental or an 
indecent assault depending on the man's state of mind; and evidence of 
articles such as child pornography in his possession, suggesting an interest 
in children as sexual objects, would be highly probative of his having the 
requisite mens rea and being guilty of the offence (see R v. Lewis (1982) 76 
Cr App R 33 (CA) and R v. Downes [1981] Crim LR 174 (CA)). A 
motorist who kills a female cyclist on the highway may have committed an 
offence or may simply have been involved in a road accident; but evidence 
that the accused had knocked down two other female cyclists the day 
before and assaulted them, and knocked down another female cyclist a 
few hours after the fatal collision and stolen her handbag, would suggest it 
was probably not just an unfortunate accident but a deliberate assault (see 
R v. Mortimer (1936) 25 Cr App R 150 (CCA)). The accused may have an 
innocent explanation for being in a garage in possession of skeleton keys, 
but evidence that a week earlier he had entered into a criminal conspiracy 
with other persons to use skeleton keys to burgle an office would indicate 
that his explanation is unlikely to be true (see R v. Hodges (1957) 41 Cr 
App R 218 (CCA)). Similarly, the accused charged with attempted 
burglary with intent to rape may have been walking round a secluded 
house late at night genuinely looking for directions, notwithstanding his 
possession of a knife, glove and condom, but previous convictions for 
rape where he managed to enter the victims' homes after asking for 
directions, and then used a knife to procure the victims' submission, 
would militate against any such innocent explanation (R v. Toothill (1998) 
unreported (97/06019/W3) (CA)). If the accused denies that the actus reus 
of the offence has been committed, evidence of similar occurrences 
connected with him on other occasions will logically undermine the 
possibility of accident. The accused's wife may have died in her bath 
following an epileptic fit or because she was murdered by him, but the 
possibility that it was murder as opposed to natural causes becomes much 
higher if his other wives have died in similar circumstances (see R v. Smith 
(1915) 11 Cr App R 229 (CCA), 3.3.4 post). In all these examples the 
possibility of coincidence is too remote to be given credence, and it is for 
this reason that the disposition evidence is so highly probative of the 
accused's guilt. 
Occasionally the accused's extraneous misconduct may be relevant in a 
way which does not depend to any extent on his having a disposition to 
commit crimes of the type charged, and there may be no possibility of the 
jury's reasoning from disposition to guilt. For example the accused's 
fingerprints at the scene of a burglary committed at 7 Acacia Avenue on 
Saturday night could not be admitted to prove that he was guilty of 
murder on the basis that a person with a burglarious disposition is more 
likely to commit the more serious offence. But if there is other 
circumstantial evidence that he is the murderer, and the murder was 
committed at 9 Acacia Avenue on Saturday night, it becomes apparent 
that the evidence of his having committed burglary is relevant to whether 
he also committed the murder, if only because it shows he was in the 
vicinity at the time. Such evidence is not usually regarded as similar fact 
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evidence, and would appear to be prima facie admissible simply on the 
ground that it has significant probative value (although a further 
justification for its admissibility ± that it is evidence forming part of the 
res gestae ± could be provided in respect of this example). Not all such 
evidence of extraneous misconduct forms part of the res gestae, however, 
so it would be wrong to classify it as such; for example the evidence might 
consist of the accused's attempts to pervert the course of justice by bribing 
witnesses some weeks or months after the alleged offence occurred. If such 
evidence is to be excluded it cannot be because of the risk that the jury 
might reason from disposition to guilt, so it can only be because of the 
`moral prejudice' which might be engendered by the jury's becoming aware 
that the accused is guilty of misconduct (3.3.2 post). 
If, however, evidence of extraneous misconduct is tendered to prove 
guilt in a way which does not depend on disposition, but that evidence 
might logically lead the jury to reason from disposition to guilt, it should 
fall within the general category of evidence governed by the law on the 
admissibility of similar fact evidence. R v. Lovegrove [1920] 3 KB 643 
(CCA) provides an example of this sort of case. L was on trial for causing 
the death of Mrs P by performing an unlawful abortion on her. Mr P gave 
evidence that Mrs T had given him L's address and he had gone there and 
arranged with L to perform an abortion on Mrs P. It was put to Mr P in 
cross-examination that there had been no such conversation, and that 
Mr P had visited L's house to look for accommodation. The prosecution 
were allowed to call Mrs T to give evidence that L had performed an 
abortion on her and that she had given L's address to Mr P. The reason 
for admitting Mrs T's evidence was to show that Mr P was not lying as 
alleged, and not for the purpose of allowing the jury to reason from 
disposition to guilt, but there was clearly a danger that the jury would 
have applied the evidence in the latter sense (see also R v. Da Silva [1990] 1 
WLR 31 (CA)). 
Another type of evidence of extraneous misconduct which is prima facie 
admissible (again, falling outside the scope of the law governing the 
admissibility of similar fact evidence generally) is `background evidence'. 
This sort of evidence is admissible to ensure that the jury will have before 
them a continuous and intelligible account of the relationship between the 
accused and the complainant or victim of the alleged criminal offence (see 
3.3.9 post). 
The probative value of similar fact evidence, like any other logically 
relevant circumstantial evidence, is very much a question of degree 
depending on a multitude of variables including the other admissible 
evidence and the accused's purported defence. Indeed, as can be seen from 
the above examples (and it is important to note that they are no more than 
examples) the nature of the prospective defence may be the key element 
which gives the similar fact evidence its cogency. This was recognised in R 
v. Lunt (1986) 85 Cr App R 241 (CA) where Neill LJ said (at p. 245): 
`In order to decide whether the evidence is positively probative in regard 
to the crime charged it is first necessary to identify the issue to which the 
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evidence is directed. Thus the evidence may be put forward, for 
example, to support an identification . . . or to prove intention or to 
rebut a possible defence of accident or innocent association.' 
Two final points need to be borne in mind. First, while the probative 
value of disposition evidence may depend on similarities, it may also 
depend on the absence of dissimilarities. In R v. Johnson [1995] 2 Cr App 
R 41 (CA) the trial judge had failed to take into account the nature and 
quality of the demonstrable disparities when assessing the probative value 
of the evidence, giving too much weight instead to the similarities, and for 
this reason the convictions were quashed (see also R v. West [1996] 2 Cr 
App R 374 (CA) at pp. 390±1). Second, although admissible disposition 
evidence is directly relevant to whether the accused committed the offence 
charged, it will also be logically relevant to the accused's credibility should 
he decide to testify, and will for this reason also have an indirect bearing 
on whether the accused is guilty. The obvious example would be where the 
accused is charged with having committed perjury and there is evidence 
that he has previous convictions for the same offence. A disposition to lie 
on oath demonstrated by the previous convictions would be regarded as 
directly relevant to whether he committed perjury on the occasion in 
question, but it would also be relevant to whether the accused should be 
believed when giving evidence in his own defence. It should be noted, 
however, that any evidence of extraneous misconduct might be regarded as 
having a bearing on whether the accused should be believed, on the 
ground that a disposition to act in an immoral or unlawful way suggests 
that the accused is not the sort of person to be trusted or believed, 
regardless of whether his previous convictions are for dishonesty offences. 
3.3.2 The Unduly Prejudicial Effect of Similar Fact Evidence 
As with any other logically relevant circumstantial evidence, similar fact 
evidence must be sufficiently probative to be admissible when weighed 
against competing policy considerations. In criminal proceedings the 
principal consideration militating against the admission of such evidence is 
the risk of unduly prejudicing the accused in the eyes of the jury to the 
extent that he would be denied a fair trial. This risk arises because the 
similar fact evidence will comprise evidence of extraneous behaviour 
(usually criminal conduct) and/or a disposition which many jurors will 
find unpalatable. Research suggests that if during the trial the jury (or 
magistrates) become aware of the accused's similar misconduct on 
previous occasions or his unappealing disposition, that information may 
weigh heavily on their minds, and their verdict may be reached without 
sufficient regard to the non-extraneous evidence before them (see 
Appendix D of the Law Commission's Consultation Paper No. 141 
(1996), and Appendix A of the Commission's Report, Law Com No. 273 
(2001)). Such findings would seem to be confirmed by what happened in 
the case of R v. Bills [1995] 2 Cr App R 643. The jury had convicted B of 
an offence contrary to s. 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, 
Relevance, Disposition and `Similar Facts' 49 
rather than the more serious s. 18 offence, and while still sitting in the jury 
box they heard the prosecution inform the judge about B's several 
previous convictions for violent conduct. The jury then sought to change 
their verdict and to convict him of the s. 18 offence. Surprisingly, the judge 
acceded to their request, but the Court of Appeal restored the original 
s. 20 conviction as it was quite possible that the jury had been influenced 
by the revelation of his previous misconduct in their presence (see also R v. 
Boyes [1991] Crim LR 717 (CA) and R v. Newton (1912) 7 Cr App R 
214 (CCA)). 
The problem with similar fact evidence is that when its probative value 
in tending to show the accused's guilt is high there is often a concomitant 
increase in the likelihood that the jury will convict him for the wrong 
reasons and therefore that the accused may be convicted of a crime he did 
not commit. By its very nature all prosecution evidence will prejudice the 
accused by making his conviction more likely, but the admission of similar 
fact evidence is hazardous because it is likely to cause him undue prejudice. 
The jury (or magistrates) may judge him more on the basis of his past 
misconduct (`he's done it before, he must be guilty') or distasteful 
disposition (`what an odious man; let's send him down') than upon a 
disinterested appraisal of the evidence relating directly to the offence 
charged. The Law Commission has referred to these two distinct types of 
undue prejudice as `reasoning prejudice' and `moral prejudice' (Consulta-
tion Paper No. 141 (1996) at pp. 122±6). Reasoning prejudice suggests that 
the jury or magistrates may reason that because the accused has 
committed similar offences before or is of a particular disposition he is 
guilty of the offence charged (a logical chain of reasoning given the 
tendency for offenders to re-offend and for individuals to act in 
accordance with their disposition) but attribute to it far more probative 
value than it deserves and fail to give sufficient consideration to other 
possibilities, for example that the accused may have changed his ways, or 
that he may have been the focus of police attention and charged partly 
because of his previous convictions, or that there might be many other 
persons who could equally have committed the offence. If the accused has 
a long record showing he has committed numerous offences of the same 
type the prejudice will be more severe because of the cumulative effect 
caused by the disclosure of so many convictions. Moral prejudice, on the 
other hand, suggests that the jury may convict the accused for a reason 
other than by a process of logical reasoning. The jury may find the 
accused's character so distasteful that the non-extraneous evidence 
becomes of secondary importance and the conviction is based more on 
fear or hatred: a desire to punish such a dissolute character for what he is, 
or what he has done in the past, and to prevent him from behaving in a 
similar way in the future. Even when due consideration is given to the non-
extraneous evidence, the knowledge of the accused's disposition may 
deprive him of the benefit of the reasonable doubt he is entitled to. The 
undue prejudice which comes with knowledge of the accused's disposition 
therefore undermines a cardinal principle of criminal justice: the 
presumption that the accused is innocent until his guilt has been proved 
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beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the undue prejudice created by an 
awareness of the accused's disposition may lead the jury to approach the 
case with a presumption of guilt. These prejudicial effects are likely to be 
particularly severe if the offence charged is of the most heinous kind, such 
as a sexual offence against a young child: 
`Nothing can so certainly be counted upon to make a prejudice against 
an accused upon his trial as the disclosure to the jury of other 
misconduct of a kind similar to that which is the subject of the 
indictment, and, indeed, when the crime alleged is one of a revolting 
character . . . and the hearer is a person who has not been trained to 
think judicially, the prejudice must sometimes be almost insurmoun-
table.' (R v. Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 (CCCR) at p. 398) 
Thus, while evidence of the accused's bad character may be logically 
relevant to whether he committed the offence in question, and therefore 
ought to be admissible by virtue of the principle of free proof, the risk that 
the evidence may be used inappropriately by the tribunal of fact may 
justify its exclusion. In short, the process of determining guilt or innocence 
may be more distorted by the admission of such evidence than by its 
exclusion. Similar fact evidence tendered by the prosecution is therefore 
generally inadmissible `because its logically probative significance is 
grossly outweighed by its prejudice to the accused, so that a fair trial is 
endangered if it is admitted' (DPP v. Kilbourne [1973] 2 WLR 254 (HL) at 
p. 277), or the court may simply hold such evidence to be `irrelevant' (3.3.7 
post). Similar fact evidence tendered by the prosecution is therefore prima 
facie inadmissible unless its probative value is so great that the risk of the 
accused being unfairly prejudiced by its admission can be disregarded or 
eliminated by an adequate direction from the judge. The rule is based on 
the way jurors are understood to be influenced by such evidence, so where 
the tribunal of fact is a judge sitting alone, and the risk of undue prejudice 
can be ameliorated, the focus should be on probative value with a prima 
facie rule of admissibility subject to the general discretion to exclude 
evidence on the ground of `irrelevance' (Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. 
Siu Yuk-Shing [1989] 1 WLR 236 (PC) at p. 241). That said, there is 
nothing to suggest that this approach is adopted by professional 
magistrates (district judges) ± presumably because justice must not only 
be done but be seen to be done. 
3.3.3 Determining Admissibility 
The law governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence represents the 
judiciary's attempt to reconcile two competing principles: that unduly 
prejudicial evidence should be excluded while probative evidence of the 
accused's guilt should be admitted. But reconciling these principles 
requires finding a solution to a paradox. The more probative a piece of 
similar fact evidence is (and consequently the greater the force of the 
inclusionary free proof principle) the more unduly prejudicial it is also 
likely to be (and consequently the greater the force of the exclusionary fair 
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trial principle). There are good reasons for excluding such evidence where 
the risk of undue prejudice is greater than the probative value provided by 
admitting the evidence, but, as in civil proceedings, some similar fact 
evidence will occasionally be so probative that as a matter of common 
sense the inclusionary principle should weigh more heavily than the 
exclusionary principle. The similar fact evidence will be so probative, 
either standing alone or in conjunction with other admissible evidence, 
that the jury would be compelled to find the accused guilty, in which case 
the question of undue prejudice effectively disappears. The law now 
recognises that a test along these lines is the only practicable way of 
resolving the paradox (DPP v. P [1991] 3 WLR 161 (HL), 3.3.6 post), yet 
there are obvious difficulties involved in its practical application. 
The trial judge not only has to ascertain what the individuals on the jury 
are likely to think but also has to compare two incomparable 
considerations with little practical assistance from any other source. Just 
as past decisions on what is sufficiently probative to be considered 
`relevant' evidence cannot be binding precedents for other factually unique 
cases, any assessment of the probative value and undue prejudice of 
similar fact evidence, and the point at which the probative value becomes 
the paramount consideration, has to be made without recourse to decided 
cases. The large number of variables involved and the fact that `probative 
value' and `prejudicial effect' are questions of degree dependent on the 
factual matrix of the case means that the trial judge is only able to come to 
a decision on admissibility by applying the underlying principles. Much 
will depend on the type of offence, the accused's defence, the facts of the 
case, the nature of the accused's disposition, his age, the locality, the 
values and concerns of the people from whom the jury are drawn and, of 
course, the shrewdness of the judge who has to make the decision. 
Past decisions should be regarded as illustrations of when similar fact 
evidence has been admitted or excluded, but no more than that. In recent 
years this has indeed been recognised, and there are now only a few 
decisions which can properly be regarded as binding precedents. But this 
was not always the case. Until the decision of the House of Lords in DPP 
v. Boardman [1974] 3 WLR 673 undue emphasis was placed on previous 
cases and too little on the underlying principles, which led to considerable 
confusion and an absurd approach to admissibility which was dependent 
on finding a specific `category of relevance' into which the evidence could 
be pigeon-holed while paying scant regard to the question of trial fairness. 
It is an unfortunate fact, however, that while this former approach has 
been discredited by the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal still 
occasionally reverts to it when determining whether similar fact evidence 
ought to have been admitted (3.3.16 post). For this reason it is still 
necessary to understand the historical background to the modern law. 
3.3.4 The Evolution of the Law 
The judiciary's approach to the admissibility of similar fact evidence 
developed during the nineteenth century and crystallised in Makin v. 
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Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57. John and Sarah 
Makin received a baby, Horace, from its mother following representations 
by them that they would adopt him, and for this they were paid a small 
sum of money. Horace's body was subsequently found buried in the 
garden of the premises formerly occupied by them, and their defence to a 
charge of murder was that Horace had been adopted in good faith and 
had died accidentally. The trial judge allowed the prosecution to rebut that 
defence by adducing evidence that the bodies of nine other infants had 
been discovered in the garden where Horace's body had been found and in 
the grounds of other premises occupied by the Makins, and that five 
women had similarly given their infants over to the Makins for adoption 
having paid a small sum of money to them. The Makins were convicted of 
Horace's murder and appealed unsuccessfully to the Privy Council on the 
ground that such evidence was inadmissible. Lord Herschell set out a two-
limbed test for determining the admissibility of similar fact evidence (at 
p. 65): 
`It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence 
tending to show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts, other 
than those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the 
conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct 
or character to have committed the offence for which he is being tried. 
On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to 
show the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it 
be relevant to an issue before the jury . . .' 
The prosecution evidence (the testimony of the other women and the 
discovery of the other bodies) was relevant to the issue of guilt as it 
suggested that the Makins had not adopted Horace in good faith and that 
his death had not been accidental. It was therefore held that the evidence 
had been properly admitted. Lord Herschell gave two examples of when 
previous misconduct could be relevant to an issue before the jury for the 
second limb of the test: (i) if it showed `whether the acts alleged to 
constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed or 
accidental', and (ii) if it was able `to rebut a defence which would 
otherwise be open to the accused'. The prosecution had not adduced the 
similar fact evidence to prove that the Makins had a disposition to murder 
young children and that they were therefore guilty of Horace's death ± 
indeed the Makins had not been convicted of any offences in relation to 
the other bodies ± so the evidence was not excluded by the first limb of 
Lord Herschell's test. The evidence was relevant in another way, and 
therefore admissible by virtue of the second limb of the test, as the jury 
could properly infer from it that the defence of accident was false. It would 
have been an affront to common sense to believe that Horace had died of 
natural causes given the large number of other dead infants discovered. 
Perhaps two accidental deaths would have been a reasonable possibility 
(that is, no more than an unfortunate coincidence) but the existence of 
nine other bodies meant that coincidence could be discounted. As 
McHugh J said in Pfennig v. R (1995) 182 CLR 461 (HCA) (at p. 531): 
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`The propensity of the accused to kill the babies was only established by 
the conclusion that it was probable to the point of certainty that so 
many babies including [Horace] could not have died by accident . . . It 
was the verdict that established the accused's propensity.' 
In subsequent cases the focus moved away from a consideration of the 
principles underlying the Makin formula ± the need to avoid unduly 
prejudicing the accused and the desirability of admitting probative 
evidence of the accused's guilt ± and instead turned to whether the facts 
of a particular case could be brought within one of the Makin categories of 
relevance (or an analogous category) and thus be automatically admissible 
(see, for example, Perkins v. Jeffery [1915] 2 KB 702 (DC)). A corollary of 
the Makin test, as subsequently interpreted and applied, was that if the 
accused indicated he would not raise an affirmative defence the similar 
fact evidence would be inadmissible; so where the defence was simply a 
bare denial of the allegation, evidence of the accused's disposition or 
extraneous misconduct could not be adduced (R v. Cole (1941) 28 Cr App 
R 43 (CCA), R v. Flack [1969] 1 WLR 937 (CA)). 
That this artificially mechanistic approach to both admission and 
exclusion should have developed is not particularly surprising given the 
ease with which the test could be applied by judges, for similar fact 
evidence was automatically admissible so long as it could undermine a 
defence which was reasonably open to the accused (R v. Boyle [1914] 3 KB 
339 (CCA), Harris v. DPP [1952] AC 694 (HL)). However, this 
interpretation of the second limb of the Makin test allowed for the 
possibility that unduly prejudicial evidence could be admissible without 
sufficient consideration being given to the actual probative value of the 
evidence or the extent of its unduly prejudicial effect, and effectively gave 
the prosecution the right to adduce evidence of disposition simply by 
finding an appropriate category of relevance: `relevance for that purpose is 
being used as a peg upon which to hang the dirty linen of the accused, so 
the jury may determine what sort of man it is upon whose acts they are to 
render a verdict' (per Julius Stone, (1932) 46 Harvard Law Review 954 at 
p. 983). Stone argued that the Makin test did not provide adequate 
protection for the accused, and that an additional safeguard was required: 
`that the trial judge should be recognised to have a discretion to decide 
whether the probative weight of proffered evidence outweighs its . . . 
prejudice.' An exclusionary discretion was indeed expressly recognised in 
later cases on similar fact evidence (Noor Mohamed v. R [1949] AC 182 
(PC) at p. 192, Harris v. DPP [1952] AC 694 (HL) at p. 707) and was 
subsequently held by the House of Lords to be of general application in 
relation to any admissible prosecution evidence in R v. Sang [1979] 3 WLR 
263. The absence of a recognised exclusionary discretion in the decades 
following Makin does not mean that the cases during this period were 
incorrectly decided, though, because the similar fact evidence held to be 
admissible on appeal was, despite the post-Makin test of categorisation, 
very often so probative when compared with the risk of undue prejudice 
that it would have been admissible even applying the modern test: 
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`a tribute to the power of common sense over the forms of legal reasoning' 
(per Hoffmann, (1975) 91 LQR 193 at p. 204). A case in point is the cause 
ceÂleÁbre R v. Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229 ± the `Brides in the Bath Case'. 
S was charged with the murder of his recent bride, Bessie Munday, who 
had drowned in her bath in 1912, and he raised the defence that she had 
died of natural causes following a fit. The prosecution were allowed to 
adduce evidence that, subsequent to the death of Bessie Munday, another 
two of his recent brides had similarly died while having a bath, and that in 
all three cases: (i) S had warned his doctor that the woman suffered from 
epilepsy, (ii) the woman had died in a bath after apparently suffering a fit, 
(iii) the bathroom door could not be locked from the inside, (iv) S stood to 
profit from the woman's death, and (v) S had claimed he had been out 
shopping for groceries at the time. The Court of Criminal Appeal held 
that the evidence had been properly admitted to rebut S's defence of 
accidental death. There was such a large aggregation of similarities that 
any possibility of coincidence could be discounted, and while the evidence 
was held to be admissible because of the second limb of the Makin test, 
there can be no doubt that the same decision would have been reached if 
the modern test had been applied. Much the same can be said of other 
decisions where the Makin test was applied to admit similar fact evidence. 
Indeed a number of decisions prior to Makin would be decided the same 
way today (see, for example, R v. Gray (1866) 4 F & F 1102 (Assizes)). 
The Makin test was unsatisfactory in an additional respect, however. Its 
first limb seemed to comprise an absolute ban on the admissibility of 
similar fact evidence if its relevance was entirely dependent on a process of 
reasoning from disposition to guilt; yet evidence which is relevant only in 
this way may occasionally be highly probative or even compelling evidence 
of the accused's guilt. This is exemplified by several cases following Makin 
where the first limb was in effect disregarded. In R v. Ball [1911] AC 47 a 
brother and sister were charged with committing incest in 1910, the 
non-extraneous evidence against them being that there was only one 
furnished bedroom in their house and that they had shared a double bed 
during that year. The prosecution were permitted to adduce evidence that 
the couple had had a prior sexual relationship, when incest was not yet an 
offence and during which time they had lived as husband and wife, and 
that they had had a child in 1908. The House of Lords, while expressly 
approving the Makin test, held the evidence to have been properly 
admitted to show their `guilty passion' for each other and that their 
sleeping arrangements in 1910 were not innocent. However, the evidence 
of their earlier conduct was relevant to the 1910 proceedings only by way 
of an argument from disposition to guilt. The earlier relationship 
demonstrated their mutual sexual attraction and from this, together with 
their sleeping arrangements, it could be inferred that they were still 
sexually active as a couple in 1910. The House of Lords could justify its 
decision in terms of the second Makin principle permitting the admission 
of similar fact evidence which could `rebut a defence which would 
otherwise be open to the accused' (in this case the defence of innocent 
cohabitation), but the decision shows that the first limb of the Makin test, 
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insofar as it represented a blanket ban on reasoning from disposition, 
could not be regarded as a correct statement of the law (see also R v. 
Marsh (1949) 33 Cr App R 185 (CCA)). 
Thompson v. R [1918] AC 221, another cause ceÂleÁbre, provides a further 
illustration. T was charged with committing acts of gross indecency on two 
boys on 16 March 1917 in the urinal near Turnham Green railway station 
in west London. On 19 March the police observed him near the same place 
at about the same time of day. The boys stated that he was the same man 
who had committed the offences against them three days earlier and who 
had on that occasion asked them to meet him at the same time and place 
on 19 March `to do it again'. In his defence T claimed he had been 
mistakenly identified, that he had never seen the boys before and that he 
had only spoken to them on 19 March to discourage them from following 
him. The trial judge allowed the prosecution to adduce evidence that 
powder puffs were found on T when he was arrested (powder puffs 
apparently being `things with which persons who commit abominable and 
indecent crimes with males furnish themselves') and that several 
photographs of naked boys had been discovered in his lodgings. The 
House of Lords dismissed T's appeal and held that the incriminating 
articles were admissible as they were relevant to rebut his defence of 
mistaken identity and to prove that he was the offender on 16 March. But, 
as in R v. Ball [1911] AC 47 (HL), the relevance depended entirely on 
reasoning from disposition to guilt. Unfortunately, for many years 
Thompson v. R was seen as laying down a binding precedent for the 
admissibility of articles showing a homosexual disposition (this is no 
longer the law: R v. Horwood [1969] 3 WLR 964 (CA), DPP v. Boardman 
[1974] 3 WLR 673 (HL)); yet the case is still a very useful illustration of 
why previous decisions on similar fact evidence should not be treated as 
precedents. The probative value of similar fact evidence depends on the 
unique factual context of the particular case being tried, and in Thompson 
v. R this depended on the unlikelihood that an innocent man with exactly 
the same tendencies as the offender of 16 March should coincidentally 
have turned up at a rendezvous arranged by that offender equipped for 
buggery: `It would be strange, indeed, if one man should commit with the 
boys the offence charged on the 16th, and make an assignation with them 
to commit it again upon the 19th, that another man should, with an intent 
to do the same, take up and fulfil the first man's engagement' (at p. 229). 
The probative value of the articles would have been significantly reduced if 
the facts had been a little different ± if, for example, the lavatory in 
question had been a common meeting ground for homosexuals, 
particularly at that time of the day, for then the possibility that T's 
presence was a mere coincidence could not so easily have been discounted. 
The circumstances which give rise to the high probative value of 
incriminating articles in one case may be entirely absent in another case. 
Thus in R v. Bartlett [1959] Crim LR 285 (CCA) it was held that an 
obscene photograph found in the accused's possession soon after an 
alleged indecent assault by him on a woman should not have been 
admitted at his trial. 
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Perhaps the most striking example of similar fact evidence being 
admitted when its relevance depended entirely on reasoning from 
disposition to guilt is the case of R v. Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911. S was 
charged with murdering a young girl, Linda Bowyer, who had been found 
strangled in a village but who had not been sexually molested or 
concealed. S had escaped from Broadmoor (a mental hospital) and was on 
the run at the time of Linda's murder. He admitted he had been in the 
village and seen Linda but claimed he had not killed her ± although news 
of her death had not at that stage been released ± and this was admitted in 
evidence at his trial. Further, although his defence was one of bare denial 
the prosecution were permitted to adduce evidence of S's murderous 
propensity: the fact that he had been incarcerated in Broadmoor for killing 
two young girls in a similar way a year earlier. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal held that the similar fact evidence had been properly admitted as 
S's abnormal propensity to strangle young girls identified him as the 
murderer. 
Evidence of disposition was admitted in the foregoing cases to prove 
guilt, notwithstanding the prohibition in the first limb of the Makin test 
and even though the accused had raised no defence other than that of 
`bare denial'. That such evidence should occasionally be admitted, even in 
the absence of an affirmative defence, is clearly illustrated by the facts of R 
v. Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 (CCA), which is perhaps the best illustration of 
the inadequacy of both limbs of the Makin test. There are many other 
examples where evidence of disposition has been admitted to prove the 
accused's guilt and it is now clear that there is no barrier to the 
admissibility of such evidence just because it is relevant only in this way. In 
R v. Thrussell (1981) [1997] Crim LR 501n (CA), for example, a copy of 
The Cocaine Consumer's Handbook found at the accused's home was 
admitted to prove his involvement in smuggling cocaine. He and his co-
accused had travelled together in Peru but they had returned to England 
separately, and only the co-accused had been found in possession of the 
cocaine. The book was therefore admissible to prove that he had been 
party to a joint enterprise. Despite its unequivocal wording, the first limb 
of the Makin test should therefore be regarded as no more than an 
expression of the principle requiring the exclusion of unduly prejudicial 
evidence, and as such it may be outweighed by the competing principle 
that highly probative evidence should be admitted, even where the 
relevance of such evidence depends entirely on drawing an inference of 
guilt from the accused's disposition. 
Where the inference from disposition is not very strong ± which will 
usually be the case if the disposition is not particularly unusual ± the 
similar fact evidence will now be inadmissible because the undue prejudice 
caused by its admission will outweigh its limited probative value. The 
same result was reached in the decades following Makin by the application 
of the first limb of Lord Herschell's test. Thus in R v. Brown (1963) 47 Cr 
App R 204 (CCA), where S and others had been charged with breaking 
into a shop at lunch-time with a skeleton key, it was held that the 
prosecution should not have been permitted to adduce evidence that S had 
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used a skeleton key to break into a shop 20 miles away at lunch-time five 
days earlier. The evidence merely demonstrated his propensity to break 
into shops at that time of day. Given the relatively large number of 
persons sharing his disposition it was not particularly probative of his 
guilt, but it would have been unduly prejudicial (certainly in the reasoning 
sense). Similarly, in R v. Taylor (1923) 17 Cr App R 109 (CCA), where 
evidence that a jemmy had been found at the accused's house was adduced 
at his trial for breaking into a shop (even though no jemmy had actually 
been used to commit the offence), it was held that the evidence should not 
have been admitted (see also R v. Manning (1923) 17 Cr App R 85 (CCA)). 
Where, however, an incriminating article found in the accused's 
possession is particularly probative in the factual context of the case it 
may be admissible even though it is not directly connected to the offence 
charged (as in Thompson v. R [1918] AC 221 (HL)). In R v. Reading (1965) 
50 Cr App R 98 several co-accused were charged with hijacking a lorry 
and the trial judge admitted evidence that walkie-talkie sets had been 
found in their cars and that number plates and a police-type uniform had 
been found in the house of one of the co-accused, although none of this 
evidence had been used in the offence charged. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal held that the articles had been properly admitted as the evidence 
was of `powerful probative value in relation to the vital issue as to the 
identification of these accused people'. Rather curiously, in R v. Mustafa 
(1976) 65 Cr App R 26 the Court of Appeal felt that the decision in R v. 
Reading provided a quite separate ground for admitting incriminating 
articles outside the ambit of the law on similar fact evidence, but this is 
clearly incorrect as the same principles must apply whether the accused's 
criminal disposition is inferred from extraneous misconduct or incriminat-
ing articles found in his possession. In R v. Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 
the Court of Appeal expressly recognised that the admissibility of such 
evidence is governed by the (modern) similar facts test, and held that a 
`robber's kit' found in the accused's car on 20 June 1992 had been properly 
admitted as circumstantial evidence identifying him as the man who had 
committed a robbery in Essex on 21 April 1992, even though the robber's 
kit had not been used to commit that offence. 
In short, the Makin test failed to make explicit the true rationale 
governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence. Its first limb expressly 
excluded any evidence which was relevant only by reasoning from 
disposition to guilt, whereas in reality such evidence could be admitted 
when it had sufficient probative value; and the second limb focused on 
categories of relevance without any consideration of the probative value of 
the similar fact evidence in question or the undue prejudice which could be 
engendered by its admission. If the first limb of the test is understood to 
represent the principle that unduly prejudicial evidence should be 
excluded, with the second limb representing the competing free proof 
principle that highly probative evidence of the accused's guilt should be 
admitted, then the Makin formula could indeed be said to have laid down 
the correct approach for assessing the admissibility of similar fact 
evidence. Read literally, though, Lord Herschell's test obscured the 
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correct approach. The key to the admissibility of similar fact evidence 
depends on which of the two competing principles should outweigh the 
other in the context of the particular case being tried, and this, as has since 
been recognised, must depend on probative value. 
3.3.5 DPP v. Boardman 
The House of Lords took the opportunity offered to it in DPP v. 
Boardman [1974] 3 WLR 673 to restate the principles governing the 
admissibility of similar fact evidence in terms of probative value and 
undue prejudice. B (the headmaster of a language school) was charged 
with attempted buggery with one boy (S) and of incitement of another boy 
(H) to commit buggery. He was tried for the two separate offences during 
the one trial, and the evidence of each offence was held by the trial judge 
to be admissible similar fact evidence in respect of the other offence (3.3.13 
post) on the ground that there were peculiar similarities between the 
offences: S and H were both pupils at B's school; both had been aroused 
from their sleep by B and invited to his sitting room; and B had wished to 
adopt the passive sexual role in each case. B appealed unsuccessfully to 
both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. The question of law 
which had been certified by the Court of Appeal required an answer to the 
question whether there was a particular category of relevance for evidence 
of homosexual activities which took a particular form. The House of 
Lords unanimously rejected the post-Makin `categories of relevance' 
approach and instead sought to explain admissibility by reference to the 
underlying principles. 
The test according to Lords Wilberforce and Cross was whether the 
similar fact evidence was sufficiently probative to justify its admission 
despite the risk of undue prejudice: `The basic principle must be that the 
admission of similar fact evidence . . . is exceptional and requires a strong 
degree of probative force' (per Lord Wilberforce at p. 690); `The question 
must always be whether the similar fact evidence taken together with the 
other evidence would do no more than raise or strengthen a suspicion that 
the accused committed the offence with which he is charged or would 
point so strongly to his guilt that only an ultra-cautious jury, if they 
accepted it as true, would acquit in the face of it' (per Lord Cross at 
p. 702). Somewhat paradoxically, however, three members of the House of 
Lords (Lords Hailsham, Morris and Salmon), while emphasising the 
importance of probative value, expressly approved the Makin formula, 
with Lord Hailsham stating (at p. 698): `I do not know that the matter can 
be better stated than it was by Lord Herschell'. Interestingly Lords Cross 
and Wilberforce failed to refer to Makin at all. The House of Lords also 
expressed various opinions on the degree of probative value which ought 
to be necessary for the admissibility of similar fact evidence, the consensus 
being that admissibility depended on there being a `striking similarity' 
between the facts of the separate incidents, inexplicable on the basis of 
coincidence, so that exclusion would be an affront to common sense. In 
the words of Lord Hailsham (at pp. 699±700): 
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`For instance, whilst it would certainly not be enough to identify the 
culprit in a series of burglaries that he climbed in through a ground 
floor window, the fact that he left the same humorous limerick on the 
walls of the sitting room, or an esoteric symbol written in lipstick on the 
mirror might well be enough. In a sex case . . . whilst a repeated 
homosexual act by itself might be quite insufficient to admit the 
evidence as confirmatory of identity or design, the fact that it was 
alleged to have been performed wearing the ceremonial head-dress of an 
Indian chief or other eccentric garb might well in appropriate 
circumstances suffice.' 
However, the term `striking similarity' is misleading as a general 
standard for the admission of similar fact evidence for two reasons. First, 
many offences committed by different persons may be very similar simply 
because of the common way certain offences are often committed (see, for 
example, R v. Brown (1963) 47 Cr App R 204 (CCA), 3.3.4 ante). The 
accused's modus operandi for burglary, such as entering through a ground 
floor window, may be identical to that used by thousands of other 
burglars, and therefore its probative value would be minimal when 
weighed against the risk of undue prejudice notwithstanding its `striking 
similarity' to the method used in respect of the instant charge. It is the 
peculiarity of the incidents rather than the similarity which needs to be 
considered for the determination of probative value. Second, evidence of 
disposition may be highly probative notwithstanding the complete absence 
of any striking similarity when compared with the facts of the offence 
charged. It has already been seen that the probative force of an item of 
circumstantial evidence depends on the other admissible evidence, and this 
is as true for similar fact evidence as it is for any other such evidence. To 
explain the requisite degree of cogency in terms of `striking similarity' is an 
impracticable formula for determining admissibility, and detracts from the 
logical assessment of probative value which is required. The evidence of 
homosexuality in Thompson v. R [1918] AC 221 (HL) was admissible not 
because of any `striking similarity', but simply because in the context of 
the other evidence it had a high degree of probative value; the evidence of 
powder puffs and photographs would not have been nearly so probative if 
the lavatory had been a popular meeting ground for homosexual men. 
Similarly, the evidence of past intercourse in R v. Ball [1911] AC 47 (HL) 
would not have been so probative if the brother and sister had merely been 
cohabiting but sleeping separately in 1910. Even the evidence of 
murderous propensity in R v. Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 (CCA) would 
have lost much of its probative value if S had not admitted to being in the 
area at around the time Linda Bowyer was strangled. 
Where a man has committed a sexual offence on another male the 
accused's homosexuality will always be logically relevant, but whether it 
will be probative enough to be admissible will depend on the other 
evidence. Compare, for example, the facts of R v. King [1967] 2 WLR 612 
(CA), where such evidence was admissible (albeit with a judicial warning 
against undue prejudice), with R v. Horwood [1969] 3 WLR 964 (CA) 
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where it was inadmissible. In R v. King the accused admitted he had 
shared a bed with one of the boys in question, whereas in R v. Horwood 
there was no such evidence of intimacy, allowing R v. King to be 
distinguished as an `exceptional case'. `The slightest movement of the 
kaleidoscope of facts creates a new pattern which must be examined 
afresh' (per Hoffmann, (1975) 91 LQR 193 at p. 204). In R v. King it is 
easy to see why the evidence of homosexuality was admitted, but there 
were no `striking similarities' involved: the similar fact evidence was 
merely K's admission under cross-examination that he was a homosexual, 
and this was felt to be sufficiently probative given the allegation against 
him and his admission that he had slept with one of the boys in question. 
In R v. Morgan [1993] Crim LR 56 (CA) evidence that the accused had 
associated with people who used cocaine was admissible at her trial for 
smuggling that drug into the UK from Jamaica. Her defence was that she 
had been an innocent dupe on whom the drugs had been planted, so her 
disposition was relevant in that it made her defence of ignorance less 
credible. The probative value of the evidence did not depend on any 
striking similarities but simply on the unlikelihood of coincidence. 
Similarly, in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Siu Yuk-Shing [1989] 1 
WLR 236 (PC) the fact that the accused had been convicted of being a 
member of the 14K Triad Society in 1975 was held to have been rightly 
admitted against him at his trial for being a member of the same society in 
1986 and for possession of Triad insignia and writings. There was no 
question of any striking similarities, given that the similar fact evidence 
was the bare fact of his membership of 14K a decade earlier, and the 
similar fact evidence was not adduced for the purpose of inviting the 
tribunal of fact to reason from disposition to guilt. The accused had been 
found in possession of a number of articles used by 14K members in their 
Triad rituals. The evidence of his previous membership established that he 
knew the 14K rituals and that the items in his possession were Triad 
related. 
Another telling example is provided by the Australian case of Pfennig v. 
R (1995) 182 CLR 461 (HCA). A 10-year-old boy, Michael Black, 
disappeared from the Sturt Reserve in South Australia on 18 January 1989 
and his bicycle was subsequently found by a river at the nearby Thiele 
Reserve, suggesting he might have gone swimming and drowned. 
However, he had gone to Sturt Reserve with a fishing rod, had not taken 
any swimming clothes or towel, was a competent swimmer, did not like 
Thiele Reserve and his body was never recovered, rendering it almost 
certain that he had been abducted from Sturt Reserve and murdered. P 
had been in Sturt Reserve with his van and had spoken to Michael Black 
around the time he disappeared. Almost a year later, on 30 December 
1989, P abducted a 13-year-old boy (`H') by inveigling him into his van. 
He then left H's bicycle at the top of a cliff before taking him to his house 
where he was sexually abused. H managed to escape, and P was convicted 
of having abducted and raped him. P was subsequently put on trial for the 
murder of Michael Black and convicted. The evidence against P comprised 
his presence with his van at the Sturt Reserve at around the time Michael 
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Black had disappeared, his contact with that boy and his violent and 
sexual disposition as established by his conduct in relation to H (and his 
admission to his then wife that he had been thinking about abducting a 
boy). Once the possibility of an accidental drowning had been discounted, 
the probative value of the extraneous (in this case subsequent) misconduct 
evidence lay not in any striking similarities but in the unlikelihood that 
two persons with exactly the same violent and sexual disposition would 
have been in exactly the same area at the same time on 18 January 1989, in 
conversation with Michael Black, and with the means with which to 
abduct him. Given the very small sub-group of individuals to which both 
P and the abductor belonged, it would have been an affront to common 
sense to accept the existence of such a coincidence. The similarity in the 
way the abductor in each case had sought to lay a false trail by depositing 
the boy's bicycle by a river or near a cliff provided the evidence with a 
degree of additional probative value, but in the context of the case as a 
whole it was superfluous. The evidence relating to H would have been 
sufficiently cogent without that similarity in the modus operandi. 
Unfortunately, in the cases following DPP v. Boardman the `striking 
similarity' test was seen as something of a panacea for determining 
admissibility and too little regard was paid to the underlying principles 
referred to in the speeches of Lords Wilberforce and Cross. `Striking 
similarity' or a similar phrase had found unanimous approval in the 
House of Lords, giving the impression of a straightforward test when it in 
fact clouded significant differences between their Lordships' approaches to 
admissibility; and although in some notable judgments the Court of 
Appeal recognised that this test was not of universal application and that 
it should be regarded as no more than a `label' for the general requirement 
of high probative value (R v. Rance (1975) 62 Cr App R 118, R v. Scarrott 
(1977) 65 Cr App R 125) the need to find a striking similarity became in 
effect the test for admissibility (see R v. Clarke (1977) 67 Cr App R 398 
(CA), Lanford v. General Medical Council [1989] 3 WLR 665 (PC) at p. 671 
and R v. Brooks (1990) 92 Cr App R 36 (CA)). Thus, in R v. Butler (1986) 
84 Cr App R 12 (CA) evidence of consensual oral sex by B's former 
girlfriend in his car was held to be strikingly similar to acts the rapist had 
forced his victims to perform in his car, so it was admissible to identify B 
as that rapist. However, there was nothing strikingly peculiar about the 
sexual act in question, at least not in the sense envisaged by Lord 
Hailsham in DPP v. Boardman. There was some highly probative 
circumstantial evidence that B was the offender (transferred fibres, one 
victim's ear-ring and another victim's hair in his car, matching tyre 
impressions, lack of sperm in the offender's and B's semen) and the 
evidence of B's sexual disposition was indeed highly probative in the 
context of this other evidence to rule out the possibility of coincidence. Yet 
the failure to assess admissibility in accordance with the underlying 
principles, and the perceived need to identify a striking similarity, 
exemplifies the general approach of the Court of Appeal in the years 
following DPP v. Boardman. Moreover, the perceived need to find 
`striking similarity' in evidence which was highly probative for a reason 
62 Evidence 
other than striking similarity resulted in the courts accepting a very low 
standard in order to satisfy the Boardman test. In R v. Shore (1988) 89 Cr 
App R 32 (CA), for example, a striking similarity was found in the way a 
headmaster had tickled and touched his young pupils; and in R v. Mustafa 
(1976) 65 Cr App R 26 (CA) a striking similarity was found in the 
accused's loading a trolley with frozen meat in a frozen-food supermarket 
together with his possession of a stolen credit card. 
Even more worrying was the reversion to the Makin formula in some 
cases, suggesting a misunderstanding of the underlying principles. In R v. 
Seaman (1978) 67 Cr App R 234 the Court of Appeal relied entirely on the 
Makin test (and made no reference to DPP v. Boardman) to uphold the 
trial judge's decision to admit similar fact evidence. S was charged with 
theft, having been seen placing bacon into his shopping bag before going 
to the supermarket check-out. Evidence that he had been seen on earlier 
occasions to place bacon into his shopping basket, only for it to have 
disappeared by the time he arrived at the check-out, was held to be 
admissible to rebut his defence of accident. In R v. Lewis (1982) 76 Cr App 
R 33, L was charged with indecently assaulting his partner's daughters and 
with offences of indecency which did not involve physical contact (an 
admitted incident when he waved his penis at the girls, and an allegation 
that he had masturbated in front of them). In his defence he claimed he 
had only waved his penis in fun, and the touching was an innocent attempt 
to become a father figure to them; he denied the alleged masturbation 
incident. Magazines, documents and posters which showed that L had a 
sexual interest in children were admitted at the trial, and he was convicted. 
The Court of Appeal referred to DPP v. Boardman but, astonishingly, felt 
it did not apply as it had been `concerned solely with similar fact evidence 
and that is not this case'. Applying the Makin test, the Court held that the 
evidence had been properly admitted to rebut L's defence of accident or 
innocent explanation in respect of the counts where he had admitted the 
incident but claimed he was acting innocently. The Court further held, 
however, that the evidence should not have been admitted in respect of the 
masturbation count as L had denied that incident and no question of 
accident or innocent explanation arose (see 3.3.4 ante). 
In a commentary on DPP v. Boardman, Hoffmann presciently stated 
that `at least one more excursion to the House of Lords will probably be 
necessary before the law can be said to be established on a simple and 
rational basis . . . to consolidate what Boardman has achieved' (`Similar 
Facts After Boardman' (1975) 91 LQR 193 at p. 193). 
3.3.6 DPP v. P 
P was charged with rape and incest in respect of his two daughters, B and 
S, and the evidence of each daughter was admitted as similar fact evidence 
to prove the separate offences against the other. The Court of Appeal 
quashed P's conviction on the ground that the girls' accounts of P's 
behaviour towards them had not shown any striking similarities and 
should not have been admitted. The prosecution successfully appealed to 
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the House of Lords (DPP v. P [1991] 3 WLR 161) and Lord Mackay, in a 
speech (at pp. 170±2) with which the rest of the House agreed, took the 
opportunity to restate the underlying principles as the test for admissibility 
in what is now the leading case on similar fact evidence: 
`From all that was said by the House in R v. Boardman I would deduce 
the essential feature of evidence which is to be admitted is that its 
probative force in support of the allegation that an accused person 
committed a crime is sufficiently great to make it just to admit the 
evidence, notwithstanding that it is prejudicial to the accused in tending 
to show that he was guilty of another crime. Such probative force may 
be derived from striking similarities in the evidence . . . But restricting 
the circumstances in which there is some striking similarity between 
them is to restrict the operation of the principle in a way which gives too 
much effect to a particular manner of stating it, and is not justified in 
principle . . . Where the identity of the perpetrator is in issue, and 
evidence of this kind is important in that connection, obviously 
something in the nature of what has been called . . . a signature or other 
special feature will be necessary.' 
The girls' evidence had been sufficiently probative to be admissible 
given that in each case there had been domination and threats against 
them by P, and P had also paid for abortions for both girls. Thus there 
was, according to the House of Lords, a single test for the admissibility of 
similar fact evidence. The trial judge must assess the probative value and 
the prejudicial effect of the evidence and admit it only if the probative 
value is so great that it would be just to admit it in spite of the prejudicial 
effect. This test not only expresses the principles which have always 
underpinned the law but has had the effect of consolidating the law on the 
admissibility of similar fact evidence with the general theory on the 
admissibility of relevant evidence (3.1.3 ante) and (to all intents and 
purposes) the trial judge's common-law discretion to exclude any unduly 
prejudicial evidence tendered by the prosecution (R v. Sang [1979] 3 WLR 
263 (HL)). One qualification was added by the House of Lords, however: 
if the identity of the offender is in issue the judge will need to identify a 
striking peculiarity or `signature' method as a prerequisite to admissibility 
(see 3.3.14 post). 
It should be noted that in a number of European jurisdictions evidence 
of extraneous misconduct is routinely admitted as evidence against the 
accused, even before lay tribunals of fact, and there is nothing in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to suggest that this 
is regarded as unfair (see Law Com No. 273 (2001) at p. 40). The test 
developed in DPP v. P exists to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial, 
and the Court of Appeal has now stated that if the accused's extraneous 
misconduct is admissible at common law it cannot be said to breach 
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (R v. Singh 
[2001] EWCA Crim 2884). In most cases similar fact evidence will be 
inadmissible on account of its low probative value, and where it is ruled to 
be admissible it will be because the probative value is so high that any 
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undue prejudice can be disregarded (or eliminated by an adequate 
direction from the judge). The test might therefore be regarded as an 
additional safeguard over and above what is required for Article 6(1) 
compatibility. Indeed, similar fact evidence which, when considered in the 
context of all the other evidence, would present a compelling case against 
the accused will be excluded if the additional probative value is insufficient 
to justify the risk of undue prejudice. Consider, for instance, the trial 
which led to the conviction of the paedophile Roy Whiting for the kidnap 
and murder of an eight-year-old girl, Sarah Payne, in the summer of 2000. 
There was a considerable body of evidence linking him to the murder, 
including eye-witness testimony that a person with a similar appearance 
had driven away from the scene in a white van, his possession of a white 
van (which was equipped with rope, hand ties, a knife, a cushion, masking 
tape and baby oil), the presence of one of Sarah's hairs on his clothing, 
and fibres from items in the van on one of Sarah's shoes, but evidence that 
he had been convicted in 1995 for kidnapping and molesting a nine-year-
old girl was ruled inadmissible by the trial judge (R v. Whiting (2001) The 
Times 13.12.01 (news report) (CC)). Whiting's sexual disposition did not 
add sufficient probative value to justify the reasoning and moral prejudice 
it might have engendered, and to ensure he received a fair trial it was 
excluded (cf. Pfennig v. R (1995) 182 CLR 461 (HCA) and R v. Black 
[1995] Crim LR 640 (CA)). 
The application of the modern test can be illustrated by reference to the 
decision in R v. Sokialiois [1993] Crim LR 872. The accused was charged 
with importing cocaine which he had sought to collect from a postal 
depot, yet he claimed not to have any involvement with drugs when 
interviewed by Customs officers. The prosecution were allowed to adduce 
evidence that his holdall had been discovered in a hotel and that it 
contained cocaine of similar purity to the cocaine which was the subject of 
the charge. The Court of Appeal, applying DPP v. P, held that the cocaine 
in the holdall had been properly admitted as its probative value, in the 
context of the accused's replies in his interview and his defence of having 
been framed, was high compared with its unduly prejudicial effect. 
Discounting the possibility that the cocaine could have been planted in the 
hotel room (and the jury were directed to disregard it if they felt it had 
been planted) it would have been a bizarre coincidence that the accused, 
who denied any involvement with drugs, should have a holdall of cocaine 
in his room if he was innocent (see also R v. Groves [1998] Crim LR 200 
(CA), R v. Yalman [1998] 2 Cr App R 269 (CA) and R v. Clark [2000] All 
ER (D) 1219 (CA)). 
In R v. Caceres-Moreira [1995] Crim LR 489 the accused was charged 
with being concerned in the importation of cocaine. The drug had been 
posted to L, and he and P had then taken the package to a meeting with 
the accused at a pub. P and the accused were arrested as they went to his 
car. The accused denied any involvement and claimed that he had simply 
been invited for a drink by P and was going to give him a lift. The 
prosecution were allowed to adduce evidence that in 1990 a greetings card 
addressed to the accused's wife had contained cocaine, and that shortly 
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after its delivery it had been passed on to the accused. The Court of 
Appeal held that the evidence had been admissible similar fact evidence 
demonstrating the accused's knowledge that P's package contained 
cocaine. It was irrelevant that the charge in 1990 had been thrown out 
at the committal stage and that the accused had never been convicted of 
any charge arising out of that incident. In other words, the admissibility of 
any prosecution evidence suggesting that the accused has a disposition to 
commit the offence charged should be considered in the light of the 
principles which underlie the similar facts test. It does not matter that the 
accused's extraneous conduct is not per se unlawful (R v. Butler (1986) 84 
Cr App R 12 (CA)); nor does it matter, if it is unlawful, that the accused 
has not been convicted of an offence in relation to it. If the jury might be 
unduly prejudiced against the accused on account of the admission of 
evidence of his disposition, then there will need to be an assessment of 
probative value and the risk of undue prejudice in order to determine 
admissibility, although it will be seen below that a different test applies for 
certain types of evidence of extraneous misconduct (3.3.8±10 post). 
In R v. Z [2000] 3 WLR 117 the House of Lords held that it was 
permissible for the prosecution to adduce similar fact evidence relating to 
other incidents in respect of which the accused had already been tried and 
acquitted, the reasoning being that as he was not being tried again for 
those other alleged offences there was no infringement of the rule against 
double jeopardy (see also R v. Ollis [1900] 2 QB 758 (CCCR)). The appeal 
in R v. Z arose out a preliminary ruling by the judge at the trial of one 
Nicholas Edwards for raping a woman in 1998. Following the decision of 
the House of Lords the prosecution were able to call the complainants 
who had alleged that he had raped them on other occasions, even though 
he had been acquitted of those charges. He had endeared himself to each 
of the women, taken them out on a date, and then turned violent and 
allegedly raped them when his advances were spurned. Each woman's 
testimony was admissible similar fact evidence in relation to the fresh 1998 
allegation, of which he was subsequently found guilty (R v. Edwards 
(2000) The Times 22.9.00 (news report) (CCC)). 
3.3.7 Similar Fact Evidence and Relevance 
The generally accepted view is that evidence of the accused's disposition or 
conduct on other occasions is logically relevant to the issue of his guilt but 
usually too prejudicial for it to be admitted (see, for example, R v. Clarke 
[1995] 2 Cr App R 425 (CA)). There is an alternative analysis, however. In 
DPP v. Boardman [1974] 3 WLR 673 (HL) Lord Hailsham recognised that 
there were two theories for the exclusionary principle in the Makin test (at 
p. 697): 
`[S]uch evidence is simply irrelevant . . . According to this theory, similar 
fact evidence excluded under Lord Herschell LC's first sentence has no 
probative value . . . The second theory is that the prejudice created by 
the admission of such evidence outweighs any probative value it may 
have . . .' 
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In R v. Miller (1952) 36 Cr App R 169 (Assizes), Devlin J said (at p. 171): 
`The fundamental principle . . . is that it is not normally relevant to 
inquire into a prisoner's previous character, and, particularly, to ask 
questions which tend to show that he has previously committed some 
criminal offence. It is not relevant because the fact that he has 
committed an offence on one occasion does not in any way show that he 
is likely to commit an offence on any subsequent occasion. Accordingly, 
such questions are, in general, inadmissible, not primarily for the reason 
that they are prejudicial, but because they are irrelevant.' 
The express application of the irrelevance theory for excluding similar 
fact evidence can be found in several cases. In R v. Rodley [1913] 3 KB 468 
(CCA), for example, evidence that the accused had entered C's house by 
its chimney at about 2 a.m. and had then had consensual intercourse with 
C was held to be irrelevant to the question whether one or two hours 
earlier he had broken into V's premises through the back door with the 
intent to rape her. Similarly, in R v. Holloway [1980] 1 NZLR 315 (NZSC), 
a rape trial, evidence that several other women had been forced to have sex 
with the accused at his home was held to be irrelevant to whether the 
complainant had consented to an admitted act of sexual intercourse (see 
also R v. Bradley (1979) 70 Cr App R 200 (CA) and R v. Knutton (1992) 97 
Cr App R 115 (CA)). The most recent application of this theory to 
evidence of disposition can be found in the older cases dealing with the 
admissibility of cash and drug-dealing paraphernalia in the possession of 
alleged dealers (3.1.3 ante), although more recently the Court of Appeal 
has expressly applied similar fact reasoning to such evidence (R v. Guney 
[1998] 2 Cr App R 242, R v. Yalman [1998] 2 Cr App R 269). 
However, once it is remembered that the word `irrelevant' can be used 
to mean that evidence is insufficiently probative to be admitted, given the 
weight of the countervailing policy considerations, it is apparent that the 
two theories identified by Lord Hailsham are in fact different ways of 
stating the same thing. 
3.3.8 `Moral Prejudice Evidence' 
Historically, the courts have focused on `reasoning prejudice' rather than 
`moral prejudice' when considering the admissibility of similar fact 
evidence. This is clear from the first limb of the Makin test (3.3.4 ante) 
which refers to `the conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his 
criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which he 
is being tried'. Thus, when the Makin test was applied, relevant evidence of 
the accused's extraneous misconduct which was fundamentally different 
from the conduct associated with the alleged offence (giving rise to no 
possibility of reasoning prejudice) was automatically admissible under the 
second limb of the test. 
A man charged with the murder of a young girl in a village may have 
visited his sister-in-law in London and asked her to give false testimony 
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that he was staying with her on the night the offence was committed. The 
prosecution would be able to call the sister-in-law to testify that the 
accused had attempted to pervert the course of justice, as circumstantial 
evidence of his guilt, even though that evidence would suggest a separate 
crime has been committed by him. If the accused instead gives as his false 
alibi that he was with a prostitute whose name he does not know, it would 
be permissible for the prosecution to show that his fingerprints were found 
at the scene of a burglary in the girl's village on the night of her murder to 
prove he was in the vicinity around the time she was killed. In Jones v. 
DPP [1962] 2 WLR 575 (HL) (at p. 597) Lord Denning felt that such 
evidence was prima facie admissible on the ground that it fell within the 
second limb of the Makin test. A further example is provided by R v. 
Onufrejczyk [1955] 2 WLR 273 (CCA) where the fact that the accused, on 
trial for murder, had tried to bribe a blacksmith to lie about the date the 
deceased had collected a horse was admissible notwithstanding the 
obvious inference that the accused had committed a separate (but 
dissimilar) offence. 
Bad-character evidence of this sort could be called `moral prejudice 
evidence' on the ground that moral prejudice is the only type of undue 
prejudice the evidence might give rise to in the jury's collective mind. As 
noted above, such evidence was prima facie admissible under the second 
limb of the Makin test, and it would appear to have been prima facie 
admissible (for the same reason) during the period when DPP v. 
Boardman [1974] 3 WLR 673 (HL) was the leading case on similar fact 
evidence. In R v. Anderson [1988] 2 WLR 1017 the accused was charged 
with conspiracy to cause explosions, and her defence was that the evidence 
against her (false papers and cash) was evidence of her involvement in a 
separate conspiracy to smuggle escaped prisoners from Ireland to 
continental Europe. She claimed that she would have accompanied male 
escapees to hoodwink immigration officials into thinking they were an 
innocent couple on holiday. The prosecution elicited evidence that she was 
`wanted' by the police in Northern Ireland, and the Court of Appeal took 
the view that it could properly have been admitted under the second limb 
of the Makin test to rebut her defence. The probative value of the evidence 
lay in demonstrating that the accused would not have been selected for the 
role of accompanying escaped prisoners, for her presence would have 
increased rather than reduced the possibility of the police noticing them. 
In other words, the evidence was prima facie admissible because it was 
relevant and there was no possibility of reasoning prejudice. 
Notwithstanding the modern test for the admissibility of similar fact 
evidence established in DPP v. P [1991] 3 WLR 161 (HL), it may well be 
that `moral prejudice evidence' remains prima facie admissible, along with 
background evidence and res gestae evidence of bad character (3.3.9 post). 
If evidence of this sort is indeed prima facie admissible, the judge will have 
to consider whether it ought to be excluded at common law or under 
s. 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 on the ground that, 
despite any direction he might give the jury, the moral prejudice generated 
by its admission would deny the accused a fair trial. 
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3.3.9 Background Evidence and Res Gestae 
Evidence of extraneous misconduct may be highly probative if it 
comprises an integral part of the history of the instant offence or sets 
out the context in which the offence was committed; and, again, such 
probative value will not necessarily depend on any striking similarity. 
Carter ((1985) 48 MLR 29 at p. 30) gives the example of D being on trial 
for stealing from V's safe and the prosecution wishing to adduce evidence 
that D had stolen V's diary on an earlier occasion. D's earlier theft would 
be highly probative evidence that he was aware of the combination to V's 
safe if the combination had been recorded in the diary. 
In R v. Ball [1911] AC 47 (HL) (at p. 68) Lord Atkinson felt that if the 
accused stands trial for murder, evidence of his past enmity to the 
deceased would be admissible to prove his motive and that he had killed 
the deceased with the requisite mens rea (see R v. Buckley (1873) 13 Cox 
CC 293 (Assizes)). Lord Atkinson's dictum was approved in R v. Williams 
(1986) 84 Cr App R 299 where the Court of Appeal held that evidence of 
the accused's previous history of assaulting the victim was admissible to 
prove that he had intended his words to be taken seriously when he had 
threatened to kill her. Further support was obtained from the decision in 
R v. Pettman (1985) unreported (5048/C/82), now the leading authority on 
what has become known as `background evidence', where, giving the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal, Purchas LJ said: 
`[W]here it is necessary to place before the jury evidence of part of a 
continual background or history relevant to the offence charged in the 
indictment, and without the totality of which the account placed before 
the jury would be incomplete or incomprehensible, then the fact that the 
whole account involves including evidence establishing the commission 
of an offence with which the accused is not charged is not of itself a 
ground for excluding the evidence.' 
In both R v. Williams (1986) 84 Cr App R 299 and R v. Pettman the 
Court of Appeal was of the view that background evidence is prima facie 
admissible by virtue of the second limb of the Makin test, a point 
reaffirmed in R v. Fulcher [1995] 2 Cr App R 251 where the Court of 
Appeal concluded that such evidence is not covered by the similar fact rule 
of prima facie inadmissibility (see also R v. Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 (CCCR) 
at p. 400). Background evidence is therefore admissible so long as it can be 
shown to be relevant to an issue in the proceedings, save that (as with 
`moral prejudice evidence') it may be excluded by the judge at common 
law or under s. 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
There is, however, a difference between `moral prejudice evidence' and 
`background evidence'. The former is (by definition) evidence which 
cannot possibly give rise to any reasoning prejudice, but the same cannot 
be said about the latter. Background evidence will often disclose 
extraneous misconduct which is similar in nature to the offence charged, 
and may therefore engender the same sorts of prejudice which underlie the 
general rule of prima facie inadmissibility. In her commentary on the case 
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of R v. Stevens [1995] Crim LR 649 (at p. 651) Professor Di Birch drew a 
distinction between similar fact evidence and background evidence which 
has been cited with approval by the Court of Appeal (R v. M(T) [2000] 1 
WLR 421 at pp. 426±7). Background evidence was said to be admitted in 
order to put the jury in the general picture about characters involved in the 
action and the run-up to the alleged offence, and `may or may not involve 
prior offences'. This is of course correct, and would justify the rule of 
prima facie admissibility at a general level, but it can hardly justify the 
application of that rule when extraneous misconduct of a similar nature to 
the offence charged is disclosed as part of the background. The general 
rule of prima facie inadmissibility should apply ± at least in cases where the 
misconduct cannot properly be said to form part of the res gestae in its 
narrowest sense ± lest similar fact evidence of insufficient probative value 
be admitted too readily. Be that as it may, the rule of prima facie 
admissibility has been reaffirmed on a number of occasions. In R v. Clarke 
[2002] EWCA Crim 2948 the prosecution were permitted to adduce 
evidence that the accused and the deceased victim (V) of an east London 
shooting had previously been arrested in respect of a serious assault, that 
V had on that occasion `grassed' on the accused, and that, having found 
out, the accused had subsequently threatened to use violence on him. 
Holding that the evidence of extraneous misconduct had been properly 
admitted, the Court of Appeal stated that the `true principles to be applied 
are whether the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case and if so, 
whether its prejudicial effect is such that, despite its probative value, it 
should be excluded as a matter of discretion'. Similarly, in R v. Phillips 
[2003] EWCA Crim 1379, where the accused's threats to kill his wife were 
admitted at his trial for her murder, the Court of Appeal stated that 
relevant background evidence `is admissible unless, in the exercise of its 
discretion, the court decides that fairness requires it to be excluded'. 
The problem with a test of prima facie admissibility for any type of 
background evidence is evident from the Australian case of R v. O'Leary 
(1946) 73 CLR 566. The deceased had been violently attacked around the 
head and face with a bottle at the workers' camp adjacent to a secluded 
timber mill in the early hours of Sunday morning, the inference being that 
the murderer was one of the workers resident at the camp. OL was one 
such worker, and evidence was admitted that during the preceding 
Saturday afternoon and evening he had made a number of unprovoked 
drunken assaults on other workers, with injuries being caused to the head, 
throat or face in each case. The majority of the High Court of Australia 
concluded that the evidence of the assaults on the other workers was prima 
facie admissible, and had been properly admitted, as evidence which 
established the context of what had happened immediately prior to the 
attack on the deceased. The `drunken orgy' and subsequent attack on the 
deceased comprised a connected series of events which could properly be 
regarded as a single transaction ± that is, the extraneous misconduct 
formed part of the res gestae ± and the evidence of what had happened 
during the orgy made it possible for the jury to obtain a real appreciation 
of the events at the camp prior to the murder: if that evidence had not been 
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admitted the jury would have been presented with an `unreal and not very 
intelligible event'. However, given the paucity of other evidence linking 
OL to the attack (OL's pullover being found nearby and evidence that OL 
had been in possession of a bottle shortly before the discovery of the 
deceased) the prosecution case was almost entirely dependent on this 
evidence of extraneous misconduct; and to justify the admission of the 
evidence on the ground that it set the murder in its proper context is to pay 
scant regard to the principles which are supposed to ensure that the 
accused receives a fair trial. The correct approach would have been to 
apply the similar facts test, assessing the probative value of the evidence by 
reference to the unlikelihood of coincidence. The murderer was almost 
certainly a worker at the timber mill and, given the manner of the brutal 
attack around the deceased's head and face and the inoffensive nature of 
the deceased, he was also an individual who was capable of inflicting 
appalling injuries without provocation while remaining oblivious to any 
sense of pity. OL fell into this very small category of individuals at the 
time in question, and was present in the camp, so the evidence of his 
previous misconduct was extremely probative. It was highly improbable 
that there was more than one person in the vicinity who would have 
murdered the deceased in such a brutal fashion, and the evidence of OL's 
disposition with the other two items of circumstantial evidence established 
a compelling case against him. Interestingly the trial judge would seem to 
have reasoned along these lines when ruling that the evidence was 
admissible similar fact evidence. 
Background evidence must therefore be `approached with particular 
care when it is being relied upon as part of the prosecution case' (R v. R 
[2001] 1 WLR 1314 (CA) at p. 1319; see also R v. Dolan [2003] 1 Cr App R 
281 (CA)). The judge should consider both reasoning prejudice and moral 
prejudice when deciding whether to exclude evidence of this sort in the 
exercise of his discretion, so the discretion to admit similar fact evidence 
has in effect become a discretion to exclude background evidence, the two 
tests being to all intents and purposes the same (a point which seems to 
have been acknowledged in R v. Underwood [1999] Crim LR 227 (CA) and 
R v. PR [2001] Crim LR 314 (CA), and which is exemplified by the way in 
which the trial judge in R v. Sawoniuk [2000] 2 Cr App R 220 (CA) 
approached the question of admissibility). That said, the prima facie rule 
of admissibility which governs background evidence may lead to this sort 
of evidence being admitted more readily, with a lower threshold of 
probative value being applied. This is what seems to have happened in R v. 
Butler [1999] Crim LR 835 (CA), where evidence of the accused's violent 
conduct against the deceased three years prior to the fatal incident was 
held to have been wrongly admitted by the trial judge. 
The case of R v. Sawoniuk [2000] 2 Cr App R 220 is of particular 
interest. S was charged under the War Crimes Act 1991 with the murder of 
a number of Jewish people in the east European town of Domachevo 
during the Second World War. The allegation was that, as a member of the 
local police force in collaboration with the German occupation forces, he 
had personally killed four individuals during the hunt for survivors 
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following the German massacre of the Jewish population in Domachevo 
on 20 September 1942, although a successful submission of no case to 
answer meant verdicts were required on only two of the murders. The 
direct evidence comprised eye-witness testimony that S had perpetrated 
those murders within the few weeks following the massacre. S's defence 
was that, though he had been a member of the local police, he had not been 
in Domachevo at the time the massacre had taken place, he had not seen 
any Jewish persons in Domachevo following his return to the town and 
there had been no police search and kill operation during that period after 
the massacre. The prosecution were permitted to call further witnesses who 
provided evidence of extraneous misconduct, the trial judge having ruled 
that it was relevant in showing that S had been actively involved in search 
and kill operations and that it ought not to be excluded in the exercise of 
his discretion as the probative value of the evidence outweighed its 
prejudicial effect. One of these witnesses, IB, testified that in the days 
following the massacre he had seen S commit a `heavy assault' on a Jewish 
woman and lead a Jewish family to the site of the massacre (none of whom 
IB ever saw again). Another witness, EM, testified that about 10 days after 
the massacre he had seen S and other policemen herding a group of Jewish 
people towards what had been the Jewish ghetto and that he never saw any 
of that group again. On appeal it was argued that the evidence of IB and 
EM should have been excluded as inadmissible similar fact evidence, but 
this submission was rejected by the Court of Appeal. First, it was held that 
the evidence was relevant in showing S's involvement in search and kill 
operations and that he was a member of the group of individuals to which 
the murderer belonged. The evidence was not adduced for the purpose of 
inviting the jury to reason from disposition to guilt, so it was not covered 
by the similar fact rule of prima facie inadmissibility ± a peculiar 
conclusion as it implies that the test in DPP v. P [1991] 3 WLR 161 (HL) 
(3.3.6 ante) does not apply unless the prosecution tender the extraneous 
misconduct evidence for that specific purpose. Second, applying R v. 
Pettman (1985) unreported (5048/C/82) (CA), it was held that the evidence 
was in any event properly admitted on the `broader basis' that criminal 
charges cannot be fairly judged in a factual vacuum and `in order to make 
a rational assessment of evidence directly relating to a charge it may often 
be necessary for a jury to receive evidence describing, perhaps in some 
detail, the context and circumstances in which the offences are said to have 
been committed'. Applying this test, it was held to be `necessary and 
appropriate' for the prosecution to prove that S, as a locally recruited 
policeman, played a leading and notorious role in enforcing Nazi policies 
against the Jewish population in Domachevo and that, following the 
massacre, he had been involved in the operation to hunt down and kill any 
Jewish survivors. Accordingly the evidence was `probative and admissible' 
for `had these gruesome events not been set in their factual context, the 
jury would have been understandably bewildered'. 
Finally, although it has been suggested above that the general test for 
admitting similar fact evidence should apply to background evidence 
which might give rise to reasoning prejudice, an exception would be 
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justified when the extraneous misconduct is inextricably linked in time and 
space with the commission of the offence charged, so that it might 
properly be regarded as part of the res gestae (in the sense that it is truly 
part and parcel of the instant allegation). As McHugh J said in Harriman 
v. R (1989) 167 CLR 590 (HCA) (at p. 633): 
`If evidence which discloses other criminal conduct is characterized as 
part of the transaction which embraces the crime charged, it is not 
subject to any further condition of admissibility. Evidence which 
directly relates to the facts in issue is so fundamental to the proceedings 
that its admissibility as a matter of law cannot depend upon a condition 
that its probative force transcends its prejudicial effect . . . Conse-
quently, it is a matter of great importance whether the evidence is 
classified as part of the res gestae . . .'  
Three points need to be noted about the res gestae justification. First, if 
the misconduct in question is charged as a separate count on the 
indictment then evidence in relation to it is admissible: it is not evidence of 
extraneous misconduct but of additional misconduct in respect of which 
the accused is on trial. Second, if there is no possibility of reasoning 
prejudice it may in any event be prima facie admissible for reasons which 
have already been given (3.3.8 ante); an example would be where criminal 
damage is committed in order to break into a house, but only the burglary 
is charged on the indictment. Third, the duration of the res gestae should 
be construed narrowly to ensure that the term is not simply used as a 
mechanism for admitting similar fact evidence `through the back door' 
without a proper assessment of its probative value and unduly prejudicial 
effect (R v. O'Leary (1946) 73 CLR 566 (HCA), above; and see R v. 
Rearden (1864) 4 F & F 76 (Assizes)). 
3.3.10 The Scope of the Similar Facts Rule 
The general exclusionary rule would appear to apply only to prosecution 
evidence of the accused's extraneous misconduct or disposition when it is 
tendered (i) to prove that the accused is guilty because of his disposition or 
(ii) to prove that the accused is guilty on some other logical basis but 
which might incidentally lead the jury to reason from disposition to guilt 
on account of the nature of the evidence and the offence charged. 
Prosecution evidence which falls into either of these categories is prima 
facie inadmissible unless it can properly be categorised as background (or 
res gestae) evidence or there is a statutory exception which disapplies the 
exclusionary rule. These types of evidence, along with (it seems) `moral 
prejudice evidence', are governed by a rule of prima facie admissibility, but 
may be excluded by the application of the common-law Sang discretion or 
s. 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
3.3.11 Similar Fact Evidence: Discretion or Rule of Law? 
The test for determining the admissibility of similar fact evidence in 
criminal proceedings is a particular application of the general test in any 
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proceedings for determining whether evidence should be considered 
`relevant' and prima facie admissible. Each test involves the weighing of 
probative value against competing factors underpinned by considerations 
of policy. It follows that, just as there can be no doctrine of `legal 
relevance' with judges bound by past decisions (3.1.4 ante), it is unrealistic 
to regard the application of the principles governing the admissibility of 
similar fact evidence as anything other than the exercise of a judicial 
discretion. This was explicitly recognised by the Court of Appeal in R v. 
Sokialiois [1993] Crim LR 872 and R v. Kidd [1995] Crim LR 406, but it is 
implicit in a number of earlier judgments (see, for example, R v. Robinson 
(1953) 37 Cr App R 95 (CCA) at p. 103, R v. Scarrott (1977) 65 Cr App R 
125 (CA) at p. 130 and R v. Butler (1986) 84 Cr App R 12 (CA) at p. 16). 
The same point was made by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. B(CR) 
[1990] 1 SCR 717. 
The trial judge's decision will be based on his personal assessment of 
the psychology of the jury: how the jury will approach the evidence, the 
weight they are likely to give it in the context of the other evidence and 
admissions, the extent to which the accused might be prejudiced in their 
collective mind and any other relevant considerations (such as whether the 
jury might be distracted from the central issues which have to be decided). 
The trial judge must `make a value judgment, not a mathematical 
calculation' (Pfennig v. R (1995) 182 CLR 461 (HCA) at p. 529) and 
`it may often be very difficult to draw the line and to decide whether a 
particular piece of evidence is on the one side or the other' (Makin v. 
Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57 (PC) at p. 65). It is 
therefore quite possible that different judges will reach a different view on 
the same facts, but this does not mean that there is no rule of law. The 
rule is that there is, in effect, an inclusionary discretion, but once the trial 
judge concludes that the evidence is so probative that it ought to be 
admitted, notwithstanding the risk or certainty of undue prejudice, it is 
admissible. 
The pre-Boardman test of automatic admissibility was a much less 
flexible rule. If the similar fact evidence was admissible by virtue of its 
falling within a category of relevance it was ipso facto admissible, save that 
the judge could apply his exclusionary discretion if its admission would 
unduly prejudice the accused (Noor Mohamed v. R [1949] AC 182 (PC) at 
p. 192, R v. Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 (CCA) at p. 917, Harris v. DPP 
[1952] AC 694 (HL) at p. 707, DPP v. Boardman [1974] 3 WLR 673 (HL) 
at p. 699). The continuing relevance of the exclusionary discretion was 
acknowledged by the Court of Appeal in a number of post-Boardman 
cases (for example, R v. Mustafa (1976) 65 Cr App R 26, R v. Lewis (1982) 
76 Cr App R 33, R v. Lunt (1986) 85 Cr App R 241 and R v. Butler (1986) 
84 Cr App R 12); but if the rule governing admissibility is in effect an 
inclusionary discretion, it is difficult to accept the argument that an 
independent exclusionary discretion may be applied to exclude otherwise 
admissible similar fact evidence, for the common-law Sang discretion to 
exclude admissible prosecution evidence itself requires a consideration of 
probative value and undue prejudice. 
74 Evidence 
One way of rationalising an additional exclusionary discretion would be 
to hold that the initial test for admissibility requires, as a matter of law, an 
analysis of reasoning prejudice and probative value, with moral prejudice 
being brought into the equation, along with any other relevant factors, for 
the subsequent exercise of the trial judge's common-law and/or statutory 
discretion. After all, when determining the admissibility of similar fact 
evidence the courts have traditionally been concerned with reasoning 
prejudice ± avoiding the `forbidden chain of reasoning' ± and there would 
appear to be a rule of prima facie admissibility for `moral prejudice 
evidence' (3.3.8 ante). 
However, there has been no explicit recognition that reasoning and 
moral prejudice are to be decoupled by the judge when considering 
whether to admit similar fact evidence; and it is highly unlikely that trial 
judges divide up the species of undue prejudice in this way (in cases where 
both types of prejudice are possible). In R v. B(CR) [1990] 1 SCR 717 the 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, having accepted that the 
admissibility of similar fact evidence depends on `whether the probative 
value of the proposed evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect', went on to 
state that `where the similar fact evidence sought to be adduced is 
prosecution evidence of a morally repugnant act committed by the 
accused, the potential prejudice is great and the probative value of the 
evidence must be high indeed to permit its reception', implying that moral 
as well as reasoning prejudice must be considered at the admissibility stage 
(see also R v. Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 (CCCR) at p. 398, 3.3.2 ante). And in 
Pfennig v. R (1995) 182 CLR 461 (HCA) McHugh J said (at p. 515) that 
`once it is accepted that the prejudicial effect of the evidence is a matter 
going to admissibility, no scope remains for the exercise of the discretion 
to reject probative evidence in criminal trials on the ground that it is 
unduly prejudicial to the accused'. 
3.3.12 Directing the Jury 
If evidence of the accused's bad character is admitted as similar fact 
evidence, the trial judge will need to consider whether it is necessary to 
direct the jury on the use which may be made of it, to minimise the risk of 
undue prejudice. In extreme factual situations, where the evidence of 
disposition is so compelling that it comprises the entire prosecution case, 
any warning on the need to avoid giving too much weight to the evidence 
would be otiose because the jury are actually being invited to reason that 
the accused is guilty on the basis of his highly unusual disposition (as in 
R v. Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 (CCA)). However, in some cases it might still 
be appropriate to warn the jury against the risk of moral prejudice. 
In other cases the risk of both moral and reasoning prejudice may need 
to be explained to the jury, but much will depend on the facts of the case 
and the reason for admitting the evidence. In DPP v. Boardman [1974] 3 
WLR 673 (HL) Lord Hailsham expressed the view (at p. 699) that a judge 
should always direct the jury not to reason from propensity to guilt ± 
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`a warning from the judge that the jury must eschew the forbidden 
reasoning' ± but his analysis was based on the first limb of the Makin 
formula, which excluded similar fact evidence if it was relevant only via an 
argument from disposition to guilt. It is apparent that similar fact evidence 
is admissible even if its relevance is entirely dependent on `forbidden' 
reasoning, and clearly a blanket warning of the sort envisaged by Lord 
Hailsham would be absurd in such cases, as indeed was recognised by the 
Court of Appeal in R v. Sokialiois [1993] Crim LR 872 (see also R v. Roy 
[1992] Crim LR 185 (CA) and R v. Whitehouse [1996] Crim LR 50 (CA)). 
However, in other cases a warning from the judge is likely to be the best 
way of reducing the risk of undue prejudice. Thus, while a warning is not a 
mandatory requirement in all cases (R v. Rance (1975) 62 Cr App R 118 
(CA)) a direction of some kind will be necessary if the relevance of the 
accused's previous misconduct is not based on reasoning from disposition 
to guilt or the accused's disposition is particularly unpleasant. If the 
accused is charged with the manslaughter of a child he has beaten on 
several occasions in the past, and the prosecution case is that his attempts 
to beat the child again caused him to run away and fall down the stairs, 
the accused's previous ill-treatment of the child would be admissible 
`background evidence' (R v. Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App R 453 (CA)). The 
reason for admitting the evidence would be to show that the child was 
afraid of being beaten again, and that it is reasonable to expect that he 
would rush down the stairs to escape from the accused. The accused's past 
misconduct would be relevant to the issue of causation, but its relevance 
would not depend on reasoning from disposition to guilt. As such, it 
would be necessary for the judge to give an appropriate direction to the 
jury on the limited use which could be made of the evidence (a point made 
in R v. PR [2001] Crim LR 314 (00/2431/Y3) (CA)). R v. Singh [2001] 
EWCA Crim 2884 provides another useful example. In that case the 
accused's previous conviction for unlawfully wounding a French student 
at 42 Oakridge Road in 1998 was admitted at his trial for blackmailing a 
number of students living at 44 Oakridge Road in 1999. The conviction 
supported the students' visual identification of the accused as the 
blackmailer, as he had told them during the course of his `protection 
racket' that he had stabbed a French student in their house or a nearby 
house a year earlier. In other words, the conviction was admitted not for 
the purpose of proving that the accused was guilty on the basis of his 
disposition, but to prove that the accused had been correctly identified by 
the students as the blackmailer. However, because the conviction also 
showed that he was a violent person, and the blackmailer had backed up 
his demands with threats of violence, the trial judge quite properly 
directed the jury not to treat the conviction as evidence of disposition. 
Finally, a warning on the weight to be attached to admissible similar 
fact evidence will be necessary in cases where there is a risk of collusion 
between complainants (R v. H [1995] 2 WLR 737 (HL), 3.3.13 post) or  
there are dissimilarities which ought to be brought to the jury's attention 
(R v. Tricoglus (1976) 65 Cr App R 16 (CA)). 
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3.3.13 Joinder of Counts and Cross-Admissibility 
Section 4 of the Indictments Act 1915 and r. 9 of the Indictment Rules 
1971 provide that charges relating to separate offences may be joined as 
several counts on a single indictment if the offences are `founded on the 
same facts or form part of a series of offences of the same or a similar 
character'. The trial judge has a statutory discretion to order separate 
trials if the accused might be prejudiced or if it is otherwise desirable 
(s. 5(3) of the 1915 Act). If the prosecution allege that the accused has 
committed a series of similar offences, the separate charges will initially be 
joined as counts on a single indictment and, following submissions from 
prosecution and defence counsel on probative value, prejudice and 
convenience, there will be one or more of three possible outcomes: 
(i)	 The judge may hold the prosecution evidence to be `cross-admissible' 
as similar fact evidence. The charges will be tried together as separate 
counts on a single indictment, and the judge will direct the jury that 
the prosecution evidence on each count may be considered relevant 
evidence tending to prove the accused's guilt in respect of the other 
counts. 
(ii)	 The judge may hold that the evidence is not cross-admissible (as the 
probative value is not high enough to amount to admissible similar 
fact evidence) but still allow the counts to be tried together on the 
ground of expediency. The jury will be directed not to regard the 
evidence on one count as relevant to any other count. This option is 
a natural consequence of Ludlow v. Metropolitan Police Commis-
sioner [1970] 2 WLR 521 where the House of Lords held that for 
counts to be joined on an indictment all that is needed is a loose 
nexus between the offences so that they can be described as a series ± 
cross-admissibility is not a prerequisite to joinder. In fact the judge 
may decide that the evidence is cross-admissible at the beginning of 
the trial (option (i)) and change his mind as the true probative value 
of the evidence materialises; the judge will then direct the jury not to 
consider the evidence to be cross-admissible, or he may discharge the 
jury if the undue prejudice generated cannot be removed by any such 
direction (option (iii) below). Conversely, the judge is free to decide 
that the evidence is cross-admissible during the trial notwithstanding 
a contrary decision at the outset. 
(iii)	 The judge may hold that it would be too prejudicial for the charges 
to be tried together. The charges will be tried separately before 
different juries who will be kept in the dark about the other charges 
against the accused. 
Option (ii) is far from satisfactory as the jury will hear unduly 
prejudicial evidence and may regard it as relevant to the other counts no 
matter what the judge says. If the accused is charged with having 
committed separate similar offences and the judge decides the evidence is 
not cross-admissible one might think, as a matter of principle, that 
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separate trials should be ordered to ensure he receives a fair trial. 
However, s. 5(3) of the Indictments Act 1915 gives the judge a broad 
discretion and the Court of Appeal will generally not interfere with the 
judge's view unless he has `failed to exercise the discretion upon the usual 
and proper principles' which requires fairness to the accused, the 
prosecution and other persons involved in the proceedings (R v. Cannan 
(1990) 92 Cr App R 16 (CA) at p. 23, R v. Christou [1996] 2 WLR 620 
(HL) at pp. 629±30). 
If the accused faces several separate charges of sexual abuse against 
young persons known to each other (such as class-mates or siblings) the 
probative value of their testimony will turn on the possibility that they 
have either conspired with each other to bring similar false allegations or 
been innocently infected by other persons (or media reports). The judge 
must come to a decision at the beginning of the trial on the issue of 
joinder, and it is clear from R v. Christou [1996] 2 WLR 620 (HL) that no 
special rules apply just because it is alleged that the accused has sexually 
abused children. The judge will also need to reach a provisional decision 
on the issue of cross-admissibility, and this will be based on the available 
witnesses' statements and the extent to which the jury are likely to be 
unduly prejudiced against the accused. At the pre-trial stage the possibility 
of conspiracy or innocent infection is likely to be no more than 
speculation, so generally the judge should not take it into account when 
assessing the probative value of the complainants' evidence: their evidence 
is to be presumed true at this stage (R v. H [1995] 2 WLR 737 (HL)). 
Assessing the risk of conspiracy or innocent infection is a matter for the 
jury, although the judge will need to give them an appropriate warning 
and, it seems, direct them to disregard the complainants' evidence if they 
are not satisfied that their evidence is free from conspiracy. (If the risk is 
one of innocent infection it seems the judge need only direct the jury to 
take that risk into consideration when assessing the weight of the 
evidence.) If the judge decides that no reasonable jury could be sure the 
complainants' evidence is free from conspiracy he will have to order 
separate trials, so it may exceptionally be necessary to hold a voir dire to 
determine the extent of this risk at the pre-trial stage. 
3.3.14 Identification and Striking Similarity 
In DPP v. P [1991] 3 WLR 161 (HL) Lord Mackay felt that where the 
identity of the offender is in issue `something in the nature of . . . a 
signature or other special feature will be necessary' in the similar fact 
evidence for it to be admissible (see also R v. West [1996] 2 Cr App R 374 
(CA) at pp. 390±1). It is difficult to see why this should be a rule of general 
application, however. The probative value of similar fact evidence depends 
on the other admissible evidence and the suggestion that there must be a 
`signature' (that is, some form of striking peculiarity) in all identification 
cases fails to appreciate this. If the prosecution case depends entirely or 
primarily on similar fact evidence to identify the accused as the offender, 
then it is correct to say that the similar fact evidence must demonstrate 
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some form of `signature' ± and the absence of any significant disparities (R 
v. Johnson [1995] 2 Cr App R 41 (CA)). Yet more often than not one 
would expect there to be other evidence identifying the accused, and in 
such cases no striking peculiarity ought to be necessary. In Thompson v. R 
[1918] AC 221 (HL) (3.3.4 ante) the issue was whether the accused was the 
person who had committed an offence on 16 March, but the evidence of 
his sexual appetite could not be described as an identifying `signature'. 
Lewd photographs and powder puffs would appear to have been the 
standard accoutrements of any pederast of that era. The probative value 
of that evidence depended not on any need for striking peculiarities but on 
the fact that the accused turned up at the rendezvous with a predilection 
for young boys, equipped for buggery. The Court of Appeal has since 
recognised that a striking similarity is not always necessary for 
identification cases (R v. Wharton [1998] 2 Cr App R 289; see also R v. 
Downey [1995] 1 Cr App R 547 (CA) at pp. 550±51, R v. Ruiz [1995] Crim 
LR 151 (CA) and R v. Lee [1996] Crim LR 825 (CA)). 
3.3.14.1 Two Approaches to Identification Evidence 
It is not uncommon for several offences to be committed in a similar way, 
suggesting a single offender, but with the evidence identifying the offender 
on each occasion being in some way unsatisfactory. The question is 
whether, and if so in what circumstances, the separate weak identifications 
should be regarded as mutually supportive to provide sufficiently 
probative evidence identifying the offender. In R v. McGranaghan [1995] 
1 Cr App R 559 the accused was tried on a single indictment containing 17 
different counts arising out of three separate aggravated burglaries in 
which women were woken up in the middle of the night and grossly 
abused and/or raped. The evidence of each attack was held to be cross-
admissible similar fact evidence to prove the other attacks. In each case the 
victims were able to identify the offender as about 5' 10'' tall with, inter 
alia, dark hair and either a Scottish or Irish accent; and the offender told 
all of his victims to turn their eyes away from him during the assaults. The 
sole issue was the identity of the offender, but the victims had only been 
able to glance at his face in dark conditions and there was no 
circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the offences. The Court 
of Appeal laid down a general rule that where an accused is charged with 
more than one offence and the facts of each offence are similar enough for 
the evidence in relation to one offence to be admissible in support of the 
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of another, the judge must 
direct the jury that they should first disregard the similar fact evidence and 
be sure from the other evidence that the accused committed at least one of 
the offences. Only then would it be permissible for the jury to use the 
similar fact evidence to decide whether the accused committed the other 
offences too: `The similar facts go to show that the same man committed 
both offences not that the defendant was that man. There must be some 
evidence to make the jury sure that on at least one offence the defendant 
was that man' (at p. 573). The Court of Appeal seemed to feel that there 
could be no circumstances where cumulative evidence of identification 
Relevance, Disposition and `Similar Facts' 79 
could be relied on, but the error in this reasoning has been demonstrated 
by a number of subsequent cases. 
If there is clear evidence that the same offender committed all the 
offences charged, then there is no logical reason why a number of separate 
identifications should not be considered cumulatively to identify that 
offender. This was recognised in R v. Downey [1995] 1 Cr App R 547 
where the accused was charged with two robberies which had been 
committed at petrol stations separated by three miles within 15 minutes of 
each other. In each case the offender had been white and of similar build, 
and had worn a black stocking mask, threatened a member of staff with a 
gun and grabbed money from the till. There was also a photograph of the 
offender at the first petrol station. The trial judge directed the jury that if 
they were sure that the same person had committed both robberies, then 
they were entitled to look at the cumulative effect of all the identification 
evidence to see whether that person was the accused. This direction was 
upheld on appeal as there was a clear nexus between the two robberies 
entitling the jury to adopt such an approach. The Court of Appeal went on 
to explain that there were two different `aspects' to the similar fact 
situation; these may be summarised as follows. 
First, there is the sequential (McGranaghan-type) situation where the 
jury are invited to reason that because the accused committed offence B he 
was also the unidentified person who committed offence A. To prove the 
accused committed offence A requires proof that he actually committed 
offence B, and also evidence of peculiar characteristics (`striking 
similarities') relating to the surrounding circumstances or the commission 
of both offences A and B. The clearest example is R v. Straffen [1952] 2 
QB 911 (CCA) (3.3.4 ante) where the accused's confession as to the way he 
had previously strangled two other girls was admitted to demonstrate the 
strikingly peculiar way in which all three girls had been killed, tending to 
prove that the same person had been responsible for all these offences (see 
also R v. Black [1995] Crim LR 640 (CA)). By contrast, in Harris v. DPP 
[1952] AC 694 (HL) the accused faced eight counts of burglary but the 
only evidence connecting him with seven of the burglaries was evidence of 
opportunity, although there was some other circumstantial evidence that 
he had committed the eighth burglary. The House of Lords held that the 
evidence of the first seven counts should not have been admitted to show 
he had committed the eighth burglary as the prosecution had not proved 
that the accused had committed any of those seven burglaries or indeed 
that the same person had been responsible for all eight offences. 
Second, there is the type of case exemplified by R v. Downey [1995] 1 Cr 
App R 547, where the circumstances clearly show that the same offender 
committed offences A and B, because of the way the offences are `welded 
together', but the identification evidence falls short of proving that that 
person is the accused in either case taken alone. The Court of Appeal felt a 
cumulative approach to be appropriate in such cases and that the trial 
judge's direction had therefore been correct. It should be noted that 
striking peculiarities are unnecessary in cases of this type because the 
prosecution are not heavily dependent on the similar fact evidence. In R v. 
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Downey it was primarily the close proximity in time and space between the 
separate offences which lent force to the theory that the same offender had 
committed both offences; the similar fact evidence merely needed to show 
that there were sufficient similarities in appearance and modus operandi on 
each occasion to prevent any suggestion that the robberies had not been 
the work of the same person. The cumulative approach has been followed 
by the Court of Appeal in a number of other cases. In R v. Barnes [1995] 2 
Cr App R 491, for example, the fact that a number of sexual offences had 
all been commenced in a similar way in the same month in the same part 
of north London by a young black man with acne provided the nexus 
which allowed the jury to be directed along the lines approved in R v. 
Downey (see also R v. Grant [1996] 2 Cr App R 272). 
3.3.14.2 Identification Evidence and Gangs 
Where the issue is whether several offences were committed by the same 
gang, it is necessary to adopt a two-stage approach requiring a 
consideration of (i) whether the same gang was actually responsible on 
each occasion and, if so, (ii) whether the gang comprised the same 
members on each occasion. If the sequential approach is used it must first 
be proved that the gang committed one offence. The similarities between 
the offences must then be assessed to see whether the same gang 
committed the other offence, and once this has been proved the 
individuals themselves must be the focus of attention to see whether they 
were members of the gang on both occasions. The cumulative approach 
will require proof that the same gang committed both offences (for 
example because of the close relationship between the offences in space 
and time), with the evidence linking an individual to one offence then 
being admissible to link him with the other offence. 
In cases of group identification the sequential approach is more likely to 
be appropriate because there is always a danger that the gang's 
composition might have changed between offences, particularly where 
the offences are not sufficiently `welded together'. In R v. Lee [1996] Crim 
LR 825 four accused were charged with two counts of burglary relating to 
separate incidents. The trial judge ruled that the evidence in respect of 
count 1 (the first burglary) was admissible similar fact evidence in relation 
to count 2 (the second burglary) because similarities in the way the 
offences had been committed indicated that the same gang had been 
responsible on both occasions. However, as already noted, while a gang 
may have a particular signature method this does not necessarily mean 
that it comprised exactly the same members during the commission of 
each offence. Lee's conviction for the second burglary was quashed by the 
Court of Appeal for, while there was sufficient evidence linking him with 
the first burglary, the evidence linking him to the second had little 
probative value. 
R v. Lee [1996] Crim LR 825 was a case where the sequential approach 
was thought appropriate, but in R v. Brown [1997] Crim LR 502 the Court 
of Appeal applied the cumulative approach on the ground that the 
similarities between the separate robberies, in each case relating to grocery 
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shops in the same chain, showed the same gang to have been involved. The 
offences occurred on 20 February and 4 April 1994 in west and north 
London respectively, and in each case the same shotgun and similar cable 
ties had been used by the offenders. The identification evidence of the 
offenders was weak, so the trial judge allowed the jury to adopt the 
cumulative approach once they were satisfied that the same gang had 
committed both offences. This approach was approved by the Court of 
Appeal: once the jury had concluded that the same gang had been 
involved on both occasions they were entitled to pool all the admissible 
evidence to determine the involvement of each individual. It was 
emphasised, however, that the totality of the admissible evidence must 
make the jury sure of each individual's involvement both as a gang 
member and as a participant in the particular offences. 
3.3.15 Section 27(3) of the Theft Act 1968 
Since the nineteenth century there has been, in respect of allegations of 
handling stolen property, a statutory provision allowing the prosecution 
to adduce evidence of the accused's conduct on other occasions as 
evidence that he had the mens rea for handling (that is, that he knew or 
believed the property was stolen). The justification for this departure from 
the general rule governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence seems 
to lie in the difficulty of proving the mens rea for handling in cases where 
the accused has been found in possession of stolen goods. The latest 
incarnation of this provision is s. 27(3) of the Theft Act 1968 which 
provides as follows: 
Where a person is being proceeded against for handling stolen goods . . . 
then at any stage of the proceedings, if evidence has been given of his 
having or arranging to have in his possession the goods the subject of 
the charge, or of his undertaking or assisting in, or arranging to 
undertake or assist in, their retention, removal, disposal or realisation, 
the following evidence shall be admissible for the purpose of proving 
that he knew or believed the goods to be stolen goods ± 
(a) evidence that he has had in his possession, or has undertaken or 
assisted in the retention, removal, disposal or realisation of, stolen 
goods from any theft taking place not earlier than twelve months 
before the offence charged; and 
(b) (provided that seven days' notice in writing has been given to him 
of the intention to prove the conviction) evidence that he has 
within the five years preceding the date of the offence charged been 
convicted of theft or of handling stolen goods. 
Once the actus reus of handling the subject matter of the proceedings 
has been proved, evidence which supposedly shows the accused to have a 
disposition to handle stolen goods (within the preceding year) and 
evidence of his convictions over the preceding five years for handling and/ 
or theft is admissible. But s. 27(3) allows the prosecution to adduce such 
evidence only where knowledge or belief that the goods were stolen is in 
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issue; the evidence cannot be adduced for any other reason such as to 
show dishonesty (R v. Duffus (1993) 158 JP 224 (CA)). The judge must 
therefore give the jury a careful direction on the use which may be made of 
the evidence if the accused is charged with several counts of handling on 
the same indictment, and knowledge or belief is in issue for some counts 
but not others (R v. Wilkins (1975) 60 Cr App R 300 (CA)). 
3.3.15.1 Section 27(3)(a) 
In R v. Bradley (1979) 70 Cr App R 200 the accused had been found in 
possession of a stolen ring and the judge allowed the prosecution to 
adduce evidence that he had been in possession of another ring (which had 
been stolen within the preceding 12 months) and also evidence of that 
other theft and how the accused had come to be in possession of that ring. 
The Court of Appeal held that s. 27(3)(a) was to be strictly construed and 
that it did not empower the prosecution to adduce `details of the very 
transactions as a result of which that earlier property had come into the 
possession of the accused'. Only the fact of possession of stolen property 
on an earlier occasion should have been admitted. Similarly, in R v. Wood 
(1987) 85 Cr App R 287 (CA) it was held that s. 27(3)(a) did not allow 
evidence of the circumstances in which the stolen goods were found or 
statements made in explanation of possession. 
The reason for admitting evidence under s. 27(3)(a) is to allow the jury 
to reason from disposition to guilt (a single possession apparently being 
sufficient evidence of disposition for this purpose). Yet s. 27(3)(a) allows 
the prosecution to adduce evidence of just the bare fact of any other 
possession even though that other possession may have been entirely 
innocent. The probative value of evidence admissible under s. 27(3)(a) is  
rarely going to be particularly high, and would seem to have no function 
other than to make admissible what would ordinarily be regarded as 
irrelevant. To be able to reason from another possession to guilt must 
depend on the improbability of a person on trial for handling being 
innocent if he has been found in possession of stolen goods on another 
recent occasion. But that chain of reasoning is generally going to be 
unsound when there is a reliance on s. 27(3)(a) as there will usually remain 
a real risk of coincidence. 
Section 27(3)(a) would make some sense if it had been drafted to allow 
the prosecution to adduce evidence that the accused had the mens rea for 
handling on the other occasions, in which case its probative value would 
be much greater; or if the provision had been interpreted to allow the 
prosecution to adduce evidence of the circumstances surrounding the 
other possession, for any probative value the fact of possession has will 
depend on those circumstances and on the accused's explanation. Indeed, 
the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v. Smith (1918) 13 Cr App R 151 
interpreted an earlier version of s. 27(3)(a) (s. 43(1)(a) of the Larceny Act 
1916) so as to permit the adduction of evidence of circumstances, but in 
R v. Bradley (1979) 70 Cr App R 200 the Court of Appeal declined to 
accept that R v. Smith had established a precedent, holding instead that 
s. 27(3)(a) had to be interpreted restrictively to protect the accused. The 
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prosecution therefore have the right to adduce the fact of a possession but 
nothing which would enable the jury to assess its probative value. 
3.3.15.2 Section 27(3)(b) 
Section 27(3)(b) was also interpreted restrictively in R v. Fowler (1987) 86 
Cr App R 219 (CA), precluding the admission of any details of the 
previous offence bar the fact of the conviction. However, that decision was 
disapproved by the House of Lords in R v. Hacker [1994] 1 WLR 1659 on 
the ground that s. 73(2)(a) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
allows the `substance and effect' of an admissible previous conviction to be 
adduced. 
3.3.15.3 The Exclusionary Discretion 
It was held by Roskill J in R v. List (1965) 50 Cr App R 81 (Assizes), a 
decision approved in R v. Herron (1966) 50 Cr App R 132 (CCA), that the 
trial judge had an overriding common-law discretion to exclude 
prosecution evidence tendered pursuant to s. 43(1) of the Larceny Act 
1916 if its prejudicial effect would outweigh its probative value. The 
discretion applies equally to s. 27(3) of the Theft Act 1968 (R v. Knott 
[1973] Crim LR 36 (CA), R v. Perry [1984] Crim LR 680 (CA)), although 
it must now be regarded as no more than one facet of the more general 
discretion recognised in R v. Sang [1979] 3 WLR 263 (HL) to exclude any 
admissible prosecution evidence. 
3.3.16 The Ghost of Makin 
In R v. Burrage [1997] 2 Cr App R 88 it was alleged that B had indecently 
assaulted his grandsons. B denied the allegations and the trial judge 
allowed the prosecution to adduce evidence of his collection of 
pornographic magazines depicting heterosexual and homosexual adults 
in action. The Court of Appeal quite properly quashed his convictions as 
the magazines clearly indicated nothing more than an interest in adult 
pornography and were of very little probative value in the context of the 
offence charged. What is worrying is that the Court expressly based its 
decision on Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57 
(PC) and applied R v. Wright (1989) 90 Cr App R 325 (CA), a throw-back 
to the post-Makin `categories of relevance' approach to admissibility. B 
had not raised any of the recognised defences which brought into play the 
automatic admissibility of similar fact evidence (his defence was a bare 
denial of the allegation) and therefore the evidence of his disposition was 
held to be inadmissible (see also R v. Lewis (1982) 76 Cr App R 33 (CA)). 
DPP v. P [1991] 3 WLR 161 (HL) was mentioned only in passing, and 
DPP v. Boardman [1974] 3 WLR 673 (HL) was not mentioned at all, 
demonstrating that the ghost of Makin lives on notwithstanding two 
attempts by the House of Lords to exorcise it. Indeed, both R v. Burrage 
and R v. Wright were relied on as precedents in R v. Alowi (1999) 
unreported (97/08493/W3) (CA), which is absurd. Reverting to categories 
of relevance is to be deprecated as illogical and wrong in principle. Why 
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should child pornography be admissible if the accused admits contact but 
claims it was innocent (the post-Makin category of `innocent association') 
and yet be inadmissible if his defence is a bare denial of any contact? It is 
true that where contact has been admitted the context may increase the 
probative value of such evidence, but that does not mean the evidence will 
never be so probative in the absence of such an admission. A young child 
may accuse his stepfather of specific indecent acts, and the accused may 
have, locked away in some secret hiding place, pornographic photographs 
of the very same acts by adult men against young boys. It would be an 
affront to common sense if the photographs could not be admitted on the 
ground that the accused's defence was one of bare denial. 
Another problem is that, even when the modern (DPP v. P) test is 
expressly applied, the Court of Appeal occasionally speaks in the language 
of the Makin test, with reference to `whether the acts alleged to constitute 
the crime charged were designed or accidental' and `to rebut a defence 
which would otherwise be open to the accused' (see, for example, R v. Kidd 
[1995] Crim LR 406 (CA)). While it is necessary to identify the context 
which gives similar fact evidence its probative value, it would be better if 
this assessment could be made without reference to the post-Makin 
categories. 
3.3.17 Similar Fact Evidence Adduced by a Co-accused 
If D1 and D2 are tried together for committing the same offence as a joint 
enterprise, they may each pursue a `cut-throat' defence, denying personal 
involvement and blaming each other. In such circumstances D2 may wish 
to adduce evidence of D1's extraneous misconduct or disposition to show 
that D1 is more likely than D2 to have committed the offence. So long as 
such evidence is relevant to D2's defence, the judge has no discretion to 
exclude it just because it would unduly prejudice D1. Similarly, if D2 
raises the defence of duress, and claims that he committed the offence 
charged because D1 had threatened him with violence, it would be 
permissible for D2 to adduce evidence of an extraneous act of violence by 
D1 against him regardless of whether it occurred before or after the 
offence charged, and regardless of any undue prejudice engendered against 
D1 by its admission (R v. Nethercott [2002] 2 Cr App R 117 (CA)). This is 
an application of the principle established in R v. Miller (1952) 36 Cr App 
R 169 (Assizes) which allows an accused to adduce any admissible 
evidence supportive of his own defence no matter how prejudicial it would 
be to his co-accused. It is not enough, however, that the evidence of D1's 
disposition makes it more likely that D1 committed the offence if it has no 
probative value in relation to D2's defence. In R v. Knutton (1992) 97 Cr 
App R 115 (CA) D1's `formidable list of previous convictions' for offences 
of violence was held to be irrelevant to the question whether D2 had also 
been involved in an aggravated burglary with D1 or had been elsewhere. 
In practice, though, the trial judge does have a limited discretion to 
exclude evidence of D1's extraneous misconduct even if it is logically 
relevant to D2's defence. This is a consequence of the theory which 
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justifies the exclusion of any logically probative evidence on the ground of 
`irrelevance' (3.3.7 ante). No party may adduce evidence which is deemed 
to be irrelevant to an issue or collateral fact, and it has been seen that 
logically relevant evidence may be excluded on the ground of irrelevance if 
it is expedient to do so (3.1.3 ante). Thus in R v. Neale (1977) 65 Cr App R 
304, where D1 and D2 were jointly charged with arson and manslaughter 
and it was D2's defence that he had not been present, evidence that D1 
had a propensity to commit arson by himself was excluded as irrelevant to 
the question whether or not D2 had been involved with him on the 
occasion in question. D1's disposition to act alone had a degree of 
probative value with regard to D2's defence, but the Court of Appeal 
dismissed this argument as a non sequitur. A different approach was 
adopted in R v. Kracher [1995] Crim LR 819, however. The prosecution in 
that case alleged that two bouncers, D1 and D2, had assaulted V as a joint 
enterprise, and D2 raised the defence that he had merely been holding V to 
protect him from D1's attack. The Court of Appeal held that D2's 
evidence of D1's propensity to sudden unprovoked violence was relevant 
to his defence and should have been admitted. Perhaps the evidence was 
admissible because there was no risk of unduly prejudicing D1, who had 
already pleaded guilty (unlike the situation in R v. Neale where both D1 
and D2 had pleaded not guilty). 
In R v. Thompson [1995] 2 Cr App R 589 the Court of Appeal left open 
the question whether it could ever be appropriate to balance probative 
value and undue prejudice where the accused seeks to adduce evidence of 
his co-accused's disposition. The prosecution case was that three men had 
been involved in burglary, arson and manslaughter as part of a joint 
enterprise. Before the trial, all three admitted involvement in the burglary 
and that a fire had been started, but D1 and D3 blamed D2 for the fire 
while D2 blamed the other two. During his interview with the police D2 
mentioned that D1 had told him in the presence of D3 that they always 
`torched their jobs' to cover their tracks and that they had burgled and set 
fire to a housing office a week earlier. The whole of D2's interview was 
admitted in evidence at the trial without objection. The trial judge also 
allowed D2's counsel to cross-examine witnesses called by the prosecution 
to elicit evidence that D1 and D3 had been seen by them at the scene of a 
fire at a housing office a week before the instant offence. The Court of 
Appeal held that D2's counsel had been entitled to do this, notwithstand-
ing the undue prejudice caused to D1 and D3, as the evidence elicited was 
relevant to the consistency and credibility of D2's defence. It was also held 
that even if an exclusionary discretion did exist it would have been 
exercised in D2's favour. 
The co-accused's adverse disposition will be relevant to the accused's 
defence and therefore admissible if they blame each other and the 
co-accused claims to be of a disposition which makes him less likely to be 
guilty. In R v. Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44, D1 and D2 were jointly 
charged with the violent murder of an elderly man during the course of 
their admitted burglary of his home, with each of them blaming the other 
for the killing. The Court of Appeal held that while evidence of D1's 
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violent disposition was not originally relevant to whether D2 had also 
been involved, it became relevant, and therefore admissible, when D1 
claimed that he was a non-violent professional burglar and that D2 was 
inexperienced and excitable. D2 should therefore have been able to cross-
examine D1 on his violent disposition and call evidence to rebut his denial 
if necessary (see also R v. Douglass (1989) 89 Cr App R 264 (CA), 3.4.5 
post). A similar decision had been reached in Lowery v. R [1973] 3 WLR 
235 where two men were jointly charged with the sadistic murder of a 15-
year-old girl. Each blamed the other for the offence, although they both 
admitted they had been at the scene. The Privy Council upheld the trial 
judge's decision to allow D2 to adduce expert opinion evidence of D1's 
aggressive personality disorder and of D2's own weak personality. The 
scientific evidence `could point to the probability that the perpetrator was 
the one rather than the other'. It was D2's defence that only D1 had been 
involved in the murder and evidence of their respective personalities was 
therefore relevant to his defence. The Court of Appeal has recently 
confirmed that, where D1 and D2 are jointly charged with an offence of 
violence, and evidence of D1's violent disposition is adduced or elicited by 
D2 pursuant to a cut-throat defence, D1's bad-character is admissible not 
only to demonstrate that D1 is not worthy of belief as a witness but also 
(as similar fact evidence) to show that D1 is more likely than D2 to have 
committed the offence charged (R v. Randall [2003] EWCA Crim 436). 
3.3.18 Special Cases 
Occasionally it will be necessary for the prosecution to adduce evidence 
that the accused has (or may have) committed an offence before, either 
because the commission of a prior offence is a necessary element of the 
offence charged or because the nature of the charge means it would be 
impossible to withhold the evidence. For example, to prove a charge of 
driving while disqualified, contrary to s. 103(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 
1988, it is necessary to prove that the accused was disqualified (following a 
conviction) at the relevant time; and to prove a charge of absconding on 
bail contrary to s. 6(1) of the Bail Act 1976 it is impossible to withhold the 
fact that the accused was on bail for an alleged offence. 
3.3.19 The Disposition of Persons other than the Accused 
If the accused is charged with an offence involving a third party, the 
accused may wish to cast the blame on to him in order to exculpate 
himself. The obvious example would be where the accused admits he killed 
another person but raises self-defence. Evidence of the deceased's own 
violent disposition would be logically relevant to his defence and therefore 
admissible. Similarly, if the accused is charged with the murder of his wife, 
and he claims that she committed suicide, he would be able to give 
evidence of her previous attempts to kill herself (as in R v. Kavanagh [2002] 
EWCA Crim 904); and in a case where the accused relies on the defence of 
duress, he would be able to adduce evidence of the violent disposition of 
the third party who allegedly threatened him. Once the judge has 
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concluded that the evidence is relevant to the accused's defence, and is 
therefore prima facie admissible, there is no further discretion to exclude it. 
The case of R v. Murray [1995] RTR 239 provides a useful illustration. M 
was charged with reckless driving, his defence being that his car had been 
deliberately forced off the road by the driver of another car, a Golf, and in 
a frightened state he had driven off at speed pursued by the Golf. The 
driver of the Golf, McM, did not turn up at the trial and the prosecution 
relied instead on the evidence of his passenger. M had wished to cross-
examine a police officer on McM's previous convictions but the trial judge 
ruled against that submission on the ground that the convictions were 
irrelevant. McM was not a witness so his credibility was not in issue; and 
his convictions were for dishonesty and firearms offences rather than 
driving offences or offences of violence. The Court of Appeal took a 
different view, however, and quashed M's conviction for reckless driving. 
McM had a long record of anti-social conduct stretching over 10 years and 
his convictions had been relevant to M's credibility and defence as they 
suggested that McM was the sort of man who would have acted in the way 
M had described. 
When determining whether to exclude logically probative evidence of 
this sort on the ground of `irrelevance', the risk of undue prejudice to the 
accused now operates as a justification for admitting the evidence, against 
which must be weighed competing considerations such as vexation to the 
third party or his family, delay, cost, the number of collateral matters 
which would be raised, the risk of overburdening the jury and so on. Such 
a balancing exercise was conducted by Fisher J in the New Zealand case of 
R v. Wilson [1991] 2 NZLR 707 (NZHC) where an alleged murderer 
wished to adduce evidence of the deceased's previous convictions to 
support his defence that he had acted in self-defence. Fisher J allowed the 
accused to adduce evidence of the deceased's violent disposition but not 
his past use of drugs. 
Given the importance attached by the law of criminal evidence to the 
accused's right to defend himself, one could be forgiven for assuming that 
policy considerations would rarely prevent the accused from adducing 
evidence which logically supports his defence. And yet, bizarrely, the 
Court of Appeal has come to the conclusion in a number of cases that 
evidence of a prosecution witness's disposition is not admissible to prove 
that he acted in accordance with his character on a particular occasion. In 
R v. Irish [1995] Crim LR 145 the accused was charged with having 
wounded J with intent to cause him grievous bodily harm, and it seems his 
defence was that he had acted in self-defence. J was called to give evidence 
for the prosecution and the accused cross-examined him on his recent 
conviction for an assault on another person, S. Cross-examining a witness 
on his previous convictions is a standard way of attacking his credibility 
(16.5 post), but the accused wished to go further than that. He sought 
leave to call S to explain the circumstances of that assault on the ground 
that it would show that J could not resist using violence. The judge ruled 
against this request and the accused was convicted. The Court of Appeal 
rejected the argument based on similar facts as `misconceived', adopting 
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the view of Lord Lane CJ in R v. Edwards [1991] 1 WLR 207 (CA), a case 
on the evidential value of police misconduct. 
Logically, if there is evidence that a police officer has a tendency to 
fabricate evidence and lie on oath (for example, because his evidence has 
been demonstrably disbelieved by juries on past occasions, or by a judge in 
civil proceedings, or he has been found guilty of perjury or perverting the 
course of justice) it should be regarded as evidence of his disposition which 
would support a defence that he has fabricated his evidence against the 
accused in the instant proceedings. Notwithstanding the logic of this 
argument, and the absence of the principal considerations which justify 
excluding evidence of the accused's extraneous misconduct, the Court of 
Appeal in R v. Edwards [1991] 1 WLR 207 made it quite clear that such 
evidence is to be considered relevant only to the question of the officer's 
credibility as a witness for the prosecution (see also R v. Clancy [1997] 
Crim LR 290 (CA), R v. Edwards (Maxine) [1996] 2 Cr App R 345 (CA) 
and R v. Malik [2000] 2 Cr App R 8 (CA)). A police officer may be cross-
examined on relevant proven misconduct, or on an implicit finding of 
perjury by a jury's decision to acquit in a previous trial, to show that the 
officer is not worthy of belief; but it is not permissible to adduce evidence 
of such extraneous misconduct as `reverse similar fact evidence' to prove 
perjury in the instant proceedings or, where the allegation is that the 
officer fabricated evidence in a particular way prior to the trial, to prove 
his misconduct with evidence that he behaved in a similar way on other 
occasions in relation to other suspects. Moreover, because the evidence is 
regarded as relevant to nothing more than credit, the rule on the `finality 
of answers on collateral matters' (16.5.2 post) means that it is not possible 
to adduce evidence to contradict the answers given during cross-
examination unless the limited `bias' exception applies (16.5.4.2 post) or  
the officer's credibility can be said to be inextricably linked with an issue. 
If there is one case more than any other which exemplifies the desirability 
of admitting police officers' extraneous misconduct as `reverse similar fact 
evidence', at least in some cases, it is R v. Twitchell [2000] 1 Cr App R 373. 
T was convicted in February 1982 of manslaughter and robbery, and while 
there was some circumstantial evidence implicating him, the heart of the 
prosecution case comprised the confessions he had made when interviewed 
in November 1980 by police officers of the notoriously corrupt (and now 
disbanded) West Midlands Serious Crime Squad, including one DS Brown. 
It was T's contention that he had been denied access to a solicitor and that 
the first of his admissions had been forced out of him by torture, in that he 
had been hand-cuffed to a chair and deprived of oxygen by having a plastic 
bag held over his head. He had reported what had happened to his solicitor 
at the earliest opportunity and raised the issue at the trial, but he was 
nonetheless convicted and served 11 years in prison. However, in a civil 
claim brought by another man, Tr, against the Chief Constable of the West 
Midlands in the 1990s, it was found that he (Tr) had been denied access to a 
solicitor, handcuffed and `bagged' in April 1982 in a similar way to that 
alleged by T at his trial, and that he too had signed a confession as a result. 
The trial judge in Tr's civil proceedings not only found that Tr had indeed 
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been `bagged' as claimed but also that one of the officers involved was none 
other than DS Brown, who was expressly found to be a dishonest witness. 
Tr's conviction was quashed as a result in 1996, which led to T's own case 
being referred to the Court of Appeal by the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission. Needless to say T's conviction was quashed too, but the basis 
of the decision was that the credibility of DS Brown (and other officers 
involved in T's interrogation) had been seriously damaged. There was no 
suggestion that Tr's account could be regarded as directly relevant (in the 
similar fact sense) to the question whether T was tortured as claimed, even 
though the similarities between his and Tr's accounts were strikingly 
peculiar. Assuming collusion or contamination can be discounted, there 
would seem to be no sound reason for limiting the relevance of such 
extraneous misconduct to credibility. Indeed s. 41(3)(c) of the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, in relation to extraneous sexual 
conduct by the complainant in proceedings for a sexual offence (17.4 post), 
demonstrates that the reverse similar facts argument is far from 
`misconceived'. 
The foregoing analysis has focused on evidence of bad character, but it is 
now clear that a third party's good character may be adduced in a criminal 
trial, in some circumstances at least, to prove that he would not have acted 
in a contrary fashion. In particular, if the accused is charged with a sexual 
offence, and the issue is consent, the prosecution may adduce evidence of 
the complainant's chaste or respectful disposition to prove that she would 
not have consented in the circumstances of the alleged offence (R v. 
Amado-Taylor (No. 2) [2001] EWCA Crim 1898, R v. Tobin [2003] Crim 
LR 408 (CA); 16.4.2 post). Moreover, in R v. Amado-Taylor (No. 2) it was 
accepted that in a case where the accused relies on self-defence against an 
allegation of violence, the non-violent disposition of the complainant 
would be logically relevant to that defence, and that, because the accused 
may adduce evidence of his own good character (3.4 post), `it would seem 
anomalous if the complainant were not able to seek to establish his non-
violent disposition', the implication being that such evidence would be 
admissible at the behest of the prosecution. A question of this sort arose in 
R v. G(R) [2003] Crim LR 43, a case of alleged murder where the accused's 
case was that he had disarmed the deceased of his knife and stabbed him in 
self-defence. The prosecution witnesses were permitted to state that, to 
their knowledge, the deceased had not habitually carried a knife; but the 
judge refused to allow the prosecution to elicit evidence of the deceased's 
non-violent disposition. The Court of Appeal quashed the murder 
conviction because the witnesses' answers to the question `have you ever 
known [the deceased] to carry a knife?' had minimal probative value in the 
factual context of the case ± but the Court was willing to assume that the 
witnesses' answers to that question were prima facie admissible. 
3.3.20 Reform 
In its report, `Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal Proceedings' (Law 
Com No. 273 (2001)), the Law Commission has reaffirmed the view 
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expressed in its consultation paper ((CP No. 141 (1996)) that the law 
governing similar fact evidence should be codified to bring `greater clarity, 
certainty and accessibility'. According to the proposed scheme, prosecu-
tion evidence of the accused's extraneous misconduct or disposition would 
be admissible, as evidence tending to prove the accused's guilt of the 
instant charge, only if the evidence has `substantial probative value' in 
relation to a matter in issue (other than whether the accused has a 
propensity to be untruthful) which is `of substantial importance in the 
context of the case as a whole' and the interests of justice require it to be 
admitted, taking into account its potentially prejudicial effect. The judge 
would be required to consider the risk of both moral and reasoning 
prejudice, and to take into account a non-exhaustive list of factors when 
determining probative value. The Commission has also suggested that 
`background evidence' which shows the accused's extraneous misconduct 
should be prima facie admissible only if it is inextricably linked to the facts 
relating to the offence charged `by reason of its close connection with them 
in time and space' (that is, it forms part of the `narrative' or the res gestae), 
the reason being that it would `be very strange if evidence of an assault 
committed in the course of a rape, but not separately charged, were to be 
treated as prima facie inadmissible'. Other types of background evidence 
(`explanatory evidence') revealing the accused's extraneous misconduct 
would be prima facie inadmissible, requiring the judge to weigh the 
importance of the evidence against the undue prejudice its admission 
might engender. Evidence of the accused's disposition or extraneous 
misconduct tendered by his co-accused would be admissible only if the 
evidence has `substantial probative value' in relation to a matter in issue 
between them `of substantial importance in the context of the case as a 
whole', the judge again being guided by the non-exhaustive list of factors 
when determining probative value. In each case the probative value of the 
evidence would be assessed on the assumption that it is true (unless the 
jury or magistrates could not reasonably find it to be true), reflecting the 
decision of the House of Lords in R v. H [1995] 2 WLR 737. 
Other recommendations include a test of `substantial probative value in 
relation to a matter in issue which is itself of substantial importance in the 
context of the case as a whole' for evidence of disposition or extraneous 
misconduct relating to a person other than the accused (with reference 
being made to the non-exhaustive list of factors); an amendment to s. 5 of 
the Indictments Act 1915 to ensure the accused receives a fair trial; and the 
repeal of s. 27(3) of the Theft Act 1968 on the ground that it is `neither 
justified nor useful'. 
3.4 The Accused's Law-abiding Disposition: 
Good-character Evidence 
Just as the accused's peculiar, criminal or anti-social disposition may be 
logically probative of his guilt, and exceptionally admissible against him as 
similar fact evidence, the accused's law-abiding disposition may be 
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logically disprobative of his guilt therefore admissible as evidence of his 
innocence. If the accused has led a blameless and positively altruistic life he 
is less likely to have broken the criminal law than if has committed similar 
(or even dissimilar) offences in the past; and he is also less likely to commit 
perjury in the witness box. This would appear to be common sense, but it 
is a view of enduring human nature which is based on little more than the 
assumption that certain people behave in a way which is consistently 
`good', regardless of the context in which they find themselves ± an 
assumption which has been thrown into doubt in recent years by empirical 
research (see Melbourne v. R (1999) 198 CLR 1 (HCA) at pp. 40±2). If the 
assumption is incorrect the admissibility of such evidence can only be 
justified as an illogical `indulgence granted to the accused which continues 
to be maintained for historical reasons', the basis of which is the `policy 
and humanity' of the common law (Melbourne v. R at p. 20). 
Whether or not the assumption is correct, proving that a person has a 
good character is hardly a straightforward task. It is the accused's inherent 
nature which is assumed to have probative value, but a person's `goodness' 
can only be established by evidence of past positive acts directly perceived 
by persons who know him well (and know that he has not committed any 
disreputable acts). In theory the best evidence of good character, insofar as 
it is relevant to innocence, would be testimony from disinterested witnesses 
that the accused has consistently behaved in a way which is dissimilar to 
the particular allegation against him, but for obvious reasons evidence of 
this sort will rarely be available. Evidence of positive deeds at a more 
general level, combined with the absence of any convictions or cautions, is 
more likely to be forthcoming, and will have some probative value; but 
occasional acts of altruism or honesty do not necessarily mean that a 
person is inherently or consistently good, and it will be seen below that 
such evidence has been held to be inadmissible for this reason. 
Furthermore, there is a distinction between a person's inherent nature 
and the reputation he has amongst those who know him, and this 
distinction can be disregarded only when the character witnesses have 
sufficient knowledge of the accused's conduct and behaviour over a 
sufficiently long period. As Lord Denning said in Plato Films v. Speidel 
[1961] 2 WLR 470 (HL) (at p. 487): 
`A man's character . . . is what he in fact is, whereas his reputation is 
what other people think he is. . . . But there is another sense in which the 
word character is used, and quite properly used, when it overlaps the 
word reputation. . . . In short, his character is the esteem in which he is 
held by others who know him and are in a position to judge his worth.' 
Needless to say, in most cases the only objective and admissible 
evidence of the accused's good character is likely to be the fact that he has 
not previously been convicted or cautioned in respect of other offences, 
but there is a real difficulty with this proposition. The absence of any 
proven bad character does not necessarily mean the presence of a good 
character; it is neutral rather than positive evidence of innocence. 
Nevertheless, the accused who has no record is regarded as having a 
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positively good character, and the jury or magistrates must take it into 
consideration as evidence of his innocence and (where relevant) his 
credibility. There is no judicial discretion to exclude evidence tendered by 
the accused in support of his innocence unless its probative value is so 
slight that it can be considered `irrelevant', and as a concession to the 
accused the absence of a criminal record is regarded as sufficiently 
probative to be admissible. 
Evidence of the accused's good character may be adduced or elicited in 
a number of different ways: (i) it may be put to prosecution witnesses in 
cross-examination as part of the accused's case (as in R v. Wood [1920] 2 
KB 179 (CCA)); (ii) it may be given on oath by defence witnesses called 
for this purpose (as in R v. Winfield (1939) 27 Cr App R 139 (CCA)); or 
(iii) the accused himself may wish to give an account of his good character 
as part of his own testimony (as in R v. Powell [1985] 1 WLR 1364 (CA)). 
It will be seen below that the law governing the admissibility of such 
evidence was developed at common law for the first two situations and 
that, rather inappropriately, this has been extended to cover the third 
situation. If evidence of the accused's good character is admitted in any of 
these ways, the prosecution are entitled to adduce evidence of his bad 
character in rebuttal. If the accused fails to testify, the admissibility of his 
bad character for the purpose of rebutting his purported good character is 
governed by the common law (3.4.5 post). If the accused testifies, the 
admissibility of his bad character will usually arise during his cross-
examination (4.4 post). 
3.4.1 The Meaning and Admissibility of the Accused's Good Character 
Evidence of the accused's past meritorious conduct, his positive reputation 
amongst those who know him and the absence of a criminal record have 
all been permitted on occasion to show that he has a good character, but, 
as a matter of law ± at least in cases where the accused refuses to testify ± 
only reputation evidence and the absence of a (relevant) criminal record 
are admissible for this purpose (the latter situation being the `usual case': 
R v. Aziz [1995] 3 WLR 53 (HL) at p. 60). This rule, that it is not 
permissible to call or adduce evidence of the accused's past meritorious 
conduct, or even extraneous conduct of a more neutral nature which might 
undermine the allegation against him, was laid down in the case of R v. 
Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 where the majority of the Court for Crown 
Cases Reserved held, first, that if the accused wishes to call or elicit 
evidence of his good character that evidence must be limited to his `general 
reputation in the neighbourhood in which he lives' and should not include 
evidence of particular facts; second, that the accused's good-character 
witnesses must not give their own personal opinion of his character 
(although they must actually have a good opinion of him to be competent 
as a good-character witness); and, third, that it is permissible for any such 
witness to say that he has never heard anything bad about the accused. 
The rule that good-character evidence is limited to the accused's general 
reputation was justified on the grounds of academic authority and 
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pragmatism. It was felt that good-character evidence went to the issue of 
the accused's general disposition against committing the offence charged 
and, according to Cockburn CJ, such disposition could only be ascertained 
from the accused's general reputation in his community. Similarly, Willes J 
felt that evidence of particular facts had to be excluded `because a robber 
may do acts of generosity, and the proof of such acts is therefore irrelevant 
to the question whether he was likely to have committed a particular act of 
robbery'. 
In R v. Samuel (1956) 40 Cr App R 8 (CCA) the accused was charged 
with having stolen a camera he had found in the grounds of a museum and 
had kept for five weeks, and was permitted to testify that he had, on 
specific previous occasions, handed in other property he had found as 
evidence of his honest disposition. The admissibility of this evidence was 
not queried on appeal, suggesting that the Rowton test for admissibility 
might have become more flexible following the enactment of the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898 and with it the accused's right to testify in his own 
defence. In R v. Redgrave (1981) 74 Cr App R 10, however, the Rowton 
test was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal. R was charged with having 
solicited in a public place for immoral (homosexual) purposes in that he 
had openly masturbated in the presence of male undercover police officers 
in a public lavatory, staring at them while doing so. His defence was 
that he had merely been satisfying his lust in the absence of his girlfriend, 
and he sought to adduce evidence of his heterosexual disposition in the 
form of letters from girls, suggesting that he had been sexually involved 
with them, and photographs showing his friendly relationships with girls 
generally. The trial judge excluded the evidence, and the Court of Appeal 
upheld R's conviction, applying R v. Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520, on the 
ground that the accused `is not allowed, by reference to particular facts, to 
call evidence that he is of a disposition which makes it unlikely that he 
would have committed the offence charged'. R could, therefore, only have 
called evidence that he did not have a reputation for the type of conduct 
alleged by the prosecution, a decision justified on two grounds: first, the 
accused could easily fabricate the sort of evidence which R had sought to 
adduce; and, second, it would not be in the public interest to allow the 
accused to compel women to testify as to their sexual relations with him. 
While these are no doubt commendable policy objectives, the decision is 
nonetheless fundamentally flawed. R v. Rowton represented the common-
law position at a time when the accused was not competent to testify and 
was therefore unable to give oral evidence of his own good character, 
whereas in R v. Redgrave the accused not only had the right to give 
evidence but wished to exercise that right to explain his own character. It 
is difficult to see how an individual can be expected to give evidence of his 
reputation amongst those who know him, and a different test must surely 
apply when it is the accused himself who wishes to testify as to his good 
character. Arguably, then, the accused should be permitted to give 
evidence of particular meritorious acts so long as that evidence is 
sufficiently probative of his disposition. If the evidence has little probative 
value and would cause undue distress to witnesses compelled by him to 
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attend, it would always be open to the judge to exclude it on the ground of 
`irrelevance'. The Court of Appeal did recognise, however, that the 
common-law rule was no longer as rigid as it had been in 1865, and 
suggested that it could have been acceptable for the accused to give 
evidence of a stable and satisfactory heterosexual relationship with his 
wife or girlfriend as an `indulgence' on the part of the court. The problem 
with this approach is that any such `indulgence' would amount to an 
inclusionary discretion to admit inadmissible evidence, which cannot be 
right. The better view is that a more flexible approach to admissibility 
exists by virtue of the accused's right (since 1898) to testify in his own 
defence. This would explain not only why the accused in R v. Samuel 
(1956) 40 Cr App R 8 (CCA) was permitted to testify as to his previous 
conduct but also the numerous other instances where the rule in R v. 
Rowton has been ignored. For example in R v. Scranage [2001] EWCA 
Crim 1171 the accused's colleagues were permitted to give evidence of his 
honesty and the way he conducted himself at work; and in R v. Sabahat 
[2001] EWCA Crim 2588 the accused's character witnesses were permitted 
to testify as to his `generous, kind, naõÈ ve, trustworthy, very honest, very 
nice and . . . good character' (see also R v. Douglass (1989) 89 Cr App R 
264 (CA) and 4.4 post). 
3.4.2 The Evidential Value of the Accused's Good Character 
If the accused testifies in his own defence, or is able to rely on an 
admissible hearsay statement made by him before the trial, admissible 
evidence of his good character will be relevant in two senses. First of all it 
will show his law-abiding propensity (that is, his disposition); in this sense 
it goes directly to the issue of his innocence or guilt. Second, it will be 
relevant to whether his testimony (or admissible hearsay statement) ought 
to be believed; in this sense it goes to the collateral question of his 
credibility as a witness and therefore indirectly to the issue of his innocence 
or guilt. If the accused refuses to testify, and has made no admissible 
hearsay statement which supports his defence, his good character will of 
course be relevant only in the first sense. Although this chapter is 
primarily concerned with evidence of disposition which is directly relevant 
to a fact in issue, it is convenient to consider here the evidential value of 
the accused's good character in both its senses. (Evidence of the accused's 
bad character elicited or adduced to undermine his credibility as a witness 
is covered in Chapter 4.) 
In R v. Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 (CCCR) Cockburn CJ and Erle CJ 
were of the view that the accused's good character gives rise to a 
presumption that he is incapable of committing the crime charged, 
Cockburn CJ recognising that this was `an anomalous exception to the 
general rule' excluding evidence of extraneous matters which `had arisen 
from the fairness of our laws' (see also R v. Stannard (1837) 7 C & P 673 
(CCC) at pp. 674±5 and Attorney-General v. Radloff (1854) 10 Ex 84 (CE) 
at p. 97). The value of the accused's good character as evidence tending to 
bolster his credibility was not addressed in R v. Rowton because it was not 
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then possible for the accused to testify in his own defence; but once the 
accused became generally competent to testify (by virtue of s. 1 of the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1898) the relevance of such evidence to credibility 
was not only acknowledged but also considered ± until relatively recently ± 
to be of greater significance. The relevance of the accused's good character 
to both innocence and credibility is now firmly established and the judge is 
obliged to give the jury a direction on its evidential value as part of his 
summing-up at the end of the trial (cf. the earlier discretionary approach 
in R v. Smith [1971] Crim LR 531 (CA)). 
The law was settled by the Court of Appeal in R v. Vye, R v. Wise, R v. 
Stephenson [1993] 1 WLR 471 (hereafter `R v. Vye') and by the House of 
Lords in R v. Aziz [1995] 3 WLR 53. The good-character direction has 
therefore come to be known as the `Vye direction'. V, a 50-year-old man 
with no previous convictions, appealed on the ground that the judge had 
failed properly to direct the jury on his good character. W, a 35-year-old 
man with no previous convictions, appealed on the basis that while the 
judge had directed the jury on the relevance of his good character to his 
credibility, he should also have given a direction on its relevance to the 
unlikelihood that he had committed the offence charged (the trial judge, 
following R v. Berrada (1989) 91 Cr App R 131 (CA), had felt that the 
propensity direction was optional). Both V and W had their convictions 
quashed, and the Court of Appeal laid down clear guidance for trial 
judges when giving directions on the accused's good character, removing 
the uncertainty over when a propensity direction should be given: first, it is 
obligatory for the judge to give a direction on the relevance of the 
accused's good character to his credibility if he has testified and/or made 
an admissible pre-trial exculpatory statement (the credibility direction); 
second, it is in all cases obligatory for the judge to give a direction on the 
relevance of the accused's good character to the likelihood of his having 
committed the offence charged (the propensity direction). The Court went 
on to state, however, that the trial judge retains a discretion as to how the 
good-character direction should be tailored to the particular circum-
stances of the case and the judge `would probably wish to indicate . . . that 
good character cannot amount to a defence'. Where the judge rules that 
the accused is of `good character', but no Vye direction is given, an appeal 
will be successful if that failure can be said to have threatened the safety of 
the conviction (R v. Micallef (1993) The Times 26.11.93 (CA), R v. Durbin 
[1995] 2 Cr App R 84 (CA), R v. Fulcher [1995] 2 Cr App R 251 (CA), R v. 
Howell [2001] EWCA Crim 2862). 
So long as the two limbs of the direction are given, it is not necessary for 
the judge to use any particular form of words (R v. Miah [1997] 2 Cr App 
R 12 (CA)), save that the direction is not to be given as a series of 
rhetorical questions but in the form of a clear affirmative statement and it 
is necessary to explain to the jury that the accused's good character is 
something which they should take into consideration (R v. Lloyd [2000] 2 
Cr App R 355 (CA), R v. Scranage [2001] EWCA Crim 1171). However, 
the Vye direction should not be qualified with a suggestion that the 
accused's good character might carry less weight where the allegation is 
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one of spontaneous conduct, particularly if the accused has been working 
(and kept his good character) in a job where spontaneous incidents are 
common (R v. Fitton [2001] EWCA Crim 215). 
In R v. Aziz [1995] 3 WLR 53 (HL) it was made clear that the reference 
in R v. Vye to pre-trial exculpatory statements was a reference to 
statements admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule as a form of 
testimonial evidence ± that is, the exculpatory parts of a `mixed statement' 
(7.1.1 post). In other words, it is mandatory to give the two limbs of the 
Vye direction if the accused is of good character and has testified in court 
or made a pre-trial mixed statement which has been adduced by the 
prosecution. The three co-accused in that case were nominally of good 
character in the sense of having no (or no relevant) convictions, but 
evidence came out during their trial of misconduct on the part of two of 
them: Y and T had both admitted making false mortgage applications and 
had respectively admitted lying to Customs officers and failing to declare 
income to the Inland Revenue. The House of Lords held that while a two-
limbed Vye direction should be given if an accused is of good character in 
the sense of having no (or no relevant) convictions, the judge would need 
to qualify that direction to take into account any disclosed criminal 
conduct to ensure the jury are given a `fair and balanced picture', save that 
the trial judge retains a limited discretion to dispense with the Vye 
direction altogether (that is, to hold that the accused is not a person of 
good character) if the revealed criminal conduct would make any such 
direction an `insult to common sense'. In other cases where the accused 
has a blemished character the judge must treat the accused as a person of 
good character and give a qualified direction. 
It follows that if the accused has admitted his guilt and been cautioned 
in respect of other misconduct, his absence of previous convictions will not 
necessarily entitle him to a full Vye direction. In R v. Martin [2000] 2 Cr 
App R 42 (CA), for example, it was held that the accused's two cautions 
for possessing an offensive weapon justified the judge's decision to give a 
direction without the propensity limb. The accused had been on trial for 
two robberies (during which he had been armed with a hammer) and it 
would have been `absurd' and `misleading' to direct the jury on 
propensity. By contrast, in R v. Sanchez [2003] EWCA Crim 735, a case 
of drug smuggling, it was held that the judge had been entitled to give only 
the propensity direction in respect of the accused's lack of previous 
convictions, on the basis that her caution for shoplifting had been relevant 
to her credibility as a witness. In R v. S [2000] All ER (D) 1482 the Court 
of Appeal stated that it would only exceptionally interfere with the way 
the judge had exercised his discretion in cases such as this, and listed four 
factors to be taken into consideration: (i) whether the offence for which 
the accused has been cautioned affects his veracity as a witness; (ii) the 
similarity of that offence to the offence charged; (iii) the seriousness of 
that offence; and (iv) the time which has passed between the caution and 
the trial. R v. Clarius [2000] All ER (D) 951 is one such exceptional case. 
The 20-year-old accused, on trial for unlawful wounding, had no previous 
convictions but had been cautioned six years earlier for stealing an 
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umbrella. The trial judge limited the good-character direction to the 
credibility limb, making no reference to the accused's lack of propensity to 
commit the sort of offence charged. The Court of Appeal allowed the 
appeal because the claim to good character had not been spurious and the 
theft was wholly irrelevant to the question of propensity. Both limbs of the 
Vye direction should have been given. 
Needless to say, if the judge rules that the accused is not of good 
character then neither limb of the Vye direction should be given, even 
though the accused has no previous convictions. In R v. Zoppola-Barraza 
[1994] Crim LR 833 the accused (who had no convictions) was charged 
with smuggling cocaine but only a credibility direction was given, as he 
had admitted smuggling gold and jewellery into the UK on previous 
occasions. It was conceded by the prosecution on appeal that if he was to 
be regarded as a man of previous good character a propensity direction 
ought to have been given too. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, 
however, as it would have been `an affront to common sense' to direct the 
jury on either the propensity limb or the credibility limb given the gravity 
of the blemish to his character. ZB had not been a person of previous good 
character, no direction had been necessary and the direction on credibility 
the judge had given had been an undeserved bonus for him (R v. Durbin 
[1995] 2 Cr App R 84 (CA) at p. 89). 
3.4.3 Qualifying the Vye Direction 
In both R v. Vye [1993] 1 WLR 471 (CA) and R v. Aziz [1995] 3 WLR 53 
(HL) it was accepted that the mere absence of convictions could amount 
to `good character'; but it was also felt that the accused could be entitled 
to this label, and therefore a two-limbed direction, even though he had 
been convicted of some misconduct in the past or had committed some 
past or recent criminal conduct for which he had not been convicted, save 
that in such cases the direction would need to be qualified by additional 
words. 
It is perhaps understandable that the absence of criminal convictions, as 
opposed to positive evidence of good character, should be regarded as 
relevant to credibility and law-abiding propensity, but it is difficult to 
understand why the accused should be regarded as a person of good 
character when there is actual evidence before the jury that he is not. 
Nevertheless, in R v. Aziz the House of Lords held that both Y and T were 
of `good character', and so entitled to the two limbs of a (qualified) Vye 
direction, notwithstanding their admitted criminal conduct and the fact 
that neither of them had been able to adduce any positive evidence of good 
character. This sort of reasoning is likely to lead to some very bizarre 
directions. Consider, for example, R v. Anderson [1990] Crim LR 862 
where the accused was a police officer charged with raping a woman in his 
patrol car. He had no previous convictions and asserted that the 
complainant had consented to sex with him. His evidence was not 
believed, he was convicted and he appealed on the basis of an inadequate 
direction on his `good character'. His conviction was quashed by the 
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Court of Appeal because it was felt he had been entitled to a direction on 
the relevance of his character to his credibility and to his law-abiding 
disposition. He was of `good character' even though he had admitted 
having sex with a woman in his patrol car while on duty as a uniformed 
officer. In R v. Durbin [1995] 2 Cr App R 84 (CA) the accused, a truck 
driver charged with importing cannabis, was held to be of `good character' 
even though he had previous convictions for offences of dishonesty (albeit 
spent), had lied to prosecution witnesses, and had admitted smuggling 
computer parts across Europe for reward at the time of the alleged 
offence. He was therefore entitled to a qualified Vye direction, regardless 
of the fact that the evidence suggested he was of bad character. The case of 
R v. Soukala-Cacace [1999] All ER (D) 1120 (99/335/Z4) provides a more 
recent but equally bizarre example. The accused was convicted of a 
number of dishonesty offences (relating to false statements in her 
applications for charge cards and a hire purchase agreement in 1997) 
and appealed on the ground that, having no previous convictions, the 
judge should have given the jury a good-character direction on both 
propensity and credibility (rather than just the former). The fact is, 
however, that she was not of good character. She had falsely claimed to be 
a doctor when changing her driving licence and applying for a bank 
account in 1994, and had falsely claimed to be unemployed in a county 
court application form. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that `there 
was no justification for departing from the conventional direction' and `if 
any tailoring was called for, it should have been in [her] favour'. She had 
been entitled to an unqualified two-limbed direction because her defence 
of marital duress had depended heavily on the jury's assessment of her 
credibility. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that there is some logic in holding a 
blemished accused to be of good character, there is considerable 
uncertainty over how blemished an accused's character needs to be before 
he loses that status and the right to the Vye direction. Durbin was of good 
character, but Zoppola-Barraza was not (a distinction justified by the 
Court of Appeal in R v. Durbin on the ground that Durbin's lies and 
smuggling related to the circumstances of his alleged drug smuggling, 
while Zoppola-Barraza's misconduct had not been so connected). In R v. 
Akram [1995] Crim LR 50 (CA) the accused's admission that he had used 
heroin in the past disentitled him from being regarded as a person of good 
character when on trial for drugs offences, whereas in R v. Anderson [1990] 
Crim LR 862 the police officer's serious misconduct did not disentitle him 
from that status. Soukala-Cacace was a person of good character even 
though the evidence suggested she had a disposition to commit the type of 
offence with which she had been charged. 
A further problem the courts have had to address is whether a person 
charged with more than one offence arising out of the same incident is 
entitled to be regarded as a person of good character when he has no 
previous convictions but has pleaded guilty to one of the less serious 
charges on the indictment. In R v. Teasdale (1993) 99 Cr App R 80 the 
accused was charged with, and pleaded not guilty to, causing grievous 
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bodily harm with intent but pleaded guilty to an alternative charge of 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm (which was not revealed to the 
jury). The trial judge recognised that the outcome of the trial depended on 
the jury's assessment of the conflicting testimony of the accused and the 
victim, and therefore the credibility of these two witnesses, but he made no 
reference to the accused's character, even though she had no previous 
convictions, on the ground that she had admitted the lesser assault. The 
Court of Appeal held that she had still been a person of good character 
and so entitled to a Vye direction (see also R v. Richens [1993] 4 All ER 
877 (CA)). R v. Teasdale was distinguished in R v. Challenger [1994] Crim 
LR 202, however. In that case the accused, who had no previous 
convictions, pleaded guilty to simple possession of cannabis but not guilty 
to the more serious alternative charge of possession with intent to supply 
and to the charge of possession of an offensive weapon. The trial judge 
refused to give any character direction and the accused appealed. The 
Court of Appeal held that the decision in R v. Teasdale applied only to 
situations where the accused pleaded guilty to a less serious alternative 
charge, and not in a case such as this where there was an offence which 
stood independently. The accused had ceased to be a person of 
unblemished character as soon as he had pleaded guilty to possession 
and a Vye direction was therefore no longer obligatory (see also R v. 
Shepherd [1995] Crim LR 153 (CA)). 
Where the accused has previous convictions which are spent under the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (16.5.4.1 post) the judge has a 
discretion to rule that he is a person of good character. According to the 
Court of Appeal in R v. Nye (1982) 75 Cr App R 247 (at p. 250): 
`It may well be that the past spent conviction happened when the 
defendant being tried was a juvenile, for instance for stealing apples, a 
conviction of many years before. In those circumstances quite plainly a 
trial judge would rule that such a person ought to be permitted to 
present himself as a man of good character. At the other end of the 
scale, if a defendant is a man who has been convicted of some offence of 
violence and his conviction has only just been spent and the offence for 
which he is then standing trial involves some violence, then it would be 
plain that a trial judge would rule that it would not be right for such a 
person to present himself as a man of good character. The essence of 
this matter is that the jury must not be misled and no lie must be told to 
them about this matter.' 
In R v. H [1994] Crim LR 205 the accused was charged with rape and 
indecent assault. As his only previous conviction was a spent one for 
possession of an airgun 12 years earlier, the Court of Appeal felt that he 
was a man of good character. The same approach was adopted in R v. 
Burnham [1995] Crim LR 491 (CA) where the accused, on trial for affray, 
had one spent conviction for criminal damage, and in R v. Davis [2003] 
EWCA Crim 402 where the accused, on trial for handling stolen goods, 
had spent convictions for criminal damage and threatening behaviour (see 
also R v. Heath (1994) The Times 10.2.94 (CA)). So long as the judge 
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exercises his discretion properly the Court of Appeal will not interfere, 
even if other judges would have taken a different view (R v. Bailey [1989] 
Crim LR 723 (CA), R v. Bett [1999] 1 Cr App R 361 (CA)). 
The Court of Appeal's decision in R v. Nye (1982) 75 Cr App R 247 
makes it quite clear that even if a blemished accused has been ruled to be a 
person of good character the jury must not be misled. In particular, they 
must not be told that the accused has no convictions (R v. O'Shea (1993) 
The Times 8.6.93 (CA)). It seems, however, that when giving the Vye 
direction in such cases it may not always be necessary to reveal the fact of 
his spent convictions to the jury (R v. Durbin [1995] 2 Cr App R 84 (CA) at 
p. 92). If the accused has recent convictions which, though not spent, are 
felt to be irrelevant to the present charge, it is still permissible for the judge 
to rule that he is of good character. For example in R v. Timson [1993] 
Crim LR 58 (CA) a solicitor on trial for legal aid fraud was felt to be of 
good character when his only blemish was a recent drink-driving 
conviction. 
How the words of the Vye direction should be modified in cases where 
the accused has a blemished character has not been explained by the Court 
of Appeal, so it is left entirely to the ingenuity of the trial judge. As 
Munday notes ([1997] Crim LR 247 at pp. 251±2), this is likely to be 
difficult for the judge and perhaps even more difficult for the jury to 
understand considering the contradictions involved. In fact the accused 
might be better off not having a good-character direction given at all as 
the jury would have their attention expressly drawn to his previous 
misconduct (a point recently acknowledged by the Privy Council in Shaw 
v. R [2001] 1 WLR 1519). The difficulties inherent in the English approach 
to the accused's character have deterred other common-law jurisdictions 
from following R v. Vye [1993] 1 WLR 471 (CA) and R v. Aziz [1995] 3 
WLR 53 (HL). The majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v. 
Falealili [1996] 3 NZLR 664 declined to hold that the mere absence of 
previous convictions warrants a good-character direction (reflecting the 
approach adopted in the pre-Vye case of R v. Buzalek [1991] Crim LR 116 
(CA)). The accused in New Zealand who has a good character will usually 
be entitled to the two-limbed direction, but there must be positive evidence 
that he has a good character. In the words of Henry J (at p. 667): 
`We think there are logical difficulties with the proposition that an 
absence of previous convictions is in itself evidence establishing a 
person's good character. It may be a factor in assessing good character, 
but standing on its own it is generally neutral. A person of bad repute 
may well have no convictions. We do not think it necessary for 
directions to be given merely because absence of previous convictions 
has been elicited.' 
The problems which have arisen in England and Wales in recent years 
are therefore unlikely to arise in New Zealand: if a person has no 
convictions but has committed some criminal conduct prior to or at the 
same time as the alleged offence, or even if his only evidence of bad 
character comprises spent convictions, then he will not be entitled to a 
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good-character direction (unless there is positive evidence of good 
character) and the jury will not have to try to make sense of the qualified 
Vye direction. Thomas J went further, suggesting in dissent that a good-
character direction should not be mandatory, even if there is positive 
evidence of good character, as every criminal trial is factually unique and 
it should lie within the judge's discretion whether a direction is or is not 
appropriate. It is this approach which was adopted by the majority of the 
High Court of Australia in Melbourne v. R (1999) 198 CLR 1 (reaffirming 
the test established in Simic v. R (1980) 144 CLR 319 (HCA)). McHugh J 
summarised the position (at p. 14): 
`The . . . trial judge must retain a discretion as to whether to direct the 
jury on evidence of good character after evaluating its probative 
significance in relation to both (a) the accused's propensity to commit 
the crime charged; and (b) the accused's credibility. The judge may 
conclude that the good character evidence adduced is of probative 
significance in relation to (a) only, (b) only, both (a) and (b) or neither 
(a) nor (b), and can direct (or not direct) the jury accordingly . . . Two 
considerations lead me to this conclusion. First, the difference between 
the use of good character evidence and the use of bad character 
evidence in a criminal trial is logically anomalous and, while that 
difference is too deeply rooted in the law to be removed by judicial 
decision, it should not be widened. Second, in cases where good 
character evidence has no logical connection with the elements of the 
offence, a mandatory direction is likely to divert the jury from properly 
evaluating evidence which more directly and logically bears upon the 
guilt of the accused . . .' 
Whether the House of Lords will revert to the former position, where 
any direction was discretionary, remains to be seen, but at present it seems 
unlikely. The Privy Council applied R v. Aziz [1995] 3 WLR 53 (HL) to the 
Caribbean states accepting its jurisdiction in Barrow v. R [1998] 2 WLR 
957, but it is to be noted that the Court of Appeal has indicated a degree of 
dissatisfaction with the present approach: 
`Ever since the law started to lay down what a jury must be told as to 
the effect of good character nearly 30 years ago in Bellis [1966] 1 WLR 
234 there has been trouble. Could the jury perhaps be allowed to work it 
out for themselves? We are, however, bound by the case of Vye . . .'  (R v. 
Wood [1996] 1 Cr App R 207 at p. 218) 
The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal has also adopted a more flexible 
approach, based on the exercise of judicial discretion to ensure a fair and 
balanced summing-up: 
`The Vye rules, applied in practice, might be highly artificial. They 
might amount to no more than the incantation of a well-worn formula. 
The need to heavily qualify the direction, to avoid an affront to 
common sense, might make the words virtually meaningless. This is 
liable to induce cynicism and despair on the part of trial judges, and 
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lower the standing of the law in the eyes of juries. It might also confuse 
the jury.' (Tang Sui Man v. HKSAR (1997±1998) 1 HKCFA 107 at 
p. 130) 
3.4.4 The Relevance of a Bad Co-accused 
In R v. Vye [1993] 1 WLR 471 the Court of Appeal also had to consider 
the position where there are several co-accused of whom only some are of 
good character. S, a man with previous convictions, had been tried with 
his co-accused, H, who had no convictions apart from one `peccadillo' 
when he was 16. The judge had directed the jury in respect of H's good 
character, and S appealed on the basis that his own (undisclosed) bad 
character had been highlighted as a consequence. The Court held that H 
had been entitled to a good-character direction notwithstanding having S 
as a co-accused; and while it was recognised that the judge has a discretion 
to comment on the co-accused's bad character and may, for example, 
warn the jury not to speculate about his character, there is no obligation to 
give any such direction (see also R v. Houlden (1993) 99 Cr App R 245 
(CA) and R v. Durbin [1995] 2 Cr App R 84 (CA)). In R v. Cain (1993) 99 
Cr App R 208 there were two co-accused: H, of good character, and C, of 
bad character. The Court of Appeal confirmed that H had been entitled to 
both the credibility and propensity limbs of the Vye direction and this was 
so even though C's previous convictions had been revealed during the trial 
(at his own request). It was also held, however, that the trial judge should 
have told the jury that C's bad character was relevant only to his 
credibility, for otherwise the jury might have assumed (quite logically) that 
C's convictions were evidence of a criminal propensity in the same way 
that H's good character was relevant evidence of her law-abiding 
propensity. 
This rule, that the `good' accused is entitled to a Vye direction 
notwithstanding the adverse effect it may have on his `bad' co-accused, is a 
further manifestation of the general principle established in R v. Miller 
(1952) 36 Cr App R 169 (Assizes) that the judge retains no discretion to 
exclude admissible evidence adduced or elicited by the accused just 
because it would unduly prejudice his co-accused's defence. 
3.4.5 Rebutting the Accused's Good-character Evidence at 
Common Law 
Evidence of the accused's bad character may be adduced by the 
prosecution at common law to rebut the accused's evidence of his good 
character. In R v. Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520, R, on trial for indecently 
assaulting a 14-year-old boy, had called witnesses to give evidence of his 
good character as a `moral and well-conducted man' and the prosecution 
witness called to rebut this evidence gave his opinion that R was `a man 
capable of the grossest indecency and the most flagrant immorality'. R 
was convicted of indecent assault and appealed. The Court for Crown 
Cases Reserved held that if the accused has adduced admissible evidence 
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of his good reputation the prosecution are entitled to rebut that evidence 
by adducing evidence of his bad reputation, but not specific examples or 
individual opinions of the accused's bad character. The witness's opinion 
should not have been admitted and R's conviction was therefore quashed. 
R did not give evidence himself because the accused was not then 
competent to testify. If the accused puts his good character in issue and 
testifies he may be cross-examined on his bad character (including his 
previous convictions) under s. 1(3)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 
to undermine his credibility as a witness (see 4.4 post). 
Where the evidence of the accused's good reputation has been given by 
a defence witness called for that purpose the prosecution may cross-
examine that witness on whether he is aware of the accused's bad 
reputation in order to show that he is mistaken and that his testimony 
should not be relied on. Further, the witness may also be cross-examined 
by the prosecution on whether he is aware of the accused's previous 
convictions (R v. Redd [1923] 1 KB 104 (CCA), R v. Winfield (1939) 27 Cr 
App R 139 (CCA)). If the witness denies any such knowledge it would 
appear that the convictions can be proved (R v. Redd). If it is permissible 
to adduce evidence of the accused's convictions it can only be for the 
purpose of rebutting the good-character evidence (of reputation) which 
has been given; the evidence would be inadmissible if tendered merely to 
show the witness's understanding is wrong, because of the rule on the 
finality of answers on collateral matters (16.5.2 post). The common law on 
the admissibility of bad-character evidence governs two other possible 
situations where the accused has failed to testify: first, where the accused 
or his counsel has cross-examined a witness called by his co-accused or the 
prosecution to elicit evidence of his good character; and, second, where a 
defence witness called to give evidence relating to the case has volunteered 
evidence of the accused's good character. In R v. Redd the Court of 
Criminal Appeal held that in the latter type of case the defence witness 
should not be cross-examined by the prosecution on the accused's 
previous convictions. 
The prosecution cannot adduce evidence of the accused's bad character 
in rebuttal at common law unless the accused has put his character in 
issue. If the accused refuses to testify and, instead of adducing or eliciting 
evidence of his good character, he or his counsel simply attacks the 
character of a prosecution witness, the accused does not run the risk of 
having his bad character admitted (R v. Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 
(CCA)) ± although he does run the risk of having an adverse inference 
drawn from his failure to testify (9.3.2 post). If the accused testifies he may 
be cross-examined on his bad character by virtue of the Criminal Evidence 
Act 1898 (4.5±7 post). 
In R v. Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 (CCCR) (at p. 531) it was said that 
bad-character evidence adduced in rebuttal by the prosecution must be `of 
the same character and confined within the same limits' as the accused's 
good-character evidence: `as the prisoner can only give evidence of general 
good character, so the evidence called to rebut it must be evidence of the 
same general description, sh[o]wing that the evidence which has been given 
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in favour of the prisoner is not true, but that the man's general reputation 
is bad'. There is, however, authority to suggest that the accused puts the 
whole of his character in issue once he has adduced or elicited evidence of 
his good reputation. The accused's character is said to be `indivisible'. By 
adducing evidence to show that one aspect of his character is `good' he 
allows the prosecution to adduce evidence in rebuttal of an entirely 
different aspect of his character which is `bad'. In R v. Winfield (1939) 27 
Cr App R 139 (CCA) the accused was on trial for indecently assaulting a 
woman and he called a character witness who gave evidence of his 
`exemplary' behaviour with regard to women. It was held that the 
prosecution had been entitled to cross-examine that witness on the 
accused's previous convictions for offences of dishonesty: `If a prisoner 
chooses to put his character in issue, he must take the consequences'. 
Unfortunately it is not clear whether R v. Winfield is authority for the 
position at common law as there is a conflict between the two reports of 
this case. In R v. Winfield (1939) 27 Cr App R 139 it seems the accused did 
not himself testify (although p. 141 suggests he possibly did) while R v. 
Winfield [1939] 4 All ER 164 reports that the accused was himself cross-
examined, suggesting that the case is authority for the position under the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1898 Act (4.4 post). Given the conflict between R v. 
Rowton and R v. Winfield the latter case, if indeed it is a decision under the 
common law, would seem to have been incorrectly decided. Nonetheless, 
given that the accused's character is indivisible under the 1898 Act, it may 
safely be assumed that the same rule now operates in cases where the 
accused fails to testify. 
The common-law rule is of interest because it permits the admission of 
the accused's bad character to rebut a defence assertion of good character 
even though the question of the accused's credibility has not arisen. The 
evidence may have a bearing on the credibility of the accused's defence, 
insofar as an affirmative defence manifests itself during the cross-
examination of prosecution witnesses, but the justification for admitting 
this sort of evidence is to rebut his good-character evidence. In other 
words, it is adduced to show the accused does not have the claimed law-
abiding propensity. Given that this evidence is unlikely to be regarded as 
merely neutralising the good-character evidence, it would seem to have 
evidential value suggesting the accused has a criminal propensity and for 
that reason is more likely to be guilty. If this is correct, the rule is in effect 
an exception to the general rule of prima facie inadmissibility which 
governs similar fact evidence tendered by the prosecution. 
The accused may adduce evidence to rebut his co-accused's good-
character evidence, whether or not the co-accused testifies, so long as the 
co-accused's bad character is relevant to the accused's defence (3.3.17 
ante). In R v. Douglass (1989) 89 Cr App R 264, D1 and D2 were charged 
with causing death by reckless driving on the basis that one or both of 
them must have been responsible. D1 did not give evidence but the defence 
put by his counsel was that D2 had been drinking and was solely 
responsible. D1's counsel also cross-examined a prosecution witness to 
elicit good-character evidence that D1 had not drunk alcohol in the two 
Relevance, Disposition and `Similar Facts' 105 
years she had known him, implying that he, unlike D2, had not been 
affected by alcohol at the time of the crash and that D2 was more likely to 
have been responsible. D2 wished to elicit evidence of D1's convictions for 
serious motoring offences and offences of violence, dishonesty and drink-
driving, but the trial judge refused this application and D2 was convicted. 
The Court of Appeal held that as D1 had put his own character in issue, 
suggesting a propensity for non-reckless driving, D2 had been entitled to 
elicit evidence of D1's bad character to show his propensity for reckless 
driving as it had been relevant to his defence. 
Chapter Summary 
.	 To be admissible an item of evidence must be `relevant' to an issue or a collateral 
fact (or an explanation of the background). However, logically relevant evidence 
may be considered `irrelevant', given its relatively low probative value, if its 
admission cannot be justified in the light of countervailing considerations such as 
the need to minimise undue prejudice, speculation, delay, expense, vexation and 
the proliferation of collateral matters. 
.	 The test for determining the admissibility of evidence of a party's extraneous 
misconduct or disposition (`similar fact evidence') to prove an issue is but one 
aspect of the general discretion to exclude logically relevant evidence on the 
ground that it is `irrelevant'. In criminal proceedings the judge will explicitly 
`balance' the probative value of the (logically relevant) bad-character evidence 
against the risk of causing the accused undue prejudice. However, some evidence 
of extraneous misconduct may be prima facie admissible in criminal proceedings 
on the ground that there is no risk that the jury will reason from disposition to 
guilt, or because the evidence explains the `background' to the case or forms part 
of the res gestae. 
.	 Evidence of a party's positive extraneous conduct is generally inadmissible to 
demonstrate that he acted in the same way on a particular occasion. However, in 
criminal proceedings the accused's good character is admissible evidence that he 
did not commit the alleged offence (and, where relevant, that he is a credible 
witness). The positive disposition of a complainant who alleges that she was 
sexually assaulted by the accused is also admissible to show that she did not 
consent. 
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The Criminal Evidence 
Act 1898 
It has been seen that the accused's good character is admissible for the 
purpose of bolstering his credibility as a witness and to show he has a law-
abiding propensity (3.4 ante). It has also been seen that evidence of the 
accused's propensity in other respects (that is, similar fact evidence of his 
bad character) is inadmissible unless its probative value is sufficiently high 
to justify its admission despite the risk of any undue prejudice (3.3 ante). 
Section 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 governs the extent to which 
the accused may be cross-examined on his bad character to undermine his 
credibility as a witness. Unlike admissible similar fact evidence, which is 
directly relevant to whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, 
such cross-examination is only indirectly relevant to his guilt. It is intended 
to show that because of his dissolute character his testimony, and 
therefore his defence, should not be believed. 
One of the reasons for cross-examining a witness is to undermine his 
credibility, and an effective way of doing this is to question him on his past 
illegal or immoral conduct. By bringing out the witness's moral failings the 
tribunal of fact is encouraged to think less kindly of him as a person and 
therefore to attach less weight to his testimony. A witness who has been 
guilty of misconduct in the past is represented as a person who cannot be 
trusted to tell the truth on oath. Moreover, evidence of the witness's 
previous convictions (or evidence showing bias or a dishonest reputation) 
may be adduced if he refuses to accept the truth of the allegations made 
against him (16.5.4 post). However, if the prosecution or a co-accused were 
entitled to cross-examine the accused on his bad character as of right, there 
would be a real danger that he would not get the fair trial to which he is 
entitled at common law (even if the trial would be regarded as fair by the 
European Court of Human Rights). This would have the knock-on effect 
of deterring accused persons from testifying in their own defence. The 
accused has therefore been given a degree of protection ± a `shield' ± from 
cross-examination on his bad character which he will lose only in certain 
circumstances. Both the shield itself, and the circumstances in which he 
runs the risk of losing it, are set out in s. 1 of the 1898 Act. 
If the accused does not testify there is of course no possibility of his 
being cross-examined as to credit, and the admissibility of his bad 
character is governed by the common law (3.3±4 ante). If, however, the 
accused gives evidence in chief which results in the loss of his shield, but he 
then refuses to allow himself to be cross-examined, the prosecution may 
still adduce evidence of his bad character to undermine his credibility (R v. 
Forbes [1999] 2 Cr App R 501 (CA)). 
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4.1 The Compromise 
There was, until the mid-nineteenth century, a general prohibition on 
interested parties being able to give sworn evidence, whether in civil or 
criminal proceedings, and although a number of statutes prior to 1898 
allowed the accused to testify in his own defence in certain situations, it 
was not until s. 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 Act came into force 
that this right (now found in s. 53(1) of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999) was extended to cover all criminal proceedings. 
With Parliament's decision to allow the accused to testify in his own 
defence, it was necessary to address the issue of his being cross-examined. 
In 1898 witnesses could already be cross-examined as to their credit on, for 
example, their previous convictions and if they denied having any such 
convictions, evidence to the contrary could be proved in rebuttal (16.5.4.1 
post). But other witnesses are in a different league from the accused. If a 
witness (who is not a party) has his bad character elicited in cross-
examination the personal consequences for him are generally bearable. It is 
the party relying on the witness who suffers so far as the trial is concerned. 
The situation is very different for the accused ± if his previous misconduct 
is raised in cross-examination there is a real danger that he and his defence 
will be unduly prejudiced. To bring out the accused's previous convictions 
in cross-examination is likely to create in the minds of the jurors or 
magistrates not only a feeling that he is less credible as a witness but also a 
degree of moral and/or reasoning prejudice against him, with the real 
possibility that he will be judged not so much on the admissible evidence 
but on his doubtful moral standing (see 3.3.2 ante). Accordingly, 
Parliament had to introduce special measures to ensure that any accused 
who took advantage of his right to testify would receive a fair trial, for 
otherwise no accused with any sizeable record would give evidence in his 
own defence. However, to have given the accused absolute immunity from 
cross-examination on his character would have been unfair to the 
prosecution and any co-accused. Evidence considered relevant to his 
credibility as a witness would have been kept from the jury, and yet he 
would have retained his own right to cross-examine the witnesses called by 
any co-accused or the prosecution on their previous convictions. 
To overcome these problems Parliament effected a compromise by 
including in s. 1 of the Act two important provisions governing the cross-
examination of the accused. The first (formerly s. 1(e), now s. 1(2)) 
exposes the accused to cross-examination on his alleged involvement in the 
offence charged, removing his common-law privilege against self-
incrimination in respect of that offence (Maxwell v. DPP [1935] AC 309 
(HL) at p. 318). The second (formerly s. 1(f)), now s. 1(3)) gives the 
accused a degree of protection (his `shield') from cross-examination on his 
bad character. But s. 1(3) is qualified by three exceptions which allow the 
accused's shield to be lost in certain circumstances. Sections 1(e) and 1(f) 
became ss. 1(2) and 1(3) respectively with effect from 24 July 2002 by 
virtue of Schedule 4 to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
(and SI 2002 No. 1739). 
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Section 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 now provides as follows: 
(2)	 A person charged in criminal proceedings who is called as a witness 
in the proceedings may be asked any question in cross-examination 
notwithstanding that it would tend to criminate him as to any 
offence with which he is charged in the proceedings. 
(3)	 A person charged in criminal proceedings who is called as a witness 
in the proceedings shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be 
required to answer, any question tending to show that he has 
committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence 
other than one with which he is then charged, or is of bad 
character, unless ± 
(i)	 the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such 
other offence is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty 
of an offence with which he is then charged; or 
(ii)	 he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the 
witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish his own 
good character, or has given evidence of his good character, 
or the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve 
imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the 
witnesses for the prosecution or the deceased victim of the 
alleged crime; or 
(iii)	 he has given evidence against any other person charged in the 
same proceedings. 
In s. 1(3) the term `character' has a broader meaning than at common 
law (R v. Dunkley [1927] 1 KB 323 (CCA) at p. 329; see also Stirland v. 
DPP [1944] AC 315 (HL) at p. 325 and Selvey v. DPP [1968] 2 WLR 1494 
(HL) at p. 1514; cf. Jones v. DPP [1962] 2 WLR 575 (HL) at p. 623). If the 
accused's bad character can be revealed by virtue of one of the exceptions, 
for example because he claims to be of good character, the prosecution 
and/or co-accused need not limit their cross-examination to evidence of 
his bad reputation. Evidence of specific incidents (such as previous 
convictions) may be revealed. Similarly, the accused may put his good 
character in issue for the purposes of the first limb of s. 1(3)(ii) by referring 
to his own specific meritorious acts (as, for example, in R v. Samuel (1956) 
40 Cr App R 8 (CCA)) and may be cross-examined under the second limb 
of s. 1(3)(ii) on his bad character if he casts specific imputations on the 
character of a prosecution witness. This approach was reaffirmed by the 
Court of Appeal in R v. Carter (1996) 161 JP 207 where it was held that 
`bad character' in s. 1(3) encompasses not only the accused's criminal 
record but also reputation and disposition, and that cross-examination on 
the accused's discreditable behaviour in relation to a civil claim fell within 
the scope of the subsection. This broad interpretation makes sense. If 
character were limited to general reputation the accused would find it 
difficult to give evidence of his own good character, whereas s. 1(3)(ii) 
recognises his right to do so; and if `imputations' covered nothing other 
than allegations of bad reputation, the accused would be able to maintain 
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his shield even after alleging that prosecution witnesses had committed 
serious acts of misconduct. 
The two subsections apply to any accused who gives evidence, even if he 
does not give evidence in support of his own defence but merely supports a 
co-accused (R v. Rowland (1909) 3 Cr App R 277 (CCA)). The phrase 
`charged with any offence' in s. 1(3) has been interpreted to mean `accused 
before a court' (Stirland v. DPP [1944] AC 315 (HL) at p. 323). But, 
though it is not necessary for there to have been a conviction, an acquittal 
must satisfy the paramount test of relevance to justify its being raised in 
cross-examination. In Maxwell v. DPP [1935] AC 309 the accused was 
alleged to have unlawfully killed a woman upon whom it was said he had 
performed an illegal abortion. He gave evidence of his good character and 
the prosecution cross-examined him pursuant to s. 1(3)(ii) of the Act on 
his previous acquittal following a similar charge. The House of Lords held 
that this charge should not have been raised as the mere fact that he had 
been acquitted of an offence was relevant neither to any issue at the trial 
nor to the accused's credibility as a witness. This does not mean that an 
acquittal will always be irrelevant, however, for otherwise the inclusion of 
`charged with any offence' in s. 1(3) would be otiose. In Maxwell v. DPP 
Viscount Sankey LC gave the example of the accused having given 
evidence at an earlier trial, following which he was acquitted, which 
contradicts the evidence given by him during the subsequent trial. Cross-
examination on the inconsistencies would be relevant to his credibility at 
the later trial. Conversely, the accused's credibility may be undermined by 
his having advanced the same or a similar defence on another occasion. In 
R v. Williamson [2003] EWCA Crim 544, a trial for possession of cannabis 
with intent to supply, the co-accused was permitted to cross-examine the 
accused under s. 1(3)(iii) in respect of a similar charge of possession with 
intent for which a prosecution was pending. The accused's defence in the 
instant case and the defence disclosed in the other case were similar, 
insofar as they each comprised a claim that the drugs had come into the 
accused's immediate vicinity without his being aware of the fact, and this 
was relevant to his credibility. Furthermore, where evidence of other 
alleged criminal conduct has been given against the accused at earlier trials 
(for that conduct) but the trials resulted in his being acquitted, and that 
evidence is nonetheless sufficiently probative to be admitted in the instant 
trial as similar fact evidence of his guilt on the basis that he did commit 
those other offences (R v. Z [2000] 3 WLR 117 (HL), 3.3.6 ante), it should 
be possible for the evidence of the allegations to be elicited in cross-
examination under an exception to s. 1(3) if it has not already been 
adduced. 
4.2 The Relationship Between Subsections (2) and (3) 
The meaning of and relationship between the two subsections have been 
described as a `nightmare of construction' (R v. Anderson [1988] 2 WLR 
1017 (CA) at p. 1023). Subsection (2) permits `any question' notwith-
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standing that it would tend to criminate the accused as to any offence with 
which he is charged. Subsection (3) prohibits `any question' tending to 
show that the accused has committed or been convicted of or been charged 
with any other offence or is of bad character. And yet questions prohibited 
by subsection (3) will often tend to criminate the accused as to the offence 
charged and therefore seem to be permitted by subsection (2). Moreover, 
subsection (3) is qualified by exception (i) which permits questions 
otherwise prohibited if proof that the accused has committed or been 
convicted of the other offence is `admissible evidence to show that he is 
guilty of an offence with which he is then charged'. 
In short, subsection (3) sets out the general prohibition on questions 
which might be called `indirectly incriminating', that is questions on 
extraneous matters which suggest that the accused is of bad character. As a 
general rule no question may be asked about the accused's bad character 
whether such evidence be directly relevant to the question of guilt (that is, 
similar fact evidence) or indirectly relevant to his guilt (that is, evidence 
suggesting that his testimony ought not to be believed). Subsection (2) 
allows questions which might be called `directly incriminating', that is any 
questions which are logically relevant to an issue or the accused's 
credibility as a witness other than questions which suggest the accused is 
guilty or lacking in credibility on account of his bad character. The 
prohibition in subsection (3) is subject to three important exceptions. 
Exception (i) allows questions relating to other offences the accused has 
committed to prove he is guilty of the offence charged. Such questions 
might be described as `indirectly incriminating', as they relate to other 
offences, but the evidence thereby elicited is directly relevant to whether or 
not the accused is guilty as charged. This is because the exception covers 
offences committed by the accused which are admissible as similar fact 
evidence at common law (or pursuant to a statutory provision) to prove 
the accused's guilt (see 3.3 ante). Exceptions (ii) and (iii) also allow 
`indirectly incriminating' questions to be asked in certain circumstances, 
but only for the limited purpose of undermining the accused's credibility. 
Thus, unlike similar fact evidence, bad-character evidence elicited under 
these two exceptions is only indirectly relevant to whether the accused is 
guilty. 
Some questions may be aimed at eliciting evidence which is directly 
relevant to an issue in the proceedings while giving rise to an incidental 
reference to the accused's bad character. The problem the courts have had 
to grapple with is whether such questions may be asked under subsection 
(2), notwithstanding the prohibition in subsection (3). This depends on 
which subsection is paramount. 
If subsection (3) is paramount no question which suggests previous 
misconduct or immorality may be asked unless an exception applies. This 
exclusionary interpretation would have the effect of preventing key 
questions from being asked on matters which are directly relevant to an 
issue if, incidentally, such questions would also reveal a bad-character 
trait. For example, if the accused is on trial for handling stolen goods and 
his defence is that he did not know or believe the goods were stolen, the 
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exclusionary interpretation would prevent the prosecution from being able 
to question him on his close friendship with the notorious burglar from 
whom he bought the goods (see Cross, `The Criminal Evidence Act 1898' 
(1962) 78 LQR 407 at p. 411). Although the questions would be directly 
relevant to the issue of mens rea, they would incidentally suggest that the 
accused has criminal associations and is therefore of bad character. 
Similarly, if the accused raises an alibi which is exactly the same as the 
alibi he raised at a previous trial, it would not be possible for the 
prosecution to cross-examine him on the previous alibi as it would fall foul 
of subsection (3), even though the questions would be directly relevant to 
an issue, that is the truth or falsity of the accused's defence. If subsection 
(2) is paramount then any question which is directly relevant to an issue 
may be asked even if it would incidentally suggest previous misconduct or 
immorality. This inclusionary interpretation would broaden the scope of 
permissible questioning under subsection (2) and narrow the scope of the 
prohibition in subsection (3). The alleged handler could then be cross-
examined on his close friendship with the miscreant from whom he bought 
the stolen goods; and the accused who has relied on a similar alibi at an 
earlier trial could be cross-examined on those similarities. The practical 
effect of this interpretation would be to render any question permissible so 
long as it was relevant to an issue in the proceedings; and subsection (3) 
would be limited to excluding questions on the accused's bad character 
which are relevant to nothing other than the collateral question of his 
credibility. The problem with the inclusionary interpretation is that it 
would render exception (i) otiose. Admissible similar fact evidence is 
directly relevant to an issue and not just credibility. If questions on such 
evidence were permissible under subsection (2) there would be no need for 
exception (i). For this reason the exclusionary interpretation, whereby 
subsection (2) is subservient to subsection (3), must be the correct 
approach, although this was not the interpretation originally adopted. 
In R v. Chitson [1909] 2 KB 945 the accused was charged with having 
had unlawful intercourse with a 14-year-old girl, K. K gave evidence for 
the prosecution and said that shortly after their act of intercourse the 
accused told her he had previously done the same thing with another girl, 
H. The prosecution were allowed to cross-examine the accused on whether 
he had made that statement to K and whether he had actually had an 
immoral relationship with H, who the prosecution suggested had been 
under the age of 16 at the time. The accused replied that H had been over 
16. Clearly the cross-examination suggested that the accused was of bad 
character (that is, sexually immoral) and also that he might have 
committed a criminal offence with H; but the questions were relevant to 
an issue because his answers corroborated K's testimony that it was the 
accused who had been sexually involved with her. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal adopted an inclusionary interpretation of the exceptions and held 
that the questions had been properly put notwithstanding the incidental 
suggestion of bad character. The Court did not explain whether the 
questioning had been permissible under s. 1(2) or 1(3)(i) ± the head-note 
states s. 1(3)(i) ± but since no evidence was adduced to prove that H had 
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been under 16 at the time of her involvement with the accused s. 1(3)(i) 
could not have been relevant and it must be seen as a decision under 
s. 1(2). An exclusionary interpretation of the exceptions would have 
prevented the accused from being asked the questions about the statement 
to K and his relationship with H as the s. 1(3) prohibition would have 
overridden s. 1(2) (see also R v. Kennaway [1917] 1 KB 25 (CCA)). In R v. 
Kurasch [1915] 2 KB 749 the accused and four other co-accused were 
charged with conspiring to defraud (by holding a mock auction) and the 
accused testified that he was merely the employee of a Mrs D who 
controlled the auction business. An exclusionary interpretation of the 
exceptions would have prevented the prosecution from cross-examining 
the accused on the fact that he and Mrs D were cohabiting as man and 
wife because of the necessary implication of immorality, even though the 
questions on their relationship would have been relevant to the question 
whether his defence was true. Again the Court of Criminal Appeal held 
that the questions had been properly put, suggesting an inclusionary 
interpretation. 
The meaning of the two subsections and the relationship between them 
was addressed by the House of Lords in Jones v. DPP [1962] 2 WLR 575. 
J was charged with the murder of a girl guide and at his trial he explained 
that he had given a false alibi to the police as he had been `in trouble' 
before. His true alibi, he said, was that he had been with a prostitute, and 
he gave evidence that his wife had reacted stormily to his late return home 
and that they had had conversations about a report of the girl's 
disappearance in their newspaper. The prosecution sought leave to 
cross-examine him on his testimony in a trial a year earlier (for the rape of 
a different girl guide, which had occurred a month before the murder) 
during which he had raised a strikingly similar defence. The prosecution 
submitted that the fact J had raised an identical defence on two occasions 
would reveal to the jury how unlikely it was that he was telling the truth in 
the present case. The judge allowed the cross-examination and, though no 
mention was made of the nature of the earlier offence or his conviction, 
other than references to his `explanation' on `another occasion' relating to 
an `incident' which had been reported in their newspaper, J was convicted. 
He appealed on the ground that he had done nothing to lose his s. 1(3) 
shield and yet had been asked questions `tending to show that he has 
committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence'. 
The question the House of Lords had to answer was whether it had been 
permissible for the prosecution to question J on his earlier explanation 
when that cross-examination had certainly implied he had been charged 
with another offence. The majority (Lords Simonds, Reid and Morris) felt 
that the questioning would not have been possible under s. 1(2) if s. 1(3) 
had applied. However, the words `tending to show' in s. 1(3) had to be 
interpreted to mean `tending to reveal' to the jury for the first time, and as 
J had already mentioned he had been `in trouble' s. 1(3) could no longer 
prevent the prosecution's questions. This was so even though the questions 
went beyond the vague admission J had made. The majority view 
amounted to an exclusionary interpretation of the exceptions: s. 1(2) sets 
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out the questions which the accused may be asked, but this is subject to 
s. 1(3) which sets out the questions the accused may never be asked unless 
one of its exceptions applies. The majority accepted that s. 1(2) could be 
interpreted in two ways: a broad (inclusionary) interpretation would allow 
any question tending to persuade the jury of the accused's guilt, but this 
would result in a conflict between the two subsections; a narrower 
(exclusionary) interpretation would restrict the class of questions to those 
which did nothing other than directly connect the accused with the 
commission of the offence charged (questions `directly relevant to the 
charge') and avoid any such conflict. The majority approved the 
interpretation of Viscount Sankey LC in Maxwell v. DPP [1935] AC 309 
(HL) (at p. 319) that s. 1(3) was `universal and absolute' unless one of its 
exceptions applied. In the words of Lord Morris (at p. 608): 
`All questions put to witnesses must satisfy the test of relevance and this 
applies to questions put in cross-examination to an accused. If, 
however, questions are proposed which can be regarded as relevant, 
but which tend to show that he has committed or been convicted of or 
has been charged with some offence other than that wherewith he is 
then charged or is of bad character, such questions can only be put and 
can only be allowed if they qualify within the permitting provisions of 
[s. 1(3)] . . . This means that even if the questions are relevant and have 
to do with the issue before the court they cannot be asked unless 
covered by the permitting provisions of [s. 1(3)].' 
It was fortunate for the prosecution that J had mentioned he had been 
`in trouble' before, for otherwise he would have been immune to cross-
examination on his previous explanation despite its direct relevance to the 
issue of his defence and the murderer's identity. Lord Reid explained that 
R v. Chitson [1909] 2 KB 945 (CCA) (and R v. Kennaway [1917] 1 KB 25 
(CCA)) had been correctly decided but for the wrong reasons: the cross-
examination in those cases could be justified on the ground that the 
accused's misconduct had already been revealed to the jury. 
The minority (Lords Denning and Devlin) adopted an inclusionary 
interpretation: the questions had been properly allowed under s. 1(2) 
which, it was felt, permitted any questions which were `directly relevant to 
the offence charged' or `relevant to the issue' even if such questions 
incidentally showed the accused had been charged with another offence. 
J had given a detailed alibi and it was of direct relevance for the 
prosecution to have shown his explanation was false and that he could be 
identified as the murderer. 
By virtue of the majority view, so long as the s. 1(3) prohibition remains 
in place no question may be asked which would `indirectly incriminate' the 
accused unless an exception applies. Only `directly incriminating' 
questions may be asked under s. 1(2). This means that questions which 
are directly relevant to an issue cannot be asked if they would incidentally 
suggest misbehaviour by the accused on another occasion. If the s. 1(3) 
prohibition disappears then (subject to any other prohibition) any 
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question may be asked whether it is `directly incriminating' or `indirectly 
incriminating'. 
The accused benefits from the House of Lords' interpretation as s. 1(3) 
absolutely prohibits any cross-examination which would tend to show the 
accused's bad character unless one of the exceptions is triggered. In 
practice, however, the strength of the accused's protective shield has been 
significantly undermined by the majority view that s. 1(3) ceases to have 
any role to play if the accused's character has been revealed to the jury 
before his cross-examination. Indeed, the facts of Jones v. DPP [1962] 2 
WLR 575 (HL) and Lord Reid's interpretation of R v. Chitson [1909] 2 
KB 945 (CCA) suggest that any mention that the accused has been in 
trouble previously, even if made by a prosecution witness, could lose him 
his shield. In R v. Anderson [1988] 2 WLR 1017 the accused, a member of 
the IRA, was charged with conspiring to cause explosions in southern 
England. Her `ambush' defence was that her role as a member of the IRA 
had been limited to acting as an escort to help escaped prisoners make 
their way to continental Europe, and that the incriminating articles found 
in her possession had been to assist her in that lesser conspiracy. The 
prosecution were permitted to cross-examine her on the fact that she was 
`wanted' by the police in Northern Ireland and that she would therefore 
not have been given such an overt role by the IRA or wish to have 
accepted it. The Court of Appeal held that because she had already 
revealed her involvement in criminal activities with the IRA when giving 
her evidence in chief s. 1(3) no longer applied, and the prosecution had 
been able to cross-examine her on the fact that she was `wanted' in 
Northern Ireland. It would therefore seem that the accused's s. 1(3) shield 
will be lost in respect of any other misconduct if its prejudicial effect would 
be no greater than the misconduct which has already been revealed. 
4.3 Exception (i) 
Under the first exception to s. 1(3) the accused may be cross-examined on 
other offences he has committed or been convicted of where such offences 
amount to `admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of an offence with 
which he is then charged'. This exception covers evidence of other offences 
admissible at common law or pursuant to a statutory provision to prove 
the accused's guilt of the instant charge. The most obvious example is 
similar fact evidence of the accused's earlier offences. It is important to 
note, however, that while the exception permits cross-examination only on 
offences the accused has `committed or been convicted of', if the 
prosecution are permitted to adduce in chief (that is, as part of their 
case) similar fact evidence of a different kind, such as disreputable 
behaviour not amounting to an offence, the evidence will already have 
been revealed to the jury before the accused faces cross-examination, and, 
by virtue of the decision of the House of Lords in Jones v. DPP [1962] 2 
WLR 575 (4.2 ante), s. 1(3) will not provide the accused with any 
protection against cross-examination on it. 
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In the light of R v. Z [2000] 3 WLR 117 (HL) (3.3.6 ante) it is apparent 
that the accused may be cross-examined on admissible similar fact 
evidence which suggests that he `committed' other offences even if he has 
already been acquitted of them, whether or not the evidence has already 
been adduced by the prosecution as part of their case. However, evidence 
of an acquittal which is insufficiently probative to be adduced in chief at 
common law, and which is not relied on in the instant trial on the basis 
that the accused was in fact guilty of the offence he was acquitted of, 
cannot be elicited under this exception. In R v. Cokar [1960] 2 WLR 836 
the accused's defence to a charge of burglary was that he had merely 
entered the house for warmth and shelter. The prosecution were allowed 
to cross-examine him on his acquittal following a similar charge, not on 
the basis that he was guilty of that offence but to show that he had become 
aware that he could not be found guilty in such circumstances. The Court 
of Criminal Appeal quashed the conviction as s. 1(3) amounted to an 
absolute prohibition on questions about the accused's previous charges, 
and exception (i) did not apply (see also R v. Pommell [1999] Crim LR 
576 (CA)). 
4.4 Exception (ii) ± The First Limb 
The first limb of exception (ii) allows the prosecution ± and possibly a 
co-accused (Murdoch v. Taylor [1965] 2 WLR 425 (HL) at p. 437) ± to 
cross-examine the accused on his bad character in response to a defence 
assertion of good character. The accused may wish to adduce evidence of 
his good character as evidence that he is unlikely to have committed the 
offence charged and that he is more worthy of belief (3.4.2 ante), so it is 
quite logical that the prosecution should be permitted to cross-examine the 
accused to show the falsity of his assertion and that he is willing to mislead 
the court. 
A literal interpretation of the first limb would suggest that the 
prosecution's right to cross-examine the accused on his bad character 
can arise only if the accused's good character has been put in issue in one 
of the specified ways (`personally or by his advocate asked questions of the 
witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good 
character, or has given evidence of his good character'), that is, that the 
accused's shield is not lost if he calls a witness to testify as to his good 
character. It has been held, however, that even if it is not the accused 
himself who gives evidence of his good character he may still lose his shield 
and face cross-examination on his bad character (R v. Ellis [1910] 2 KB 
746 (CCA), R v. Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 204 (CCA), R v. Winfield 
[1939] 4 All ER 164 (CCA)). That said, if a witness is called for a reason 
unconnected with giving good-character evidence and he volunteers such 
evidence without the accused's authority, the shield will not be lost (R v. 
Redd [1923] 1 KB 104 (CCA)). R v. Winfield [1939] 4 All ER 164 reports 
that the accused, on trial for indecently assaulting a woman, was cross-
examined on his convictions for dishonesty offences, even though it was 
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his good-character witness who had given evidence of his sexual morality. 
This case is therefore authority for the indivisibility of the accused's 
character should he face cross-examination under exception (ii) (see also 
Stirland v. DPP [1944] AC 315 (HL) at p. 326 and R v. Buzalek [1991] 
Crim LR 116 (CA)). 
In R v. Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746 (at pp. 762±3) the Court of Criminal 
Appeal addressed the policy behind the first limb of the exception in the 
following terms: 
`It was intended to apply to cases where witnesses to character were 
called, or where evidence of the good character of the prisoner was 
sought to be elicited from the witnesses for the prosecution. In civil 
actions evidence of good character is not, as a rule, admissible. It is 
admissible in criminal cases, and it is to this class of evidence that the 
statute refers, not to mere assertions of innocence or repudiation of guilt 
on the part of the prisoner, nor to reasons given by him for such 
assertion or repudiation.' 
Importantly, then, the accused will not trigger exception (ii) if he gives 
evidence on matters relating to the offence charged which incidentally 
casts him in a good light. Thus in Malindi v. R [1966] 3 WLR 913 (PC) it 
was held that the accused, on trial for conspiring to commit arson at a 
meeting in 1962, had not put his good character in issue by testifying that 
the meeting had broken up because he had expressed his disapproval of 
violence. 
In other situations the case-law demonstrates that the accused runs the 
risk of losing his shield even if the assertions of good character are 
relatively commonplace. Moreover, it is not necessary for the good-
character evidence to be evidence of general reputation for the accused to 
lose his shield. In other words, the courts have focused on whether it was 
right to have allowed the prosecution to cross-examine the accused under 
exception (ii) following an assertion of good character, regardless of 
whether his evidence of good character was technically admissible (in 
accordance with the decision in R v. Redgrave (1981) 74 Cr App R 10 
(CA), 3.4.1 ante). 
It is important to bear in mind that `good character' is very much a 
question of degree, and the judge's ruling will in practice depend as much 
on the factual context of the case as on the nature of the assertion made 
(see R v. Parker (1924) 18 Cr App R 14 (CCA) at p. 17). In R v. Coulman 
(1927) 20 Cr App R 106 (CCA), for example, it was felt that the accused, 
charged with indecently assaulting boys, could have put his good character 
in issue merely by stating that he was married with a family; and in R v. 
Baker (1912) 7 Cr App R 252 (CCA) an assertion by the accused that he 
had been `earning an honest living' for several years was enough to lose 
him his shield when charged with possessing a mould for counterfeiting 
coins. More recently, in R v. Davison-Jenkins [1997] Crim LR 816 (CA) the 
accused, who was charged with shoplifting, lost her shield by testifying as 
to her job as a manageress, her university education and to her having a 
wealthy partner (see also R v. Powell [1985] 1 WLR 1364 (CA)). An 
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accused charged with an offence of dishonesty can expect to lose his shield 
if he gives evidence of specific incidents of honest conduct in the past (R v. 
Samuel (1956) 40 Cr App R 8 (CCA)); and claiming to be a practising 
Catholic for many years would be an assertion of good character if 
charged with stealing from a Catholic church (R v. Ferguson (1909) 2 Cr 
App R 250 (CCA)). Similarly, a purported reluctance to drive at high 
speeds when charged with high-speed motor manslaughter could amount 
to an assertion of good character (R v. Beecham [1921] 3 KB 464 (CCA)). 
The accused will also put his good character in issue by stating he has no 
previous convictions. This happened in R v. Marsh [1994] Crim LR 52 
(CA) where the prosecution were allowed to cross-examine the accused on 
his disciplinary record of violent play on the rugby field. 
A line has to be drawn somewhere, however, for otherwise the mere 
wearing of a smart suit for the trial, or the assertion of being employed, 
could be construed as an implied assertion of good character. In R v. 
Stronach [1988] Crim LR 48 (CA) it was accepted, in the factual context of 
the case, that evidence of the accused's employment with London 
Transport and his being married was insufficient to trigger the exception 
(although in reality this seems to have been a Malindi-type situation); and 
the mere wearing of a regimental blazer was held not to be an assertion of 
good character in R v. Hamilton [1969] Crim LR 486 (CA). In R v. 
Robinson [2001] Crim LR 478 the Court of Appeal held that holding or 
waving a small Bible while giving evidence could not amount to an implied 
assertion of good character. As the accused does not suggest he is of good 
character (for the purposes of the exception) by taking the oath, he cannot 
put his character in issue by reminding the jury of that fact or by waving a 
Bible during the course of his testimony. 
If the accused has mentioned only one of his several previous 
convictions ± for example, to explain his conduct at the scene of the 
crime, such as running away when spotted by a police officer ± he will not 
have asserted his good character unless he has also expressly or impliedly 
understated his criminal record and thereby represented that his character 
is better than it really is (R v. Thompson (1965) 50 Cr App R 91 (CCA); see 
also R v. Mauricia [2002] 2 Cr App R 377 (CA)). Nor is it generally an 
assertion of good character to attack the character of another person (R v. 
Lee [1976] 1 WLR 71 (CA)). 
If it is ruled that the accused has adduced evidence of his good 
character, the judge retains a discretion as to whether the prosecution 
should be allowed to cross-examine him on his bad character (R v. 
Thompson (1965) 50 Cr App R 91 (CCA)); but if such cross-examination is 
permitted the questions must relate to actual bad character as opposed to 
mere suspicion of bad character. In other words, the questions must satisfy 
the general requirement of relevance. In Maxwell v. DPP [1935] AC 309 
the accused gave evidence that he had `lived a good, clean, moral life' and 
thereby lost his shield, but the House of Lords held that his acquittal 
following an earlier trial should not have been raised by the prosecution. It 
had been a mere `misfortune' which was of no relevance to his credibility. 
Maxwell v. DPP was distinguished in R v. Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 
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204, however. The accused in that case, on trial for receiving stolen goods, 
called a witness to testify that he bore `a good reputation for honesty'. The 
prosecution subsequently recalled the accused and cross-examined him on 
his prior conviction and acquittal for receiving, having already cross-
examined the good-character witness on the same matters. The Court of 
Criminal Appeal felt that a charge of receiving could justify cross-
examination on a previous acquittal for the same offence by analogy with 
what is now s. 27(3) of the Theft Act 1968 (3.3.12 ante). 
Because evidence of good character is relevant both to law-abiding 
propensity and to credibility, evidence of bad character raised in rebuttal 
pursuant to the first limb of exception (ii) might logically be regarded as 
relevant in the same ways on the ground that such questions are asked `to 
show the contrary' (Maxwell v. DPP [1935] AC 309 (HL) at p. 319). It 
might be argued, moreover, that there would be no injustice in adducing 
bad-character evidence for this purpose (insofar as the evidence is in fact 
logically probative of the accused's guilt and the jury are properly 
directed) if the accused has deliberately sought to deceive the court by 
adducing false evidence of law-abiding propensity. However, because it is 
thought to be undesirable in principle to admit the accused's bad character 
for the purpose of proving guilt unless it is sufficiently probative to be 
admissible as similar fact evidence, the courts have recognised on several 
occasions that bad-character evidence brought out under the first limb of 
s. 1(3)(ii) is to be considered relevant only to the accused's credibility (see, 
for example, R v. Richardson [1968] 3 WLR 15 (CA)). The courts have also 
recognised, however, that this distinction is likely to be lost on a jury. In R 
v. Samuel (1956) 40 Cr App R 8 (CCA) the accused was tried for the theft 
of a camera he said he had found. He gave evidence of handing in lost 
property on previous occasions to show he would eventually have got 
round to handing the camera in, and this caused him to lose his shield. 
Lord Goddard CJ said (at p. 12): 
`It is very difficult to see how if it is permissible to cross-examine a 
prisoner with regard to convictions, for instance, if he is a thief and he is 
cross-examined on previous convictions of larceny, the jury is not, in 
effect, being asked to say: ``The prisoner is just the sort of man who will 
commit these crimes and therefore it is highly probable he did.'' In 
theory, at any rate, what the jury is being asked to do is to reject the 
prisoner's evidence when he says: ``I acted honestly in this case . . . 
I always intended to hand back that camera to the police when I had a 
reasonable opportunity.'' By putting these questions to him the 
prosecution were in fact trying to destroy his credibility . . .' 
In practice, because good-character evidence goes to propensity, there 
may be a greater willingness to admit evidence which is suggestive of a bad 
propensity under this limb than under the second limb of the exception. In 
R v. Marsh [1994] Crim LR 52 it was felt that the accused's record of 
violent conduct during rugby matches could have been raised against him 
on a charge of inflicting grievous bodily harm on another rugby player 
during a match, even though it would have suggested a violent disposition. 
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Interestingly, the Court of Appeal accepted that the evidence might not 
have been admissible if the second limb rather than the first limb had been 
triggered. 
If the accused loses his shield, and faces cross-examination under this 
limb, the prosecution may bring out his convictions whether they are for 
offences committed before or after the offence for which he is on trial (R v. 
Wood [1920] 2 KB 179 (CCA)). 
4.5 Exception (ii) ± The Second Limb 
The second limb of exception (ii) allows the accused to be cross-examined 
on his bad character by the prosecution ± and possibly by a co-accused 
(Murdoch v. Taylor [1965] 2 WLR 425 (HL) at p. 437; R v. Lovett [1973] 1 
WLR 241 (CA) at p. 245) ± if the `nature or conduct of the defence' is such 
as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor, a witness for 
the prosecution or the deceased victim of the alleged crime. If the 
prosecution adduce a witness statement under an exception to the hearsay 
rule, the maker of that statement is deemed to be a prosecution witness for 
the purposes of this limb (R v. Miller [1997] 2 Cr App R 178 (CA)). The 
accused may be able to avoid losing his shield if the imputations were 
made in reply to prosecution questions, so as not to have been part of `the 
nature or conduct of the defence' (R v. Jones (1910) 3 Cr App R 67 
(CCA)). This is not an absolute rule, however, for there are cases where 
the exception was triggered by imputations made by the accused during 
cross-examination (for example R v. Rappolt (1911) 6 Cr App R 156 
(CCA) and R v. Stone [2001] EWCA Crim 2379). In R v. Bartholomew 
[2002] EWCA Crim 1312 the Court of Appeal accepted that the accused 
could say something in the course of his being cross-examined which 
might trigger the exception, but went on to state that, as a general rule, the 
trial judge should warn the accused of the consequences of his making an 
imputation against a prosecution witness. 
Bad-character evidence brought out pursuant to the second limb is 
relevant to the accused's credibility but not his guilt (R v. Inder (1977) 67 
Cr App R 143 (CA), R v. McLeod [1995] 1 Cr App R 591 (CA), R v. 
Barratt [2000] Crim LR 847 (CA)). For this reason, it has been held that if 
the bad-character evidence includes previous convictions the prosecution 
should limit their questioning to the bare facts of the offences and not 
bring out any specific details (R v. Khan [1991] Crim LR 51 (CA)). More 
recently, however, the Court of Appeal has accepted that it may be 
permissible to bring out further details of the offences to demonstrate that 
a similar defence was raised by the accused and disbelieved on a previous 
occasion, even if a collateral effect of such questioning would be to suggest 
propensity, so long as the prosecution do not go `too far' (R v. Barsoum 
[1994] Crim LR 194, R v. McLeod [1995] 1 Cr App R 591). The 
prosecution may bring out convictions for offences committed before or 
after the offence for which the accused is on trial (R v. Coltress (1978) 68 
Cr App R 193 (CA)). 
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The second limb, based on the retaliatory policy of `tit for tat', prevents 
the accused from being able to undermine the credibility of prosecution 
witnesses without having his own credibility as a witness, or the credibility 
of his defence, brought into question. If the accused is going to impugn the 
credibility of those who testify against him: 
`it is only fair that the jury should have before them material on which 
they can form their judgment whether the accused person is any more 
worthy to be believed than those he has attacked. It is obviously unfair 
that the jury should be left in the dark about an accused person's 
character if the conduct of his defence has attacked the character of . . . 
the witnesses for the prosecution . . .' (R v. Jenkins (1945) 31 Cr App R 1 
(CCA) at p. 15) 
One justification for the second limb is the desirability of equipping the 
jury (or magistrates) with information which would help them to compare 
the veracity and therefore testimony of opposing witnesses, but this cannot 
be the sole rationale. The accused's bad character may now be revealed if 
he attacks the character of a deceased victim who is not the author of any 
testimonial evidence. In such cases there is no need for any comparison of 
conflicting testimony. The essence of the second limb, much like the first 
limb, is to ensure that the tribunal of fact is not misled by the accused's 
tactics. If the accused tries to tilt the balance of the proceedings in his own 
favour by raising character, it is essential that the balance should be 
restored if the tribunal of fact would otherwise be misled. It would be 
repugnant to common sense to allow an accused with numerous previous 
convictions to make imputations against prosecution witnesses for the 
purpose of showing them to be morally bankrupt, and therefore less 
worthy of belief, if at the same time he would be completely immune to a 
similar attack by the prosecution. The tribunal of fact would be left with a 
poorer image of the prosecution witnesses and have no reason to doubt 
the veracity of the accused. The same must be true if the accused has killed 
the deceased, raised self-defence, and attacked the violent character of the 
deceased as a way of supporting his version of events. If the accused also 
has a history of violent conduct his defence is likely to be less credible, so 
his bad character should be revealed to the jury to help them come to the 
correct decision at the end of the trial. 
As with the first limb, the accused's character is indivisible. The accused 
may bring out any immoral conduct of prosecution witnesses to show that 
their general moral character (their `moral credibility') is such that no 
conviction should be based on their evidence. Similarly, the prosecution 
may adduce any evidence of the accused's immorality to show that he (and 
his defence) ought not to be believed. The rationale is that one who is 
generally immoral is less likely to be truthful in court, and for this reason 
the evidence of bad character need not be evidence of past dishonesty. 
Some types of past misconduct will of course be far more disprobative of 
truthfulness than others. In the self-defence example, the fact the accused 
has a violent disposition or convictions for perjury would make his 
testimony and defence less credible than convictions for drink-driving or 
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theft. The problem is that where bad-character evidence is highly 
disprobative of truthfulness, and therefore indirectly probative of guilt, 
the tribunal of fact may mistakenly regard it as evidence of propensity 
directly suggesting guilt and end up convicting on an erroneous basis. 
One further justification for the second limb is that it acts as a deterrent, 
preventing gratuitous attacks on the character of prosecution witnesses. If 
there were no inhibitory rule prospective witnesses might be reluctant to 
come forward as there would be little to stop the accused from casting 
aspersions on their character. This justification is undermined, however, 
by the fact that the accused can refuse to testify and instruct his counsel to 
make any such imputations on his behalf (R v. Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 
(CCA), 3.4.5 ante). 
Although there is something to be said for the tit-for-tat rule, its 
application will often be far from fair in practice. First, the undue 
prejudice which is likely to result from the accused's misconduct being 
revealed will in many cases outweigh any damage caused to the 
prosecution case by the accused's imputations. The accused is on trial; 
the prosecution witnesses are not. Although the jury will be told that the 
accused's bad character is relevant only to his credibility, there will always 
be a risk of moral prejudice, and a high risk of reasoning prejudice 
whenever his past misconduct is similar to the charge he now faces (see 
3.3.2 ante). Second, the accused will often have no choice but to cast 
imputations on prosecution witnesses as part of his defence, and yet a 
literal reading of the second limb of the exception means he may still lose 
his shield despite the necessity of adopting such tactics. It will be seen 
below that the literal interpretation has indeed been accepted as the 
correct approach. Even if the accused alleges that evidence against him has 
been fabricated, or he simply brings out a prosecution witness's conviction 
for perjury, he faces the prospect of having all his own misconduct 
revealed; and as there is no rule which obliges the prosecution to reveal 
their own witnesses' convictions during the trial (R v. Carey (1968) 52 Cr 
App R 305 (CA)) the accused's advocate may have no choice but to elicit 
their convictions during cross-examination. Third, although defence 
counsel has to tread carefully to ensure that the accused's shield is not 
lost, there is no such deterrent influencing the prosecution. The 
prosecution are free to attack the character of defence witnesses safe in 
the knowledge that if the defence retaliates in kind the accused will run the 
risk of losing his shield. The consequence is that prosecution witnesses 
may be left appearing entirely credible even though the accused's witnesses 
have been thoroughly discredited. Fourth, the second limb encourages 
police malpractice. A corrupt officer can fabricate evidence against a 
suspect with previous convictions in the knowledge that if he alleges such 
malpractice in court his convictions will be revealed. Of course the accused 
always has the option of not testifying so that he can discredit the 
prosecution witnesses without having his own bad character revealed, but 
this approach now permits an inference to be drawn in support of the case 
against him (R v. Cowan [1995] 3 WLR 818 (CA), 9.3.2 post; see also R v. 
Taylor [1999] Crim LR 77 (CA)). 
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The judiciary began to recognise the problems associated with the 
application of the second limb soon after the 1898 Act came into force and 
have, to some extent at least, sought to prevent it from being applied too 
harshly (although, as noted above, one problem stems from the literal way 
in which the exception has been interpreted). First, it has been held that a 
mere `emphatic denial of the charge' will not lose the accused his shield, 
notwithstanding the implied suggestion that prosecution witnesses are 
lying; nor, generally, will the accused lose his shield by expressly calling 
prosecution witnesses liars. This is not a particularly surprising 
interpretation of the exception, for any other approach would have 
rendered the accused's right to testify devoid of all substance, at least in 
cases where there can be no possibility of mistake. A mere plea of `not 
guilty' will often be an implied assertion that prosecution witnesses are 
willing to commit perjury to see the accused convicted. For example, if D 
faces a charge of indecently assaulting C, D's defence of consent will not 
only suggest that C was quite happy to be sexually molested, but also that 
C was willing to lie on oath to secure an innocent person's conviction. 
Similarly, D's plea of self-defence to a charge of battery will necessarily 
involve a suggestion that C is the sort of person who is willing to start a 
fight and then perjure himself. Second, the trial judge has been recognised 
to have an exclusionary discretion to ensure a fair trial, and this discretion 
can be applied to prevent cross-examination of the accused on his bad 
character even though he has fallen squarely within the scope of the 
second limb (see 4.6 post). Third, the Court of Appeal has recognised that 
the convictions of an accomplice who has pleaded guilty and decided to 
turn Queen's evidence should be revealed by the prosecution at the 
beginning of the trial (R v. Taylor [1999] 2 Cr App R 163). 
Nevertheless, despite these concessions the accused still runs the risk of 
losing his shield even though casting imputations on the character of 
prosecution witnesses is a necessary part of his defence, and the 
indivisibility of his character means that any evidence of his bad character 
can, subject to the application of the judge's exclusionary discretion, be 
raised in cross-examination. It is true that bad-character evidence is 
admissible under the second limb of the exception solely for the purpose of 
demonstrating the accused's lack of credibility, but, as noted already, the 
practical effect of the evidence will often be to lead the jury along a 
forbidden chain of reasoning from disposition to guilt (R v. Samuel (1956) 
40 Cr App R 8 (CCA), 4.4 ante). This undermines the principle that the 
jury or magistrates should decide whether the accused is guilty of the 
particular offence charged and not simply judge him on his past 
misconduct or unappealing character. 
The decision of the House of Lords in Selvey v. DPP [1968] 2 WLR 
1494, the leading case on the second limb of exception (ii), illustrates some 
of the problems an accused may face when his defence necessitates an 
attack on a prosecution witness. M had gone to the police claiming that D 
had buggered him, and medical evidence showed that he had indeed 
recently been buggered. In his defence D testified to the effect that he had 
not buggered M, and that M had told him he had been buggered by 
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someone else earlier that day for £1. D also gave evidence that M had 
offered himself to D for £1 too, an offer D said he had declined and which 
had resulted in M bringing his false allegation. The trial judge ruled that D 
had thrown away his shield and allowed the prosecution to cross-examine 
him on his previous convictions for indecently assaulting young boys and 
importuning male persons. D appealed on the ground that, because the 
imputations against M had been a necessary part of his defence, the 
prosecution should not have been allowed to cross-examine him on his 
convictions. The House of Lords confirmed the existence of the trial 
judge's discretion to prevent cross-examination under the exception, but, 
approving R v. Hudson [1912] 2 KB 464 (CCA), dismissed D's appeal, 
holding that there was no rule disapplying the exception or obliging the 
trial judge to exercise his discretion in the accused's favour just because the 
nature of his defence necessarily involved casting aspersions on a 
prosecution witness's character. The House of Lords also confirmed, 
however, that if an imputation in reality amounts to no more than a denial 
of the offence charged, even if expressed in emphatic language, it should 
not be regarded as triggering the second limb. (Cf. R v. Britzman [1983] 1 
WLR 350 (CA) (at p. 355) where it was felt that a mere denial could 
amount to an imputation save that cross-examination was to be prevented 
in such cases by the mandatory application of the exclusionary 
`discretion'.) 
An emphatic denial of guilt will very often carry with it an implied 
imputation, but this is not enough to lose the accused his shield. The 
difficulty lies in trying to determine in advance how far the accused can 
develop his denial before it becomes an imputation likely to trigger the 
exception. Decided cases offer some guidance, but should not be regarded 
as precedents because of the unique factual context of each case (though it 
will be seen that there is a precedent for rape trials). Furthermore, before 
the judicial discretion to prevent cross-examination was recognised, it is 
quite possible that judges sometimes regarded an attack on the character 
of a prosecution witness as a mere `denial of guilt' if it was thought the 
accused should not be cross-examined on his character. The same 
situation today is more likely to lead to a ruling that there actually has 
been an imputation, with the discretion being applied in the accused's 
favour. 
Generally speaking, to call a prosecution witness a liar will not lose the 
accused his shield on the ground that it is no more than an emphatic denial 
of guilt (R v. Rouse [1904] 1 KB 184 (CCCR), Selvey v. DPP [1968] 2 
WLR 1494 (HL)). If, however, the accused goes beyond merely calling a 
witness a liar he will trigger the application of the exception. In R v. 
Rappolt (1911) 6 Cr App R 156 (CCA), for example, the accused lost his 
shield after asserting that the prosecution witness was a `horrible liar'; and 
in R v. Lasseur [1991] Crim LR 53 (CA) the accused lost his shield by 
asserting that his former accomplice (who had pleaded guilty and testified 
for the prosecution) was lying in order to get a lighter sentence. In R v. 
Wignall [1993] Crim LR 62 the Court of Appeal felt that the accused might 
have crossed the line when his counsel accused a prosecution witness of 
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`making up her evidence as she went along to bolster her case', but 
accepted that the allegation had added little to the suggestion that the 
witness's evidence was untrue and that defence counsel `had to be allowed 
a certain latitude'. It was also felt that if the line had been crossed the 
judge in his discretion should not have allowed the prosecution to bring 
out the accused's convictions (see also R v. Desmond [1999] Crim LR 313 
(CA)). One conclusion which can be drawn from the cases is that there will 
be an imputation once the accused or his counsel has suggested an 
offensive reason for the witness's alleged dishonesty, even though the 
reason gives credence to the accused's denial. Thus, in R v. Dunkley [1927] 
1 KB 323 (CCA) the accused lost his shield not because he had called the 
prosecution witness a liar, but because he added that her lies were actuated 
by malice; and in R v. McLean (1926) 19 Cr App R 104 (CCA) the accused 
lost his shield by alleging that the complainant had lied to obtain money 
from her relatives. In R v. Manley (1962) 126 JP 316 (CCA) it was alleged 
that the witness had been lying because he wanted to keep the accused 
away from his (the witness's) wife. This had not suggested any impropriety 
on the part of the witness; it had merely brought out the fact that his 
marriage was on the rocks. Lord Parker CJ said (at p. 318): 
`[T]he mere suggestion of a reason for the lie does not change the 
position at all unless the reason itself imputes some bad character or 
previous conviction to the witness. Here, however disagreeable it may 
have been for [the prosecution witness] to have his private life referred 
to in public, it was in no way suggesting that he . . . had been guilty of 
any disgraceful or criminal conduct.' 
It is now well established that if the accused is charged with rape and he 
asserts that the complainant consented, his shield is not lost. In R v. 
Turner [1944] KB 463 (CCA) the accused stated not only that the 
complainant had consented but also that she had initiated intercourse by 
handling his penis (conduct amounting, in the words of the trial judge, to 
an imputation that she was a `filthy, nasty woman, utterly filthy, who 
would commit an indecent assault upon that man'). It was held on appeal, 
however, that this additional assertion was no more than a description of 
the complainant's conduct showing that she had consented and did not 
cause the accused's testimony to amount to an imputation. Consent to 
sexual intercourse should not be regarded as an imputation because the 
issue is central to the definition of rape. In other words, because it is for 
the prosecution to prove the absence of consent, to raise consent is no 
more than a denial of rape. However, in Selvey v. DPP [1968] 2 WLR 1494 
(HL) it was suggested (at pp. 1512 and 1520) that an assertion of consent 
in a rape case is an imputation on the character of the complainant, save 
that there is a special rule that the judge is obliged to exercise his 
`discretion' in the accused's favour in such cases. 
Logically one might think that any defence which comprises no more 
than a denial of an ingredient of the offence, such as self-defence, should 
similarly prevent the application of s. 1(3)(ii), but this view has not been 
accepted. A recent example is provided by R v. Stone [2001] EWCA Crim 
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2379, where the accused triggered the exception by his assertion that he 
had acted in self-defence against a knife attack by the complainant. The 
necessity of casting an imputation is not of itself a ground for preventing 
the application of the second limb of s. 1(3)(ii), and it would seem that 
rape is the only exception (R v. Cook [1959] 2 WLR 616 (CCA), Selvey v. 
DPP [1968] 2 WLR 1494 (HL)). 
Whether an assertion amounts to an imputation in other types of case is 
governed by an objective test. It does not matter that the accused did not 
intend to make the imputation and that he only wished to explain his 
defence. He will be held to have made an imputation if a reasonable 
person would regard it as such (R v. Bishop [1974] 3 WLR 308 (CA) at 
p. 312). The judge must therefore place himself in the role of the 
reasonable person and decide whether, according to the moral standards 
of the day, the allegation is serious enough to amount to an attack on the 
moral credibility of the witness. If the judge comes to the conclusion that it 
is, then prima facie the accused's bad character is admissible to be weighed 
in the balance by the jury when they come to decide which version of 
events to believe. If the allegation is so trivial and commonplace that the 
reasonable person would not regard it as an imputation then s. 1(3)(ii) will 
not be triggered. 
A mere allegation that a prosecution witness was drunk and foul-
mouthed on one or more occasions is likely to be regarded as too trivial to 
count as an imputation (R v. McLean [1978] Crim LR 430 (CA), R v. 
Morris [2002] EWCA Crim 2968) as, it would seem, is an allegation that a 
prosecution witness is an habitual drunkard (R v. Westfall (1912) 7 Cr 
App R 176 (CCA)). However, to accuse a prosecution witness of being an 
offensive drink-driver is likely to be an imputation (R v. Brown (1960) 44 
Cr App R 181 (CCA)) as is an allegation of corruption such as bribery (R 
v. Wright (1910) 5 Cr App R 131 (CCA)) or involvement in the offence 
charged (R v. Hudson [1912] 2 KB 464 (CCA)) or theft and unlawful 
sexual intercourse (R v. Morris (1959) 43 Cr App R 206 (CCA)). It is 
hardly surprising that allegations of criminality should be regarded as 
imputations triggering s. 1(3)(ii), but even an allegation of non-criminal 
behaviour will amount to an imputation if the judge feels most people 
would disapprove of it. In R v. Jenkins (1945) 31 Cr App R 1 (CCA), for 
instance, the accused was charged with receiving stolen property and he 
alleged that the complainant, a married woman, had been sexually 
involved with him and had allowed him to take photographs of her in the 
nude; this amounted to an imputation (see also R v. Morris (1959) 43 Cr 
App R 206 (CCA)). In R v. Bishop [1974] 3 WLR 308 (CA) the accused 
sought to explain his fingerprints in a prosecution witness's room by 
saying that he had been having a homosexual relationship with him. He 
was held to have lost his shield. In other words, so long as it is thought 
that reasonable people regard homosexual relations as immoral an 
allegation of this sort will amount to an imputation. 
The theoretical distinction between a mere emphatic denial of guilt and 
an imputation remains even if the prosecution witness is a police officer, 
although the distinction becomes even more contrived in this context ± it is 
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`one thing . . . to deny that he had made the confession; but it is another 
thing to say that the whole thing was a deliberate and elaborate 
concoction on the part of the inspector; that seems to be an attack on 
the character of the witness' (R v. Jones (1923) 17 Cr App R 117 (CCA) at 
p. 120; see also R v. Clark [1955] 3 WLR 313 (CCA)). An analysis of the 
case-law suggests that merely to call an officer a liar will not trigger 
s. 1(3)(ii) so long as the sole imputation cast upon that witness is one of 
perjury. However, if the defence case goes beyond that, either expressly or 
impliedly suggesting additional misconduct, then s. 1(3)(ii) will be 
triggered. In R v. Jones (1923) 17 Cr App R 117 (CCA), for example, it 
was an imputation to allege that a confession had been fabricated by a 
police officer. The line between an allegation of perjury and additional 
misconduct is clearly a fine one, and for this reason the Court of Appeal 
has laid down guidelines for judges on how they should exercise their 
discretion in such cases (R v. Britzman [1983] 1 WLR 350 (CA), 4.6 post). 
An imputation will also be made if it is alleged that a confession was 
improperly induced. This occurred in R v. Cook [1959] 2 WLR 616 (CCA), 
where the accused claimed he had only confessed because of the threats 
made by a police officer to charge his wife, and in R v. Wright (1910) 5 Cr 
App R 131 (CCA) where it was alleged that a police officer had persuaded 
the accused to confess by offering him tobacco and matches. An allegation 
that two or more officers have conspired to commit perjury will also 
trigger s. 1(3)(ii). In R v. Clark [1955] 3 WLR 313 (CCA) Lord Goddard CJ 
said (at p. 320): 
`I do not believe that any judge would allow a roving cross-examination 
into the prisoner's past merely because he said, ``The police constable is 
a liar'', or ``The police constable is not telling the truth''; for all he is 
doing is pleading not guilty with emphasis . . . It is quite another thing to 
make the suggestion against police officers that they have been 
conspiring together to defeat the ends of justice.' 
An imputation may be made in such cases either expressly or impliedly; 
that is to say, it is the substance of the defence case as opposed to its form 
which determines whether s. 1(3)(ii) has been triggered. In R v. Tanner 
(1977) 66 Cr App R 56 (CA) the accused's counsel put to police officers 
that their testimony was `wishful thinking', although it was not expressly 
put to them that they were lying, and the accused simply denied having 
made the confession attributed to him. Browne LJ said (at p. 64) that `the 
appellant was saying impliedly that the police officers had made up a 
substantial and vital part of their evidence and . . . had conspired together 
to do so'. The implied suggestion that the officers had conspired to 
commit perjury was therefore an imputation. 
It has been suggested that in many if not most cases it is desirable that 
the trial judge should give a warning to defence counsel if it is felt an 
imputation is being made against a prosecution witness (see, for example, 
Selvey v. DPP [1968] 2 WLR 1494 (HL) and R v. Stanton [1994] Crim LR 
834 (CA)). However, there is no rule of law which makes such a warning 
obligatory (R v. McGee (1979) 70 Cr App R 247 (CA)). Nor is there any 
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rule requiring the judge to state in advance how he would exercise his 
exclusionary discretion in the event that an imputation is made by the 
accused (R v. Dempster [2001] Crim LR 567 (CA)). 
The final words `or the deceased victim of the alleged crime' in s. 1(3)(ii) 
were added by s. 31 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
This amendment demonstrates that the rationale for the second limb 
cannot solely be the desirability of furnishing the tribunal of fact with 
sufficient information for a comparative assessment of opposing 
witnesses' testimony, unless the deceased was the author of an admissible 
hearsay statement incriminating the accused. The amendment was relied 
on in R v. Wainwright [1998] Crim LR 665 (CA) where the accused, on 
trial for the murder of T, lost his shield under both limbs of the exception 
by adducing evidence of T's violent disposition and his own `friendly and 
soft' disposition. The accused had raised self-defence and it was therefore 
necessary for the success of his defence to show the difference in their 
respective characters. This did not, of course, prevent the operation of 
s. 1(3)(ii) and his convictions for dishonesty offences and `a grave offence 
of violence' were brought out in cross-examination. It did not matter that 
the allegations made against the deceased victim were true and not in 
dispute. If what is alleged amounts to an imputation according to the 
standard of ordinary people then s. 1(3)(ii) is triggered. 
4.6 Judicial Control Over Exception (ii) Cross-examination 
It has been seen that the trial judge has a discretion to prevent cross-
examination under both the first limb (R v. Thompson (1965) 50 Cr App R 
91 (CCA)) and the second limb (Selvey v. DPP [1968] 2 WLR 1494 (HL)) 
of s. 1(3)(ii). The prosecution must therefore seek the judge's leave before 
commencing cross-examination pursuant to this exception (R v. Carter 
(1996) 161 JP 207 (CA); cf. Fearon v. DPP (1995) 159 JP 649 (DC)). 
The judge's exclusionary discretion is simply one facet of the judge's 
general common-law discretion in criminal trials to exclude prosecution 
evidence which would unduly prejudice the accused and adversely affect 
the fairness of his trial. If the probative value of the previous convictions 
in undermining the accused's credibility would be outweighed by the 
unduly prejudicial effect that evidence would have on him and his defence 
then the judge should not allow (or should limit the extent of) the cross-
examination. In Maxwell v. DPP [1935] AC 309 (HL) Viscount Sankey 
said (at p. 321): 
`[T]he question whether a man has been convicted, charged or acquitted 
ought not to be admitted, even if it goes to credibility, if there is any risk 
of the jury being misled into thinking that it goes not to credibility but 
to the probability of his having committed the offence of which he is 
charged.' 
This sound guiding principle has often been ignored in practice, however. 
The fact that the accused's previous convictions are for offences similar to 
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the offence charged will not necessarily be enough to persuade the judge to 
exercise his discretion in the accused's favour, as recently illustrated by R 
v. Stone [2001] EWCA Crim 2379 where the accused, on trial for 
wounding with intent, was cross-examined on his convictions for a 
number of offences involving violence. In Selvey v. DPP [1968] 2 WLR 
1494, where the accused was on trial for buggering a young man, the trial 
judge allowed the prosecution to cross-examine the accused on his 
convictions for indecently assaulting young boys and importuning male 
persons, but did not allow cross-examination on the accused's convictions 
for dishonesty offences. Curiously the House of Lords did not address the 
nature of the convictions which had been revealed, although it was felt 
that the judge had not exercised his discretion improperly. The accused's 
homosexual propensity was therefore regarded as relevant to his 
credibility, and admissible solely for that purpose, while his history of 
dishonest conduct was not. A homosexual disposition of itself has no 
bearing on the question of veracity at a general level, but in the context of 
the case the accused's disposition certainly undermined the credibility of 
his testimony and defence. The problem with this reasoning is that, while it 
is quite logical, it is also analogous to the justification for admitting past 
misconduct as similar fact evidence to prove guilt. 
In Maxwell v. DPP [1935] AC 309 the House of Lords held that the 
questions which had been put to the accused in cross-examination about a 
previous acquittal should have been prevented on the ground of 
irrelevance. This is the starting point for determining the permissibility 
of any question which the prosecution would wish to ask pursuant to 
s. 1(3)(ii). If the bad character is not logically relevant to the question of 
the accused's credibility then the questions should not be asked. If, 
however, the accused's bad character logically has something to say about 
the likelihood of his testimony and/or his defence being untruthful then 
the judge should balance that probative value against the risk of undue 
prejudice to ensure the accused receives a fair trial. 
Bad-character evidence can be relevant to the veracity of the accused or 
the credibility of his defence in a number of ways. Before looking at some 
examples, though, it should be noted that the accused's veracity is not 
irrelevant just because he has failed to testify. Even if the accused has 
failed to give evidence, his veracity is relevant to the extent that the 
defence run by his counsel is based on the version of events put forward by 
the accused in conference before the trial. Apart from the (it is hoped) rare 
cases where a corrupt advocate has fabricated a defence for his client, any 
defence run during the trial must be based on what the accused has 
actually told his lawyers. His advocate acts as his mouthpiece, putting 
forward the defence he has been instructed to run. It follows that the 
accused's veracity is always relevant once he has pleaded not guilty and 
proceeded to trial with an affirmative defence. 
Some types of bad character will always be specifically disprobative of 
the accused's truthfulness, for example convictions for perjury or 
perverting the course of justice. Perhaps one could even extend this 
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argument by holding that any conviction following a trial in which the 
accused has testified is logically probative of perjury, but given that a 
conviction does not always mean the accused was disbelieved this would 
be an untenable inference to draw in the absence of sufficient information 
about the earlier trial. (The tribunal of fact might have believed the 
accused's testimony but concluded that it was not sufficient to justify an 
acquittal.) Convictions for offences of dishonesty other than perjury (and 
related offences) will always be logically disprobative of truthfulness to the 
extent that such convictions demonstrate the accused's willingness to be 
deceitful in some circumstances, but with such convictions there is a 
danger the jury will reason that dishonesty in an entirely different context 
necessarily means the accused is lying on oath. Paradoxically, then, 
evidence of out-of-court dishonesty could be unduly prejudicial when 
compared with its probative value as evidence of perjury. Perhaps this is 
what influenced the trial judge in Selvey v. DPP [1968] 2 WLR 1494 (HL) 
when he disallowed cross-examination on such convictions. 
In isolation, a conviction for a violent or sexual offence might seem to 
have no probative value on the question of veracity, but this does not mean 
such evidence is actually irrelevant to the credibility of the accused and his 
defence. It has been seen that whether or not the accused testifies, his bad 
character may undermine the likelihood that his defence is true if his 
convictions are for offences similar to the one he now faces, although this is 
where the risk of reasoning prejudice is so high that the judge ought to 
consider excluding the evidence (unless it would be admissible as similar fact 
evidence). Moreover, general immorality would seem to have some logical 
relevance to the likelihood of the accused's lying on oath no matter what the 
offence charged, even though the convictions have no dishonesty ingredient. 
If one were to accept that any out-of-court dishonesty is logically probative 
of testimonial dishonesty while an offence against the person is not, it would 
follow that a convicted rapist is more likely to tell the truth on oath than a 
petty thief, which is surely repugnant to common sense. 
The courts have therefore taken a pragmatic approach and held that the 
accused's character is indivisible, and that any bad-character trait ought to 
be regarded as relevant to the accused's `general credibility' (R v. 
Richardson [1968] 3 WLR 15 (CA) at p. 24). When a judge directs a 
jury that the accused's bad character is relevant only to his credibility this 
would seem to mean that the jury may use it in any way they wish, so long 
as they do not follow a forbidden chain of reasoning and directly infer 
guilt from that evidence or convict just because of the sort of person the 
accused is. It can be used to compare the moral character of the accused 
with the moral character of the prosecution witnesses, and this can then be 
applied as a tool for the comparative assessment of the veracity and 
therefore the weight of the opposing witnesses' evidence. Alternatively, if 
the person impugned is the deceased alleged victim, there can be no 
comparison of truthfulness and the relevance of the accused's bad 
character on the question of credibility lies in its preventing the jury from 
being misled by a distorted picture of the accused. This will adversely 
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affect the tribunal of fact's assessment of the accused's veracity and 
therefore the weight of his testimony. Accordingly, there can be no 
justification for allowing a non-testifying accused to impugn the character 
of prosecution witnesses or the deceased with impunity. The rule in R v. 
Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 (CCA) (3.4.5 ante) ought to be abolished, with 
the non-testifying accused being brought within the scope of the second 
limb of s. 1(3)(ii). The law at present allows a distorted picture to be 
painted of the relative moral credibility of the accused and prosecution 
witnesses (or the deceased) with the likelihood that the jury will be misled. 
The Court of Appeal has on occasion implied that it is logically 
fallacious to infer a willingness to lie on oath from non-dishonest 
misconduct. In R v. Watts (1983) 77 Cr App R 126 the accused was 
charged with indecent assault and lost his shield after alleging that police 
officers had fabricated evidence against him. He was subsequently cross-
examined on his convictions for sexually assaulting his young nieces, and 
appealed on the ground that the judge should not have allowed such cross-
examination given the nature of the offence charged and his criminal 
record. The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction for the following 
reason (at pp. 129±30): 
`There are numerous decisions of this Court and of the House of Lords 
to the effect that the only relevance of the previous convictions of the 
defendant, admitted by virtue of [s. 1(3)(ii)], is as to the credibility of the 
prisoner, and that the jury must not be asked to infer guilt from such 
convictions. This in many cases requires the jury to perform difficult 
feats of intellectual acrobatics . . . The prejudice which the appellant 
must have suffered in the eyes of the jury when it was disclosed that he 
had previous convictions for offences against young children could 
hardly have been greater. The probative value of the convictions, on the 
sole issue upon which they were admissible, was, at best, slight. The 
previous offences did not involve dishonesty . . . In short, their 
prejudicial effect far outweighed their probative value.' 
In R v. Powell [1985] 1 WLR 1364, however, the Court of Appeal 
suggested that as the House of Lords in Selvey v. DPP [1968] 2 WLR 1494 
had not criticised the trial judge's ruling it could be taken that the Court of 
Appeal must have fallen into error in R v. Watts. The correct position was 
summarised as follows (at p. 1370): 
`In short, if there is a deliberate attack being made upon the conduct of 
a prosecution witness calculated to discredit him wholly, if there is a real 
issue about the conduct of an important witness which the jury will have 
to settle in order to reach their verdict, the judge is entitled to let the 
jury know the previous convictions of the man who is making the 
attack. The fact that the defendant's convictions are not for offences of 
dishonesty, the fact that they are for offences bearing a close 
resemblance to the offences charged, are matters for the judge to take 
into consideration, but they certainly do not oblige the judge to disallow 
the proposed cross-examination.' 
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This approach has been reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal on a number 
of occasions (see, for example, R v. Owen (1985) 83 Cr App R 100 and R v. 
McLeod [1995] 1 Cr App R 591). Any evidence of past misconduct is 
therefore prima facie relevant to the question of credibility with its 
probative value to be left to the jury, save that the judge should prevent 
cross-examination under s. 1(3)(ii) where the nature of the bad-character 
evidence would unduly prejudice the accused. The judge will also prevent 
bad-character evidence from being raised in cross-examination if it is so 
trivial and stale that any probative value it might have is minimal (R v. 
Nye (1982) 75 Cr App R 247 (CA), R v. Barratt [2000] Crim LR 847 
(CA)), or where an imputation which triggers the second limb of s. 1(3)(ii) 
relates to only one of several counts on the indictment and his previous 
convictions would, if revealed, prejudice his defence in respect of the other 
counts (R v. Curbishley [1963] Crim LR 778 (CCA)). 
In R v. McLeod [1995] 1 Cr App R 591 the Court of Appeal reviewed 
the authorities and expressed its view on the general principles which 
ought to govern the exercise of the judge's discretion to disallow cross-
examination under s. 1(3)(ii). First, the `primary purpose' of cross-
examination of the accused on his bad character is to show that he is not 
worthy of belief and not to show that he has a disposition to commit the 
type of offence with which he is charged; but the mere fact that the 
offences are of a similar type to that charged or because of their number 
and type have the incidental effect of suggesting a disposition to commit 
the offence charged will not make them improper. Second, it is undesirable 
that there should be prolonged or extensive cross-examination in relation 
to previous offences, and the prosecution should not seek to probe or 
emphasise similarities between the underlying facts of previous offences 
and the instant offence. Third, similarities of defences which have been 
rejected by juries on previous occasions, for example false alibis or the 
defence that an incriminating substance has been planted and whether or 
not the accused pleaded guilty, or was disbelieved having given evidence 
on oath, may be a legitimate matter for questions as they are relevant to 
credibility. Fourth, underlying facts which show a particularly bad 
character are not necessarily to be excluded, although the judge must be 
careful to balance the attack on the prosecution witness with the degree of 
prejudice to the accused. Fifth, defence objections to the line of cross-
examination adopted ought to be made as soon as it seems the prosecution 
are going too far. Sixth, the Court of Appeal will not interfere with the 
exercise of the judge's discretion save on well-established principles. 
Seventh, the judge must direct the jury that the purpose of the questioning 
goes only to credit and they should not consider that it shows a propensity 
to commit the offence they are considering. With regard to the fourth 
point, in R v. Taylor [1999] 2 Cr App R 163 the Court of Appeal stated 
that where the accused has a particularly bad or damaging record then the 
judge is likely to admit it only if the imputations made against the 
prosecution witness are correspondingly grave. 
In R v. McLeod the Court of Appeal also pointed out that details of 
sexual offences against children are likely to be particularly prejudicial to 
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the accused. So if the accused has been convicted of a particularly heinous 
offence the judge is more likely to prevent the prosecution from raising it, 
as in R v. Watts (1983) 77 Cr App R 126 (CA); or, if such questioning is 
allowed, the details of those convictions may be withheld. Such offences 
will inevitably give rise to severe moral prejudice no matter what the 
instant allegation against the accused. It may also be appropriate to 
exclude any mention of less serious offences, notwithstanding the low risk 
of moral prejudice, if there is a high risk of reasoning prejudice. In R v. 
Showers [1996] Crim LR 739 the accused faced a charge of possessing a 
flick-knife. He denied possession of the knife and made imputations 
against the police witness, triggering s. 1(3)(ii), and the judge gave the 
prosecution leave to cross-examine him on his convictions for possessing 
offensive weapons. The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction on the 
ground, inter alia, that the judge had `failed expressly to weigh up the very 
prejudicial effect on the defendant of admitting evidence of his particular 
convictions'. In R v. Davison-Jenkins [1997] Crim LR 816 the accused 
triggered s. 1(3)(ii) during her trial for shoplifting cosmetics by giving 
evidence of her good character, and the prosecution were allowed to cross-
examine her on her previous convictions, referring specifically to a 
conviction for shoplifting cosmetics. The Court of Appeal quashed her 
conviction as it had been `effectively impossible for the jury to disregard 
propensity once they had been given the information about the previous 
offence of shoplifting'. Moreover, the judge's satisfactory direction on the 
evidential value of her convictions had not negated that `overwhelming 
prejudice'. The prosecution ought not to have gone into the specific details 
of the earlier offences but should merely have referred to the bare facts of 
her convictions for other forms of dishonesty. In R v. Wignall [1993] Crim 
LR 62 the Court of Appeal felt that the judge should have exercised his 
discretion in favour of the accused, on trial for theft, to prevent the 
prosecution from revealing his numerous convictions which included 
several for theft. The combination of moral prejudice arising from the 
accused's large number of convictions and the reasoning prejudice caused 
by his convictions for similar offences justified this approach. The Court 
of Appeal has also laid down guidelines for the exercise of the judge's 
discretion in cases where the accused has alleged that evidence given by 
police witnesses has been fabricated by them or that they are mistaken: 
`Firstly, [the discretion] should be used if there is nothing more than a 
denial, however emphatic or offensively made, of an act or even a short 
series of acts amounting to one incident or in what was said to have 
been a short interview . . . The position would be different however if 
there were a denial of evidence of a long period of detailed observation 
extending over hours . . . Secondly, cross-examination should only be 
allowed if the judge is sure that there is no possibility of mistake, 
misunderstanding or confusion and that the jury will inevitably have to 
decide whether the prosecution witnesses have fabricated evidence. 
Defendants sometimes make wild allegations when giving evidence. 
Allowance should be made for the strain of being in the witness box and 
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the exaggerated use of language which sometimes results from such 
strain or lack of education or mental instability . . . Finally, there is no 
need for the prosecution to rely upon section [1(3)(ii)] if the evidence 
against a defendant is overwhelming.' (R v. Britzman [1983] 1 WLR 350 
at p. 355) 
Now that police interviews are routinely recorded, allegations of false 
confessions are less common, but as there is still scope for fabricating 
confessions en route to the police station, or planting incriminating 
evidence, the guidelines continue to be of importance. 
Although the judge's role usually becomes relevant only once the 
prosecution have submitted that s. 1(3)(ii) has been triggered, or where the 
judge of his own volition has decided to warn defence counsel about a 
dangerous line of cross-examination, his duty is not only to ensure a fair 
trial for the accused but also to ensure fairness for prosecution witnesses. 
The Court of Appeal has therefore recognised the judge's right to initiate 
an application to cross-examine under s. 1(3)(ii) if the prosecution fail to 
do so (R v. Chinn (1996) 160 JP 765; cf. R v. Goodwin (1993) The Times 
26.11.93 (CA)). 
4.7 Exception (iii) ± The `Cut-Throat' Defence 
If the accused is adjudged to have `given evidence' against a co-accused 
`charged in the same proceedings' the co-accused is entitled to cross-
examine the accused on his bad character. The purpose of the provision is 
to provide a mechanism by which a co-accused is able to undermine the 
credibility of the accused, who has sought to lay the blame for the offence 
on him while testifying in his own defence, and thereby show that the 
accused's testimony should not be relied on. As with s. 1(3)(ii), there is an 
assumption that general bad character is evidence of testimonial 
dishonesty. It is important to note that s. 1(3)(iii) applies so long as two 
or more persons are tried together; they do not need to be charged with the 
same offence. 
While s. 1(3)(iii) is fair to the extent that it allows a co-accused to defend 
himself by revealing the character of the person who has testified against 
him (as if he were a prosecution witness), the exception provides a real 
dilemma for the innocent accused with a bad record who wishes to clear 
himself by revealing to the court that it was the co-accused and not he who 
committed the offence. His bad character will be revealed and, if the 
co-accused is of good character, the jury are unlikely to give the accused's 
testimony much credence. If the accused blames his co-accused, the 
co-accused will inevitably retaliate and blame the accused, so by refusing 
to order separate trials and allowing them to `cut each other's throats' the 
prosecution's task is facilitated (R v. Varley (1982) 75 Cr App R 242 (CA) 
at p. 246). 
The leading case on s. 1(3)(iii) is Murdoch v. Taylor [1965] 2 WLR 425. 
M and L were jointly charged with receiving stolen cameras knowing them 
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to be stolen. M had several previous convictions, whereas L was of good 
character. During cross-examination by L's counsel M claimed that the 
transaction in question, when they had tried to sell the cameras to a third 
party, had been L's responsibility and that he had not known what was in 
L's box. L's counsel then cross-examined M pursuant to s. 1(3)(iii) and M 
was convicted. His appeal was dismissed by the House of Lords on the 
ground that he had `given evidence against' L even though he had made 
his comments during cross-examination, had not borne any hostile 
intent against L (the test is objective) and his answers had been given in 
reply to specific questions put by L's counsel. The test for whether an 
accused has given evidence against a co-accused is whether his evidence 
`supports the prosecution's case in a material respect or . . . undermines the 
defence of the co-accused'. The majority of the House of Lords further 
held that the judge has no discretion to exclude cross-examination by a 
co-accused as to credit once s. 1(3)(iii) has been triggered, but Lord Morris 
pointed out that whether or not the exception has been triggered is itself a 
question for the judge and he can always prevent irrelevant cross-
examination. 
The freedom given to a co-accused to cross-examine an accused who 
has given evidence against him is an application of the general principle 
established in R v. Miller (1952) 36 Cr App R 169 (Assizes) that the trial 
judge has no discretion to prevent an accused from adducing or eliciting 
admissible evidence relevant to his defence just because it would unduly 
prejudice a co-accused's defence. By contrast, while it is permissible for the 
prosecution to cross-examine an accused as to his bad character pursuant 
to s. 1(3)(iii) (R v. Seigley (1911) 6 Cr App R 106 (CCA)) they must first 
seek leave, for in this respect the judge does retain a discretion to prevent 
cross-examination. 
Although the test for having `given evidence against' is objective, not 
every contradiction between the evidence of the accused and his 
co-accused will trigger s. 1(3)(iii). In R v. Bruce [1975] 1 WLR 1252 eight 
youths were charged with robbery and the judge ruled that B had given 
evidence against McG by contradicting the latter's evidence that there had 
been a plan to rob. B's convictions were brought out in cross-examination 
and he was convicted. The Court of Appeal held that while B's 
contradiction had undermined part of McG's defence, and damaged his 
credibility, it had not undermined his evidence that he had not taken part 
in the robbery, and in fact had undermined the prosecution case. B's 
evidence had made it less rather than more likely that McG would be 
convicted and he had not therefore given evidence against him. According 
to the Court (at p. 1259): `evidence cannot be said to be given against . . . if 
its effect, if believed, is to result not in his conviction but in his acquittal' 
(see also R v. Kirkpatrick [1998] Crim LR 63 (CA)). 
A mere denial by the accused can amount to evidence against his 
co-accused if it necessarily implies that the co-accused is guilty of the 
offence. In R v. Davis [1975] 1 WLR 345, D and O faced an allegation of 
stealing, inter alia, a gold cross on a chain. D denied the charge but when 
cross-examined by O's counsel he said: `I am not suggesting [O] took the 
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cross and chain. As I never, and it is missing, he must have done it, but I 
am not saying he did . . . I never saw him steal it. I have got no idea.' The 
Court of Appeal held that D had given evidence against O. As only D or O 
(or both of them) could have stolen the cross and chain, his denial that he 
had done so necessarily meant that O had. A similar conclusion was 
reached in R v. Varley (1982) 75 Cr App R 242, where V's denial of any 
participation in an alleged joint enterprise, a robbery, with D, contra-
dicting D's account that V had forced him to commit the robbery, 
necessarily amounted to an assertion that D had voluntarily committed 
the robbery on his own and not acted under duress. As such V was held to 
have given evidence against D and been properly cross-examined on his 
convictions. The Court of Appeal felt, first, that merely to deny 
participation in a joint enterprise would not of itself be sufficient to rank 
as evidence against a co-accused unless the denial `must lead to the 
conclusion' that if the accused did not participate then it must have been 
the co-accused who did; and, second, that s. 1(3)(iii) could also be 
triggered if the accused asserted a view of the joint enterprise which was 
directly contradicted by the co-accused. V had fallen within the ambit of 
both these propositions. In R v. Crawford [1997] 1 WLR 1329, C and A 
were alleged to have robbed a woman of her handbag in a restaurant 
lavatory with the assistance of another accomplice (L) who had not been 
traced. A claimed to have been a mere bystander in the lavatory and 
blamed C and L. C's evidence was that she had no longer been present in 
the lavatory when A and L entered and that she saw them leave shortly 
after the victim had cried out. The Court of Appeal held that C's evidence 
regarding A's presence at the time of the robbery had not amounted to 
evidence against her because A's presence had not been in issue: it had not 
supported the prosecution's case `in a material respect'. However, as C's 
evidence that she had not been in the lavatory herself, if believed, would 
have jeopardised A's credibility and made her version of events less likely, 
it had amounted to evidence against A for those (alternative) reasons and 
C had been properly cross-examined on her convictions. Counsel for C 
had argued that this was not a case where two persons were alleged to 
have been involved and that C's evidence was not such that it `must lead to 
the conclusion' that A was guilty. The Court of Appeal rejected this 
interpretation of what was said in R v. Varley ± it is sufficient if the 
accused's evidence `may' lead to the conclusion that the co-accused is 
guilty (a point reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in R v. Rigot (2000) 
unreported (99/2892/Y4)). 
Although there is no judicial discretion to prevent cross-examination of 
an accused by a co-accused pursuant to s. 1(3)(iii) once the exception has 
been triggered ± even if the accused's convictions are spent (R v. Corelli 
[2001] Crim LR 913 (CA)) ± in R v. Varley (1982) 75 Cr App R 242 the 
Court of Appeal recognised that care must be taken to see that the 
accused's evidence `clearly undermines' the co-accused's defence. This 
suggests a de minimis principle echoing Lord Morris's view in Murdoch v. 
Taylor [1965] 2 WLR 425 (HL) (at p. 428) that `anything trivial or casual' 
ought to be disregarded when deciding whether s. 1(3)(iii) has been 
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triggered. The same point was made in R v. Crawford [1997] 1 WLR 1329, 
where the Court of Appeal felt that s. 1(3)(iii) would be triggered only if 
the accused's evidence, if accepted, `damaged in a significant way' the 
co-accused's defence. 
If bad-character evidence is elicited by a co-accused and/or the 
prosecution pursuant to s. 1(3)(iii) the value of such evidence is limited 
to showing that the accused's `testimony is not worthy of belief' (Murdoch 
v. Taylor [1965] 2 WLR 425 (HL) at p. 435). That said, according to the 
Court of Appeal in R v. Reid [1989] Crim LR 719, if s. 1(3)(iii) is relied on 
by a co-accused the cross-examination `must be allowed to the full extent 
desired, subject only to the test of relevance' to credibility, even though 
highly prejudicial facts suggesting propensity may be brought out in the 
process. In that case, R and three other men were jointly charged with the 
robbery of a taxi driver, and R claimed that he had got into the car only 
after the robbery had occurred. He also said that one of the co-accused 
had held a knife to the taxi driver's throat, which led to R's being cross-
examined on his previous conviction for robbing a taxi driver where his 
defence had been that he had left the taxi before the robbery occurred. The 
Court of Appeal dismissed R's appeal as the facts relating to the earlier 
offence had been relevant to his credibility by suggesting his defence was 
untrue and that he was willing falsely to incriminate others. 
4.8 Proposals for Reform 
The problems with s. 1 of the 1898 Act are catalogued in the Law 
Commission's report, Law Com No. 273 (2001) (at pp. 56±74). Section 
1(3)(i) is defective because it excludes misconduct falling short of crime. 
Section 1(3)(ii) is open to criticism on at least nine grounds. First, 
psychological research does not support the notion that a person's 
character is indivisible (see also Consultation Paper No. 141 (1996) at 
pp. 101±4). Second, evidence of the accused's bad character is relevant 
only to credibility whereas evidence of his good character is relevant to his 
credibility and propensity, but it may be difficult in practice for the jury to 
draw this distinction when his bad character is elicited. Third, it is unclear 
what kinds of assertion will be regarded as a claim to good character and 
trigger the first limb. Fourth, there is no exception under the second limb 
for necessary imputations. This may deter the accused from giving oral 
evidence in support of a legitimate defence. Fifth, there is over-reliance on 
the trial judge's exclusionary discretion, which means that defence 
advocates may find it difficult to predict whether the accused's shield 
will be lost. (The defence is not entitled to an advance ruling as to how the 
discretion will be exercised: R v. Dempster [2001] Crim LR 567 (CA).) 
Sixth, the justifications for admitting the accused's bad character under 
the second limb are unsound. The accused's previous misconduct may 
have little if any probative value in relation to his credibility as a witness; 
there is no fairness in penalising the accused for daring to dispute and 
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contradict the evidence against him; and there are better ways of 
protecting prosecution witnesses from irrelevant and unfair cross-
examination. Further, in cases where there are two co-accused, D1 (with 
a bad record) and D2 (with no record), it is possible for D2 to attack 
prosecution witnesses for the benefit of both co-accused and thereby avoid 
having D1's record elicited under the second limb. Seventh, the non-
testifying accused cannot lose his shield under the second limb of the 
exception, even though his previous misconduct may have a bearing on the 
credibility of the defence put forward on his behalf by his advocate. 
Eighth, investigating officers may be tempted to fabricate evidence against 
the accused, on the ground that if he alleges fabrication at his trial he is 
likely to lose his shield. Ninth, it is unclear what sort of allegation will be 
regarded as an imputation, or whether a co-accused can cross-examine the 
accused on his bad character pursuant to the second limb. With regard to 
s. 1(3)(iii), there is no exclusionary discretion to prevent the cross-
examination of one co-accused (D1) on his bad character by another (D2), 
giving precedence to the interests of D2 over the interests of D1. Second, a 
co-accused may be inhibited in his defence as he will be aware that, if he 
gives evidence against the other co-accused, he will have his bad character 
revealed. 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eleventh Report (Cmnd 4991 
(1972) at pp. 71±85) contained a number of proposals for reforming the 
1898 Act. However, while there was a clear preference for the minority 
view in Jones v. DPP [1962] 2 WLR 575 (HL) (4.2 ante), a reform which 
would allow cross-examination on an issue even if matters prohibited by 
s. 1(3) were incidentally referred to, the Committee were deeply divided 
over how the second limb of exception (ii) should be reformed. The view 
which prevailed was that the second limb should be triggered only if the 
main purpose of the cross-examination of a prosecution witness was to 
undermine that witness's credibility. If the imputation was necessary for 
the accused's defence as a matter relevant to an issue and not just the 
witness's credibility the shield would not be lost. This concession was 
somewhat undermined, however, by the suggestion that the accused would 
lose his shield by making an imputation on the character of a witness 
called by a co-accused. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Cm 
2263 (1993) at p. 127) agreed with the suggestion that s. 1(3)(ii) should not 
be triggered if the imputation was `central' to the accused's defence, as 
opposed to being mere gratuitous disparagement, but further suggested 
that the rule in R v. Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 (CCA) (3.4.5 ante) ought 
to be abolished. In reality this rule has lost much of its practical 
significance since s. 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
came into force (9.3.2 post). 
In Law Com No. 273 the Law Commission recommended that the 1898 
Act be repealed and replaced by a new scheme which would apply whether 
or not the accused gave evidence in his own defence. The Commission's 
view was that relevant imputations of bad character relating to the events 
which are the subject of the trial or their investigation or prosecution (`the 
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central set of facts'), whether made by the prosecution or the defence, 
should be prima facie admissible. However, it would not be possible to 
adduce or elicit evidence of the accused's bad character (outside the 
central set of facts) unless the court's leave was first obtained or the 
accused consented. 
Evidence of the accused's bad character (outside the central set of facts) 
would be admissible at the behest of the prosecution in only two 
situations, but in each case the evidence would have to have substantial 
(that is, more than trivial) probative value and it would have to be shown 
that the interests of justice require that it should be admitted on account of 
its importance and probative value, notwithstanding the reasoning and/or 
moral prejudice which might be engendered by its admission. Under the 
`corrective exception' evidence of the accused's bad character would be 
adduced or elicited by the prosecution to correct a false or misleading 
impression for which the accused was responsible. In other words, 
sufficiently probative bad-character evidence would be admissible to rebut 
the accused's false or misleading evidence of good character. Under the 
`credibility exception' sufficiently probative evidence of the accused's 
propensity to be untruthful would be adduced or elicited by the 
prosecution if the accused's credibility was in issue and he had (with the 
court's leave) introduced evidence showing that another person ± most 
obviously a prosecution witness ± had a propensity to be untruthful. This 
exception would ensure that the jury were not left with a misleading 
impression of the accused's propensity to be untruthful in comparison 
with that of the other person. 
The Commission also recommended that one co-accused (D1) should be 
able to introduce sufficiently probative evidence of another co-accused's 
(D2's) bad character (outside the central set of facts) to show that D2 has 
a propensity to be untruthful, but only if D2 has undermined D1's own 
defence. While it would be necessary for D1 to obtain the leave of the 
court before introducing D2's bad character under this `co-defendant 
exception', he would not need to satisfy the additional `interests of justice' 
test. 
Bad-character evidence admitted under the `corrective exception' could 
be considered relevant to the accused's credibility and to whether or not he 
was guilty of the offence charged. Bad-character evidence adduced or 
elicited by the prosecution under the `credibility exception' or by a 
co-accused under the `co-defendant exception' would be admitted in order 
to shed light on the accused's credibility. The Commission suggested, 
however, that in cases where the bad-character evidence would also 
suggest that the accused has a propensity to commit offences of the type he 
is on trial for, the judge should explain to the jury why the evidence was 
not being introduced for that purpose and warn them that they should not 
attach undue weight to it. For example the judge might explain that it can 
be very dangerous to reason that the accused is guilty merely because he 
has done something similar in the past. 
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Chapter Summary 
.	 The accused may be cross-examined under s. 1(2) of the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898 about his involvement in the offence he is on trial for, so long as the 
questions do not expressly or impliedly suggest he has been involved in some 
other offence or is in other respects of bad character. Section 1(3) sets out an 
absolute prohibition on such questioning, although this barrier to admissibility 
disappears once the jury have become aware that the accused is of bad character. 
.	 If s. 1(3) applies, the accused may be cross-examined in a way which expressly or 
impliedly suggests he is of bad character only if one of its exceptions applies. 
However, if one of the exceptions applies the judge may prevent or limit cross-
examination by the prosecution to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial. 
.	 Exception (i) permits cross-examination on `similar fact evidence' of offences the 
accused has committed. Exception (ii) permits cross-examination on the 
accused's bad character to rebut evidence of his purported good character or 
because the defence has impugned the character of a prosecution witness or the 
deceased `victim'. Exception (iii) permits cross-examination on the accused's bad 
character if he has given evidence which undermines the defence of a co-accused 
or supports the prosecution case against him. 
.	 Bad-character evidence elicited under exceptions (ii) and (iii) is admissible for 
the limited purpose of showing that the accused (and his testimony) is not worthy 
of belief. Bad-character evidence elicited under exception (i) is admissible 
evidence that the accused (and his testimony) is not worthy of belief and that he 
is guilty of the alleged offence. 
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The Scope of the Hearsay Rule

5.1 Hearsay Defined 
In R v. Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7 (HL) Lord Havers said (at p. 11): 
`I accept the definition of the hearsay rule in Cross on Evidence, 6th ed. 
(1985), p. 38: ``an assertion other than one made by a person while 
giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of 
any fact asserted.'' ' 
Hearsay is defined in the Civil Evidence Act 1995 as `a statement made 
otherwise than by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings 
which is tendered as evidence of the matters stated' (s. 1(2)(a)), but for 
ease of exposition it might equally be described as `any out-of-court 
statement tendered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matters 
stated'. In this context `out-of-court' is no more than a convenient way of 
describing a statement made otherwise than by a witness on oath during 
the instant proceedings. A statement made on oath in earlier proceedings 
is hearsay for the purposes of any subsequent proceedings if it is tendered 
to prove the truth of the matters stated (see R v. Lockley [1995] 2 Cr App 
R 554 (CA)). The exclusionary hearsay rule referred to in R v. Sharp [1988] 
1 WLR 7 (HL) no longer applies in civil proceedings (8.1 post), but still 
operates with full effect in criminal trials and has been described, 
justifiably, as `inflexible and sometimes absurdly technical' (R (McCann) 
v. Crown Court at Manchester [2002] 3 WLR 1313 (HL) at pp. 1323±4). 
That said, there are numerous statutory and common-law exceptions to 
the rule which allow hearsay to be admitted as a form of testimonial 
evidence in certain circumstances; but, in the absence of any such 
exception, hearsay evidence is absolutely prohibited no matter how 
reliable or important it may be (Myers v. DPP [1964] 3 WLR 145 (HL), 
5.8 post). The exceptions to the hearsay rule are explained in Chapters 6 
and 7. 
It is crucial to understand at the outset that the exclusionary rule applies 
only to `statements' (`assertions') which actually have a descriptive content 
capable of being true and which are tendered to prove the truth of that 
content. Any out-of-court, non-descriptive utterance which is incapable of 
being either true or false cannot fall (directly) within the scope of the 
hearsay rule and may, if relevant, be admissible as `original evidence'. Nor 
does the hearsay rule apply if an out-of-court statement, having a content 
which is capable of being true, is tendered for a reason other than to prove 
the truth of that content; such statements may similarly be admissible as 
original evidence: 
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`Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not 
himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and 
inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of 
what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible 
when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the 
statement, but the fact that it was made.' (Subramaniam v. Public 
Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 (PC) at p. 970) 
`A question of hearsay only arises when the words spoken are relied on 
testimonially . . . establishing some fact narrated by the words.' (Ratten 
v. R [1971] 3 WLR 930 (PC) at pp. 933±4) 
5.2 Justifications for the Hearsay Rule 
In Teper v. R [1952] AC 480 (PC) Lord Normand said (at p. 486): 
`The rule against the admission of hearsay evidence is fundamental. It is 
not the best evidence and it is not delivered on oath. The truthfulness 
and accuracy of the person whose words are spoken to by another 
witness cannot be tested by cross-examination, and the light which his 
demeanour would throw on his testimony is lost.' 
In R v. Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7 (HL) Lord Havers said of the rule (at p. 11): 
`I suspect that the principal reason that led the judges to adopt it many 
years ago was the fear that juries might give undue weight to evidence 
the truth of which could not be tested by cross-examination, and 
possibly also the risk of an account becoming distorted as it was passed 
from one person to another.' 
Accordingly, the rationale for the rule is: (i) that it is not the best evidence; 
(ii) that it is not delivered on oath; (iii) that inaccuracy may have arisen 
through repetition; (iv) that the demeanour of the maker cannot be seen; 
(v) that the veracity of the maker cannot be tested in cross-examination; 
and (vi) that the accuracy of the maker cannot be tested in cross-
examination. 
The first two points are hardly compelling reasons for excluding 
hearsay. Hearsay (in particular certain types of documentary hearsay) 
may in fact be better evidence than direct testimony, but in the absence of 
a recognised exception to the exclusionary rule it will still be inadmissible 
(as in Myers v. DPP [1964] 3 WLR 145 (HL), 5.8 post); and even if it is less 
satisfactory than direct testimony it may be the best available evidence. 
The fact that hearsay is not given on oath is perhaps of no more than 
historical interest, and certainly fails to explain why testimony given on 
oath is inadmissible in subsequent proceedings. The third reason is sound 
insofar as it applies to multiple oral hearsay, but it can hardly justify first-
hand hearsay or hearsay transferred from one document to another in 
circumstances where the risk of error can be discounted. The fourth reason 
is inextricably linked with the fifth and sixth, but standing alone it is a 
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weak justification given the unreliability of demeanour as an indicator of 
witness reliability. Thus, the principal reason for excluding hearsay is a 
compendium of the last two points: 
`The rationale of excluding it . . . is a recognition of the great difficulty 
. . . of assessing what, if any, weight can properly be given to a statement 
by a person whom the jury have not seen or heard and which has not 
been subject to any test of reliability by cross-examination.' (R v. 
Blastland [1985] 3 WLR 345 (HL) at p. 350) 
The maker could have fabricated the evidence or been mistaken and yet 
he is unavailable for cross-examination on his statement; and where the 
statement is heard and passed on by someone who is himself unavailable 
for cross-examination the problem is multiplied. In particular, if the 
prosecution were to be permitted to adduce any hearsay statement as part 
of their case, the accused would often be unable effectively to challenge the 
veracity or reliability of the maker, and if that person is his accuser it is 
immediately obvious that the adduction of such evidence might prevent 
him from being able to defend himself in any meaningful sense, violating a 
fundamental tenet of natural justice. It is for this reason that Article 
6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights expressly 
recognises as an integral component of the right to a fair trial the 
accused's right `to examine or have examined witnesses against him'. A 
related component of the Article 6(1) right to a fair trial is the accused's 
right to participate (a right which manifests itself on a number of occasions 
in Article 6(3)). Justice demands that the accused should be able to defend 
himself effectively by challenging the evidence against him and that he 
should be able to participate fully in the proceedings. The `minimum 
rights' of Article 6(3) ensure not only that the accused will be fairly tried, 
but that his trial will be seen to be fair and that a finding of guilt against 
him will be legitimate in terms of both factual accuracy and public 
perception. 
The exclusionary rule prohibiting the adduction of hearsay therefore 
accords with Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention insofar as it 
prevents the prosecution from adducing such evidence as part of their 
case. In this context the possibility of a breach of Article 6 of the 
Convention will arise only if the prosecution are permitted to rely on an 
exception to the rule (see 6.2.5 post). However, the exclusionary rule works 
both ways, and may therefore operate so as to prevent the accused from 
adducing evidence which supports his defence. Whether the exclusion of 
hearsay evidence would deny the accused a fair trial depends on how 
reliable that evidence is and how important it would be to his defence; but 
the purpose of the hearsay rule is legitimate and the rule is not in principle 
contrary to Article 6(1) of the European Convention where it operates 
against the accused (Blastland v. United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 528 
(ECmHR) at p. 531). 
The justification based on the inability to cross-examine and challenge 
prosecution evidence is somewhat flawed as a rationale for the very broad 
scope of the common-law rule. Certain types of documentary hearsay may 
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be inherently reliable and, in any event, cross-examination is not 
necessarily a useful forensic tool for testing such evidence. For example, 
records made in the course of a business many years before the trial are 
likely to be accurate and reliable, and the witnesses who compiled them 
are unlikely to remember anything of significance so long after the event. 
Nevertheless, even reliable business records are inadmissible at common 
law (Myers v. DPP [1964] 3 WLR 145 (HL)). That said, the scope of the 
hearsay rule cannot properly be considered in isolation from the numerous 
common-law and statutory exceptions to it. It will be seen that certain 
categories of hearsay evidence which are likely to be reliable (such as 
business records) ± and in respect of which the right to challenge becomes 
less important ± are admissible. 
5.3 Statements Excluded as Hearsay 
The hearsay rule applies to any statement (whether made orally, in a 
document or by way of a gesture) if it is tendered for the purpose of 
proving the truth of the matters stated. It is an absolute and indiscriminate 
exclusionary rule subject to specific statutory and common-law excep-
tions. The trial judge has no discretion to admit such evidence merely 
because it seems to be reliable and highly probative. 
Decided cases provide useful illustrations of how the rule has been 
applied in practice and the potential for injustice. Perhaps the most 
notorious case is that of Sparks v. R [1964] 2 WLR 566 (PC). The accused 
in that case, a white male, was charged with having indecently assaulted a 
three-year-old child. The child, who did not give evidence, had told her 
mother soon after the assault that the offender had been `a coloured boy' 
and the accused sought to have that statement admitted as evidence that 
he was not the offender. The judge ruled that the statement was 
inadmissible hearsay, a ruling subsequently upheld by the Privy Council 
on the ground that there is `no rule which permits the giving of hearsay 
evidence merely because it relates to identity'. 
In R v. Turner (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 one of the co-accused, B, was 
convicted of robbery following the trial judge's refusal to allow him to 
adduce evidence that a third party, S, who was not called as a witness, had 
confessed to the offence. The Court of Appeal held (at p. 87) that S's 
confession was inadmissible hearsay and the judge had been right to 
exclude it. A similar view was adopted by the House of Lords in R v. 
Blastland [1985] 3 WLR 345. B was charged with buggering and murdering 
a 12-year-old boy and sought (i) to adduce evidence that a third party, M, 
had confessed to those crimes, (ii) to adduce evidence that M had made 
statements showing he had known the murder had been committed before 
the body was found and (iii) to compel M's attendance as a defence 
witness so that he could be treated as `hostile' and cross-examined on what 
he had said and known. The trial judge refused the applications and B was 
convicted on both counts. He sought leave to appeal to the House of 
Lords on two grounds: first, that M's confession had been wrongly 
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excluded; and, second, that other comments made by M ought to have 
been admitted as evidence of his knowledge that a murder had been 
committed (3.1.3 ante). The House of Lords refused leave on the first of 
the two points as such evidence was hearsay which did not fall into any 
recognised exception to the exclusionary rule. In the words of Lord Bridge 
(at p. 349): 
`To admit in criminal trials statements confessing to the crime for which 
the defendant is being tried made by third parties not called as witnesses 
would be to create a very significant and, many might think, a 
dangerous new exception.' 
Lord Bridge did not explain why an exception for third-party confessions 
would be dangerous, but the question was addressed in some detail by the 
Supreme Court of South Australia in Re Van Beelen [1974] 9 SASR 163 (at 
p. 205): 
`The mere knowledge that an extra-judicial confession of crime could, in 
favourable circumstances, be received to exculpate an alleged offender, 
would . . . tempt the less scrupulous members of our community to 
undertake clandestine operations of self-help. All that would be 
required by a guilty accused person would be the services of two or 
three accomplices and a person, known to all, who had died after the 
date of the alleged offence and who, theoretically, could have 
committed it. The accomplices, when called as witnesses, could then 
simply attribute a confession to the deceased man, and the confession 
could be given artistic verisimilitude by inserting in it evidence of 
esoteric knowledge that had, in fact, come from the best of all sources ± 
the offender. If there were not at hand a deceased person into whose 
mouth the confession could conveniently be put, the unavailability of a 
living person could, no doubt, be arranged by any one of a number of 
irregular methods ± direct or indirect. Where serious crime was alleged, 
the motive for making such arrangements would be strong . . . 
Perjurious or lying defences would thus become dangerously easy to 
fabricate, and correspondingly difficult to expose.' 
Following the House of Lords' dismissal of Blastland's appeal he 
applied to the European Commission of Human Rights on the ground 
that the exclusion of M's confession and the evidence of his state of mind 
had prevented him from receiving a fair trial, given that the prosecution 
had been permitted to adduce his own admissions to the police. The 
Commission rejected this `equality of arms' argument because M could 
have been called by the defence (although it was acknowledged that M 
would not have been obliged to provide any self-incriminating answers), B 
had been afforded full facilities to challenge the hearsay ruling and the 
case against him, and some other evidence relating to M had been placed 
before the jury (see Blastland v. United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 528). 
It should be noted, however, that so long as the criterion of relevance 
can be established it may be possible for the accused to adduce a third 
party's confession by virtue of one of the statutory or common-law 
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exceptions to the hearsay rule. In particular, if the confession is in a 
document it would be possible to rely on ss. 23 and/or 24 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988, subject to the judge's discretion to exclude the evidence 
under ss. 25 or 26 (see R v. Iqbal (1990) 91 Cr App R 193 (CA)). But if no 
such exception is available, and the third party's confession appears to be 
reliable and is supported by extraneous evidence which also tends to 
exculpate the accused, the accused may be denied a fair trial if he is 
prevented from relying on that evidence (see, for example, Chambers v. 
Mississippi (1973) 410 US 284 (USSC)). 
The exclusionary hearsay rule applies with equal force to statements in 
writing or communicated in any other manner. In Patel v. Comptroller of 
Customs [1965] 3 WLR 1221 (PC) the accused was charged with making a 
false declaration in a customs import form. The allegation was that he had 
described the provenance of his imported bags of Moroccan coriander 
seed as India, and the prosecution were allowed to rely on a statement on 
the bags which read `produce of Morocco'. It was held that the statements 
were inadmissible hearsay, and as there had been no other evidence that 
the seeds had come from Morocco the conviction was quashed. A similar 
approach was adopted in R v. Brown [1991] Crim LR 835. The accused in 
that case was charged with obtaining property by deception in that he had 
overcharged for surgical appliances he had supplied to a number of 
patients. The prosecution called an expert witness who testified that he 
had examined the appliances and identified the patients to whom they had 
been supplied on the basis of the name on a shoe, what he had been told 
by third parties and an invoice. The Court of Appeal held that all the 
identification evidence was inadmissible hearsay. 
A number of cases involve inadmissible hearsay statements which were 
made to police officers and recorded in writing. The officer is not 
permitted to read out the note from his pocket book or refresh his memory 
from it; nor can he tell the court what he remembers having been told. 
Ahmed v. DPP [1998] RTR 90 provides a recent example. A motorist 
spoke to a police officer informing him that a Nissan Primera car was 
being driven dangerously along the M27 motorway and reported the 
registration number as `M911 SJB'. The officer made enquiries through 
the police national computer and established that a car of that number 
had been rented to D and that it was a Nissan Primera. At the trial the 
officer could not give evidence of the registration number which had been 
reported to him as it was hearsay, but the magistrates convicted D on the 
basis that the officer's enquiries established a nexus between the car seen 
on the M27 and D's car. The Divisional Court quashed D's conviction 
because the magistrates had heard no admissible evidence connecting his 
car M911 SJB with the car which had been driven dangerously (see also R 
v. Eleftheriou [1993] Crim LR 947 (CA), Jones v. Metcalfe [1967] 1 WLR 
1286 (DC), R v. McLean (1967) 52 Cr App R 80 (CA) and 16.4.1 post). 
An out-of-court statement made entirely by way of a physical gesture is 
similarly covered by the hearsay rule. In Chandrasekera v. R [1937] AC 
220 a woman who had had her throat cut could respond to questions put 
to her only by nodding her head and making other signs. She died before 
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the trial, so the prosecution were obliged to call evidence of her physical 
responses to prove that the accused had been responsible for her fatal 
injury. The accused was convicted and appealed on the ground that such 
evidence ought not to have been admitted. The Privy Council held that the 
deceased's nod of assent to a question put to her amounted to a hearsay 
statement (which had been properly admitted by virtue of a statutory 
exception to the exclusionary rule). In R v. Gibson [1887] 18 QBD 537 
(CCCR) the accused's conviction for malicious wounding was quashed on 
the ground that the complainant had been permitted to give evidence that 
a passer-by had pointed to the door of the accused's house and said, `The 
person who threw the stone went in there.' The spoken words and the 
gesture were inadmissible. 
A witness's testimony based not on his own personal knowledge but on 
inadmissible hearsay which has been related to him is equally inadmissible 
if such testimony is given for the purpose of proving the truth of the 
hearsay statement. Such testimony is nothing more than a repetition of the 
hearsay and therefore equally worthless as evidence. In R v. Rothwell 
(1993) 99 Cr App R 388 the accused was charged with supplying heroin to 
third parties and a police officer gave evidence that he had observed the 
accused passing small packets to persons he knew to be heroin users. The 
Court of Appeal held that the witness should not have been permitted to 
give evidence that the third parties had been heroin users as his knowledge 
had been based on what he had been told by other persons as opposed to 
his own direct perception of, for example, hypodermic needle marks on 
their arms. The prosecution should have adduced evidence of the third 
parties' convictions for possession of heroin pursuant to s. 74(1) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (R v. Warner (1992) 96 Cr App R 
324 (CA)). Alternatively, the police officer could have testified that the 
third parties were heroin users if he had known of their relevant 
convictions (R v. Rothwell (1993) 99 Cr App R 388). 
An admission made by the accused which is based on inadmissible 
hearsay is also inadmissible if the prosecution seek to rely on the 
admission to prove the truth of the hearsay statement. In R v. Marshall 
[1977] Crim LR 106 (CC) the accused, on trial for receiving stolen goods, 
admitted that when purchasing the goods he had been told by the seller 
that they were stolen. His admission was inadmissible for the purpose of 
proving the goods were stolen. Similarly, in Comptroller of Customs v. 
Western Lectric [1965] 3 WLR 1229 (PC) the accused's admission 
regarding the provenance of goods he had imported was based entirely 
on the hearsay statements in the labels attached to the goods, so his 
admission was of no evidential value and inadmissible. 
5.4	 Out-of-court Statements Admissible as Original 
Evidence 
Any out-of-court statement which is tendered not to prove the truth of the 
matters stated but for another relevant reason is admissible as `original 
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evidence'. In such cases it is the mere fact the statement has been made, 
not that its content is true, which is relevant. 
If the accused is charged with an offence and he raises the defence of 
duress he will need to adduce or elicit evidence that he was threatened with 
death or serious injury and that he reasonably believed the threat would be 
carried out. Whether the person making the threat truly intended to carry 
it out is irrelevant. The question for the jury is the accused's state of mind 
(his belief) and this depends on whether or not the threat was actually 
made. Thus in Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965, 
where the accused raised the defence of duress to a charge of having been 
in unlawful possession of ammunition, the Privy Council held that he 
should have been allowed to give evidence of the threat to show he had 
believed he would be murdered unless he committed the offence. An out-
of-court statement may also be relevant to the accused's state of mind in 
other situations, such as where he has raised the partial defence of 
provocation and needs to give evidence of the `things said' which caused 
him to lose his self-control (s. 3 of the Homicide Act 1957), or where he is 
charged with theft and his defence is that he was told by a third party that 
he could have the goods as they were his to give away. 
Conversely, the prosecution may adduce an out-of-court statement as 
original evidence to prove that the accused had the mens rea for the 
offence charged. If the charge is one of handling stolen goods it will be 
permissible to adduce the accused's admission that the person from whom 
he bought the goods had told him they were stolen. The statement is 
relevant to whether the accused had believed the goods were stolen when 
handling them (R v. Hulbert (1979) 69 Cr App R 243 (CA); cf. R v. 
Marshall [1977] Crim LR 106 (CC), 5.3 ante). Similarly, evidence of a 
statement made by a third party to the accused, regardless of its truth, 
could be relevant in showing the accused had a motive for committing the 
offence charged. For example, the third party might have insulted the 
accused, providing evidence of the accused's reciprocated enmity towards 
him; or the third party might have written a letter explaining that the 
accused's wife was having an affair, suggesting that the accused had a 
motive for murdering her. The prosecution may also adduce an out-of-
court statement to show its falsity if it is relevant to an issue in the trial. In 
Mawaz Khan v. R [1966] 3 WLR 1275 (PC) the accused's purported alibi, 
provided before the trial, was admissible for the purpose of proving that 
he had lied, allowing an inference to be drawn that he had been conscious 
of his guilt. 
If the accused submits that an adverse inference should not be drawn 
from his failure to mention in his police interview facts he has relied on in 
his defence at trial, on the ground that he was advised to remain silent by 
his solicitor, it may be necessary for him to give evidence of what his 
solicitor said to him (9.2.2.5 post). This is permissible so long as he does 
not infringe the hearsay rule. If the mere fact that the statement was made 
explains the accused's state of mind at that time, and therefore his reason 
for remaining silent, the evidence is admissible as original evidence. But if 
the accused wishes to repeat the out-of-court statement to prove the truth 
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of something his solicitor said the evidence will be inadmissible. The judge 
should be informed in advance, in the absence of the jury, what the 
evidence is going to be and the purpose for giving it so that a ruling can be 
made on admissibility (R v. Davis [1998] Crim LR 659 (CA)). 
The state of mind of a person other than the accused may be relevant 
and therefore justify the admission of an out-of-court statement as 
original evidence. For example, in R v. KL [2002] EWCA Crim 2171, a 
rape case, the prosecution adduced a video recording of an interview with 
the mentally-handicapped complainant, not because they were relying on 
the substance of what she was saying, but to prove her child-like mental 
state and inability to consent to sexual intercourse. In Ratten v. R [1971] 3 
WLR 930 (PC) the accused was charged with the murder of his wife and 
his defence was that he had accidentally shot her while cleaning his gun. A 
telephonist was allowed to give evidence of the deceased's hysterical and 
fearful request for the police (`Get me the police please!') a few minutes 
before the fatal shooting. The call itself was relevant in that it rebutted the 
accused's denial that any call had been made, and the deceased's hysterical 
request for the police was also admissible `to explain and complete the fact 
of the call being made'. Ratten v. R was distinguished by the House of 
Lords in R v. Blastland [1985] 3 WLR 345 (5.3 ante) on the ground that 
while the comments made by the third party, M, indicated his awareness 
that the murder had been committed, his state of mind was not actually 
relevant to any issue in the trial. The evidence had therefore been properly 
excluded (see also 3.1.3 ante). 
One class of out-of-court words usually considered in the context of 
original evidence is that of `operative words', that is, words which have a 
legal effect irrespective of the intention of the person who wrote or spoke 
them. Such words have often been regarded as statements in that they may 
be said to carry a content capable of being true. However, the truth (or 
falsity) of that content is deemed to be irrelevant to the effect of the 
statement as a matter of law. Operative words are regarded, objectively, as 
having a legal effect just because they have been made. An example is the 
offer and acceptance which give rise to a valid contract. If O has made an 
offer and A has accepted it, both parties are bound by their agreement 
even if O or A had been joking or deceitful and had not intended to be 
bound. If Oliver says, `I offer to sell you my computer for £500,' the truth 
or falsity of what he has stated is irrelevant; he is deemed to have made an 
offer. If Alex replies, `I accept your offer and will pay you £500,' the truth 
or falsity of what he says is also irrelevant; he too is bound by the contract 
irrespective of his real intention. 
This reasoning explains the decision in Woodhouse v. Hall (1980) 72 Cr 
App R 39. The accused was charged with having been involved in the 
management of a brothel contrary to s. 33 of the Sexual Offences Act 
1956, but the magistrates prevented the police officers called by the 
prosecution from giving evidence that they had been offered `hand relief' 
and `topless hand relief' by ladies working there. The prosecution 
appealed by way of case stated to the Divisional Court where it was 
held that as a brothel was `an establishment at which two or more women 
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were offering sexual services' the police officers had been entitled to give 
evidence that a sexual service (in this case masturbation) had been offered. 
The evidence was not hearsay. Donaldson LJ said (at p. 42): 
`I suspect that the justices . . . may have thought that they had to be 
satisfied as to the truth of what the ladies said or were alleged to have 
said in the sense they had to satisfy themselves that the words were not a 
joke but were meant seriously and something of that sort. But this is not 
a matter of truth or falsity. It is a matter of what was really said ± the 
quality of the words, the message being transmitted.' 
To reason that a brothel is an establishment where sexual services are 
offered, whether or not such offers are intended to be taken seriously, is to 
accept a broad interpretation of the substantive criminal law to justify the 
admission of what would otherwise be inadmissible evidence. The same 
sort of approach was adopted by the Court of Appeal in the earlier case of 
R v. Chapman [1969] 2 WLR 1004, where a police officer was permitted to 
give evidence that when a breath test was administered to the accused in 
the casualty department of a hospital following a road accident the doctor 
had `made no objection'. On appeal it was submitted that this evidence 
was hearsay and inadmissible. The Court of Appeal held that as s. 2(2)(b) 
of the Road Safety Act 1967 prohibited the taking of samples if `the 
medical practitioner . . . objects to the provision of a specimen' the 
question was simply whether or not there had been an objection. 
Consequently the evidence was held to have been properly admitted. 
5.5 `Performative Words' as Original Evidence 
Many out-of-court utterances do not amount to (descriptive) statements 
in that the words carry no content capable of being true. Utterances such 
as `Hello!' or `What is your favourite colour?' or `Gosh!' do not fall within 
the scope of the hearsay rule as nothing capable of being considered true 
has been stated. Operative words (5.4 ante) will often carry a descriptive 
content capable of being true or false, and such words have traditionally 
been admitted on the ground that the sincerity of the maker (and so the 
truth of the matters stated) is irrelevant. However, in addition to the 
descriptive content, operative words have a performative function. Indeed 
the real significance of operative words lies in this function, with the 
descriptive content existing as an unintended and incidental side-effect 
which can be disregarded. As such, operative words could be described as 
`performatives' as their function is, in the appropriate context, intended to 
be performative as opposed to descriptive. 
Words such as `I marry you' or `I'm sorry' or `I bet you £5 Arsenal will 
beat Spurs' or `I offer you my computer for £500' or `Would you like 
topless hand relief?' or `I do not object to your taking a specimen from my 
patient' or `Get me the police please' or `Look after this ammunition or I'll 
kill you' are not primarily descriptive statements; nor are they intended to 
be. The descriptive element is incidental to the performative function of 
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the words, and the person who utters them does so, in the appropriate 
context, for the purpose of performing that intended function, whether it 
be to marry, or apologise, or place a bet, or make an offer of sale, or offer 
a sexual service, or authorise an act, or request a service or make a threat. 
In each case the person is doing something over and above merely saying 
something. Once it is appreciated that the descriptive factor is incidental to 
the performative function of such words a more appropriate rationale for 
their admissibility as non-hearsay materialises. 
Operative words give the appearance of a descriptive content but their 
intended function is the non-descriptive (non-narrative) performance of an 
act. For this reason, operative words (and their non-verbal equivalents) 
should not be regarded as descriptive statements at all for the purposes of 
the hearsay rule. They are examples of performative non-statements and 
should be considered prima facie admissible for that reason. This 
approach has the advantage of dispensing with the somewhat artificial 
approach adopted in cases such as Woodhouse v. Hall (1980) 72 Cr App R 
39 (DC) (an offer) while also justifying the admissibility of performative 
words in other cases such as Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 
WLR 965 (PC) (a threat) without the need to question the maker's 
sincerity. Similarly, when the deceased in Ratten v. R [1971] 3 WLR 930 
(PC) asked for the police she was not intending to make a descriptive 
statement but simply making a request; her words were primarily 
performative and the admissibility of her request could also be justified 
on this basis. 
5.6 The Problem of `Implied Assertions' 
The hearsay rule clearly applies to statements which are intended by the 
maker to be descriptive of some matter (`express assertions') whether the 
maker's method of communicating that statement is oral, written, or 
otherwise. The question is whether the hearsay rule, as currently defined in 
England and Wales, also applies to unintended but logically inferable 
statements, that is, where a person has conducted himself and/or spoken in 
a way which, in the circumstances, allows an inference logically to be 
drawn as to his belief in (or knowledge of) the existence of a fact and 
therefore that the fact actually exists. If Anthony asks Paul to pass the salt 
one may logically infer that Paul and not Anthony has the salt. The 
request `Pass the salt please, Paul' allows the statement `Paul has the salt' 
to be inferred. Such an inferred statement (more commonly ± but 
incorrectly ± referred to as an `implied assertion') would seem, logically, to 
be covered by the hearsay rule as defined in R v. Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7 
(HL) (5.1 ante) if tendered to prove that Paul did indeed possess the salt at 
the time the request was made. 
5.6.1 Does the Hearsay Rule Extend to `Implied Assertions'? 
A witness's statement such as `the doctor told me David was dead' is a 
statement of fact. It is possible for the matter stated to be true (or false): 
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either David was dead or he was alive. An express out-of-court assertion 
such as this would therefore fall within the scope of the hearsay rule and, 
in the absence of an exception, would not be admissible in a criminal trial 
to prove David's death. However, if the witness had not been spoken to by 
the doctor but instead had seen the doctor cover David's face with a 
blanket, would the witness be allowed to state in court that David had 
died? The traditional view is that he would. Any witness is allowed to give 
his opinion if it is no more than a compendious way of summarising a 
number of observations and the inferences drawn from them (12.1 post). 
As the witness would have directly perceived an incident and logically 
inferred death he should be able to testify to that effect. Unfortunately 
there is a body of case law which throws doubt on the admissibility of such 
evidence on the ground that it would amount to an `implied assertion' 
covered by the hearsay rule. It is now well established that a statement 
which can be inferred from spoken or written words is covered by the 
hearsay rule, and it is therefore possible (although there is no clear 
authority on the point) that any statement which can be inferred from 
conduct will also fall foul of the rule. 
5.6.1.1 Statements Inferred from Spoken or Written Words 
The starting point for any discussion on the admissibility of statements 
which can be inferred from spoken or written words is the case of Wright 
v. Tatham (1837) 7 Ad & El 313. The issue in that case was whether a 
testator, John Marsden, had been sane at the time he made his will. The 
party wishing to uphold the will sought to adduce letters written to 
Marsden by third parties who had been well-acquainted with him but who 
had also died before the trial. The reasoning was that as the persons who 
had written to Marsden had done so in respectful terms which 
demonstrated their opinion of his good health and sound mind, it could 
be inferred that he had been sane when his will was drawn up and that it 
was therefore valid. The Court of Exchequer Chamber held that the letters 
had been properly excluded as `mere hearsay evidence', and Parke B gave 
examples of other types of correspondence which would fall foul of the 
hearsay rule for the same reason: a letter demanding the payment of a debt 
to prove the debt was due, and a note congratulating a person on his high 
state of bodily vigour to prove he was in good health. 
An example of an `implied assertion' being held to be inadmissible 
hearsay is provided by the case of Teper v. R [1952] AC 480. T was 
charged with setting fire to the shop where he conducted his business in 
order to claim on insurance policies, and his defence was that he had been 
elsewhere. At his trial a police officer was allowed to give evidence that he 
had seen a motorist resembling T driving away from the fire after he had 
heard an unidentified woman shouting, `Your place burning and you 
going away from the fire!' The Privy Council quashed T's conviction 
because what the police officer had heard was hearsay evidence. The sole 
relevance of the woman's words lay in the inference that she had identified 
T fleeing the scene, and this `implied assertion' fell within the scope of the 
exclusionary rule. Similarly, in Walton v. R (1989) 166 CLR 283 it was 
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held by the majority of the High Court of Australia that a three-year-old 
child's greeting of `Hello Daddy' to someone on the phone was an `implied 
assertion' identifying the caller as `Daddy' and therefore inadmissible; and 
in R v. West [1999] All ER (D) 1005 (99/04541/W3) the Court of Appeal 
accepted that the words `Fuck off, Adrian!' amounted to a hearsay 
statement of identification (cf. R v. Sawoniuk [2000] 2 Cr App R 220 (CA) 
at p. 229). 
The question of `implied assertions' also arose in the case of R v. 
Blastland [1985] 3 WLR 345. It has been seen already (3.1.3 ante) that 
comments made by a third party, M, to the effect that the deceased had 
been murdered, were excluded even though M's words amounted to 
evidence from which the jury might have inferred M's involvement and 
therefore B's innocence. The reason for the judge's ruling was that the 
defence wished to rely on the comments as an implied admission by M that 
he had known about the crime and therefore an implied admission of his 
involvement. Although the House of Lords dismissed B's appeal on the 
ground that M's state of mind had not been relevant to any issue in the 
trial, Lord Bridge approved the judge's approach, stating (at p. 350) that a 
contrary decision would have led to `the very odd result that the inference 
that Mark may have himself committed the murder may be supported 
indirectly by what Mark said, though if he had directly acknowledged guilt 
this would have been excluded'. 
The case of Ratten v. R [1971] 3 WLR 930 (PC) (5.4 ante) raised similar 
problems. If the evidence was simply that a telephone call had been made 
by a woman from the accused's house the question of hearsay would not 
have arisen. The mere fact of the call would have rebutted the accused's 
denial of a call having been made. However, the telephonist was also 
permitted to give evidence that the deceased had been hysterical and 
sobbing and that she had requested the police (`Get me the police please!'). 
The Privy Council justified the admission of this evidence of the deceased's 
emotional state as it explained her reason for making the call, and the 
request for the police indicated the nature of her emotional state. Such 
evidence was relevant as it tended to rebut the accused's defence of a 
peaceful lunch-time which was shattered by an unfortunate accident, but 
the evidence would also appear to have infringed the hearsay rule. The 
request for the police together with her highly-charged emotional state 
allowed a statement to be inferred from the deceased that she was in 
desperate need of help from the police, that is, that she was in imminent 
danger from someone or something. 
Ratten v. R [1971] 3 WLR 930 exemplifies the important point that 
where out-of-court words give rise to an `implied assertion', that inference 
will not prevent the words from being admissible if they are otherwise 
relevant to an issue in the trial for a reason unconnected with the hearsay 
element. The deceased's request had `double relevance'. It was relevant as 
original evidence for the purpose of rebutting the accused's denial that a 
call had been made and showing the deceased's emotional state, thereby 
undermining his defence of accident; but it was additionally relevant in 
that a (hearsay) inference could be drawn from the request and the 
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deceased's emotional state that she believed her life was in danger from the 
accused. Because the prosecution had relied on the original evidence 
aspect and not on the hearsay aspect the conviction was upheld. If the 
prosecution had relied on the hearsay aspect the conviction would have 
been quashed in the absence of a recognised exception to the hearsay rule. 
As it was, the Privy Council felt that even if the hearsay aspect had been 
relied on it would have been admissible under one of the res gestae 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule (6.1.1.1 post). Thus, where a party 
wishes to rely on words as original evidence an incidental hearsay 
inference will not prevent the admissibility of the words if the party is not 
relying on that inference. For example, if a party wishes to rely on a 
witness's out-of-court statement to demonstrate the witness's consistency 
and credibility (by virtue of an exception to the rule prohibiting reliance 
on previous consistent statements) the possibility that the jury might 
erroneously rely on the forbidden hearsay element will not prevent the 
non-hearsay aspect from being admissible (see 16.4.2 post). 
In giving the judgment of the Privy Council in Ratten v. R [1971] 3 
WLR 930, Lord Wilberforce made a fleeting reference to McGregor v. 
Stokes [1952] VLR 347 in which the ruling of Salmond J in Davidson v. 
Quirke [1923] NZLR 552 (NZSC) was approved by the Supreme Court of 
Victoria. These are but two examples of the many `betting cases' which 
have come before the courts of Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States of America, the question in each case being whether police officers 
could give evidence that a large number of telephone calls had been made 
to certain establishments, for the purpose of placing bets, to prove those 
premises had been used by the occupiers for illegal gambling. In Davidson 
v. Quirke [1923] NZLR 552 (at pp. 555±7) Salmond J held that the 
telephone calls and their content were admissible: 
`Such a practice does not arise by accident or mistake, and points 
logically to the inference that such use of the telephone by outsiders has 
its source in the agreement and purpose of the occupier himself . . . I am 
of the opinion that, notwithstanding the general rule which excludes 
evidence of statements, the contents of those telephone messages as 
received and testified to by the police officers are legally admissible in 
evidence. This is an illustration of the principle that, notwithstanding 
the rule against hearsay, where the purpose or meaning of an act done is 
relevant, evidence of contemporaneous declarations accompanying and 
explaining the act is admissible in proof of such purpose and meaning 
. . . The position is the same as if those persons had resorted to the 
appellant's premises in person and had there offered to make bets with a 
police officer in the belief that he was the occupier. In such a case 
evidence would have been admissible not merely of the fact of such 
visits, but of contemporaneous statements made by the visitors as to 
their motives and purposes.' 
An offer to place a bet is a performative utterance comprising a verbal 
method of effecting an act. It is not intended to be descriptive or narrative. 
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Such words do not therefore directly infringe the rule against hearsay, but 
they do allow a descriptive statement to be inferred (that is, the words give 
rise to an `implied assertion'). The words allow an inference to be drawn 
that the caller knows or believes that gambling occurs in his interlocutor's 
premises, which gives rise to the further inference that gambling does 
indeed take place there. If the only relevance the words have is based on a 
process of reasoning which depends on the truth of the `implied assertion' 
(that is, there is no `double relevance') then, according to the decision in 
Wright v. Tatham (1837) 7 Ad & El 313 (CEC), the words are inadmissible 
unless there is a recognised hearsay exception which can be relied on. To 
say that the content of such a conversation is admissible to explain the 
purpose of the caller in making the call is to ignore the fact that the only 
probative value the calls have in such cases is to prove a belief that the 
premises were being used for gambling. This belief is then relied on as 
evidence that the premises were actually being used for gambling. This was 
recognised in the leading English case on `implied assertions', R v. Kearley 
[1992] 2 WLR 656, where the majority of the House of Lords refused to 
follow the Commonwealth betting cases. Before considering the facts of R 
v. Kearley, though, it should be noted that the principle referred to by 
Salmond J, and regarded as a way of admitting original evidence in 
McGregor v. Stokes [1952] VLR 347 (VSC) and Ratten v. R [1971] 3 WLR 
930 (PC), is in truth the application of a common-law exception to the 
hearsay rule (6.1.1.4 post). 
Alan `Chippie' Kearley, was charged with possession of amphetamine 
with intent to supply contrary to s. 5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. 
17.4 grammes of the drug were found in a rabbit hutch at his home, but 
that quantity was not of itself sufficient to permit a proper inference that 
he had intended to supply it to other persons. Following K's arrest, and 
while he was being kept out of the way, police officers remained at his 
home and received a number of telephone calls and personal callers. Ten 
of the telephone callers asked for `Chippie' and for drugs. Seven of the 
personal callers indicated that they wanted to purchase drugs and some of 
them were carrying cash in their hands. At the trial the prosecution called 
the police officers, and the judge allowed them to give evidence of those 
calls to prove K's intent to supply. K was convicted and the Court of 
Appeal dismissed his appeal, relying on the case of Woodhouse v. Hall 
(1980) 72 Cr App R 39 (DC) (5.4 ante) as authority for the proposition 
that the offer to buy drugs was admissible original evidence to prove that 
the premises were being used to supply drugs, which was evidence that K 
himself was the supplier, the two issues being inextricably linked. 
The majority of the House of Lords (Lords Bridge, Ackner and Oliver) 
allowed K's appeal. Lord Ackner simply held the evidence to be 
inadmissible on the ground of irrelevance; the requests for drugs did not 
amount to factual assertions (that is, they were performative words) and 
while those words indicated the state of mind of the callers (namely their 
belief that K was a supplier) they had no bearing on the state of mind of K 
himself. However, his Lordship did suggest that if the words could be said 
to have given rise to an `implied assertion' that K was a supplier, that 
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assertion was inadmissible hearsay. Lords Bridge and Oliver agreed that 
the state of mind of any caller was not of itself relevant to any issue, but 
accepted that the words spoken had given rise to an `implied assertion' as 
to the callers' belief that K was a supplier and that this in turn gave rise to 
an `implied assertion' that he was in fact a supplier. While this latter 
assertion was relevant to the question of K's state of mind it was 
inadmissible hearsay on account of the rule in Wright v. Tatham (1837) 7 
Ad & El 313 (CEC). This was not a case of `double relevance' so K's 
conviction could not stand; and the fact that there had been such a large 
number of `implied assertions' made no difference. Relying on the decision 
of the House of Lords in Myers v. DPP [1964] 3 WLR 145, Lord Oliver 
said (at pp. 696±7): 
`The multiplicity of calls can go only to indicating that a shared belief is 
more likely to be true than a belief held by a single person or a few 
people. That, however, goes to weight or reliability, not to admissibility 
and it cannot in itself make admissible that which is inadmissible . . . 
I cannot, for my part, see any logical difference between evidence of a 
positive assertion and evidence of an assertion expressed as a question 
from which the positive assertion is to be inferred. In both cases the 
opinion or belief of the maker is unsworn and untested by cross-
examination and is equally prejudicial. To admit such statements as 
evidence of the fact would, in my opinion, not only entail . . . the 
overruling of a case of high authority which has stood unchallenged for 
a century and a half but would involve embarking upon a process of 
judicial legislation.' 
The majority agreed that the Commonwealth betting cases could not be 
reconciled with English authorities. Lord Bridge said (at p. 669): 
`While the admissibility of words which accompany an action may be 
derived from the relevance of the action itself, if an action considered 
apart from any accompanying words is not of any relevance, the action 
will be of no assistance in establishing the admissibility of the 
accompanying words. Moreover, if the words and action considered 
together amount to no more than an implied assertion of a fact which, if 
asserted directly by the speaker, would be excluded as hearsay, they 
clearly fall within the exclusionary principle . . .' 
While Lords Oliver and Bridge were clearly unhappy to be bound by 
Wright v. Tatham, given the high probative value of the hearsay evidence 
(on account of the plurality of calls) their Lordships accepted that any 
reform must come from Parliament. The minority (Lords Griffiths and 
Browne-Wilkinson) felt they could find `double relevance' by applying the 
reasoning of Salmond J in Davidson v. Quirke [1923] NZLR 552 (NZSC), 
arguing that the reference to his ruling in Ratten v. R [1971] 3 WLR 930 
meant the Privy Council had approved the Commonwealth betting cases. 
On this view the large number of calls, explained by the callers' state of 
mind as revealed by their contemporaneous words, were relevant in that 
they showed a potential market was available for the purchase of drugs 
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from K, and this opportunity for K to supply drugs allowed an inference 
to be drawn that K had an intention to supply drugs. While this evidence 
was also capable of giving rise to an impermissible secondary inference 
(that the callers believed K supplied drugs) this could not preclude its 
admissibility for the purpose of showing an available market. The 
minority accepted the irrelevance of the callers' belief in K's state of mind, 
but the calls and the words spoken had, on this view, additional relevance 
in that they demonstrated an available market. Not surprisingly, Lords 
Griffiths and Browne-Wilkinson shared the view of Lords Oliver and 
Bridge that the hearsay rule was in need of reform. The majority judgment 
led to a result which is contrary to common sense, so it is not surprising 
that the minority should have tried to find an additional aspect of 
relevance by which to admit the evidence. The large number of callers and 
their requests for drugs were of course relevant to the question of whether 
K was a supplier, but that relevance was based on the `implied assertion' 
that K was a supplier, and the majority were not willing to accept the 
argument advanced by the minority. As Lord Oliver asked (at p. 691): 
`What is it about the existence of a potential customer or of a body of 
customers, whether substantial or not, that tends to render it more or 
less likely that a given individual intends to supply their requirements?' 
The prosecution might, however, have tried to have the evidence 
admitted by an alternative route. The collective belief amongst the callers 
that K supplied drugs was logically relevant to whether he had the 
intention to supply the drugs in his possession. The large number of callers 
and their belief demonstrated his general reputation in the local 
community as a dealer, which was relevant to his state of mind if only 
on the ground that a notorious reputation is usually deserved. If a person's 
belief is relevant to an issue in the trial, his out-of-court statement is 
admissible to prove it (6.1.1.2 post), so the numerous requests might have 
been tendered together on this ground to prove K's reputation for 
supplying drugs in his immediate community. On this analysis the 
question of admissibility should have been one of `similar facts': was the 
evidence of K's disposition to deal in drugs (inferable from his general 
reputation) sufficiently probative in the context of the other admissible 
evidence that it could be admitted to prove mens rea notwithstanding the 
risk that his defence might be unduly prejudiced? 
The rule that `implied assertions' are covered by the hearsay rule can 
operate just as much against the accused as it can work in his favour. In R 
v. Harry (1986) 86 Cr App R 105 cocaine and drug-dealing paraphernalia 
were found in a flat used by H and his co-accused `Sacha'. After they had 
been arrested, the police intercepted a number of telephone calls to the flat 
during which the callers asked for `Sacha' and whether drugs were for sale. 
H was not allowed to cross-examine the police officers for the purpose of 
eliciting this evidence and showing that it was his co-accused and not he 
who had been the dealer. This ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeal 
on the ground that the evidence had been inadmissible hearsay. 
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R v. Kearley [1992] 2 WLR 656 (HL) was recently applied in R v. 
O'Connell [2003] EWCA Crim 502; but it was distinguished in R v. Warner 
(1992) 96 Cr App R 324 (CA). In the latter case the two co-accused were 
charged with supplying heroin. The prosecution were allowed to adduce 
evidence, pursuant to s. 74(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 (12.3.2 post), that a large number of persons had been seen by the 
police to pay very short visits to the co-accused's house and that eight of 
the visitors had previous convictions for the possession or supply of 
heroin. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence showed the character 
of the persons visiting their house and that the question of hearsay did not 
even arise. The defence which had been raised was that the callers had 
been paying social visits, and the callers' bad character was therefore 
relevant (albeit weak) circumstantial evidence from which it could be 
inferred that the sale of heroin had been taking place, confirming the 
`primary evidence' of the witnesses who had given direct testimony that 
the two co-accused had been dealing in heroin. The prosecution had not 
relied on anything said by the callers so there was no question of any 
`implied assertion' (from words). The evidence had been relevant and 
prima facie admissible subject to the judge's discretion to exclude it if its 
probative value was outweighed by its unduly prejudicial effect. 
5.6.1.2 Statements Inferred from Conduct 
In Wright v. Tatham (1837) 7 Ad & El 313 (CEC) Parke B went on to 
consider some examples of statements which could be inferred from 
conduct and would therefore be inadmissible as hearsay: (i) the payment 
of a wager to prove the outcome of the event in respect of which the wager 
had been made; (ii) the payment to third parties by underwriters under an 
insurance policy to prove the subject-matter insured had been lost; (iii) the 
conduct of the family of a testator, taking the same precautions in his 
absence as if he were a lunatic to prove that he was one, or electing him in 
his absence to some responsible office to prove he was competent to hold 
that office; (iv) the conduct of a doctor who permitted a will to be executed 
by a sick testator to prove that the testator was competent to make the 
will; and (v) the conduct of a deceased captain on a question of 
seaworthiness, who, after examining every part of the vessel, embarked in 
it with his family. 
If this is a correct statement of the hearsay rule its scope is far wider 
than most practitioners would appreciate. If it is impermissible to give 
evidence that a doctor permitted a will to be executed by a patient, on the 
ground that this would imply a statement that the testator was competent, 
so it cannot be permissible to give evidence that a doctor covered a 
patient's face to prove that the patient was dead. Indeed, in the New York 
case of Thompson v. Manhattan Railway Co (1896) 11 ADR 182 (NYSC) it 
was not possible for the plaintiff to elicit from a witness that she had been 
cauterised on the back by a doctor to prove that she had suffered a spinal 
injury. Such proof was held to be in the nature of hearsay. Similarly, in the 
Australian case of Holloway v. MacFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 (HCA) it 
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was felt by Dixon CJ and Kitto J that the conduct of a motorist in running 
away after a road accident in which he had been involved would amount 
to an `implied assertion' of culpability covered by the hearsay rule. Such 
evidence would therefore be admissible as an implied admission of liability 
(an exception to the hearsay rule) if the driver was a party to the 
proceedings, but not otherwise. The same must be true for criminal 
proceedings, save that the admissibility of the accused's implied admission 
of guilt is subject to s. 76(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(7.1.3 post). The reasoning in Holloway v. MacFeeters provides an 
alternative explanation for the decision in Mawaz Khan v. R [1966] 3 WLR 
1275 (5.4 ante). The accused's false statement in that case was in effect an 
`implied assertion' of culpability and hearsay, save that it was admissible 
by virtue of the confessions exception. Following R v. Kearley [1992] 2 
WLR 656 (HL), an out-of-court statement made by the accused and 
tendered by the prosecution to prove its falsity should have to satisfy the 
requirements of s. 76(2) of PACE. This has now been brought about, 
albeit by a different route, as a result of the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in R v. Z [2003] 1 WLR 1489 (7.1.1 post). 
There is no binding authority in English law that assertions inferred 
from conduct are covered by the hearsay rule, although the reliance placed 
on Wright v. Tatham (1837) 7 Ad & El 313 (CEC) in R v. Kearley [1992] 2 
WLR 656 (HL) supports the argument that they are. In Manchester 
Brewery v. Coombs (1901) 82 LT 347 (ChD) it was felt, obiter, that 
evidence that customers in a public house had tasted beer and left it or 
thrown it away would be admissible to prove the beer was bad; but that 
decision could also be explained as the application of an exception to the 
hearsay rule to otherwise inadmissible `implied assertions' (6.1.1.4 post). 
5.6.2 Should the Hearsay Rule Cover `Implied Assertions'? 
The scope of the exclusionary hearsay rule should be no wider than its 
rationale demands. If the rule fails to serve the interests of justice or 
otherwise adversely affects the admissibility of evidence which generally 
ought to be admitted then its scope should be redefined by Parliament. 
Whether the hearsay rule should cover `implied assertions' depends 
primarily on whether the justifications for excluding express assertions 
apply with equal force to inferred statements. 
It has been seen that the principal justification for the hearsay rule is to 
exclude evidence of unascertainable reliability. The person who made the 
out-of-court statement, assuming he exists, may have been lying or 
mistaken about the matters he was purporting to narrate (or misinter-
preted by a nonetheless convincing witness); and yet the maker is 
unavailable for cross-examination. However, where a statement has been 
inferred from words or conduct, the likelihood that the maker intended to 
mislead the reporter will often be low. As a general rule people do not 
request drugs from a person on the off-chance that someone is listening 
who will infer that that person is a dealer, or go through the charade of 
covering a patient's face to mislead an observer into thinking he has died, 
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or call an establishment to place a bet hoping the call will be intercepted 
by the police. 
In those examples the risk of deception is probably low enough to be 
discounted, but it is quite possible to envisage other situations where the 
risk of deception cannot so easily be ignored. If a house is raided by the 
police and D1 and D2 are charged with possession of heroin with intent to 
supply, is it really too far-fetched to imagine that D1 would arrange to 
have several calls made to the house asking for drugs from D2? Can it be 
taken for granted that a letter written in a respectful way reflects the 
author's true feelings about the recipient? In Wright v. Tatham (1837) 7 Ad 
& El 313 (CEC) (5.6.1.1 ante) there was evidence that the testator, 
Marsden, had actually been insane; and it is therefore quite possible that 
the persons who wrote to him were acting in accordance with the social 
conventions of the early nineteenth century and that their letters did not 
reflect their true opinion of his state of mind, particularly if they had been 
aware that their correspondence would be dealt with by a sane person 
acting on Marsden's behalf. 
Furthermore, even if deception can be discounted there is still the 
possibility of unreliability from mistake on the part of the maker, whose 
powers of perception and memory cannot be tested in cross-examination. 
Teper v. R [1952] AC 480 (PC) (5.6.1.1 ante) is a case in point. If the 
hearsay rule had not been applicable the absent woman's shout of `Your 
place burning and you going away from the fire!' would have been prima 
facie admissible notwithstanding her unavailability for cross-examination 
on what she had said and the circumstances of her visual identification. 
There is also the possibility of an erroneous inference being drawn by the 
jury from what has been seen or heard by the witness, particularly in cases 
where there is a degree of ambiguity in the maker's words or conduct. In 
Parke B's example of the ship's captain (5.6.1.2 ante), the mere fact that he 
was seen walking round his vessel could lead to any number of inferences 
as to his state of mind or competence, even though deliberate deception 
would have been unlikely. He could, for example, have been exercising or 
checking the paintwork or looking for something he had lost; and if he 
was indeed inspecting the vessel for seaworthiness it would be necessary to 
consider the collateral question of whether he actually knew what he was 
doing. If evidence such as this were to be admitted to prove that the ship 
was seaworthy it is difficult to see how the tribunal of fact would properly 
be able to evaluate its reliability and weight. The reasoning process would 
be predicated on little more than speculation, and it has already been seen 
that this is not an acceptable basis for resolving issues of fact (R v. 
Blastland [1985] 3 WLR 345 (HL), 3.1.3 ante). 
On the other hand, there can be little doubt that a hearsay rule which 
would exclude any statement which is inferable from words or conduct is 
far too wide to be acceptable. A rule along these lines would, subject to 
any exception, prohibit probative and reliable evidence which is now 
admitted as a matter of course. Most if not all human conduct gives rise to 
an inference about the actor's state of mind such as his belief or intention 
and it would be absurd if all such evidence were to be excluded, subject to 
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the availability of a suitable exception, on the ground that it is inherently 
unreliable. 
If the above examples illustrate anything it is that an absolute 
exclusionary rule is out of place in the law of evidence where each case 
turns on its own facts. Some form of guided discretion is needed for 
hearsay evidence and, drawing on the law governing the admissibility of 
the accused's extraneous misconduct for an analogy (3.3.11 ante), a 
solution would be to have a prima facie rule of inadmissibility (subject to 
an inclusionary discretion) for express assertions (6.4 post) and a rule of 
prima facie admissibility (subject to an exclusionary discretion) for 
`implied assertions'. 
Rule 801 of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence provides as 
follows: 
A `statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) non-verbal 
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion . . . 
`Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
Although it is first necessary to eliminate the possibility that the inferred 
statement was intended by the maker, this rule has the merit of making 
(unintended) statements of fact which have been inferred from words or 
conduct prima facie admissible on account of the absence or the 
unlikelihood of deception. The Law Commission (Law Com No. 245 
(1997) at pp. 85±90) has accepted this approach as its preferred option for 
reform: 
`(1) . . . in criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in 
the proceedings should not be admissible as evidence of any matter 
stated, and (2) a matter should be regarded as stated in a statement if 
(and only if) the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the person making 
the statement appears to the court to have been (a) to cause another 
person to believe the matter, or (b) to cause another person to act, or a 
machine to operate, on the basis that the matter is as stated.' 
The risk of mistake remains, but this can be effectively ameliorated. If 
either party wishes to adduce an `implied assertion' any such risk can be 
taken into account when the judge determines the question of relevance. 
If, for example, the probative value of the evidence is dependent on 
speculation, or a proper assessment of its probative value would require 
the jury to resolve a number of extraneous collateral questions, it might be 
appropriate to exclude the evidence on the ground that it is `irrelevant' 
(3.1.3 ante). Of course if the evidence is tendered by the prosecution the 
judge would be able to take the risk of mistake and fabrication into 
account when exercising his common-law or statutory discretion to 
exclude it. 
Taking Parke B's example again, the various inferences which might be 
drawn from the conduct of the ship's captain would necessitate a process 
of reasoning which would depend on speculation. To avoid such 
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speculation it would be necessary to resolve the collateral matter of what 
the captain was actually doing, which would mean that evidence (and no 
doubt counter-evidence) would need to be adduced, leading to lengthier 
and costlier proceedings. And even if it could be inferred that the captain 
was indeed inspecting his ship for seaworthiness, an enquiry into whether 
he was mistaken in his conclusion would depend on an assessment of his 
experience, qualifications and competence, which would necessitate the 
resolution of a further collateral matter. Accordingly, there would be a 
sound basis for excluding the evidence on the ground that it is `irrelevant'. 
5.7 Hearsay and Mechanically-generated Documents 
The hearsay rule applies to out-of-court statements which have emanated 
from a human source. If there is no human involvement the question of 
hearsay does not arise. Thus, where a machine, instrument or computer 
has produced a statement in the absence of any human input between the 
act of measuring or calculating and the production of the statement, the 
sole question is whether the machine, instrument or computer is reliable 
and not whether an exception to the hearsay rule applies. Such 
mechanically-generated statements are admissible as real evidence. 
Television footage is admissible real evidence (Kajala v. Noble (1982) 75 
Cr App R 149 (DC)) as are still photographs and audio recordings (R v. 
Maqsud Ali [1965] 3 WLR 229 (CCA)). In Taylor v. Chief Constable of 
Cheshire [1986] 1 WLR 1479 (DC) it was held that witnesses could give 
evidence of what they had seen on a video recording if the tape was no 
longer available at the time of the trial. In The Statue of Liberty [1968] 1 
WLR 739 (PD) it was held that radar recordings were admissible; Simon P 
said (at p. 740): 
`Similarly, if evidence of weather conditions were relevant, the law 
would affront common sense if it were to say that those could be proved 
by a person who looked at a barometer from time to time, but not by 
producing a barograph record. So, too, with other types of dial 
recordings. Again, cards from clocking-in-and-out machines are 
frequently admitted in accident cases. The law is now bound to take 
cognizance of the fact that mechanical means replace human effort.' 
Other examples of real evidence include print-outs from Intoximeter 
breath-test machines (Castle v. Cross [1984] 1 WLR 1372 (DC)), from 
weighing machines and spectrometers (R v. Wood (1982) 76 Cr App R 23 
(CA)) and from computerised machines which automatically record that 
telephone calls have been made (R v. Spiby (1990) 91 Cr App R 186 (CA)). 
In R v. Wood (1982) 76 Cr App R 23 (CA) a print-out from a computer 
which had performed nothing more than calculations in respect of data 
produced by an X-ray spectrometer was held to be admissible real 
evidence (although the evidence would not have been admissible if the 
chemists had not given oral evidence of the data which had been entered 
into the computer). In R v. Pettigrew (1980) 71 Cr App R 39 (CA), 
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however, it was assumed that the print-out of a computer in the Bank of 
England's automatic sorting machine was hearsay. This cannot be right as 
there was no human input at all (see R v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex 
parte Levin [1997] 3 WLR 117 (HL) at p. 121). 
Where there is a degree of human involvement which has influenced the 
final statement the hearsay rule does apply. Thus in R v. Coventry Justices 
ex parte Bullard (1992) 95 Cr App R 175 (DC) a computer print-out 
stating that the accused was in arrears with his poll tax payments was 
inadmissible hearsay because it was based on information entered into the 
computer by a person and that information had not been properly proved 
(cf. R v. Wood (1982) 76 Cr App R 23 (CA)); and in R v. Shephard (1991) 
93 Cr App R 139 the Court of Appeal felt that as the information recorded 
on till rolls had been supplied by cashiers it was hearsay. The Law 
Commission (Law Com No. 245 (1997) at p. 92) has made the following 
recommendation in line with R v. Coventry Justices ex parte Bullard: 
`Where a representation of any fact is made otherwise than by a person, 
but depends for its accuracy on information supplied by a person, it 
should not be admissible as evidence of the fact unless it is proved that 
the information was accurate.' 
5.8 Circumventing the Hearsay Rule 
In Myers v. DPP [1964] 3 WLR 145 the accused faced several charges of 
receiving stolen cars. The prosecution case was that wrecked cars and their 
log books had been bought at a very low price and then cars of the same 
type had been stolen, passed off and sold as the legitimately bought cars. 
The prosecution were allowed to establish that the cars were stolen by 
calling employees of the car manufacturers, and those witnesses produced 
microfilm records (photographs of the written record compiled by 
anonymous workmen on the production line) purporting to show the 
cylinder block numbers which had been indelibly stamped on the engines 
and contemporaneously recorded during the manufacturing process. The 
majority of the House of Lords held that the evidence had been wrongly 
admitted on the ground that the hearsay rule was absolute unless an 
exception applied. The list of common-law exceptions was closed, and the 
mere fact that hearsay evidence was highly reliable could not justify its 
admission in the absence of an established exception. 
The technical nature of the hearsay rule has created difficulties for the 
courts. If highly reliable and probative evidence falls within the scope of 
the exclusionary rule it is inadmissible unless a statutory or established 
common-law exception can be found to justify its admission. In the 
absence of any such exception the courts must either exclude the evidence 
or find a way of side-stepping the hearsay rule. This side-stepping has been 
effected in two ways. First, the courts have been willing to redefine 
evidence so that it is not caught by the exclusionary rule at all, and this has 
led to anomalous cases where what appears to be hearsay has been 
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classified as something else. Second, where it has been thought 
inappropriate to redefine an item of obvious hearsay evidence as non-
hearsay the courts have ignored the hearsay problem altogether or 
broadened an existing exception so that the evidence can be brought 
within its scope. 
A written entry in a record which a party relies on for the purpose of 
proving the truth of the matter recorded falls within the scope of the 
hearsay rule, and logically the same should be true for the absence of an 
entry if it too amounts to an assertion of fact. If a teacher places a tick next 
to the name of any students who are present and makes no mark next to 
the names of absent students, the absence of a tick amounts to an assertion 
of fact (`this student was absent on this date') just as much as the tick (`this 
student was present on this date') and as such both should be covered by 
the hearsay rule. This is not the approach the Court of Appeal has 
adopted, however. In R v. Patel (1981) 73 Cr App R 117, P faced a charge 
of assisting the illegal entry into the UK of a third party, A, and the 
prosecution called an immigration officer to prove that A was an illegal 
entrant. The immigration officer was allowed to rely on Home Office 
records he had previously examined and gave evidence that A's name was 
not recorded as a person entitled to a certificate of registration in the UK. 
Although P's conviction was quashed on appeal, on account of the 
immigration officer's reliance on hearsay evidence, the Court of Appeal 
went on to intimate that it would have been permissible for the officer 
responsible for the compilation and custody of the records to give evidence 
that the method of compilation and custody was such that if A's name was 
not there he must be an illegal entrant. The Court of Appeal did not 
explain why the evidence would not be hearsay merely because it was given 
by one type of officer rather than another, but the dictum was considered 
with approval in R v. Shone (1982) 76 Cr App R 72. The accused in that 
case was charged with handling stolen vehicle springs which had been 
identified as coming from a particular wholesaler. The wholesaler's stock 
clerk and parts sales manager were called and they gave evidence that while 
the receipt and the sale or use of all spare parts were recorded on cards, 
there was no record of the sale or use of the material springs, even though 
those springs had been received and found to be missing from their stock. 
The Court of Appeal held that the absence of any mark indicating the sale 
or use of the springs, as related to the court by the witnesses, was not 
hearsay but direct evidence from which the jury had been entitled to draw 
the inference that the springs were stolen. It would seem to be permissible, 
therefore, to relate hearsay evidence in court, thereby converting it into 
admissible direct testimony, so long as the hearsay relied on is the absence 
of a record rather than a positive entry. It is a sensible result, but it is also a 
new common-law exception to the hearsay rule. 
The hearsay rule was simply ignored in R v. Muir (1983) 79 Cr App R 
153. The accused in that case was charged with stealing a video recorder he 
had hired from Granada Television Rentals, his defence being that two 
men had called round to collect the video, and his wife, presuming they 
were employees of Granada, had allowed them to take the video away. 
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The prosecution were allowed to call Granada's district manager to give 
evidence that he had been told by his head office that no repossession 
order had been made in respect of the accused's video. The Court of 
Appeal held that as this was not a case where a document was relied on, 
and there was no document in existence (cf. R v. Shone (1982) 76 Cr App 
R 72 (CA)), the question for the jury was simply whether or not the video 
had been repossessed by Granada as the accused had claimed. The district 
manager as `the best person to give the relevant evidence' had therefore 
been entitled to say that he had been informed by his head office that the 
video had not been repossessed. 
A number of decisions concerning identification evidence exemplify the 
pragmatic approach adopted by the Court of Appeal to the admissibility 
of hearsay evidence. The hearsay rule was ignored in R v. Osbourne [1973] 
2 WLR 209 (CA), a common-law exception was widened in R v. McCay 
[1990] 1 WLR 645 (CA) (6.1.1.4 post), and in R v. Cook [1987] 2 WLR 775 
(CA) hearsay evidence was held to be admissible on the ground that the 
evidence in question (photofits and sketches) was sui generis and not 
hearsay at all (see generally 16.4.2.5 post). More recently, in R v. Ward 
[2001] Crim LR 316 the Court of Appeal held that if a person identifies 
himself with reference to a name and the date of birth and address of the 
person bearing that name this may be regarded as an admission of 
identification (and therefore presence) for the purposes of the statutory 
exception to the hearsay rule which governs confessions ± even though the 
statement is being tendered to prove the identity of the maker of the 
statement (and the exception to the hearsay rule can be relevant only if the 
identity of the maker as the accused is first established by other evidence). 
The consequence is that if person X knows the name, address and date of 
birth of person Y he can, if asked by a police officer to identify himself, 
give those details; and if Y is subsequently charged with the offence 
committed by X the evidence of the purported self-identification will be 
admissible against Y as an admission of his presence at the time the 
statement was made. The Court of Appeal justified its approach on the 
ground that evidence that a person has provided a name along with a 
corresponding address and date of birth is compelling evidence of a self-
identification, although it was recognised that the jury should be given a 
(somewhat circular) direction not to rely on such evidence as an admission 
of presence by the accused unless they are first sure from the contents of 
the statement and any other evidence that it was indeed the accused 
identifying himself. A more appropriate way of justifying the admission of 
this sort of evidence is addressed in Chapter 6 (6.1.1.2 post). 
Hearsay evidence may also be relied on by expert witnesses (R v. 
Abadom [1983] 1 WLR 126 (CA), 12.2.3 post), and the House of Lords in 
R v. Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7 (HL) created a new common-law exception by 
recognising that the exculpatory parts of a `mixed' statement were 
admissible as evidence of the truth of the matters stated (7.1.1 post). It 
should also be noted that the common law allows hearsay evidence to be 
admitted `through the back door' in two other ways: a witness who relies 
on his earlier statement to `refresh his memory' in respect of an event 
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which he has entirely forgotten is in effect relating hearsay to the court 
(16.4.1 post); and hearsay may also become admissible if a document 
containing it is given to a witness to read during cross-examination and he 
accepts the truth of the matters stated therein (16.5.1 post). 
A case which has given rise to much academic discussion is R v. Rice 
[1963] 2 WLR 585. Rice and his several co-accused, including Moore and 
Hoather, were charged with two counts of conspiracy. The prosecution 
were allowed to adduce a used airline ticket for two seats with the names 
`Rice' and `Moore' as evidence from which it could be inferred that Rice 
had travelled from London to Manchester with Hoather (who had 
admitted using Moore's booking and travelling with Rice). The ticket was 
produced by a representative of the airline who had custody of tickets 
returned after use. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the ticket had 
been properly admitted as real evidence, although its evidential value was 
said to be limited to allowing the jury to draw an inference that `probably 
two people had flown on the particular flight and that it might or might 
not seem to them by applying their common knowledge of such matters 
that the passengers bore the surnames which were written on the ticket'. 
(It was accepted that the latter inference was not one to be readily drawn 
given the suggestion that Moore had not taken the flight.) The Court drew 
an analogy with passports: just as a passport is likely to be in the 
possession of the person to whom it has been issued, so an airline ticket 
which has been used on a particular flight and which has a name on it is 
likely to have been used by a person of that name (or by one of two men 
whose names are on it). However, the ticket was inadmissible for the 
purpose of `speaking its contents' as this would be hearsay. A passport 
could not be adduced to say `my bearer is X' and equally an airline ticket 
could not be adduced to say `I was issued to Y'. According to this 
reasoning the document was not admissible as an assertion (`this ticket 
was issued to Rice') but it was nonetheless admissible for the purpose of 
linking Rice to it on that flight. This decision has been criticised as an 
example of hearsay being improperly admitted, on the ground that the 
probative value of the ticket depended on an `implied assertion' of 
possession (`this ticket was used by Rice') like the expressly assertive labels 
in Patel v. Comptroller of Customs [1965] 3 WLR 1221 (PC) and R v. 
Brown [1991] Crim LR 835 (CA) (5.3 ante). 
The decision in R v. Rice can be justified, however, if it is seen as an 
example of evidence having `double relevance' (5.6.1.1 ante). If the word 
`Rice' on the ticket is regarded as an identifying mark, rather like a 
fingerprint, it has additional probative value based on the unlikelihood of 
a coincidence. Identifying marks which are not intended to be assertive do 
not fall directly within the scope of the hearsay rule (see Miller v. Howe 
[1969] 1 WLR 1510 (DC)). It is true that such a mark can give rise to an 
`implied assertion' of possession (or presence at the place where the object 
was found), but the evidence is not relied on for that purpose. Its 
evidential value depends not on an acceptance of the truth of any `implied 
assertion' but on the unlikelihood that a person other than the accused 
was also in possession of something with such a distinctive mark upon it. 
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If a rare, intricately-embroidered handkerchief is found at the scene of a 
crime, the fact the accused was in possession of a similar handkerchief, 
now lost, would be probative of his presence there. The same would be 
true if the handkerchief was uncommon for a more prosaic reason, for 
example because it bore the accused's initials upon it. The initials would 
give rise to an `implied assertion', but the evidence would not be adduced 
for the purpose of proving the truth of that assertion. The evidential value 
relied on would be the fact that the accused belongs to the class of persons 
who have such a mark on their handkerchiefs. Taking this one step 
further, the same must be true if the handkerchief was marked with a 
surname. If a handkerchief bearing the name `Rice' is found at the scene of 
a crime this is admissible circumstantial evidence that a person who is 
likely to have handkerchiefs decorated with that name (that is, a person 
called Rice) was there. In R v. Rice the ticket had been returned to the 
airline by the passenger at the end of the flight so it amounted to an item 
of circumstantial evidence directly connecting a person called Rice to that 
particular flight to Manchester. Just as a handkerchief marked `Rice' is 
likely to have been used by a person called Rice, an airline ticket marked 
`Rice' and handed in immediately after a flight is likely to have been used 
on that flight by a person called Rice. The probative value depends on this 
degree of likelihood and not on the truth of an `implied assertion' such as 
`this ticket was issued to Rice' or `Rice travelled on this flight'. If the ticket 
had been found in any other place it would not have had probative value 
as circumstantial, real evidence; its only relevance would have lain in the 
`implied assertion' that the ticket had been issued to and used by a person 
called Rice, which would have been inadmissible hearsay. Strictly 
speaking, of course, the evidence was tainted by hearsay to the extent 
that usually a name is printed on a ticket, or a monogram is printed on a 
handkerchief, because the person requesting the item has expressly or 
impliedly represented that a person with those initials or that name will be 
using it. However, when it is understood that much evidence is dependent 
upon hearsay to some extent (after all, how does anyone know his name or 
age or where he lives?) this can be disregarded as a de minimis taint, and R 
v. Rice would seem to have been correctly decided. In this respect it is 
worth noting the recent decision in R v. Clarke [2003] EWCA Crim 718, 
where it was held, in effect, that the hearsay rule is indeed subject to a de 
minimis limitation. V had identified two of her assailants as girls who had 
been at the same school as her, whose names she had come to know over a 
period of four years, although she had never spoken to them or heard 
either of them acknowledge their names. The Court of Appeal held that 
this was a case of recognition as opposed to mere identification, and that 
the argument that V's evidence was tainted by hearsay (and so either 
inadmissible or unreliable) lacked `practical realism'. According to the 
Court, over a period of several years schoolchildren, or others in 
comparable institutions, get to know who their fellows are, often because 
they are named by persons who know them and there is nothing to suggest 
the contrary. Accordingly, `what once may have been hearsay to start 
with, after much uncontradicted repetition over a period of time becomes 
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repute and common knowledge', and to hold otherwise would be `an 
affront to common sense'. 
Another case of `double relevance' which is in some respects similar to 
R v. Rice [1963] 2 WLR 585 (CCA) is that of R v. Lydon (1986) 85 Cr App 
R 221. The accused, Sean Lydon, was charged with robbery and the 
prosecution sought to identify him as one of the offenders by adducing, 
inter alia, a gun, which had been found along the route used by the 
getaway car, and pieces of paper bearing the words `Sean rules' and `Sean 
rules 85' which had been found near the gun. Scientific analysis showed 
that smears of ink on the gun matched the ink on the pieces of paper. 
Lydon appealed on the ground that the evidence linking him to the gun 
(the references to Sean) was hearsay and ought not to have been admitted. 
The Court of Appeal held that the evidence had been properly admitted 
because it was `no more than a statement of fact involving no assertion as 
to the truth of the contents of the document'. The notes had not been 
relied on by the prosecution for the purpose of proving the truth of any 
express or `implied assertion'. The relevance of the note, as in R v. Rice, 
lay simply in the likelihood that the person who would write such notes 
would be called Sean. As such, the evidence was not hearsay at all but 
circumstantial evidence from which the jury had been entitled to draw an 
inference that Lydon had disposed of the gun and been involved in the 
robbery (see also R v. Orrell [1972] RTR 14 (CA)). 
In R v. McIntosh [1992] Crim LR 651 (CA) the accused was charged 
with being concerned in the importation of cocaine and the prosecution 
were permitted to adduce a piece of paper of unknown authorship bearing 
calculations of the price and weight of a quantity of drugs. The piece of 
paper had been found concealed in the chimney of the house where the 
accused had been living prior to his arrest, and was held to be admissible 
real evidence which did not infringe the hearsay rule. The document was 
adduced not for the purpose of proving the truth of the matters stated but 
simply to show the accused had an interest in the information it contained. 
Similarly, in R v. Snowden [2002] EWCA Crim 923 it was held that the 
accused's retention of a humorous birthday card with the words `Keep on 
the grass man' and `Get mown away! It's your birthday!' had been 
properly admitted as real evidence that he was treating the cultivation of 
cannabis as a joke, and that he had not therefore been forced to do it 
under duress as he had claimed. The same sort of reasoning applies to 
items such as a book which reveals the accused's interest in a particular 
branch of knowledge or type of news. In R v. George [2002] EWCA Crim 
1923, for example, the prosecution were entitled to rely on the fact that 
magazine articles relating to the murder G had allegedly committed were 
found in his flat, along with articles about (and photographs of) the 
deceased, to show his fascination with her (and other television 
personalities) and to rebut his assertion when interviewed that he had 
never heard of her. Similarly, if the accused is charged with being involved 
in a joint enterprise to import cocaine, the mere fact he has a book entitled 
The Cocaine Consumer's Handbook would be relevant circumstantial 
evidence of his involvement (R v. Thrussell (1981) [1997] Crim LR 501n 
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(CA)). The book would not be relied on as evidence of the truth of the 
matters stated so the hearsay rule would not apply. However, because a 
book on cocaine consumption would suggest a criminal disposition the 
evidence would have to satisfy the `similar facts' test before it could be 
admitted. 
5.9 Reforming the Hearsay Rule 
A sure indicator that the hearsay rule is in need of reform is the way the 
courts have tried to circumvent the decision of the House of Lords in 
Myers v. DPP [1964] 3 WLR 145 (5.8 ante). This is not surprising. The 
exclusionary rule is absolute unless one of the well-established exceptions 
applies, regardless of how reliable or probative the evidence might be. The 
rule can prevent the prosecution from relying on cogent and reliable 
evidence of the accused's guilt; and it is quite possible to envisage 
situations where the absence of a suitable exception will prevent the 
accused from being able to defend himself with cogent evidence of his 
innocence (as, for example, in Sparks v. R [1964] 2 WLR 566 (PC)). The 
latter eventuality could well result in a violation of Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
The Law Commission (Law Com No. 245 (1997) at pp. 69±80) 
considered six options: (i) the free-admissibility approach; (ii) the best-
available-evidence approach; (iii) an exclusionary rule with a general 
inclusionary discretion; (iv) adding an inclusionary discretion to the 
present scheme; (v) categories of automatically admissible evidence; and 
(vi) an exclusionary rule with categories of automatic admissibility and a 
`safety-valve' inclusionary discretion. 
The free-admissibility approach (that is, the complete abolition of the 
hearsay rule) was rejected for the traditional reasons (5.2 ante), including 
the possibility of infringing Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and because of the likelihood that much superfluous 
evidence would be rendered admissible. The best-available-evidence 
approach (which would allow hearsay to be admissible when direct 
testimony was unavailable) was also rejected because of the possibility that 
the parties would not respect their obligations to produce witnesses and 
the difficulty magistrates would face in applying the test. The third option 
was rejected because of the potential for uncertainty and inconsistency 
and, again, the fear that magistrates would be unable to apply the test. The 
fourth option was rejected because of the uncertainty which would result 
and the Commission's desire for other reforms. The fifth option, which 
would require a number of exceptions allowing in hearsay where it was 
likely to be reliable and/or where direct testimony was unavailable, was 
rejected because of the possibility that unforeseen situations would arise 
and cogent evidence would still end up being excluded. 
This left the sixth option, which would entail reforming the exclusionary 
rule and its exceptions and providing judges (and magistrates) with a `very 
limited discretion' to ensure highly reliable hearsay would not be excluded. 
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This option was described as one striking the right balance between 
certainty and flexibility: `a general rule against hearsay, subject to 
specified exceptions, plus a limited inclusionary discretion.' The discretion 
would be exercised in favour of admitting the evidence where the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement indicated that it 
could be treated as reliable (see 6.4 post). 
Chapter Summary 
.	 The common-law rule against hearsay prohibits the admission of any out-of-court 
statement if it is tendered to prove the truth of the matters stated, unless a 
statutory or common-law exception applies. In the absence of any such exception 
the courts must exclude the evidence, no matter how reliable or cogent it might 
be, unless a way can be found to `side-step' the rule. 
.	 The rule does not prohibit the admission of any statement which has been 
automatically generated by a machine without the benefit of human intervention. 
.	 The rule against hearsay does not prevent the admission of an out-of-court 
statement if it is tendered as `original evidence' to prove that the statement was 
made (if that is relevant). Nor does the rule prohibit the admission of a descriptive 
statement (e.g., a book) which is tendered not to prove the truth of the matters 
described but as (real) circumstantial evidence from which it can be inferred that 
the person in whose possession it was found had a particular interest or from 
which it can be inferred that a particular person had it in his possession. 
.	 The rule against hearsay does not directly prevent the admission of words or 
`utterances' which do not carry any (or any relevant) descriptive content, but it 
does prohibit the admission of statements of truth which can be inferred from 
such words or `utterances'. 
.	 It is unclear whether statements of truth which can be inferred from human 
conduct are similarly inadmissible, but what limited authority there is suggests 
that such statements are indeed encompassed by the rule. 
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Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

In civil proceedings s. 1 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 provides that 
evidence is no longer inadmissible merely on the ground that it is hearsay, 
although as a rule certain notice conditions have to be complied with to 
ensure that the judge does not attach insufficient weight to the evidence 
(8.1 post). The notice provisions are unnecessary if the evidence is adduced 
pursuant to a separate statutory exception (8.2 post) or one of the few 
common-law exceptions preserved by the Act (8.3 post). 
In criminal proceedings the position is more complicated. The general 
exclusionary rule remains absolute in nature subject to a number of 
statutory and well-established common-law exceptions, the former 
applying only to hearsay evidence in documentary form. Although only 
a few common-law exceptions are still of any relevance in civil 
proceedings, they all apply in criminal proceedings; indeed it is only by 
relying on a common-law exception that the prosecution (or the accused) 
may adduce oral hearsay evidence. If the hearsay evidence is in 
documentary form it may be possible to admit it at common law or 
pursuant to a statutory exception (or both). Confessions were formerly 
admissible at common law but the exception governing such statements 
has now been replaced by an important statutory regime which deserves 
separate treatment (7.1 post). This chapter is concerned with the other 
statutory exceptions which may be relied on in criminal proceedings 
together with the remaining common-law exceptions. 
6.1 The Common-law Exceptions 
Several exceptions to the hearsay rule have evolved at common law on 
account of the supposed reliability of statements made in certain 
circumstances and/or because of the unlikelihood of any non-hearsay 
evidence being available to prove the issue in dispute. Unless otherwise 
stated these exceptions have been superseded in civil proceedings by the 
provisions of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. 
6.1.1 Statements Forming Part of the Res Gestae 
A `statement forming part of the res gestae' is one which can be said to be 
inextricably linked in time and space with an event or state of affairs. The 
expression is most often used in relation to spontaneous statements 
(`excited utterances') made approximately contemporaneously with a 
dramatic incident, usually the commission of a criminal offence, the 
assumption being that such circumstances provide some guarantee against 
the risk of unreliability from fabrication by the declarant. However, 
statements made approximately contemporaneously with the declarant's 
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state of mind or health or conduct are also admissible to prove his state of 
mind or health at that time or to explain his conduct. These exceptions are 
also grouped under the general res gestae heading but the risk of 
fabrication cannot so easily be discounted in such cases, and the rationale 
underlying them is less certain. Although the requirement of contempor-
aneity may provide something of a safeguard against the risk of 
fabrication and mistake on the part of the declarant, it would seem the 
principal reason for admitting such evidence is necessity. 
6.1.1.1 `Excited Utterances' 
A statement made during or soon after an overwhelmingly dramatic event 
(or just prior to an imminent event of this sort) which can be said to have 
been made spontaneously and in response to (or in immediate anticipation 
of) that event, is admissible as evidence of the truth of the matters stated. 
The high degree of spontaneity involved means that the risk of fabrication 
can be discounted, and it is this reduced risk of unreliability which justifies 
the admission of such evidence. In the context of criminal proceedings it 
used to be thought that the dramatic event (the res gestae) must be the 
commission of the offence itself, but it now seems that this is not a 
requirement. 
Until relatively recently the exception was construed rather strictly, with 
almost exact contemporaneity being required before an excited utterance 
could be admitted as part of the res gestae. There is no better illustration 
of this than the old case of R v. Bedingfield (1879) 14 Cox CC 341 
(Assizes). Henry Bedingfield was charged with the murder of a woman, the 
facts being that she and Bedingfield had been in a house together when she 
suddenly came out with her throat severely cut saying, `See what Harry 
has done!' She died 10 minutes later. This statement was ruled 
inadmissible on the ground that because it had not been something said 
while her throat was being cut it had not formed part of the res gestae. 
Similarly, the lack of contemporaneity (and physical proximity) meant 
that the exception could not be relied on in Teper v. R [1952] AC 480 (PC) 
(5.6.1.1 ante) where a woman was heard to identify the accused (`Your 
place burning and you going away from the fire!') 26 minutes after the 
relevant fire had started and some 200 metres away from it. 
The excited utterance exception was reformulated in the seminal case of 
Ratten v. R [1971] 3 WLR 930 (5.6.1.1 ante). It will be remembered that 
the deceased's emotional telephone call to the local operator, and her 
words (`Get me the police please!') about five minutes before her death, 
were held to be admissible on the ground that the call itself was relevant, 
as it rebutted the accused's denial that any such call had been made, while 
her words and sobbing explained her reason for making the call. 
According to the Privy Council the deceased's words and emotional state 
had been properly admitted as original evidence. (In fact it is an exception 
to the hearsay rule; see 6.1.1.4 post.) Of more importance in the present 
context is that the Privy Council went on to consider the question of 
admissibility on the basis that the deceased's words had `impliedly 
asserted' that she was in imminent danger from the accused, concluding 
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(obiter) that her request for the police would have been admissible as part 
of the res gestae. The test to be applied was simply whether, on account of 
the statement having been made `in circumstances of spontaneity or 
involvement in the event', the possibility of concoction could be 
disregarded. It was not necessary for the words to be exactly 
contemporaneous with the event, and as the deceased's words had been 
closely associated in time and space with the shooting, and had clearly 
been forced from her by the overwhelming pressure of the surrounding 
circumstances, the test had been satisfied. The inflexible criterion of exact 
contemporaneity was thus discarded in favour of a common-sense test 
based on sincerity. 
The Ratten test was subsequently applied on a number of occasions by 
the Court of Appeal (see for example R v. Nye (1977) 66 Cr App R 252 
and R v. Turnbull (1984) 80 Cr App R 104) but received its most 
authoritative stamp of approval when the House of Lords considered it in 
R v. Andrews [1987] 2 WLR 413. In that case, a drunken man was stabbed 
and mortally wounded by two men who had called at his flat, but within a 
few minutes of the attack he had been able to make his way to a 
neighbour's flat on the floor below. The police arrived a few minutes later 
and while administering emergency first aid asked the victim if he could 
identify who had stabbed him. The victim replied that one of the assailants 
was known to him as `Donald' or `Donavon' and the prosecution sought 
to have this evidence admitted at Donald Andrews' trial for murder. The 
trial judge applied the Ratten test and held that the statement of 
identification was admissible as part of the res gestae, a decision upheld by 
the House of Lords. Lord Ackner, in a speech with which all their 
Lordships agreed, overruled R v. Bedingfield (1879) 14 Cox CC 341 
(Assizes) and laid down fresh guidelines (at pp. 422±3): 
`1. The primary question which the judge must ask himself is ± can the 
possibility of concoction or distortion be disregarded? 2. To answer that 
question the judge must first consider the circumstances in which the 
particular statement was made, in order to satisfy himself that the event 
was so unusual or startling or dramatic as to dominate the thoughts of 
the [declarant], so that his utterance was an instinctive reaction to that 
event, thus giving no real opportunity for reasoned reflection. In such a 
situation the judge would be entitled to conclude that the involvement 
or the pressure of the event would exclude the possibility of concoction 
or distortion, providing that the statement was made in conditions of 
approximate but not exact contemporaneity. 3. In order for the 
statement to be sufficiently `spontaneous' it must be so closely 
associated with the event which has excited the statement that it can 
be fairly stated that the mind of the declarant was still dominated by the 
event . . . The fact that the statement was made in answer to a question 
is but one factor to consider under this heading.' 
Lord Ackner further stated that any other `special features' in the case, 
such as alleged malice on the part of the declarant, had to be taken into 
consideration when deciding whether the possibility of concoction or 
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distortion could be discounted. With regard to the possibility of error, it 
was felt that while the ordinary weaknesses of human recollection went 
merely to weight and not to the admissibility of the statement, where there 
were `special features' giving rise to the possibility of error, such as the 
drunken state or defective eyesight of the declarant, or where the 
declarant's statement of identification was made in circumstances of poor 
visibility, the trial judge would have to consider those features when 
determining whether the possibility of error could be excluded. If the judge 
decided to allow the evidence to be adduced he was still obliged to give the 
jury an appropriate direction on the possibility of concoction, distortion 
or mistake and to point out to them any special features relevant to that 
possibility. 
The approval of the flexible approach adopted in Ratten v. R [1971] 3 
WLR 930 (PC) means that a trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of an 
excited utterance will not be interfered with on appeal so long as he 
properly directed himself and there was material entitling him to reach his 
conclusion. The test is one of reliability, based on the assumption that the 
effect of dramatic circumstances on the mind of a declarant considerably 
reduces the possibility of his having lied or distorted the truth (if not the 
possibility of error). Furthermore, even a fairly lengthy interval between 
the event in question (generally the commission of the offence) and the 
making of the declarant's statement may be an insufficient basis for 
refusing to admit that evidence under the Andrews test. A case in point is R 
v. Carnall [1995] Crim LR 944 where the severely injured victim of a 
violent attack took about an hour to crawl for help before making a 
statement identifying the accused. The Court of Appeal held that his 
statement had been correctly admitted as part of the res gestae (see also R 
v. Gilfoyle [1996] 1 Cr App R 303 (CA), 6.1.1.2 post). 
However, if the possibility of error or concoction cannot be discounted 
the evidence will be inadmissible. In R v. Harris [2002] EWCA Crim 1597, 
for example, it was held that an eight-year-old witness's declaration on the 
telephone to the police should not have been admitted as she had spoken 
to a number of individuals before making her call and might therefore 
have been intentionally or inadvertently influenced by them; and in 
Furbert v. R [2000] 1 WLR 1716 (PC) a declaration by V as to who had 
shot him, made shortly after he was mortally wounded, was inadmissible 
because his location meant that he would not have been able to see his 
assailant. 
It has been noted that an impending emergency, such as the 
circumstances immediately preceding the commission of an offence, may 
be sufficiently dramatic to justify the admission of a statement as part of 
the res gestae. This is clear from the facts of Ratten v. R [1971] 3 WLR 930 
(PC) where the deceased's statement was made possibly several minutes 
before her death, in response to the imminent attempt on her life. But not 
every statement made in the run up to the commission of an offence will be 
admissible as an excited utterance. In R v. Newport [1998] Crim LR 581 
the deceased had made a telephone call to her friend about 20 minutes 
before she was fatally stabbed, and that friend was allowed to give 
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evidence that the deceased had sounded agitated and had asked whether 
she could stay at her house in the event of her having to flee her husband 
(the accused) at short notice. The Court of Appeal held that the deceased's 
statement should not have been admitted as it had not been a spontaneous 
and unconsidered reaction to an impending emergency. 
In Teper v. R [1952] AC 480 the Privy Council felt that a statement 
prompted by the sight of a person leaving the scene of an offence, rather 
than by the offence itself, would not justify its admission, so the accused's 
apparent flight from his burning business was not regarded as the res 
gestae. The Andrews test fails to draw any such distinction, however, and 
there would seem to be no good reason why some other type of sufficiently 
dramatic event should not be regarded as the res gestae, so long as the 
criteria of that test are satisfied. Indeed the Court of Appeal has recently 
suggested (albeit obiter) that being asked to write suicide notes might 
amount to a sufficiently dramatic event to justify the admission of a 
statement made the next day, even though the alleged offence (murder) 
occurred some two months later (R v. Gilfoyle [1996] 1 Cr App R 303 
(CA), 6.1.1.2 post). Conversely, the mere fact that the event is an offence is 
not of itself enough to make it a res gestae event ± it must be a dramatic 
offence. This is exemplified by Tobi v. Nicholas (1987) 86 Cr App R 323 
(DC) where a statement made by the driver of a coach damaged in a traffic 
accident about 20 minutes after the accident was held to be inadmissible 
on the ground that `there is a world of difference between such an 
unfortunately commonplace situation and the thoughts of somebody who 
has been assaulted or stabbed'. In R v. West [1999] All ER (D) 1005 (99/ 
04541/W3) (CA) the circumstances of an assault on the complainant were 
sufficiently dramatic for her `implied assertion' of identification (`Fuck 
off, Adrian!') to be admissible as an excited utterance. 
It was stressed in R v. Andrews [1987] 2 WLR 413 (HL) that if the 
declarant was available as a witness the res gestae doctrine should not be 
used as a device to avoid calling him. However, this does not mean that 
witness unavailability is a precondition for an excited utterance to be 
admissible. According to the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General's 
Reference (No. 1 of 2003) [2003] EWCA Crim 1286, a declaration 
satisfying the Andrews criteria is prima facie admissible, and the 
availability of the declarant is a factor for the judge to take into 
consideration when deciding whether the hearsay statement (tendered by 
the prosecution) should be excluded under s. 78(1) of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984. In that case, V, having made an excited 
utterance at the time of the attack on her, refused to testify against her son, 
the accused, and the prosecution had no choice but to rely on her hearsay 
statements. The Court of Appeal accepted that the prosecution had not 
relied on the res gestae exception as a device to avoid calling their witness, 
so it is to be presumed that in cases where the exception is used as such a 
device the evidence will be ruled inadmissible, particularly as s. 78(1) 
cannot be relied on to exclude res gestae evidence tendered by the accused. 
Finally, although it is often the case that the excited utterance was made 
by the victim or complainant this is by no means a requirement of the 
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Andrews test. In R v. Glover [1991] Crim LR 48 (CA) the assailant himself 
was so excited following his assault on V that his self-identifying boast 
(`I am David Glover . . . we will not think twice of shooting you and your 
kids') was held to be admissible as a statement forming part of the res 
gestae (see also R v. Harris [2002] EWCA Crim 1597, above). 
6.1.1.2 Statements Relating to the Declarant's State of Mind 
An out-of-court statement may be admissible to prove the contempora-
neous state of mind of the declarant: 
`What a person said or heard said may well be the best and most direct 
evidence of that person's state of mind. This principle can only apply, 
however, when the state of mind evidenced by the statement is either 
itself directly in issue at the trial or of direct and immediate relevance to 
an issue which arises at the trial.' (R v. Blastland [1985] 3 WLR 345 
(HL) at p. 351) 
A recent example is provided by R v. Gregson [2003] EWCA Crim 1099, 
where it was held that the accused's friends should have been allowed to 
give evidence of what he had said to them in anxious terms about the large 
number of ecstasy tablets which had inadvertently come into his 
possession, to the effect that he had believed he was buying fewer tablets 
(for his own use) and had wanted to know what to do with the excess. The 
evidence was relevant to the issue whether he had intended to supply them 
as a dealer. In R v. Gilfoyle [1996] 1 Cr App R 303 the central issue was 
whether the deceased had committed suicide or been murdered. She had 
been found hanging and had left a number of suicide notes suggesting that 
she had taken her own life and not been murdered by her husband as the 
prosecution alleged. The Court of Appeal held that statements made by 
the deceased to her friends the day after she had written the suicide notes, 
to the effect that she had been asked to write them by her husband to help 
him with a suicide course at his place of work, could have been admitted 
to show that she had not been in a suicidal frame of mind when writing 
them. The Court was of the view that as the deceased's state of mind had 
been one of the principal issues at the trial such evidence was admissible as 
original evidence (citing Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 
965 (PC), 5.4 ante) or under this res gestae exception, to rebut the 
inference which might otherwise be drawn from her notes. However, it is 
difficult to understand how the deceased's statements could have been 
admitted as original evidence unless the manner in which she made them 
demonstrated a non-suicidal state of mind at that time. The content of a 
statement made by a declarant will have probative value as evidence of his 
own state of mind only if it reflects what the declarant is actually thinking. 
If a person is heard to state that he is cheerful, the content of that 
statement can be evidence of his cheerful frame of mind only if it is 
accepted that he is speaking the truth. This must be contrasted with the 
situation where one person's declaration is heard by another person and 
adduced to prove the latter's state of mind, as in Subramaniam v. Public 
Prosecutor. The truth or falsity of the declaration in such cases is 
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irrelevant and therefore admissible as original evidence. Similarly, a 
statement made by a declarant may be admissible as original evidence to 
prove his state of mind if it is not the content of the statement which is 
being relied on but the way in which it was made (for example, in a 
cheerful or non-suicidal manner). 
Statements falling within this hearsay exception are not admissible to 
prove the cause of the declarant's state of mind, and in R v. Gilfoyle [1996] 
1 Cr App R 303 (CA) it was accepted that the deceased's statements could 
only show that, when writing the suicide notes, she had believed she was 
assisting her husband in a course at work and had not been suicidal. (The 
Court of Appeal did, however, go on to consider whether the statements 
could have been admitted by virtue of the separate Andrews test (6.1.1.1 
ante) as evidence that her husband had asked her to write the notes. It was 
accepted that as her mind had still been dominated by the note-making 
event when making her statements the next day those statements had been 
sufficiently spontaneous to discount the possibility of invention or 
unreliability.) 
It is well established that a statement which is admissible to show the 
declarant's belief about a past or present matter is not admissible to show 
that what was believed was actually true (Thomas v. Connell (1838) 4 M & W 
267 (CEC)). The rule against hearsay excludes `what a stranger to the cause 
has said . . . if it is offered to prove his knowledge of some fact and thus the 
existence of that fact' (Martin v. Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 (HCA) at 
p. 375). This is quite logical. If the exception could be used to prove the 
existence of the matter referred to, the hearsay rule would be otiose. It 
would seem, however, that a declarant's statement that he intended to do a 
certain future act is admissible not only to prove his state of mind (the 
intention itself) but also to prove that the act was actually done by him in 
accordance with his declared intention. In R v. Moghal (1977) 65 Cr App R 
56 the Court of Appeal was of the opinion (albeit obiter) that a tape 
recording by the accused's mistress, in which she had expressed an intention 
to kill the deceased six months before he was murdered, could have been 
admitted at the accused's trial for that murder to support his defence that it 
had been the mistress and not he who had been responsible. This decision 
was doubted by the House of Lords in R v. Blastland [1985] 3 WLR 345 on 
the ground that the mistress's state of mind had not been relevant to the 
issue whether the accused had been involved in the murder, but their 
Lordships did not reject the possibility that a declarant's statement of 
intention could be admissible to prove it was carried out by him if the test of 
relevance was satisfied. In R v. Buckley (1873) 13 Cox CC 293 (Assizes) a 
statement by a police officer to his inspector that he was setting out to 
watch the accused's movements was admitted to prove that he had carried 
out his intention. The officer had been found dead some distance from the 
accused's cottage and the inspector was permitted to give evidence of what 
the officer had said as additional circumstantial evidence supporting the 
prosecution case that the accused had murdered him. Similarly, in R v. Hart 
(1932) 23 Cr App R 202 (CCA) the accused's stated intention to harm a 
prison warder ± `I'll do you for this; I've got a gang outside that will fix you 
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up' ± was admissible to identify him as one of the men who attacked the 
warder a few days later. These decisions accord with the approach taken in 
a number of civil cases. In Sugden v. Lord St Leonards (1876) 1 PD 154 
(CA) it was held that a testator's pre-testamentary declaration of intention 
as to the content of his prospective will was admissible evidence from which 
the content of his missing will could be inferred; and in Lloyd v. Powell 
Duffryn Steam Coal Co [1914] AC 733 the House of Lords held that 
statements by a man to the effect that he would marry the infant plaintiff's 
mother before the child was born were admissible to show his intention to 
marry her, which in turn allowed an inference to be drawn that he would 
have supported the child (see R v. Blastland [1985]  3 WLR  345 (HL)  at pp .  
352±3). Similarly, in Marshall v. Owners of SS Wild Rose [1910] AC 486 
(HL) evidence that the engineer on board a steam trawler had remarked to 
his companion that he intended to go on deck for fresh air was admitted 
without objection to show he had gone on deck. 
That said, there are also a number of criminal cases where statements of 
intention have been ruled inadmissible when tendered to prove the 
intention was carried out. In R v. Wainwright (1875) 13 Cox CC 171 
(CCC) a statement by the deceased that she was going to visit the 
accused's premises was ruled inadmissible on the ground `that it was only 
a statement of intention which might or might not have been carried out'. 
A similar view was taken in the earlier case of R v. Pook (1871) 13 Cox CC 
172n (CCC); and in R v. Thomson [1912] 3 KB 19 (CCA) it was held that a 
statement by the deceased that she intended to perform an abortion on 
herself had been properly excluded at the accused's trial for performing 
that operation on her. 
The admissibility of statements of intention in criminal proceedings was 
considered by the High Court of Australia in Walton v. R (1989) 166 CLR 
283. The prosecution case was that the accused had lured the deceased to 
the town centre of Elizabeth in South Australia and thereafter driven her 
into the country and killed her to claim on an insurance policy in his 
favour. In support of the prosecution case, several witnesses were called to 
testify that the deceased had stated her intention to meet the accused in the 
town centre the following evening, evidence which the Court held had 
been properly admitted as original evidence of her state of mind from 
which an inference could be drawn that she had actually gone to that 
location to meet him. The United States Supreme Court had adopted a 
similar approach in Mutual Life Insurance Co v. Hillmon (1892) 145 US 
285 in holding that letters sent by a man, W, in which he had stated his 
intention to travel with H, were admissible original evidence of that 
intention from which it could be inferred that he had indeed travelled with 
him (see also R v. Smith [1992] 2 SCR 915 (SCC)). 
If statements of intention are generally admissible in England and 
Wales for this purpose (and the weight of authority suggests that they are) 
it should be seen as an application of the present exception to the hearsay 
rule, notwithstanding the commonly stated view that such evidence is 
`original evidence' of a state of mind from which an inference may be 
drawn. As noted above, the statement is adduced for the purpose of 
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proving the intention was honestly held by the declarant. Indeed, it is only 
upon that basis that a circumstantial inference can be drawn that the 
intention was subsequently put into effect. Whether any such inference 
should be drawn depends on whether the declarant was the sort of person 
who carried out his intentions, or whether a valid generalisation can be 
established to the effect that people generally do what they say they intend 
to do and that the declarant was one such person. Presumably the trial 
judge would have to direct the jury on all the relevant circumstances of the 
case, such as any evidence that the declarant had made statements of 
intention in the past and acted upon them (or not acted upon them as the 
case may be), the interval between the statement of intention and the 
incident, and the nature of the act intended. 
A statement of intention may also be admissible to prove that the 
accused still had that state of mind when he committed a particular act on 
a subsequent occasion. The probative value of any such statement depends 
on the time interval between the statement and the act, that is, on the 
strength of the presumption of continuance (15.5.1 post). Such a statement 
of intention was admissible in R v. Valentine [1996] 2 Cr App R 213, a rape 
case in which the accused was alleged to have said to the persons giving 
him a lift into town, `I am going to get a ride tonight one way or the other.' 
He had sexual intercourse with a woman in the middle of a playing field 
later that night and was charged with her rape, his defence being that she 
had consented. The Court of Appeal held that the accused's statement of 
intention was admissible as it was relevant to whether he had had the mens 
rea for the offence when intercourse took place some hours later. 
The presumption of continuance explains why statements relating to the 
declarant's state of mind (or indeed physical sensation, 6.1.1.3 post) need 
not be exactly contemporaneous with the mental (or physical) state which 
is in issue. In R v. Gilfoyle [1996] 1 Cr App R 303 (CA) the deceased's 
statements to her friends were made some time after the suicide notes had 
been written, but logically a person who is not suicidal on one day is 
unlikely to have been suicidal on the previous day (although the converse 
may not be true). The strength of the presumption of continuance is a 
question of fact dependent on the type of state of mind (or physical 
condition) in issue and the interval between the time of its (purported) 
existence and the time when the statement was made. 
Finally, it should be noted that this res gestae exception provides an 
explanation for the admissibility of the statement in R v. Ward [2001] 
Crim LR 316 (5.8 ante) which does not depend on the circular reasoning 
relied on by the Court of Appeal. If a person identifies himself with 
reference to a person's name and personal details (such as his address and 
date of birth) that statement of identification would be admissible to show 
an awareness on the part of the declarant (X) that the person bearing that 
name (Y) has such details. This would then allow a circumstantial 
inference to be drawn that X and Y are the same person, the strength of 
which inference would depend on the nature of the personal details 
known. The more X knows about the personal details of Y the more likely 
it is that X and Y are the same person, particularly if those details are 
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unlikely to be known by anyone other than Y. Accordingly, X's 
knowledge of Y's name, address and date of birth would place X in the 
small class of individuals (including Y) who are aware of those details and 
this would be some evidence that X is Y. One might expect several other 
individuals of the same sex to know those details, however, and that 
knowledge would therefore be insufficiently peculiar to justify the 
inference of self-identification unless supported by some other evidence. 
If, however, X were to state facts such as Y's blood group and mother's 
maiden name, demonstrating a unique awareness of Y's personal details, it 
would be possible to assume that the class of individuals into which X and 
Y fall comprises no more than one person, and that X is indeed Y. 
6.1.1.3 Statements Relating to the Declarant's Physical Sensations 
Just as a declarant's statement may be the best, indeed only, evidence of 
his state of mind, such evidence is admissible to prove his contempora-
neous physical sensations, although it is not admissible to prove how he 
came to be in that condition. Thus, in Gilbey v. Great Western Railway Co 
(1910) 102 LT 202 (CA) the deceased's statement to the effect that he was 
in pain due to an injury caused while carrying a side of beef as a porter was 
admissible to prove his painful condition, but not for the purpose of 
showing it had been caused by an accident in the course of his 
employment. Other examples are provided by R v. Conde (1868) 10 Cox 
CC 547 (CCC), where evidence that a deceased boy had complained of 
hunger and begged for bread was admissible for the purpose of proving his 
state of health, and Aveson v. Lord Kinnaird (1805) 6 East 188 (KB) where 
a woman's declaration about the poor state of her health both then and a 
few days earlier in Manchester was admissible to prove that she had been 
ill on that earlier occasion. (See also R v. Nicholas (1846) 2 C & K 246 
(Assizes) and R v. Gloster (1888) 16 Cox CC 471 (CCC) at p. 473.) 
The decision in Aveson v. Lord Kinnaird (1805) 6 East 188 (KB) was 
relied on in Tickle v. Tickle [1968] 1 WLR 937 where the Divisional Court 
held that what a psychiatrist had told a patient about the latter's state of 
health was admissible to prove what the patient himself had believed 
about his mental health. This had been relevant to whether the patient had 
intended to bring cohabitation with his wife permanently to an end and 
was therefore admissible even though the patient was not the declarant. It 
should be noted, however, that because it was the patient's belief rather 
than his actual physical condition which was relevant, the psychiatrist's 
statement could have been admitted as original evidence (5.4 ante). 
6.1.1.4 Statements Relating to the Declarant's Performance of a 
Relevant Act 
A statement made by the declarant while performing a relevant act is 
admissible to explain the act and his reason for so acting. The justification 
appears to be that many acts would be inexplicable or erroneously 
interpreted in the absence of an explanation by the person performing it, 
and the requisite degree of contemporaneity between the statement and 
the act affords some protection against unreliability. Thus, in R v. 
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Edwards (1872) 12 Cox CC 230 (Assizes), where the accused faced a charge 
of having murdered his wife, evidence was admitted that the deceased had 
left a carving knife and an axe with her neighbour a week before her death, 
stating that as her husband was always threatening her with those 
implements she would feel safer if they were out of the way. In R v. 
Wainwright (1875) 13 Cox CC 171 (CCC) (6.1.1.2 ante) it was submitted 
by the prosecution that the declarant's statement upon leaving her house 
that she intended to go to the accused's premises was admissible as a 
statement explaining her act of departure. Lord Cockburn CJ refused to 
accept this argument on the ground that it had been an incidental remark 
and no part of the act of leaving. (Cf. Thomas v. Connell (1838) 4 M & W 
267 (CEC) where Parke B was of the opinion that a statement explaining a 
person's absence from home was admissible if made just before or during 
his act of departure. If this is correct it provides an alternative explanation 
for Marshall v. Owners of SS Wild Rose [1910] AC 486 (HL), 6.1.1.2 ante.) 
This exception has recently been applied by the Court of Appeal to 
justify the admission of a statement of identification made by a witness at 
an identification parade (R v. McCay [1990] 1 WLR 645). At the parade 
the witness had identified the accused by saying, `It is number 8' but could 
not remember that number at the time of the trial. The trial judge allowed 
a police officer to give evidence of what the witness had said at the parade, 
a ruling which was upheld on appeal on the ground that it had been a 
statement by the witness `explaining his physical and intellectual activity in 
making the identification at the material time'. 
Other common-law jurisdictions have relied on this res gestae exception 
to justify the admission of bets placed by telephone for the purpose of 
proving illegal gambling (for example, Davidson v. Quirke [1923] NZLR 
552 (NZSC) and Lenthall v. Mitchell [1933] SASR 231 (SASC)). In Ratten 
v. R [1971] 3 WLR 930 (5.6.1.1 ante) the Privy Council preferred to 
interpret this ground of admissibility in terms of original evidence (see also 
McGregor v. Stokes [1952] VLR 347 (VSC)). 
6.1.1.5 The Relationship Between the Res Gestae Exceptions 
While excited utterances are admissible because of the reduced possibility 
of fabrication by the declarant, the other res gestae exceptions are 
primarily based on necessity, although the common requirement of 
approximate contemporaneity does act to reduce the possibility of 
fabrication and/or error to some extent. In R v. Callender [1998] Crim 
LR 337, however, the Court of Appeal felt that the test for excited 
utterances (6.1.1.1 ante) governs the admissibility of any evidence tendered 
pursuant to one of the res gestae exceptions. This novel attempt to 
reconcile the different grounds of admissibility cannot be regarded as a 
correct statement of the law, although it is perhaps an unsurprising 
development given the trial judge's duty to ensure that the adduction of 
hearsay evidence by the prosecution does not contravene Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (as to which, see 6.2.5 post). The 
decision in R v. Callender should therefore be interpreted to mean nothing 
more than that the judge should take into consideration the question of 
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mistake and (in particular) fabrication when deciding whether to allow 
hearsay evidence to be admitted under one of the res gestae exceptions. 
6.1.1.6 The Future of the Res Gestae Exceptions 
The Law Commission has recommended that the four res gestae 
exceptions be codified to cover the following: (a) any statement made by 
a person so emotionally overpowered by an event that the possibility of 
concoction or distortion can be disregarded; (b) any statement accom-
panying an act which can be properly evaluated as evidence only if 
considered in conjunction with that statement; and (c) any statement 
relating to a physical sensation or a mental state (see Law Com No. 245 
(1997) at pp. 123±8). 
6.1.2 Statements Made by Persons now Deceased 
Several exceptions to the hearsay rule have been recognised to ensure that 
the knowledge possessed by persons who have died prior to the trial 
should not be lost, but this is not the sole criterion of admissibility. The 
exceptions are circumscribed by further considerations which have 
traditionally been seen as a guarantee against insincerity on the part of 
the declarant. The upshot is that the mere fact the declarant has died is 
insufficient to justify the admission of his statement at common law, 
although by virtue of s. 23 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (6.2.1 post) the 
fact of death may be enough for the evidence to be admitted if his 
statement was made in a document. Moreover, it is only death which 
justifies the admission of the declarant's hearsay statement at common 
law. If the declarant is unavailable for any other reason, or no longer able 
to testify on the ground of his poor physical or mental health, his 
statement is inadmissible (cf. s. 23 of the 1988 Act). 
6.1.2.1 Dying Declarations 
If the accused has been charged with the murder or manslaughter of the 
declarant, the declarant's oral or written statement as to the cause of his 
death is admissible to prove those circumstances, so long as he had a 
settled hopeless expectation that he would die within a short time when his 
statement was made (R v. Perry [1909] 2 KB 697 (CCA), R v. Austin 
(1912) 8 Cr App R 27 (CCA)). However, a dying declaration which is 
incomplete is inadmissible on the ground that it is impossible to tell what 
the declarant would have added to his statement. In Waugh v. R [1950] AC 
203 (PC) the deceased started to make a statement but slipped into a coma 
(from which he never recovered) just as he was about to explain why the 
accused bore him a grudge. It was held that the statement ought not to 
have been admitted. If a dying declaration is admitted it is incumbent 
upon the judge to remind the jury that it has not been tested by cross-
examination and that it ought to be scrutinised with care, but there is no 
requirement that the jury should be directed that it would be dangerous 
for them to convict on that evidence alone (Nembhard v. R [1981] 1 WLR 
1515 (PC)). 
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A recent example is provided by the case of R v. Lawson [1998] Crim 
LR 883. The deceased had been found badly burnt and unconscious at the 
scene of a fire following an argument with her husband, the accused. On 
the way to hospital she began to regain consciousness and said, `You have 
really got me now.' At the hospital she managed to dislodge her oxygen 
mask to say `Murder, murder!' She died the next afternoon. The Court of 
Appeal held that her words were prima facie admissible as dying 
declarations, subject to the judge's inherent discretion to exclude the 
evidence if it was so unreliable or ambiguous that it would be unfair to 
invite the jury to consider it. (It was noted that the words were also 
admissible under the `excited utterance' res gestae exception.) 
In addition to the necessity of admitting dying declarations to ensure 
justice is done, the rationale underlying this exception has traditionally 
been based on the assumption that a person is highly unlikely to lie about 
the cause of his death once he has realised that his involvement in worldly 
affairs is soon to end (R v. Woodcock (1789) 1 Leach 500 (CCC)). It is for 
this reason that the law requires a settled hopeless expectation of death 
within a short time. However, although it has been said that the 
declarant's sincerity can be assumed from his realisation that he would 
soon be in the `presence of his Maker' (R v. Osman (1881) 15 Cox CC 1 
(Assizes)) it is no longer necessary to prove that the declarant had any 
particular religious belief for his declaration to be admissible; indeed in 
Mills v. R [1995] 1 WLR 511 the Privy Council expressly rejected the 
rationale based on religious belief. Despite this trend it may still be the law 
that if the declarant could not possibly have been able to understand the 
meaning of death on account of his tender years or mental condition his 
statement will be inadmissible. In R v. Pike (1829) 3 C & P 598 (Assizes) a 
four-year-old girl's dying declaration was ruled inadmissible on this 
ground. 
It is the declarant's belief at the time his statement was made which is 
relevant, so if he believed he would die from his injuries, and subsequently 
regained hope of recovery before dying, his declaration will still be 
admissible (R v. Austin (1912) 8 Cr App R 27 (CCA)). Indeed, dying 
declarations have been admitted even though the declarants died some 
considerable time after making their statements; in R v. Bernadotti (1869) 
11 Cox CC 316 (Assizes) the intervening period between the declaration 
(`Be quick, or I shall die') and death was nearly three weeks. Conversely, if 
there was some hope of survival at the time the statement was made it will 
be inadmissible. In R v. Jenkins (1869) LR1 CCR 187 (CCCR) the 
deceased had the original words `with no hope of my recovery' in her 
written statement amended to read `with no hope at present of my 
recovery.' This indication of some slight hope rendered her statement 
inadmissible (see also R v. Gloster (1888) 16 Cox CC 471 (CCC)). 
Evidence of what the declarant was told at the time by the persons 
around him, or what he himself said, is admissible to show his state of mind 
on the ground that it is either original evidence or hearsay forming part of 
the res gestae, but in the absence of such evidence appropriate inferences 
will need to be drawn from the circumstances to prove the declarant's state 
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of mind. In R v. Woodcock (1789) 1 Leach 500 (CCC) the deceased's 
statement was left to the jury even though the only evidence of her belief 
that she was soon to die was the inference which could be drawn from her 
awareness of the severity of her wounds. However, other cases suggest a 
reluctance to draw such an inference. In R v. Bedingfield (1879) 14 Cox CC 
341 (Assizes), for instance, the judge refused to admit the deceased's 
statement as a dying declaration even though her throat had been severely 
cut and she died just 10 minutes later (see also R v. Cleary (1862) 2 F & F 
850 (Assizes) and R v. Morgan (1875) 14 Cox CC 337 (Assizes)). 
The dying declaration exception is of limited use in practice. It allows a 
deceased's statement to be admitted at the trial for his murder or 
manslaughter only if he believed that he was soon to die and if the 
statement relates to the circumstances of his death. Thus, if a dying 
declaration relates to the commission of another offence against the 
declarant, or to the murder or manslaughter of another person, it is 
inadmissible despite the assumed sincerity of the declarant at that time. 
Moreover, the rule is based entirely on the supposed sincerity of those who 
believe in divine retribution. The rule prevents the admission of a 
declarant's statement, no matter how probative it is of the accused's guilt 
(or innocence), unless the declarant was completely convinced he would 
soon die; and the very real possibility of the declarant's being mistaken or 
confused is disregarded for the purposes of determining admissibility. In 
Mills v. R [1995] 1 WLR 511 the Privy Council favoured a more flexible 
test, based on probative value, so that other statements made by deceased 
persons could be admitted. 
6.1.2.2 Statements Against the Declarant's Pecuniary or Proprietary 
Interest 
An oral or written statement by a person now deceased which was, at the 
time he made it and to his personal knowledge, against his pecuniary or 
proprietary interest is admissible to prove the truth of the facts stated, the 
reason being that a person can be presumed not to make such an adverse 
statement unless it is true (R v. Rogers [1995] 1 Cr App R 374 (CA)). Thus, 
an acknowledgement by the deceased of a debt owed by him to another 
person would be admissible to prove the fact of that debt. The exception 
also applies to any incidental fact mentioned in the statement against 
interest so long as the fact was within the declarant's personal knowledge 
and explains the nature of the transaction in question. Thus, in Higham v. 
Ridgway (1808) 10 East 109 (KB) the statement of a deceased male 
midwife, recording that he had been paid for delivering a child on a certain 
date, was admissible to prove the child's date of birth. 
In R v. Rogers [1995] 1 Cr App R 374 the accused sought to adduce a 
statement by a deceased third party, L, to the effect that he was being 
pursued for money relating to heroin the police had found. It was argued 
that this statement had been against L's pecuniary interest and that the 
incidental facts he had mentioned, namely that the accused had been 
unaware of the heroin store or the presence of a gun, were admissible to 
show the accused had not been in possession of heroin with intent to 
184 Evidence 
supply or possession of a firearm as alleged. The judge's ruling that the 
evidence was inadmissible was upheld by the Court of Appeal on two 
grounds. First, L's statement that he was being pursued for money had not 
amounted to an acknowledgement of a debt owed by him, so it had not 
been a statement against his pecuniary interest. Secondly, even if L's 
statement had been against his pecuniary interest the incidental facts were 
not necessary to explain the nature of the transaction to which they 
related. The Court also reaffirmed that the fact an obligation to pay a sum 
of money is not legally enforceable, for example because it relates to an 
illegal drugs transaction, will not prevent a declaration in respect of that 
obligation from being admissible (see also Coward v. Motor Insurers' 
Bureau [1962] 2 WLR 663 (CA)). 
In the Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl & F 85 the House of Lords held 
that the exception does not extend to a statement against the declarant's 
penal interest, a somewhat anomalous proviso given that criminal liability 
may bring with it a financial penalty such as a fine, a compensation order 
or an order for costs. An important practical consequence of this decision 
is that a deceased third party's confession to the offence the accused is 
charged with is not admissible at common law to establish the accused's 
innocence (5.3 ante). The United States and Canada have departed from 
the English approach and now accept that statements against penal 
interest fall within the scope of this common-law exception to the hearsay 
rule, at least in relation to third-party confessions tendered by the accused. 
In Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 US 284 the US Supreme Court held 
that such evidence is admissible if the surrounding circumstances provide 
`considerable assurances of [its] reliability' (regardless of whether the 
declarant is dead). In R v. O'Brien [1978] 1 SCR 591 the Supreme Court of 
Canada extended the common-law exception to third-party confessions so 
long as the declarant was aware that his self-incriminating statement might 
well be used against him; but the exception cannot be relied on by the 
prosecution to incriminate the accused (R v. Lucier [1982] 1 SCR 28 
(SCC)). In Bannon v. R (1995) 185 CLR 1 the High Court of Australia 
considered the possibility of including statements against penal interest 
within the scope of this common-law exception but left the question open. 
A third party's confession in documentary form may now be admissible in 
England and Wales by virtue of ss. 23 and/or 24 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988 (6.2.1±2 post; cf. s. 65(2)(d) of the Australian Evidence Act 1995 
and r. 804(b)(3) of the US Federal Rules of Evidence). 
6.1.2.3 Statements Made During the Course of a Duty 
An oral or written statement of fact by a person now deceased while acting 
under a duty to another to record or report his performance of an act is 
admissible at common law to prove the truth of the part of the statement 
which it was his duty to make. This exception to the hearsay rule may be 
justified on the ground that a person acting under a duty is likely to record 
or report his own acts accurately and truthfully and because of the 
necessity of admitting such evidence (R v. McGuire (1985) 81 Cr App R 
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323 (CA)). Given that such records are usually made in documentary form 
and may now be admissible in criminal proceedings by virtue of ss. 23 
and/or 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (6.2.1±2 post) this exception is 
no longer of much practical importance. 
Before hearsay evidence can be admitted under this exception it must be 
proved not only that the declarant is dead and that he was acting under a 
duty but also that the statement was made approximately contempor-
aneously with the act in question and that it deals with the declarant's own 
acts. Further, a statement of this sort will be inadmissible if it can be 
proved that the declarant had a motive to misrepresent the facts stated. In 
The Henry Coxon (1878) 3 PD 156 (PD) a written record in a ship's log of 
the circumstances of a collision with another vessel was held to be 
inadmissible on three grounds. First, the record had not been made 
sufficiently contemporaneously with the collision as there had been a two-
day delay; second, it was impossible to disentangle the parts of the entry 
relating to what had been done by the vessel on board which the log had 
been kept from entries relating to the acts of third parties on board the 
other vessel; and third, the ship's mate had had a motive to misrepresent 
the facts so as to cast the blame for the collision on the bad navigation of 
the other vessel. 
Unlike the exception governing the admissibility of statements against 
interest (6.1.2.2 ante), the present exception does not render admissible 
incidental facts mentioned in the statement which the declarant was under 
no duty to record (Chambers v. Bernasconi (1834) 3 LJ Ex 373 (CEC)). 
6.1.2.4 Statements as to Pedigree 
The oral or written statement of a relative now deceased regarding a 
matter of family pedigree (such as consanguinity or affinity) is admissible 
to prove the truth of the facts stated, so long as the statement was made 
before any dispute about the matter arose and the deceased was either a 
blood relative of the family or married to a person so related. It does not 
matter whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the matter stated 
(in other words, multiple hearsay evidence of family tradition or 
reputation suffices). This exception, which can be justified on the grounds 
of necessity and presumed sincerity, has been preserved for civil 
proceedings by s. 7(3)(b) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. 
6.1.2.5 Statements as to Public or General Rights 
The oral or written statement of a person now deceased regarding the 
reputed existence of an ancient right relating to the entire population (a 
public right) or to a particular section of the population (a general right) is 
admissible to prove the existence of that right so long as the statement was 
made before any dispute about it arose and, in the case of general rights, 
the deceased had sufficient knowledge to speak competently about the 
matter. This exception (which has been preserved for civil proceedings by 
s. 7(3)(b) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995) can be justified on the ground of 
necessity and the likelihood that such statements are true, having been 
discussed in public and not contradicted. 
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6.1.2.6 Witnesses who Die Before the Accused's Retrial 
If a witness who gave evidence at the accused's trial is unable to attend the 
retrial on account of his death the transcript of his testimony is admissible 
at common law to prove the truth of the matters stated therein (R v. Hall 
[1972] 3 WLR 974 (CA)). The exception has also been held to apply to 
witnesses who are unable to attend because of illness or incapacity to be 
called (R v. Thompson [1982] 2 WLR 603 (CA)). Such statements are now 
also admissible by virtue of ss. 23 or 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
(R v. Lockley [1995] 2 Cr App R 554 (CA)) or Schedule 2 to the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1968. 
6.1.3 Statements Made by Parties to a Common Enterprise 
A statement made by one party to a common enterprise (such as a 
criminal conspiracy) is admissible at common law against any other party 
to the enterprise so long as it was made in the course or furtherance of the 
enterprise and there is independent evidence of both the enterprise and the 
other party's involvement in it (R v. Murray [1997] 2 Cr App R 136 (CA) 
at pp. 147±9; R v. Smart [2002] EWCA Crim 772, R v. Williams [2002] 
EWCA Crim 2208). Thus in R v. Jones [1997] 2 Cr App R 119 (CA) it was 
held that a recording of telephone conversations between parties to a 
common enterprise to import cannabis and third parties, during which the 
involvement of B (a co-accused) had been mentioned, was admissible 
evidence of B's guilt. Until recently it was necessary to prove that the 
statement had been made in the course and furtherance of the enterprise, 
but the trend has been to admit statements which merely record the 
progress of the enterprise without actually furthering it (as, for example, in 
R v. Ilyas [1996] Crim LR 810 (CA) where a record of the receipt of stolen 
car parts was held to be admissible under this exception). 
6.1.4 Statements in Public Documents 
A document prepared by a public official acting pursuant to a legal duty 
to prepare and keep the same as a record or register for the public to use 
and refer to is admissible at common law to prove the truth of its contents 
(Sturla v. Freccia (1880) 5 App Cas 623 (HL) at p. 643), save that if the 
official did not himself have personal knowledge of the information 
recorded (or did not inquire into the accuracy of the information pursuant 
to a legal duty to satisfy himself of its truth) the person providing it must 
have had such knowledge and been acting under a legal duty to provide it 
(R v. Halpin [1975] 3 WLR 260 (CA)). This exception is now of limited 
importance in criminal proceedings on account of s. 24 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 (6.2.2 post). Section 7(2)(b) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 
preserves the common-law exception for civil proceedings (with s. 7(2)(c) 
preserving the exception governing the admissibility of documents such as 
treaties and court records). 
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6.1.5 Works of Reference 
Published works of reference dealing with matters of a public nature (such 
as maps, dictionaries and scientific reports) are admissible at common law 
to prove the facts stated therein. This exception has been preserved for 
civil proceedings by s. 7(2)(a) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. 
6.1.6 Evidence of Reputation 
In criminal proceedings the accused's good or bad character may be 
proved by his general reputation amongst those who know him in his 
community (R v. Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520 (CCCR)). Thus, a witness 
may give evidence that the accused has a good or bad character based on 
what he has heard said by persons to whom the accused is known. This is, 
in effect, an extension of the res gestae exception relating to the state of 
mind of the declarant. The witness has heard the accused's neighbours or 
colleagues express a view on the accused's character, the inference being 
that that their views have been expressed sincerely and reflect their true 
opinion of him. If those views tally, the witness is permitted to relay to the 
court the nature of that collective belief as evidence that the accused is 
good or bad (as the case may be). 
Evidence of reputation is also admissible in civil and criminal 
proceedings to prove a witness's dishonesty and, where such evidence 
has been adduced, to re-establish his status as an honest witness (16.5.4.3 
post). Section 7(3)(a) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 provides that the 
common-law rule which permits evidence of reputation to be adduced to 
prove good or bad character is preserved for civil proceedings. 
6.2	 Statutory Exceptions (and Supplementary Provisions) 
in Criminal Proceedings 
While most of the common-law exceptions apply to any type of hearsay 
statement tendered in criminal proceedings, whether made orally or in a 
document or by way of a gesture, the statutory exceptions, justified on the 
grounds of necessity and reliability, apply only to statements in 
documentary form. The principal statutory exceptions are found in ss. 23 
and 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, but even if the conditions of 
admissibility set out in either or both of these sections have been satisfied 
the judge may still exclude the evidence under ss. 25 or 26 if its admission 
would not be in the interests of justice. If the party tendering the evidence 
manages to overcome these hurdles the opposing party is still entitled to 
attack the credibility of the absent witness by virtue of provisions contained 
in Schedule 2 to the Act. Section 28(1)(a) of the Act provides that no other 
hearsay exceptions are prejudiced by ss. 23 to 26, so it will often be the case 
that documentary hearsay is admissible under more than one exception. 
Section 27 of the 1988 Act provides that a statement contained in a 
document which is admissible in criminal proceedings may be proved by 
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the production of an authenticated copy of that document. Paragraph 5 of 
Schedule 2 to the Act gives definitions of some of the key words used in 
ss. 23 to 27: a document is `anything in which information of any 
description is recorded'; a statement is `any representation of fact, however 
made'; and a copy is `anything onto which information recorded in the 
document has been copied, by whatever means and whether directly or 
indirectly'. So, for example, an oral statement recorded by the maker on to 
an audio tape would be a statement in a document; and, for the purposes of 
s. 27, an authenticated transcript of that recording would be a copy. 
6.2.1 Section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
Section 23(1) provides that `a statement made by a person in a document 
shall be admissible in criminal proceedings as evidence of any fact of 
which direct oral evidence by him would be admissible' if: `the person who 
made the statement' is dead or by reason of his bodily or mental condition 
unfit to attend as a witness (s. 23(2)(a)); or he is outside the United 
Kingdom and it is not reasonably practicable to secure his attendance 
(s. 23(2)(b)); or all reasonable steps have been taken to find him but he 
cannot be found (s. 23(2)(c)); or the statement was made to a police officer 
or some other person charged with the duty of investigating offences or 
charging offenders and the person who made the statement does not give 
oral evidence `through fear or because he is kept out of the way' (s. 23(3)). 
The party tendering a statement under s. 23 must prove with admissible 
evidence one of the four reasons for the unavailability of its maker. The 
standard of proof depends on whether it is the defence or prosecution who 
wish to adduce the evidence (R v. Mattey [1995] 2 Cr App R 409 (CA), R 
v. Medway (1999) unreported (98/7579/Y3) (CA)). As a general rule, the 
defence are entitled to cross-examine the witnesses called by the 
prosecution to establish the reason relied on (R v. Wood [1998] Crim 
LR 213 (CA), R v. Elliott [2003] EWCA Crim 1695). 
Section 23 allows a hearsay statement to be admitted only if the person 
who made it (`the maker') would have been able to give oral evidence of 
the facts stated. There are two points to note about this restriction. First, 
according to the Court of Appeal in R v. D [2002] 3 WLR 997, it is 
doubtful whether this means that a preliminary ruling must be made on 
whether the maker of the statement would actually be competent to give 
oral evidence. The question whether the requirements of s. 53(3) of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (16.3.3 post) are satisfied 
should be a matter for the judge to consider at the stage when he decides 
whether to exclude the evidence under ss. 25 or 26 of the Act. Second, 
although, as a general rule, only first-hand documentary hearsay is 
admissible under this section (that is, statements containing facts which 
the maker himself directly perceived), if the maker directly perceived 
another person's out-of-court statement of fact admissible at common 
law, and included it in his documentary statement, his evidence should still 
be admissible. If, for example, M opened his front door to find V bleeding 
to death from severe wounds and V stated that he had just been stabbed 
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by D, M would be able to give oral evidence of V's identifying statement 
under the `excited utterance' res gestae exception (6.1.1.1 ante). If M later 
records what V told him in a document but M himself is subsequently 
unable to give oral evidence for one of the four s. 23 reasons, his written 
statement, including V's statement, should still be admissible even though 
M did not personally see V being stabbed by D. This interpretation of s. 23 
is supported by the decision in R v. Lockley [1995] 2 Cr App R 554 (CA) 
where it was felt that a documentary hearsay statement made by an absent 
witness, to the effect that one of the accused had made an oral confession 
to her, was prima facie admissible under s. 23 to prove the truth of the 
confession. 
To be admissible the statement must have been `made by a person in a 
document'. Thus, the maker's own written statement, or one dictated and 
verified by him, or a statement which he knowingly allows to be recorded 
on audio tape (or by a court stenographer) or one which he types up on a 
computer will all fall within the scope of this expression. In R v. 
McGillivray (1992) 97 Cr App R 232 the victim of an attack had been set 
on fire and was therefore unable to write because of the severity of his 
burns, but he was able to dictate a statement to a police officer who wrote 
it down and read it back to him in the presence of a nurse. The victim 
could not sign his name but he was able to say that the statement had been 
correctly recorded. The Court of Appeal held the statement to be 
admissible under s. 23 (following the victim's death) as his oral verification 
of its content meant it had been made by him in a document even though 
he had not signed it. 
A statement other than one `made by a person in a document' is not 
admissible under s. 23. In Re D (a Minor) [1986] 2 FLR 189 (FD), a case 
on Part I of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 (which has now been repealed), it 
was held that the notes taken by a solicitor during an interview with the 
deceased did not amount to a statement made by the deceased as she had 
not verified or even seen what the solicitor had written. In Ventouris v. 
Mountain (No. 2) [1992] 1 WLR 887 (CA), another case on Part I of the 
Civil Evidence Act 1968, it was held that a surreptitiously made audio 
recording of an oral statement was not a statement made in a document as 
the maker had not intended his conversation to be recorded. Furthermore, 
a statement cannot be admitted under s. 23 if it is so ambiguous that it is 
impossible to determine whether the maker, if available, would have been 
able to give oral evidence of the matters stated, that is, it is unclear 
whether or not the maker was referring to matters which he had directly 
perceived (R v. JP [1999] Crim LR 401 (CA)). 
The first ground for admitting hearsay evidence under this provision 
(s. 23(2)(a)) is self-explanatory, covering not only persons who are 
physically unable to get to court but also those who would not have the 
capacity to give evidence in accordance with their earlier statement (R v. 
Setz-Dempsey (1993) 98 Cr App R 23 (CA)). The second ground 
(s. 23(2)(b)) requires proof that it is not reasonably practicable to secure 
the attendance of the maker, the question of reasonableness being governed 
by a cost-benefit analysis. In R v. Castillo [1996] 1 Cr App R 438 the Court 
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of Appeal set out certain considerations for the judge to take into account: 
(i) the importance of the maker's evidence, (ii) the expense and 
inconvenience involved in securing his attendance from overseas and (iii) 
the reasons put forward to explain why it was not reasonably practicable 
for him to attend. With regard to the third point, the judge should consider 
the extent to which the party tendering the statement has actually taken 
steps to secure the maker's attendance (R v. Bray (1988) 88 Cr App R 354 
(CA)). Although it must be proved that it was not reasonably practicable 
to secure the maker's attendance, there is no bar to the use of another 
person's admissible hearsay statement for this purpose. In R v. Castillo the 
prosecution wished to adduce the written statement of a travel agent, M, 
based in Venezuela. To do this a British customs officer gave oral evidence 
on the voir dire that it was not reasonably practicable to secure the 
attendance of a customs liaison officer, T, also based in Venezuela. T's 
written statement explaining why it was not reasonably practicable to 
secure the attendance of M was therefore admitted under s. 23 for the 
purpose of having M's statement admitted under the same provision. The 
third ground (s. 23(2)(c)) also includes a criterion of reasonableness, in 
respect of which it has been held that the importance of the witness and the 
resources of the police are relevant factors, but the seriousness of the 
offence is not (R v. Coughlan (1999) unreported (98/05345/Y3) (CA)). 
The fourth ground (s. 23(3)) actually comprises two alternative 
grounds, although in each case the statement must be one which was 
made to a police officer or similar such person. A witness's statement may 
be admitted on the ground of `fear' or because `he is kept out of the way', 
but neither ground is qualified by a requirement of reasonableness or any 
causal link with the offence charged or its consequences. In R v. Martin 
[1996] Crim LR 589 the Court of Appeal stated that s. 23(3) had been 
introduced to combat the problem of witness intimidation and held that 
there was no reason why its words should be qualified in any way. 
Protection for the accused is provided by the leave requirement of s. 26 
(6.2.3 post). The obligation to comply with Article 6(1) and 6(3)(d) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights militates against allowing 
witnesses to avoid cross-examination simply on the basis of `fear', at 
least in cases where the witness has not been intimidated; and it may be 
that a pre-trial procedure which would allow the defence to put questions 
to the witness will need to be established if the requirements of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence are to be complied with in cases where s. 23(3) is 
relied on (see 6.2.5 post). In R v. H [2001] Crim LR 815 (CA) it was said 
that when considering the admissibility of evidence under s. 23(3) there 
should be evidence before the court to prove the witness's fear at the time 
of the trial, an explanation (preferably from the witness himself) as to his 
reason for being afraid, and an explanation of the steps taken to persuade 
him to attend or to alleviate his fears (for example by an offer of screens at 
court). The last two factors are not relevant to s. 23(3) itself but will be 
taken into account when s. 26 is considered. 
The common-law res gestae exception which allows the maker's oral or 
written statement as to his contemporaneous state of mind to be admitted 
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for the purpose of proving the truth of the matters stated can be relied on 
to satisfy the `fear' requirement imposed by s. 23(3) (see 6.1.1.2 ante). 
Thus if a police officer hears from the maker and other officers that the 
maker is too frightened to testify, that officer may give evidence of what he 
was told by the maker himself but not what he was told by those other 
officers (R v. Wood [1998] Crim LR 213 (CA)). Alternatively, the maker 
may explain his state of mind in a written statement which can be put 
before the court (R v. Fairfax [1995] Crim LR 949 (CA)); or he may attend 
court to explain his fear to the judge or magistrates in person, in which 
case he need not be sworn (R v. Greer [1998] Crim LR 572 (CA)). In R v. 
H [2001] Crim LR 815 the Court of Appeal suggested that, where possible, 
the witness should provide an explanation for his fear in person or by 
video link or tape recording. 
Section 23 may also be relied on where the maker has attended court to 
give oral evidence, been sworn and started to testify, so long as his refusal 
to give the additional evidence expected of him (or his claim to have 
`forgotten' it) is due to fear (R v. Ashford Justices ex parte Hilden [1993] 2 
WLR 529 (DC), R v. Waters (1997) 161 JP 249 (CA)). The fact of the 
maker's fear can be established from his testimony, or by an inference 
drawn from his demeanour in the witness box (as in R v. Ashford Justices 
ex parte Hilden), or by the adduction of earlier statements made by him 
regarding his state of his mind. 
The Law Commission has recommended a wider statutory exception 
based on the unavailability of the maker which would also allow oral 
hearsay to be admitted, so long as the maker could be identified and he 
would have been competent to give oral evidence at the time the statement 
was made. The grounds of unavailability match those in s. 23, save that 
the leave of the court would be required if the reason relied on was that of 
fear; and the `kept out of the way' exception would be abolished (see Law 
Com No. 245 (1997) at pp. 94±112). 
6.2.2 Section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
Section 24(1) provides that a statement in a document shall be admissible 
in criminal proceedings as evidence of any fact of which direct oral 
evidence would be admissible if: (i) the document was created or received 
by a person in the course of a trade, business, profession or other 
occupation or as the holder of a paid or unpaid office; and (ii) the 
information contained in the document was supplied by a person (whether 
or not the maker of the statement) who had, or who may reasonably be 
supposed to have had, personal knowledge of the matters dealt with. 
It does not matter whether the information contained in the document 
was supplied directly or indirectly through intermediaries, save that if 
it was supplied indirectly each person through whom it was supplied must 
have received it in the course of a trade, business, profession or other 
occupation, or as the holder of a paid or unpaid office (s. 24(2)). However, 
if the statement was prepared for the purposes of pending or contemplated 
criminal proceedings or a criminal investigation it is not admissible by 
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virtue of s. 24(1) unless one of the four s. 23 grounds of admissibility has 
been satisfied or `the person who made the statement' cannot reasonably 
be expected (having regard to the time which has elapsed since he made 
the statement and to all the circumstances) to have any recollection of the 
matters dealt with in the statement (s. 24(4)). 
Section 24 differs from s. 23 in several ways. It is limited to certain types 
of document which are assumed to be more reliable than documents 
generally, and allows multiple hearsay to be admissible, no matter how 
many times removed the final statement is from the person who directly 
perceived the events, so long as each intermediary through whom the 
information was passed was acting in the course of an occupation or as the 
holder of some office. It is not necessary that the person who perceived the 
events or any other person should be unavailable for a documentary 
statement to be admissible under s. 24 (unless the statement was prepared 
for pending or contemplated criminal proceedings or a criminal 
investigation). And while s. 23 is concerned with only one person ± the 
person who made the statement in the document ± s. 24 refers to three 
types of person: the person reasonably supposed to have had personal 
knowledge of the events who supplied the information; the person who 
created or received the document in the course of a trade (etc.); and the 
person who made the statement. 
Consider the following example. Sam, a university librarian, tells 
David's tutor that he has seen David tearing pages out of library books. 
The tutor later informs the head of department who makes a written note 
of it, intending to pass it on to the discipline officer. Having ascertained 
the extent of the damage, the head of department decides it is a matter for 
the police and calls them in several months later. The police charge David 
with criminal damage but are unable to find Sam as he has emigrated to 
Australia. The written note would be admissible under s. 24 as the 
document was created by a person (the head of department) in the course 
of his profession, and the information in the document was supplied by a 
person (Sam) who may reasonably be supposed to have had personal 
knowledge of the matters dealt with. It does not matter that the 
information was supplied through an intermediary (the tutor) as he 
received it in the course of his profession, although the statement would 
presumably be inadmissible if the intermediary had been a student. 
The statement in this example was made for the purposes of 
contemplated disciplinary proceedings, but if the head of department 
had written his note in the contemplation of criminal proceedings one of 
the s. 24(4) grounds of admissibility would need to be satisfied. The 
prosecution would then need to prove that the `person who made the 
statement' (i) was dead or unfit to attend, (ii) was outside the country and 
that it was not reasonably practicable to secure his attendance, (iii) could 
not be found, (iv) would not give oral evidence through fear or because of 
his being kept out of the way (if the statement had been made to a police 
officer etc.) or (v) that he could not reasonably be expected to have any 
recollection of the matters dealt with in the statement. Logically, then, the 
`person who made the statement' should be the person who directly 
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perceived the event and supplied the information (that is, Sam), but s. 24(1) 
envisages situations where the maker of the statement and the supplier of 
the information are different persons (`supplied by a person (whether or 
not the maker of the statement)'), suggesting that the maker of the 
statement is the person who wrote (or otherwise placed) the statement into 
the document (that is, the head of department). A literal interpretation of 
s. 24 would therefore lead to the absurd result that it is the absence or the 
recollection of the person who wrote the statement in the document which 
is relevant for s. 24(4) as opposed to the person who perceived the matters 
dealt with in the statement. This interpretation was adopted in a number 
of cases (Brown v. Secretary of State for Social Security (1994) The Times 
7.12.94 (DC), R v. Carrington (1993) 99 Cr App R 376 (CA), R v. Hogan 
[1997] Crim LR 349 (CA)) and would mean Sam's absence would not 
satisfy s. 24(4). The evidence would be inadmissible unless the head of 
department could be placed within one of the five s. 24(4) categories. 
To overcome this absurdity there are two options. First, it might be 
possible to interpret s. 24 purposively rather than literally, an approach 
which is implicit in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v. Lockley 
[1995] 2 Cr App R 554, where it was held that the transcript of a witness's 
testimony was admissible at the accused's retrial under s. 24 (as well as 
under s. 23). The witness had supplied information to the court (at the first 
trial) and this had been put into documentary form by the court's 
stenographer acting in the course of that profession. As the transcript was 
made during the course of criminal proceedings it was held to fall within 
the expression `prepared for the purposes of contemplated criminal 
proceedings', requiring a s. 24(4) condition to be satisfied. The Court of 
Appeal assumed that the s. 23(2)(c) condition had been met by the fact the 
witness had absconded from prison, even though she had been the supplier 
of the information and not the person who had placed the statement in the 
document. A more authoritative decision, though, is the case of R v. 
Derodra [2000] 1 Cr App R 41, where the problem was confronted head-
on. D was charged with obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception, the 
allegation being that he had taken out an insurance policy following a 
burglary and then claimed under the policy for goods stolen. Central to 
the prosecution case was the fact that D's tenant had reported the burglary 
(and the goods stolen) on a particular date, which report had been 
received by one PC Gable and entered into the computer to form a 
computerised record of incident (`the CRIS report'). The tenant could not 
be found, however, and the prosecution sought to have the CRIS report 
admitted under s. 24(1) on the basis that s. 24(4) was satisfied (by virtue of 
the tenant's unavailability and s. 23(2)(c)). D appealed on the ground that 
it was not the tenant but PC Gable who was `the person who made the 
statement', and PC Gable did not fulfil any of the criteria in s. 24(4). 
Recognising that the literal interpretation of s. 24 adopted in Brown v. 
Secretary of State for Social Security (1994) The Times 7.12.94 (DC) was 
`a construction that produces absurdity', the Court of Appeal held that the 
person who made the statement is `the person testifying to the facts 
represented by the statement', in other words, `the person who makes or 
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vouches for the representation of fact that the statement consists of', and 
who that person is would depend on the circumstances of the particular 
case. The tenant was the person who had made the statement, as he had 
`made the representation of fact of which the evidence consisted' and it 
was his veracity and reliability which should have been in issue. The CRIS 
report had therefore been properly admitted. 
The second (and more appropriate) alternative would be to rectify the 
defect by amending s. 24(1) to read: `supplied by a person (whether or not 
the creator of the document)'; and the Law Commission has recently 
recommended that s. 24 be amended so that it would be the supplier of the 
information who is unavailable or unable to remember the matters dealt 
with (Law Com No. 245 (1997) at pp. 115±16). Parliament could also take 
the opportunity to clarify the meaning of `received by a person in the 
course of a trade' in s. 24(1) as it seems to make just about any 
documentary hearsay admissible so long as it has been received by 
someone in the course of his employment, which surely cannot be what 
was intended. The mere receipt of a statement in a document would seem 
to provide no guarantee of reliability at all. 
Finally, whether a document falls within the scope of s. 24(1) will often 
be inferable from the document itself, and extraneous evidence to prove 
compliance with the subsection will generally be unnecessary (R v. Foxley 
[1995] 2 Cr App R 523 (CA), R v. Ilyas [1996] Crim LR 810 (CA)). 
6.2.3 Sections 25 and 26 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
A statement in a document which is prima facie admissible by virtue of 
ss. 23 or 24 may nevertheless be excluded by the trial judge if its admission 
would not be in the interests of justice. Section 25 provides the judge with 
an exclusionary discretion with regard to any statement tendered under 
ss. 23 or 24. Section 26 is narrower in scope as it applies only to statements 
which were prepared for pending or contemplated criminal proceedings or 
a criminal investigation; yet it is also more potent than s. 25, providing 
that no such evidence may be admitted without the judge's leave. These 
provisions do not in any way affect the judge's more general common-law 
and statutory discretions to exclude any evidence tendered by the 
prosecution (s. 28(1)(b)), but it is important to note that ss. 25 and 26 
are not limited to prosecution evidence and may be applied to exclude 
documentary hearsay tendered by the defence too. 
Both sections list a number of factors the judge is obliged to take into 
consideration before exercising his discretion or granting leave. For the 
purposes of s. 25 the judge must take into account `all the circumstances' 
(s. 25(1)) having particular regard to four factors listed in s. 25(2): (a) the 
nature and source of the document and its likely authenticity; (b) the 
extent to which the statement supplies evidence which would otherwise not 
be readily available; (c) the relevance (that is, probative value) of the 
evidence; and (d) any risk, having regard in particular to whether it is 
likely to be possible to controvert the statement, that the admission or 
exclusion of the evidence will result in unfairness to the accused. This last 
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consideration is repeated in s. 26, along with two others: the content of the 
statement and any other circumstances which appear to be relevant. If the 
judge permits the hearsay evidence to be adduced reasons should be given 
to explain why the ss. 25 or 26 discretion was exercised in favour of the 
party tendering it (R v. Denton [2001] 1 Cr App R 227 (CA)). 
The relationship between ss. 25 and 26 was considered by the Court of 
Appeal in the leading case of R v. Cole [1990] 1 WLR 866, the conclusion 
being that where s. 26 applies there is a presumption in favour of exclusion 
so it is for the party tendering the evidence to persuade the judge to grant 
leave; but where s. 26 is inapplicable the presumption is that the evidence 
ought to be admitted and it is for the opposing party to persuade the judge 
to exclude it under s. 25. The Court of Appeal emphasised the importance 
to be attached to the quality of the hearsay evidence and rejected an 
argument that a statement tendered by the prosecution could be 
controverted only by cross-examination. Controvert was said to have 
the same meaning as contradict and as such it was always open to the 
accused to give evidence himself or to call other witnesses to dispute the 
hearsay evidence. It was also felt that the judge should consider the extent 
to which any unfairness arising from the accused's inability to cross-
examine on a hearsay statement could be counter-balanced by an effective 
warning and explanation to the jury as part of his summing-up (see also 
6.3 post). 
When considering the application of ss. 25 or 26 the judge must take 
into account all the circumstances and undertake `a complex balancing 
exercise' (R v. Cole [1990] 1 WLR 866 (CA) at p. 876) to ensure not only 
that the accused receives a fair trial but also that the prosecution can 
properly present their case. The judge has a duty to be fair and even-
handed to both sides (R v. Patel (1992) 97 Cr App R 294 (CA), R v. Gokal 
[1997] 2 Cr App R 266 (CA), R v. W [1997] Crim LR 678 (CA)). Each case 
will of course turn on its own facts. For this reason decided cases should 
not be regarded as precedents, but they do provide useful illustrations of 
how these provisions have been applied in practice and give an indication 
of the factors which are considered to be particularly important. One 
factor which ought not to be over-emphasised, though, is the importance 
of the evidence to the prosecution case, for as a consideration it cuts both 
ways. To exclude such evidence might result in the prosecution case 
collapsing, and might therefore be considered a reason for admitting it (R 
v. Batt [1995] Crim LR 240 (CA)); but to admit the evidence might prevent 
the accused from being able to challenge the substance of the case against 
him, justifying a decision to exclude it, for the accused `cannot conduct an 
argument with, nor ask questions of, a piece of paper' (R v. Radak [1999] 1 
Cr App R 187 (CA) at p. 200). 
Where there is reason to doubt the credibility of the absent witness and 
that witness's evidence is central to the prosecution case, the absence of 
any opportunity to cross-examine militates strongly against the admission 
of the statement. In R v. Lockley [1995] 2 Cr App R 554 (CA), for 
example, it was felt that while the absent witness's evidence was prima 
facie admissible under both ss. 23 and 24 it ought to have been excluded 
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under s. 26 because of her bad and dishonest character. She had openly 
boasted of her ability to deceive the staff at large stores when out 
shoplifting and her evidence concerned a purported confession to her by 
one of the accused while they had been a sharing a cell in the absence of 
any other witnesses. It was felt to be of great importance that the jury 
should have been able to assess her credibility for themselves, and as she 
had absconded from prison and could not be found her evidence ought to 
have been excluded. 
It has also been said that courts `will be cautious about admitting . . . 
documentary evidence of identification . . . where this is the principal 
element in the prosecution's case' (Neill v. North Antrim Magistrates' 
Court [1992] 1 WLR 1220 (HL) at p. 1229), but this dictum should not be 
seen as an exclusionary presumption to be applied inflexibly in all cases 
where identification evidence is tendered. The question of admissibility 
must turn on the quality of the identification evidence, and if its quality is 
high it may be possible to justify admitting it so long as the accused's 
interests are protected by an adequate direction to the jury. A good 
example is provided by R v. Dragic [1996] 2 Cr App R 232 (CA), a case in 
which a pub landlord had found three men burgling his premises and 
recognised D, one of his regular customers, following an observation 
which lasted for between five and ten seconds in a well-lit room. D was 
subsequently identified by the landlord at a confrontation and charged 
with burglary, his defence being one of alibi. The landlord made a written 
statement for the police and, as he was taken ill prior to the trial, the 
prosecution were given leave to adduce it pursuant to ss. 23 and 26 of the 
1988 Act. D was convicted and appealed on the ground that it had not 
been in the interests of justice for the landlord's statement to be admitted 
since it was identification evidence and the prosecution case depended 
almost entirely on it. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal as the 
landlord's evidence had not been weak, D had been able to controvert it 
with his own alibi evidence, and the judge had properly exercised his 
discretion under s. 26. 
A relevant consideration for the purposes of s. 26, where the 
prosecution wish to rely on the `fear' requirement of s. 23(3), is whether 
the accused has directly or indirectly intimidated the witness. In R v. 
Harvey (1998) unreported (98/00885/Y4) the Court of Appeal stated that 
it `does not lie in the mouth of a defendant to complain that a witness is 
not available for cross-examination when he himself has been instrumental 
in bringing that situation about', but accepted that if the accused gave 
credible evidence on the voir dire that he neither knew nor approved of 
such intimidation that would be a relevant factor in the exercise of the 
judge's discretion. This approach was approved in R v. Montgomery 
[2002] EWCA Crim 1655 and R v. M(KJ) [2003] 2 Cr App R 322 (CA). 
6.2.4 Schedule 2 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
Once the party tendering a statement under ss. 23 or 24 of the 1988 Act 
has satisfied the conditions of admissibility in either of those sections, and 
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the judge has exercised his discretion under s. 25 or given leave under s. 26 
in favour of that party, allowing the evidence to be adduced, the opposing 
party (usually the accused) is entitled to adduce evidence of his own to 
impeach the absent witness's credibility and undermine the probative 
value of the statement. The relevant provisions are to be found in 
paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 to the 1988 Act, which supplement ss. 23 to 28 
(s. 28(2)). These provisions are intended to compensate the opposing party 
for his inability to cross-examine the absent witness as to credit (as to 
which, see 16.5 post). The opposing party may therefore adduce any 
evidence relevant to the absent witness's credibility which would have been 
admissible had that witness been called to give oral evidence (paragraph 
1(a); 16.5.4 post), but he may also apply to the judge to waive the rule on 
the finality of answers on collateral matters (16.5.2 post) in order that he 
be allowed to adduce evidence relevant to credibility which would not 
have been admissible had the witness been called (paragraph 1(b)). Any 
previous inconsistent statement made by the absent witness is admissible 
for the purpose of showing he has contradicted himself (paragraph 1(c); 
see 16.5.3 post). It is important to note, however, that if these provisions 
are relied on by the accused to attack the credibility of an absent 
prosecution witness he runs the risk of losing his shield against cross-
examination on his own bad character (if any) should he decide to testify 
(R v. Miller [1997] 2 Cr App R 178 (CA), 4.5 ante). 
6.2.5 Hearsay and the European Convention on Human Rights 
Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention expressly provides that the 
accused has the right `to examine or have examined witnesses against him' 
as one of the facets of his more general right to a fair trial under Article 
6(1). It is therefore necessary to consider whether the adduction of hearsay 
evidence incriminating the accused is compatible with the Convention, 
bearing in mind that the rights in Article 6(3) are not absolute and may be 
qualified so long as any qualification is directed towards a legitimate 
objective (such as convicting those who have committed crimes) and is a 
proportionate way of achieving that objective (2.9 ante). 
The earlier relevant judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
include Kostovski v. Netherlands (1989) 12 EHRR 434, Unterpertinger v. 
Austria (1986) 13 EHRR 175, Windisch v. Austria (1990) 13 EHRR 281, 
Delta v. France (1990) 16 EHRR 574, Asch v. Austria (1991) 15 EHRR 
597, Ludi v. Switzerland (1992) 15 EHRR 173, Saidi v. France (1993) 17 
EHRR 251, Doorson v. Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330 and Van 
Mechelen v. Netherlands (1997) 25 EHRR 647. Although each case before 
the Strasbourg court is decided on its own facts, a number of principles 
may be derived from these cases in relation to whether, and in what 
circumstances, it is permissible for the prosecution to adduce hearsay 
evidence. First, the maker of a hearsay statement admitted against the 
accused is a `witness' for the purpose of Article 6(3)(d). Second, 
complainants and witnesses in criminal proceedings also have rights 
under the Convention, and in appropriate cases their interests may have to 
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be balanced against the interests of the defence. Third, whether a hearsay 
statement has been properly admitted as evidence is a question for the 
domestic courts to decide ± the task of the Strasbourg Court is not to hold 
in the abstract whether oral evidence given on oath should always be relied 
on in preference to a hearsay statement made by that witness; rather, it is 
to ascertain (retrospectively, and in relation to the particular applicant 
before the Court) whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in 
which the evidence was taken, were fair. Fourth, the use of statements 
obtained before the trial is not in itself inconsistent with Article 6(1) taken 
together with Article 6(3)(d) so long as the rights of the defence have been 
respected, which requires, as a general rule, that the accused be given an 
adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question the maker of 
that statement. Fifth, any measures restricting the rights of the defence 
should be strictly necessary. Sixth, there is no violation of Article 6(1) 
taken together with Article 6(3)(d) if it can be shown that the handicaps 
under which the defence laboured were sufficiently counterbalanced by 
procedures which allowed the accused effectively to challenge the 
evidence. Seventh, relevant factors are whether there was any evidence 
against the accused in addition to the hearsay statement and whether the 
accused was able to adduce evidence which would put the credibility of the 
maker of the statement in doubt. Eighth, a conviction should not be based 
solely or to a decisive extent on anonymous witness statements. 
However, a number of more recent cases suggest that the principle that 
a conviction should not be based solely or to a decisive extent on 
anonymous witness statements and the principle that, as a general rule, the 
accused should have an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and 
question the maker of a hearsay statement have been merged, and in the 
process altered, to become a broader principle to the effect that `where a 
conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on [witness statements] 
that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no 
opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during the 
investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defence are restricted to an 
extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6' 
(Luca v. Italy (2001) Application No. 33354/96 (ECtHR), PS v. Germany 
(2001) 36 EHRR 1139 (ECtHR)). This principle would certainly appear to 
prohibit the use by the prosecution of the complainant's witness statement 
in a sexual offence case, where the complainant's credibility is central to 
the truth of her allegation, there is no other independent evidence of the 
accused's guilt and the defence have been given no opportunity to 
challenge her evidence (AM v. Italy (1999) Application No. 37019/97 
(ECtHR), PS v. Germany (2001) 26 EHRR 1139 (ECtHR)). 
However, Luca v. Italy (2001) Application No. 33354/96 (ECtHR) 
should not be taken to have established an inflexible requirement of 
`opportunity to examine or to have examined' for any case where the 
prosecution case is `based solely or to a decisive degree' on the witness 
statements of one or more absent witnesses. In some cases it will be 
impossible to question the sole prosecution witness during the pre-trial 
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule 199 
proceedings or the course of the trial itself (for example, where the witness 
has died or is seriously ill, as in Ferrantelli v. Italy (1996) 23 EHRR 288 
(ECtHR)) and, if there is no reason to doubt that witness's reliability, it 
would hardly be in the interests of justice if a mandatory rule of law 
prohibited a conviction just because there has been no pre-trial 
examination. The ultimate question is whether the particular accused 
can receive a fair trial in the particular circumstances of his case, and it 
may be that a fair trial is possible so long there is some other mechanism 
which can allow the defence effectively to challenge the absent witness's 
evidence. 
Where, however, the witness is available (but afraid to testify) it may 
now be necessary to consider alternatives to ss. 23±26 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988, on the basis that any measures restricting the rights of 
the defence should be strictly necessary. If a less restrictive measure would 
suffice then that measure should be used instead (Van Mechelen v. 
Netherlands (1997) 25 EHRR 647 (ECtHR)). Procedures such as those set 
out in Chapter I of Part II of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999 (16.4.4 post), where the witness may be cross-examined via a live 
television link, or in advance of the trial, would be less restrictive for the 
accused than the alternative under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and it 
may be that in cases where the witness is available (and still capable of 
giving coherent evidence) measures of this sort should be used instead of 
the 1988 Act. Alternatively, there might need to be some form of challenge 
before or during the trial, where questions are put to the prosecution 
witness through the accused's legal representative or an intermediary, to 
supplement the hearsay evidence adduced under the Act, particularly if the 
prosecution case is based solely or to a decisive extent on that witness's 
evidence (see SN v. Sweden (2002) Application No. 34209/96 (ECtHR), 
16.4.4 post). 
The issue of Article 6(1) and (3)(d) compatibility has been addressed by 
the Court of Appeal on a number of occasions, the conclusion being that, 
despite the absence of any mechanism for challenging an absent witness's 
evidence in advance of the trial, there is no conflict between ss. 23 and 24 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and Article 6 because the judge's 
exclusionary powers in ss. 25 and 26 and the credibility provisions in 
Schedule 2 operate to ensure that the accused will receive a fair trial (R v. 
Gokal [1997] 2 Cr App R 266, R v. Thomas [1998] Crim LR 887, R v. D 
[2002] 3 WLR 997, R v. M(KJ) [2003] 2 Cr App R 322). The obligation on 
the trial judge to direct the jury on any weaknesses in the witness's 
evidence and on the fact that it was not tested by cross-examination 
provides an additional safeguard for the accused (6.3 post). 
In R v. M(KJ) [2003] 2 Cr App R 322, a case relating to a fatal 
stabbing, the Court of Appeal strongly deprecated the view that ss. 23 and 
26 should never be relied on in a case where the essential or only witness 
for the prosecution is afraid to testify (although it is to be noted that the 
Court did not consider any alternative mechanisms for protecting 
frightened witnesses): 
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`That would seem to us an intolerable result as a general proposition 
and could only lead to an encouragement of criminals to indulge in the 
very kind of intimidation which the sections are designed to defeat. 
Certainly, decisions of this court before the passage of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, as well as common sense, suggest that no invariable 
rule to that effect should be either propounded or followed . . . [W]e 
would not subscribe to any formulation of the approach to be adopted 
which states without qualification that a conviction based solely or 
mainly on the impugned statement of an absent witness necessarily 
violates the right to a fair trial under Article 6.' 
There will be a violation of Article 6, however, if the prosecution case 
depends wholly or mainly on the hearsay statement of a witness whose 
credibility is in real doubt, where the defence would be significantly 
handicapped by the inability to cross-examine. Such a state of affairs led 
to a successful appeal in R v. M(KJ), where it was held that the trial judge 
had wrongly allowed the statement of the sole prosecution witness to be 
read under s. 23. The witness had himself been a suspect in the murder 
inquiry; he had refused to co-operate with the police; his change of heart 
had come at a time when he was on bail in respect of a charge of robbery, 
when the offer of a reward for information relating to the murder had 
come to his attention; and he had considerably `improved' his evidence 
with the passage of time. There was thus `every reason to question his 
motive and his veracity in pinning the murder on the defendant, a person 
with the mind of a child who . . . could have no realistic opportunity of 
going into the witness box and defending himself'. 
The decision of the European Commission of Human Rights in Trivedi 
v. United Kingdom (1997) EHRLR 521 (Application No. 31700/96) 
provides support for the view that ss. 23±26 of the 1988 Act are 
compatible with the requirements of Article 6 in cases where the witness is 
unavailable and there is additional evidence of the accused's guilt. T was 
convicted of false accounting on the basis of, inter alia, two hearsay 
statements made by C. These statements were adduced by the prosecution 
pursuant to ss. 23 and 26 of the 1988 Act on account of C's poor mental 
condition at the time of the trial. T complained to the Commission on the 
ground that there had been no opportunity for him to question C or 
challenge his evidence. The Commission rejected the application as 
manifestly ill-founded as T's rights had been respected. First, in order to 
assess the quality of C's evidence, and before deciding to grant the 
prosecution leave to adduce the same under s. 26 of the Act, the trial judge 
had received evidence in the absence of the jury on C's mental condition 
and memory when the statements were made and had heard oral 
submissions on the issue. Second, there was other evidence of T's guilt. 
Third, T had been able to give evidence which stood uncontroverted 
because of C's absence. Fourth, T's counsel had been given a full 
opportunity to comment on C's evidence with a view to impugning his 
credibility and reliability. Fifth, the judge had expressly directed the jury 
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule 201 
during his summing-up to attach less weight to C's evidence as it had not 
been tested by cross-examination. 
Insofar as ss. 23±26 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 are compatible 
with the European convention, it follows that, where the prosecution seek 
to rely on a hearsay statement which is prima facie admissible at common 
law, the judge should adopt an approach similar to that laid down in ss. 25 
and 26 when determining whether the evidence should be excluded under 
s. 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, with particular 
emphasis on whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to be placed 
before the jury. The decision of the Court of Appeal in R v. Callender 
[1998] Crim LR 337 (6.1.1.5 ante) might be seen as an attempt to achieve 
the same result by a different route. 
6.2.6 Schedule 2 to the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 
Written statements which have been admitted at committal proceedings in 
the magistrates' court prior to trial on indictment are now admissible in 
the Crown Court trial by virtue of s. 68 of the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996 and paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 2 to the Act, the 
only safeguards being the judge's discretion not to allow such evidence to 
be admitted (paragraph 1(3)(b)) and an `interests of justice' test which 
must be applied when a party to the proceedings (that is, the accused) 
objects (paragraph 1(4)). This is an alarmingly wide exception to the rule 
against hearsay, as prosecution statements tendered at committal 
proceedings are now admitted in those proceedings as a matter of course 
(ss. 5A and 5B of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980) and there are no 
safeguards in Schedule 2 such as those connected with the admissibility of 
evidence tendered pursuant to ss. 23 and 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1988 (although no doubt judges will turn to ss. 25 and 26 of the 1988 Act 
for guidance in practice). Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 makes similar 
provision for the admissibility at trial of certain written depositions 
admitted at committal proceedings pursuant to s. 97A of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act 1980. The Law Commission, noting that Schedule 2 may 
contravene Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, has 
recommended the repeal of paragraphs 1(4) and 2(2) (see Law Com No. 
245 (1997) at pp. 122±3). This would have the effect of preventing the 
admission of evidence if an objection has been raised by the accused. 
6.2.7 Other Significant Statutory Exceptions 
A video-recording of an interview with a vulnerable witness (other than 
the accused) may be admitted to stand in place of his evidence in chief 
under Chapter I of Part II of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999 (see 16.4.4 post). Section 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides 
that an expert's written report is admissible evidence of any fact or 
opinion stated therein if the expert would have been competent to give 
such evidence if called as a witness. The court's leave is required before 
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such evidence can be admitted unless the expert is called to testify. 
Section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 allows any party in criminal 
proceedings to adduce a witness's written statement instead of calling him 
so long as no other party objects within seven days of being notified. 
Section 3 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act 1879 allows copies of entries 
in bankers' books to be admissible in any proceedings (subject to certain 
conditions in s. 4 being satisfied). Schedule 2 to the Criminal Appeal Act 
1968 permits the adduction at a retrial of the record of a witness's evidence 
given at the previous trial. 
6.3 Directing the Jury 
If a party is permitted to adduce an absent witness's hearsay statement in 
criminal proceedings the judge should give an appropriate direction to the 
jury, warning them to have regard to the lack of cross-examination when 
evaluating its probative value (Scott v. R [1989] 2 WLR 924 (PC), R v. 
Curry (1998) The Times 23.3.98 (CA)) and directing them to consider any 
specific weaknesses in the evidence (R v. Kennedy [1994] Crim LR 50 
(CA)). In R v. McCoy (1999) unreported (99/01674/W4) the Court of 
Appeal stated that where the hearsay evidence is that of a critical 
prosecution witness it is incumbent on the judge to ensure that the jury 
realise the drawbacks imposed on the defence and that they might feel 
quite unable to attach anything like as much weight to the evidence 
because that witness has not been cross-examined. This is not a hard and 
fast rule, though, for more recently it has been said that the judge has a 
discretion as to the direction which should be given, appropriate to the 
circumstances of the case (R v. Hardwick [2001] EWCA Crim 369). 
Where the hearsay statement is related to the court by another witness, 
for example a bystander who overheard the deceased's oral `excited 
utterance' or dying declaration, it is most important that the jury should 
be directed to scrutinise the hearsay evidence with care as they have the 
additional task of deciding whether the witness before them can be relied 
on (Nembhard v. R [1981] 1 WLR 1515 (PC)). In R v. Andrews [1987] 2 
WLR 413, the leading case on excited utterances, Lord Ackner said (at 
p. 424): 
`Of course, having ruled the statement admissible the judge must . . . 
make it clear to the jury that it is for them to decide what was said and 
to be sure that the witnesses were not mistaken in what they believed 
had been said to them. Further, they must be satisfied that the declarant 
did not concoct or distort to his advantage or the disadvantage of the 
accused the statement relied upon and where there is material to raise 
the issue, that he was not activated by any malice or ill-will. Further, 
where there are special features that bear on the possibility of mistake 
then the [jury's] attention must be invited to those matters.' 
However, it seems the judge's failure to give a warning on the need for 
caution when assessing an excited utterance untested by cross-examination 
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will not prove fatal so long as the jury have had their attention drawn to 
all the relevant matters. In R v. Carnall [1995] Crim LR 944 the Court of 
Appeal rejected an argument to the contrary on the ground that `it was 
obvious that someone who had died could not be cross-examined'. 
6.4 An Inclusionary Discretion? 
The common-law exceptions evolved in a piecemeal fashion to allow for 
the admission of out-of-court statements made in a variety of situations on 
the ground that the peculiar nature of those situations could be assumed 
to enhance the reliability of the hearsay evidence, and the absence of any 
other evidence on the disputed issue necessitated an exception. These twin 
grounds of necessity and reliability also underpin ss. 23 and 24 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988. The problem is that, as the law stands, it is 
impossible to adduce reliable hearsay evidence which does not fall within a 
recognised exception even though there may be no other available 
evidence on the disputed issue. In the absence of any recognised exception 
the exclusionary hearsay rule is absolute which means the prosecution may 
be prevented from adducing cogent evidence of the accused's guilt and the 
accused may be unable to adduce cogent evidence of his innocence. It was 
decided in Myers v. DPP [1964] 3 WLR 145 (HL) that it is no longer 
possible for the courts to create new exceptions to the hearsay rule, so 
unless an existing exception such as the Andrews test for excited utterances 
(6.1.1.1 ante) is enlarged to be of general application any reform must 
come from Parliament. 
The most obvious reform would be to give trial judges an inclusionary 
discretion so that hearsay evidence falling outside the recognised common-
law and statutory exceptions could be admitted if it was in the interests of 
justice to do so. It has already been suggested (5.6.2 ante) that the rule of 
prima facie inadmissibility should be limited to express assertions and 
qualified by an inclusionary discretion, but it would not be necessary for 
any such discretion to replace the existing exceptions. Rather, a residual 
discretion could be introduced to supplement the common-law and 
statutory exceptions. This would strike the right balance between the 
desirability of maintaining certainty in the law and the necessity of serving 
the interests of justice. The judge would take into consideration a range of 
factors when deciding whether to admit the hearsay, particularly the twin 
considerations of necessity and reliability. The criterion of necessity would 
be satisfied if the maker of the statement was unavailable for a good 
reason (as with s. 23 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988) or was, for example, 
a very young child who could no longer remember his earlier statement. 
Reliability would depend on the risk of deception and mistake in the light 
of all the circumstances in which the statement was made. In other words, 
the judge would determine whether cross-examination could safely be 
dispensed with. This test would be similar to that applied by the judge 
when considering whether a confession should be admitted when it has 
been challenged under s. 76(2)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
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1984 (7.1.3.2 post), in the sense that the judge would not determine 
reliability itself (as that would usurp the function of the jury) but whether 
the statement is apparently reliable and therefore safe for the jury to 
consider despite the absence of any cross-examination. 
A residual inclusionary discretion would make the law more logical, 
ensure fairness for the prosecution and the accused and obviate the need 
to create new quasi-exceptions (5.8 ante). A common-law discretion of this 
sort has now been recognised in New Zealand (R v. Manase [2001] 2 
NZLR 197 (NZCA)). Canada too has a principled common-law discretion 
to admit hearsay evidence based on `necessity and reliability', although it 
is considerably broader than the New Zealand exception. Indeed it has 
recently been held that the `necessity and reliability' test is applicable in all 
cases, with the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule comprising 
nothing more than `practical manifestations of the principled approach' 
raising a strong presumption in favour of admitting the evidence (R v. 
Starr [2000] 2 SCR 144 (SCC)). The High Court of Australia has yet to 
recognise a common-law inclusionary discretion, but there are dicta to the 
effect that a discretion of this sort may exist, or that exceptions to the 
hearsay rule will be developed if reliability can be guaranteed (Walton v. R 
(1989) 166 CLR 283, R v. Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110, Pollitt v. R (1992) 174 
CLR 558, Bannon v. R (1995) 185 CLR 1). 
The Law Commission has recommended a statutory `safety-valve' 
inclusionary discretion, which would be available to both the prosecution 
and the accused, to prevent potential injustice in exceptional circum-
stances (see Law Com No. 245 (1997) at pp. 129±34). The test to be 
applied by the court would be one of potential reliability based on the 
circumstances in which the statement was made and whether its admission 
could be justified in the interests of justice. Rule 807 of the United States 
Federal Rules of Evidence sets out a residual exception of this sort for 
hearsay evidence which does not fall within any of the other exceptions in 
the Rules, where the evidence has `equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness' and ought to be admitted in the interests of justice. 
Chapter Summary 
.	 A number of common-law and statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule have been 
recognised or created, the underlying principles being reliability and necessity. 
.	 The most important common-law exceptions for criminal proceedings allow oral 
as well as documentary hearsay evidence to be admitted. These are the res gestae 
exceptions and (for trials involving joint enterprises and conspiracies) the 
exception for statements made by parties to a common enterprise. 
.	 Most hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings is now admitted in documentary 
form pursuant to a statutory exception. Agreed statements may be admitted under 
s. 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (`section 9 statements'), but contested 
evidence must satisfy the requirements of ss. 23 or 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1988, and overcome the hurdle of the leave requirement in ss. 25 or 26. If 
documentary hearsay evidence is admitted under ss. 23 or 24 the credibility of the 
absent witness may be challenged under Schedule 2 to the Act. 
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.	 If hearsay evidence is admitted pursuant to a common-law exception or under 
ss. 23 or 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the judge should give the jury an 
appropriate direction on any weaknesses in the absent witness's evidence and the 
disadvantage caused to the opposing party (usually the accused) by the 
unavailability of the witness for cross-examination. 
.	 The provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 have been held to comply with 
the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but 
additional powers may need to be introduced to ensure that the accused's 
interests are sufficiently safeguarded if the prosecution case is heavily dependent 
on an available witness who does not wish to testify through fear. 
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A party's informal admission (or, in criminal proceedings, the accused's 
confession) is an out-of-court statement made by that party which is 
adverse to his case. Such admissions have long been recognised as an 
exception to the exclusionary hearsay rule and are thus admissible to 
prove the truth of the matters stated. Confessions tendered by the 
prosecution are now governed by s. 76 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (`PACE'), whereas in civil proceedings informal 
admissions are admissible by virtue of s. 1(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 
1995. A confession or an informal admission is not conclusive evidence of 
any fact admitted, however; the party who made it may adduce other 
evidence at the trial to show why it should not be relied on. By contrast, a 
party's formal admission is conclusive evidence of any fact admitted; the 
effect of any such admission is to obviate the need for the opposing party 
to prove the admitted fact, thereby reducing the length and cost of the trial 
(see 15.6.3 post). It is with confessions (and, to a lesser extent, informal 
admissions in civil proceedings) that this chapter is concerned. 
7.1 Criminal Proceedings: Confessions 
In England and Wales a confession may be relied on as sufficient proof of 
guilt even if it is unsupported by any other evidence (R v. Sykes (1913) 8 
Cr App R 233 (CCA)). This is a natural consequence of the traditional 
justification for the admissibility of confessions: `A free and voluntary 
confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow 
from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as proof of 
the crime to which it refers' (R v. Warickshall (1783) 1 Leach 263 (CCC) at 
p. 263). More recently, in Western v. DPP [1997] 1 Cr App R 474 (DC) 
Butterfield J said (at p. 481): 
`This exception [to the hearsay rule] is based on the assumption that 
what a person says against his or her own interests is likely to be true, 
although the reliability of this assumption has long been doubted.' 
There are two points to note about this dictum. First, to say that the 
admissibility of confessions is predicated upon the likelihood of their being 
true does not satisfactorily explain the decisions in R v. Turner (1975) 61 
Cr App R 67 (CA) and R v. Blastland [1985] 3 WLR 345 (HL) (5.3 ante) 
where it was held that a third party's confession to the offence charged is 
inadmissible at common law. The better view is that confessions are 
admissible for a combination of two reasons. The principal objection to 
the admissibility of hearsay evidence ± that the declarant is unavailable for 
cross-examination ± does not apply if an out-of-court statement has been 
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made by a party to the proceedings; after all, a party who has volunteered 
an admission can hardly complain that he is unavailable for cross-
examination. Then there is the traditional justification: the common-sense 
view that a statement which is inculpatory is more likely to be truthful 
than one which is exculpatory. The second noteworthy point about the 
dictum is that, by recognising that the traditional assumption `has long 
been doubted', Butterfield J was suggesting that the accused may have 
falsely confessed to his guilt. The possibility of false confessions has long 
been recognised ± as indeed it was in R v. Warickshall (1783) 1 Leach 263 
(CCC) ± and at common law the accused's confession was admissible 
against him only if it was free and voluntary. If the confession was elicited 
by oppression or `by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage excited or held 
out by a person in authority' it was inadmissible (DPP v. Ping Lin [1975] 3 
WLR 419 (HL) at p. 439, R v. Rennie [1982] 1 WLR 64 (CA) at p. 70). The 
common law on confessions has now almost entirely been supplanted by 
s. 76(1)±(2) of PACE. 
7.1.1 Confessions as an Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay 
Any out-of-court inculpatory statement made by the accused ± that is, an 
admission that he committed the offence charged or an admission of some 
fact which goes towards proving he committed the offence charged ± is 
admissible against him at his trial to prove the truth of the matters 
admitted: 
In any proceedings a confession made by an accused person may be 
given in evidence against him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in 
issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the court in pursuance of 
this section. (s. 76(1) of PACE) 
In this Part of this Act ± `confession' includes any statement wholly or 
partly adverse to the person who made it, whether made to a person in 
authority or not and whether made in words or otherwise. (s. 82(1) of 
PACE) 
Before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, it was said that, for 
the purposes of s. 82(1) of PACE, a statement made by the accused was a 
confession only if it was adverse to him at the time he actually made it (R 
v. Sat-Bhambra (1988) 88 Cr App R 55 (CA), R v. Park (1993) 99 Cr App 
R 270 (CA)). Accordingly, if the accused made a wholly exculpatory 
statement before the trial (for example, `I was elsewhere, playing golf') 
which subsequently became adverse to him because it was shown to be 
false, that admissible non-hearsay statement (5.4 ante) would not directly 
fall within the meaning of s. 82(1) and the prosecution would not need to 
satisfy the conditions of s. 76(2) of PACE (7.1.3 post). The position was 
recently reconsidered in R v. Z [2003] 1 WLR 1489 (CA), however, where 
it was held that, in the light of Saunders v. United Kingdom (1996) 23 
EHRR 313 (ECtHR) (14.1 post), Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights demands that an out-of-court statement be regarded as a 
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confession if it is self-incriminating at the time of the trial, even if the 
accused intended it to be exculpatory when he made it (although the Court 
queried whether the statement `I did not do it' could amount to a 
confession). Thus, if the prosecution wish to support their case against the 
accused with an out-of-court statement made by him which was intended 
to be exculpatory, but can now be shown to be a lie, that false statement 
will be admissible at the behest of the prosecution only if they are able to 
discharge the burden(s) imposed upon them by s. 76(2). This is a sensible 
return to the position at common law (R v. Wattam (1952) 36 Cr App R 72 
(CCA)). Given the rationales which underpin s. 76(2), it would be absurd 
if, for example, a false statement elicited from the accused by torture could 
be prima facie admissible against him. 
An out-of-court statement made by the accused which is (and continues 
to be) wholly exculpatory in relation to the offence charged is not 
admissible at his trial for that offence under s. 76(1) to prove the truth of 
the matters stated (see, for example, R v. Squire [1990] Crim LR 341 
(CA)). Nor is such a statement admissible to show the accused's 
consistency as a witness (R v. Roberts (1942) 28 Cr App R 102 (CCA), 
16.4.2 post). A statement of this sort will be admissible only by virtue of a 
separate exception to the rule against hearsay; or under an exception to 
the `rule against narrative' to show the accused's consistency and reaction 
when taxed with incriminating facts (16.4.2.4 post). If, however, the 
accused has made a `mixed statement' in response to an allegation, that is, 
a statement which is partly inculpatory and partly exculpatory, the whole 
statement is prima facie admissible as evidence of the truth of the matters 
stated under s. 76(1), save that the jury ought to be directed that the 
inculpatory parts are more likely to be true (R v. Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7 
(HL)). There are limits to this exception, however. In R v. Aziz [1995] 3 
WLR 53 (HL) it was felt that a mixed statement could be admissible only 
at the behest of the prosecution; and in Western v. DPP [1997] 1 Cr App R 
474 the Divisional Court felt that where there was no other evidence in 
support of the exculpatory part of a mixed statement its weight was likely 
to be minimal. Moreover, not every exculpatory comment will be 
admissible hearsay just because the accused also made a trivial admission. 
The admission must be significant in the sense that it is `capable of adding 
some degree of weight to the prosecution case on an issue which [is] 
relevant to guilt' (R v. Garrod [1997] Crim LR 445 (CA)). 
A confession made by the accused which inculpates his co-accused, and 
which does not fall within any other exception to the hearsay rule, is no 
evidence of the co-accused's guilt unless he accepts its truth; and the jury 
must be directed to this effect (R v. Gunewardene [1951] 2 KB 600 (CCA)). 
To ensure that the co-accused's defence is not prejudiced by the admission 
of such a confession, it may be appropriate for the prosecution to edit out 
the references to him (or substitute a letter for the co-accused's name), but 
this is not an absolute rule. If the accused objects to such editing because 
the references to the co-accused comprise the exculpatory part of his 
mixed statement the judge has no power to prevent the confession from 
being admitted in its unedited form (Lobban v. R [1995] 1 WLR 877 (PC)). 
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Like any other statement, a confession may be made orally, in writing 
or by way of a gesture or action. In Li Shu-Ling v. R [1988] 3 WLR 671 
(PC), for example, it was held that a video recording of the accused's 
demonstration of how he had strangled his victim had been properly 
admitted as an admission that he had indeed killed her in that way (see 
also Lam Chi-Ming v. R [1991] 2 WLR 1082 (PC) and Timothy v. The 
State [2000] 1 WLR 485 (PC)). In certain circumstances it may be possible 
to infer an admission of guilt from the accused's reaction or demeanour or 
silence in the face of an allegation made against him in his presence and 
hearing (9.2.1 post) or from his fleeing from the authorities or (as noted 
above) from his lying when interrogated, so long as there is no realistic 
possibility of an innocent explanation for his conduct (11.6 post). In R v. 
Stubbs [2002] EWCA Crim 2254 it was held that an intercepted hand-
written letter in which the author identified himself as the offender in two 
attached photographs (taken from closed-circuit television footage of two 
robberies) had been properly admitted as a confession by the accused of 
his involvement in those robberies, as the author could not conceivably 
have been anyone other than the accused. 
It is also possible for an admission to be made on the accused's behalf 
by his agent. So long as the agent was duly authorised by the accused to 
speak on his behalf and the admission was made within the scope of that 
authority it will be prima facie admissible against the accused as a 
confession. Thus in R v. Turner (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 (CA) the accused, 
S, was bound by the incriminating comments his barrister had made when 
speaking on his behalf during a speech in mitigation in earlier proceedings. 
The Privy Council has indicated, however, that admissions made in 
mitigation should not subsequently be held against the accused as it is 
often unrealistic for the advocate to continue to assert his client's 
innocence following a conviction (Wu Chun-Piu v. R [1996] 1 WLR 1113). 
In R v. Turner the barrister acting for S was assumed to have been acting 
within the scope of his authority, but generally it will be necessary to prove 
that the agent was authorised to speak on the accused's behalf. In R v. 
Evans [1981] Crim LR 699 (CA) a statement made by a solicitor's clerk 
was not admissible against his client as there was no admissible evidence to 
prove the clerk had been given such authority. If admissions made by an 
authorised agent are not admissible by virtue of s. 76(1) of PACE (which 
covers confessions `made by an accused person') they presumably remain 
admissible at common law. 
7.1.2 The Reliability of Confessions 
A truthful confession may be the best evidence for the prosecution, and in 
some cases the only evidence against the accused. It is not unknown for 
suspects, or even individuals who have not fallen under suspicion, to 
confess to their crimes because they are overcome with the stress 
associated with having a guilty conscience and/or the fear of detection. 
Confessing to an offence may provide cathartic relief for the offender in 
addition to the obvious evidential benefit for the prosecution, so it should 
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not be surprising that confessions are admissible. This is of course 
dependent on the confession being truthful. It is true to say that people 
rarely make false confessions in ordinary circumstances; but most 
confessions are made in the face of questioning by agents of the state in 
an alien and potentially hostile environment. In the context of a formal 
interrogation a suspect may indeed falsely incriminate himself for a variety 
of possible reasons, and it is only when those possibilities have been 
sufficiently reduced or eliminated that a confession should be left to the 
jury. The law must therefore ensure that confessions are not made in 
circumstances which might cast doubt on their reliability as truthful 
assertions of fact. This requires, first, a body of rules governing the 
conduct of interviews generally, to minimise the potential for unreliability; 
and, second, rules to prevent the admission of any confession made in 
circumstances where the risk of unreliability is too great for it to be safe to 
allow the jury to consider it. This is not to say that reliability is the sole 
consideration governing the admissibility of confessions, however. Even a 
demonstrably reliable confession may be excluded if it has been obtained 
with scant regard for the accused's privilege against self-incrimination, for 
example by physical abuse (see Lam Chi-Ming v. R [1991] 2 WLR 1082 
(PC) and 10.2.3 post). In addition to the question of the truth or falsity of a 
confession which has been provided by the accused, there is the separate 
question of `verballing' where the accused denies that he made the 
statement which has been attributed to him. Whether a confession has 
been concocted by a corrupt interrogator or some other person with an axe 
to grind is ultimately a question of fact for the jury (or magistrates), but it 
is essential that the law should minimise the scope for fabrication and the 
risk that the accused will be able to make a false allegation of fabrication 
at his trial. Any body of rules governing the interrogation of suspects must 
therefore include provisions to minimise the possibility of verballing. 
Thus, whenever the prosecution wish to adduce a confession 
purportedly made by the accused two questions may need to be 
considered. First, did the accused actually make the confession or was it 
fabricated by the witness for the prosecution? Second, if the accused did 
confess as alleged, are the matters to which he confessed true or false? 
False confessions are most likely to be made during the course of a formal 
interrogation, and it is this risk which is discussed below (7.1.2.1 post); but 
it should always be remembered that even in a less formal context the 
accused's inculpatory remarks might have been mistakenly overheard, or 
misinterpreted, or deliberately taken out of context and misrepresented by 
the witness. 
7.1.2.1 False Confessions Made by the Accused 
A suspect may falsely confess to an offence he did not commit or overstate 
his involvement in an offence for a number of reasons. One such reason 
can generally be discounted, though, on the ground that it is rare and the 
confession can usually be shown to be false. This is where a person 
voluntarily confesses to a notorious offence as a way of basking in 
reflected notoriety. The example usually referred to in this context is that 
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of the large number of persons who falsely confessed to having kidnapped 
the American aviator Charles Lindbergh's baby in 1932. In R v. Sykes 
(1913) 8 Cr App R 233 (CCA), a case concerning the murder of an 
11-year-old girl, Ridley J accepted that: `the murder was the talk of the 
countryside, and it might well be that a man under the influence of 
insanity or a morbid desire for notoriety would accuse himself of such a 
crime'. Needless to say, a voluntary confession of this sort is likely to be 
made by a confessor who is suffering from a mental illness or personality 
disorder, following the commission of a highly-publicised offence. In 1974 
Judith Ward, an IRA sympathiser, confessed to a number of IRA 
bombings including the destruction of a coach in which 12 persons were 
killed. One of the reasons why her conviction was subsequently quashed 
was the availability of fresh evidence suggesting that in 1974 she had been 
suffering from a severe mental disorder which had caused her to fantasise 
about being involved with members of the IRA (R v. Ward [1993] 1 WLR 
619 (CA)). A more recent example is provided by the case of Peter Fell, a 
fantasist who had his convictions for two murders quashed in 2001, having 
spent 17 years in prison (R v. Fell [2001] EWCA Crim 696). Fell, who had 
a history of making up stories about himself, made a series of anonymous 
telephone calls in 1982 and 1983 naming himself as the culprit and 
subsequently admitted being involved in an attack on the victims. Apart 
from his personality disorder, it appears that one of the reasons for his 
confession was that he was trying to give the police the impression that he 
should be charged with manslaughter, having become convinced that he 
would soon be charged with murder. 
Less severe psychological conditions may also cause a suspect to 
volunteer a false confession. The suspect may be particularly susceptible to 
suggestions put to him (as in R v. Raghip (1991) The Times 6.12.91 (CA) 
and R v. King [2000] 2 Cr App R 391 (CA)) or feel an overwhelming need 
to get the interview over and done with (as in R v. Delaney (1988) 88 Cr 
App R 338 (CA)) or confess on account of a child-like desire to protect a 
loved one (as in R v. Harvey [1988] Crim LR 241 (CCC)) or because of a 
sense of guilt over some other real or imagined misconduct in the past. A 
simple-minded suspect, not realising the long-term implications of any 
admissions, may confess as the quickest and easiest way of getting home, 
or accept suggestions put by those in authority that he may have 
committed the offence while he was suffering from a black-out (as in R v. 
Paris (1992) 97 Cr App R 99 (CA)). For similar reasons, even quite normal 
suspects may falsely confess, particularly if the stress of the interview has 
become intolerable. The combination of constant questioning and the 
sterile environment of the interview-room is likely to cause any sane 
person's resistance to drop eventually and this may lead to a false 
confession as a way of escape ± the immediate prospect of freedom 
outweighing the obvious long-term consequences. Alternatively, the 
suspect may be a mother who wishes to get home to look after her 
children (a point raised unsuccessfully in R v. Tyrer (1989) 90 Cr App R 
446 (CA)) or be suffering from the effects of a prescribed drug (as in R v. 
Sat-Bhambra (1988) 88 Cr App R 55 (CA)) or wish to get out of custody in 
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order to obtain a `fix' of a drug to which he is addicted (as in R v. 
Goldenberg (1988) 88 Cr App R 285 (CA)). 
Police trickery or impropriety may also induce false confessions. The 
suspect may be deceived about the evidence against him or have had 
evidence planted on him and realise he has little chance of being believed 
by a jury. The reduction in sentence the accused can expect on account of 
his confessing at an early stage in the proceedings is an added incentive to 
make a false confession in such circumstances. The suspect may falsely 
confess to a lesser offence following threats that he (or perhaps members 
of his family) will otherwise be charged with a more serious offence. The 
police may promise bail (as in R v. Barry (1991) 95 Cr App R 384 (CA)) or 
threaten custody, or promise to drop other charges (or threaten to add 
more charges), or understate the seriousness of the offence (as in R v. 
Delaney (1988) 88 Cr App R 338 (CA) and R v. Kirk [2000] 1 WLR 567 
(CA)), or even promise not to proceed with any prosecution at all (as in R 
v. Mathias (1989) The Times 24.8.89 (CA)). In R v. Clark [1999] Crim LR 
573 (CA) a conviction was quashed because fresh evidence suggested that 
the police might have left heroin in the suspect's cell and that he had 
confessed after smoking it. 
The most serious form of police misconduct is oppression, whether it 
amounts to threats, physical abuse or something more insidious such as 
sleep deprivation. It would appear, for example, that four members of the 
`Birmingham Six' signed false confessions to mass murder in 1974 in 
consequence of police brutality (R v. McIlkenny (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 
(CA)), 7.1.2.2 post) and that Keith Twitchell confessed to his involvement 
in an armed robbery in 1980 only after members of the notorious West 
Midlands Serious Crime Squad had suffocated him by placing a plastic 
bag over his head (R v. Twitchell [2000] 1 Cr App R 373 (CA), 3.3.19 ante). 
It may be that prolonged oppression or torture will eventually cause any 
person to confess to any offence, no matter how serious the allegation 
may be. 
7.1.2.2 Oral Confessions Fabricated by Interrogators 
It is not only the risk of false confessions actually made by the accused 
which needs to be considered. The accused may assert that the confession 
was fabricated by the prosecution witness. An obvious example is so-called 
`noble-cause corruption', where a police officer feels the need to construct 
evidence against the person he genuinely believes committed the offence, 
but against whom he is unable to gather sufficient evidence. 
In 1975 the `Birmingham Six' were convicted of terrorist outrages which 
killed 21 people the year before. Two of the six were alleged to have made 
oral confessions (which they denied) while the other four admitted signing 
written confessions but asserted that they were false and had been elicited 
by force (see Mullin, Error of Judgment (1986, Chatto & Windus) at 
pp. 57±103). The prosecution case was based on these confessions, 
corroborated by expert scientific evidence suggesting that two of the six 
men had been handling the explosive nitroglycerine. The convictions were 
quashed in 1991 on the ground that the scientific evidence could no longer 
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be regarded as reliable and that police witnesses had lied on oath (R v. 
McIlkenny (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 (CA)). Interestingly, the psychologist 
Dr Gudjonsson applied his `suggestibility and compliance' test to the six 
men in 1987 and found that the two who failed to sign written confessions 
registered very low scores, one possible conclusion being that while 
brutality was enough to force the other four to sign false confessions the 
remaining two held out, compelling the police to fabricate oral confessions 
instead (Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and 
Testimony (1992, John Wiley), at pp. 270±2; see generally Dennis, 
`Miscarriages of Justice and the Law of Confessions' (1993) PL 291). 
Similarly, the conviction of Winston Silcott for the murder of PC 
Blakelock during a riot in north London in 1985 was quashed on the 
ground that evidence of his purported oral admission had been severely 
undermined. The only evidence against Silcott was that he had made oral 
admissions to a Detective Chief Superintendent during his interview, but 
in the light of expert evidence demonstrating that that officer had been 
guilty of `misbehaviour' (altering his interview notes) the prosecution 
evidence was rendered worthless and Silcott's conviction could not be 
allowed to stand (R v. Silcott (1991) The Times 6.12.91 (CA)). 
7.1.2.3 Ensuring the Reliability of Confession Evidence 
Section 76(2) of PACE was enacted to ensure that potentially unreliable 
(that is, potentially false) confessions would be excluded as a matter of 
law. The subsection prevents the admission of confessions (even if they are 
true) if they have been obtained as a consequence of oppression or 
anything said or done which was likely in the circumstances to render 
unreliable any such confession made by the accused. 
A confession which has been made in consequence of oppression is 
inadmissible for a number of reasons. First, as a matter of common sense 
any confession obtained by oppression is highly likely to be unreliable (the 
`reliability principle', 10.2.1 post). Second, an exclusionary rule of this sort 
reflects the need in a civilised society to protect the rights of any suspect 
being questioned by agents of the state (the `protective principle', 10.2.3 
post), in particular the suspect's right not to incriminate himself and his 
right to be treated in a way which is neither degrading nor oppressive. To 
torture or in some other way maltreat a suspect in order to elicit a 
confession from him is unacceptable, and one way in which the law can 
prevent such behaviour is to exclude any confession so obtained. Closely 
allied to the protective principle is the `disciplinary principle', which acts 
to deter police misconduct by excluding the fruits of their impropriety. 
However, because it has been said on a number of occasions that it is not 
the function of the Court of Appeal to discipline the police, the true 
rationale would (in theory) seem to be protective rather than disciplinary 
(see 10.2.2 post). Finally there is the `integrity principle'. This demands 
that the moral integrity of the criminal justice system, and the moral 
soundness of a verdict of guilt at the end of the trial, should not be 
undermined by evidence obtained in consequence of police misconduct 
(10.2.4 post). 
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Oppression aside, admissibility under s. 76(2) turns on the question of 
reliability, but this does not mean reliability in the sense that the 
confession is actually a truthful assertion by the accused, for that is a 
question of fact for the jury; it is apparent reliability in the sense that the 
confession can safely be placed before the jury so that they can decide 
whether or not it is true. Section 76(2)(b) therefore excludes the accused's 
confession if it was made in consequence of anything said or done which 
was likely, in the circumstances, to render unreliable any (such) confession 
which the accused might have made in consequence thereof. If the thing 
said or done was such that any (such) confession made by the accused in 
consequence is likely to be unreliable, the accused's confession can be 
placed before the jury only if it is first proved that it was not so obtained 
(7.1.3.2 post). For the purposes of this admissibility test the actual truth or 
falsity of the confession is irrelevant; so in R v. Cox [1991] Crim LR 276 
(CA) it was held that the judge should have disregarded the accused's 
admission on the voir dire that his confession was true (see also R v. 
McGovern (1990) 92 Cr App R 228 (CA)). But if a confession can be ruled 
inadmissible under s. 76(2)(b) notwithstanding its actual reliability it 
follows that, as with s. 76(2)(a), there must be some other policy 
consideration at work. Given that most confessions are made in response 
to questions put by agents of the state, such as police or customs officers, 
reliability (in both senses of the word) is best ensured by the elimination of 
any factors during the interview process as a whole, including any periods 
of detention, which might cause a suspect to make a false confession; and 
one way of achieving this is to impose certain obligations on those who 
investigate offences. The purpose of s. 76(2)(b) (and the Codes of Practice 
issued under ss. 60 and 66) is to ensure, first, that suspects are not treated 
in a way which would cast doubt on the reliability of their confessions and, 
second, that their human rights are respected and protected at a more 
general level, beyond the specific prohibition on oppressive interviewing 
techniques imposed by s. 76(2)(a). 
7.1.3 Confessions Tendered by the Prosecution 
There are five ways in which a confession tendered by the prosecution may 
be challenged, to prevent the jury from considering it at the end of the 
trial. Two of these are found in s. 76(2) of PACE, requiring the exclusion 
of a confession as a matter of law if the prosecution are unable to prove it 
was not obtained as a result of oppression (s. 76(2)(a)) or anything said or 
done which renders it potentially unreliable (s. 76(2)(b)). If the confession 
falls to be excluded under s. 76(2) the judge has no discretion to allow it to 
be admitted (R v. Paris (1992) 97 Cr App R 99 (CA)). If a confession is not 
excluded under s. 76(2) it is prima facie admissible, but may be excluded by 
the judge in the exercise of his statutory discretion to exclude any 
prosecution evidence which would adversely affect the fairness of the 
proceedings (s. 78(1) of PACE). The judge also has a broad common-law 
discretion to exclude (or withdraw) any prosecution evidence which would 
be unduly prejudicial to the accused, and a narrower common-law 
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discretion to exclude (or withdraw) any confession tendered (or adduced) 
by the prosecution if it was obtained in violation of the accused's right not 
to incriminate himself (R v. Sang [1979] 3 WLR 263 (HL), 10.1 post). 
When deciding whether to exclude a confession the judge will take into 
consideration any breaches of PACE, such as s. 56 (the right to have 
someone informed) and s. 58 (the right to legal advice), and the latest 
(2003) version of its Codes of Practice, particularly Codes C and E. 
Section 67(11) provides that if any provision of the Codes appears to be 
relevant to any question arising in the trial it `shall be taken into account'. 
Code C contains provisions relating to, inter alia, the right not to be held 
incommunicado (C-5 and Annex B); the right to legal advice (C-6 and 
Annex B); the conditions of detention for suspects (C-8); the treatment of 
detained suspects (C-9); the cautioning of suspects (C-10); interviews ± 
including special rules governing the interviewing of juveniles and the 
mentally-handicapped ± (C-11, C-12, Annexes C and E), written 
statements under caution (Annex D), interpreters (C-13), special restric-
tions on questioning (C-14), reviews and extensions of detention (C-15) 
and charging (C-16). Codes E and F respectively govern the audio and 
`visual' recording of interviews (although Code F, issued under s. 60A of 
PACE, currently applies only to certain areas of England and Wales as 
part of a pilot study). These Codes of Practice bind all persons `charged 
with the duty of investigating offences' (s. 67(9)) such as police officers, 
customs officers and even commercial investigators (R v. Twaites (1990) 
92 Cr App R 106 (CA)) and private store detectives (R v. Bayliss (1993) 98 
Cr App R 235 (CA)). 
7.1.3.1 Section 76(2)(a) of PACE: Oppression 
If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in 
evidence a confession made by an accused person, it is represented to 
the court that the confession was or may have been obtained ± (a) by  
oppression of the person who made it . . . the court shall not allow the 
confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the 
prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the 
confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as 
aforesaid. 
Section 76(8) provides that `oppression' includes torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence (whether or not 
amounting to torture), reflecting the substance of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Code C-11.5 complements 
s. 76(2)(a) by prohibiting investigating officers from trying to obtain 
answers or elicit a statement by oppression. If the accused does not raise 
the issue, the court itself may require proof that a confession was not 
obtained by oppression (s. 76(3)). 
The meaning of oppression was considered by the Court of Appeal in R 
v. Fulling [1987] 2 WLR 923. The accused claimed she had been told by a 
police officer that her lover had a mistress who was being kept in the 
adjoining cell. This, it was claimed, had so distressed her that she had 
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confessed simply to get out, and it was argued on appeal that the police 
officer's conduct had amounted to oppression. The Court of Appeal 
rejected this submission, holding that oppression was to be given its 
ordinary dictionary meaning ± the `exercise of authority or power in a 
burdensome, harsh or wrongful manner; unjust or cruel treatment of 
subjects, inferiors, etc.; the imposition of unreasonable or unjust burdens' 
± and that for conduct to amount to oppression there would generally 
have to be impropriety on the part of the interrogator. According to Lord 
Lane CJ, the word `oppression' connotes `detestable wickedness', so it 
should not be surprising that rude and discourteous questioning has been 
held not to amount to oppression (R v. Emmerson (1990) 92 Cr App R 284 
(CA)). Where the questioning is more aggressive and intimidating, 
however, it may enter the realm of oppression and justify the exclusion 
of a confession under s. 76(2)(a). In R v. Paris (1992) 97 Cr App R 99 
(CA) the fact that the accused (`M') had made his first inculpatory 
comment within an hour of having been continuously bullied and shouted 
at by interviewing police officers resulted in his conviction being quashed. 
The `force and menace' of the officers' technique amounted to oppression, 
and this was not altered by the fact that his solicitor had been with him 
and failed to intervene. M, who was of low intelligence, had been 
continuously hectored during the interrogation, even though he denied 
any involvement in the alleged offence over and over again, and had been 
crying and sobbing for extended periods. 
At common law the particular character of the accused was deemed to 
be relevant to the question of oppression, so the hardened criminal was 
expected to put up with a more vigorous style of interrogation. This would 
still seem to be the position under s. 76(2)(a). The mental state of the 
accused was thought to be relevant in R v. Paris (where it was felt the 
questioning would have been oppressive even for a suspect of normal 
intelligence) and in R v. Spens [1992] 1 WLR 148 (CA) the `intelligent and 
sophisticated' personality of the accused was considered relevant to 
whether he had been questioned oppressively. 
7.1.3.2 Section 76(2)(b) of PACE: Unreliability 
If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in 
evidence a confession made by an accused person, it is represented to 
the court that the confession was or may have been obtained . . . (b) in  
consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the 
circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession 
which might be made by him in consequence thereof, the court shall not 
allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far 
as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the 
confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as 
aforesaid. 
Code C-11.5 prohibits police officers from indicating, except in answer to 
a direct question, what action the police will take in the event that the 
suspect answers questions or makes a statement or refuses to do either. 
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Section 76(3) of PACE provides that the court itself may require the 
prosecution to prove that a confession was not obtained in consequence of 
anything said or done which was likely to render it unreliable. 
There will inevitably be an overlap between the two limbs of s. 76(2) if it 
is oppressive behaviour which has led to the potential unreliability of the 
confession (as in R v. Paris (1992) 97 Cr App R 99 (CA); see also R v. 
Beales [1991] Crim LR 118 (CC)). But the test in s. 76(2)(b) is broader in 
scope than s. 76(2)(a). The phrase `anything said or done' covers not only 
threats but also favourable inducements such as a promise to grant bail or 
an assurance that the accused's family members will not be charged. It also 
covers words or behaviour emanating from another source which would 
render the accused's confession unreliable; for example, where the accused 
heard her lover confess and wished to protect her by taking the blame 
upon herself (as in R v. Harvey [1988] Crim LR 241 (CCC)) or where, 
during the interview, the accused's solicitor behaved like an incredulous 
and hostile police officer (as in R v. M (2000) unreported (99/4259/X4) 
(CA)). Unlike s. 76(2)(a), however, there need be no impropriety on the 
part of interviewing officers for a confession to fall foul of s. 76(2)(b) (R v. 
Fulling [1987] 2 WLR 923 (CA), R v. Walker [1998] Crim LR 211 (CA)). 
The test for admissibility was broken down by the Court of Appeal in R 
v. Barry (1991) 95 Cr App R 384 in the following way: (i) Was there 
`anything said or done'? (ii) If so, was the thing said or done likely in the 
circumstances to render unreliable `any confession' which might have been 
made by the accused as a consequence? (iii) If so, did the thing said or 
done actually cause the accused to make his particular confession? 
Sensibly, the reference to `any confession' in s. 76(2)(b) has been 
interpreted to mean `any such' or `such a' confession as the one the 
accused made, as opposed to any entirely different confession (R v. Bow 
Street Magistrates' Court ex parte Proulx [2001] 1 All ER 57 (DC) at 
p. 77). 
The accused merely needs to represent to the judge (or magistrates) that 
his confession may have been obtained in consequence of anything said or 
done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render 
unreliable any (such) confession. It is then for the prosecution to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused's particular confession was not 
obtained in consequence of the thing said or done. This is a test of 
causation. The test is not whether the particular confession is actually 
unreliable, but whether any (such) confession which might have been 
made by the (particular) accused in those circumstances, as a result of the 
thing said or done, is likely to be unreliable. If the accused's particular 
confession was actually made in consequence of that thing said or done, in 
those circumstances, it is inadmissible as a matter of law. Every case will 
turn on its own facts, but consideration will be given to the nature of what 
was said or done, the personality of the accused, the nature of the offence 
in question, the accused's experience of the criminal justice system, the 
accused's mental or physical health, the nature and extent of the 
confession and indeed any other relevant circumstances existing at the 
time. The underlying policy is to ensure that a confession should be made 
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available to the jury only when it is safe to do so ± whether the confession 
is actually reliable, in the sense of being true, is a question of fact for them. 
In R v. Goldenberg (1988) 88 Cr App R 285 the Court of Appeal held 
that `anything said or done' was limited to extraneous matters and did not 
apply to anything emanating from the accused himself, in that case the 
accused's purported craving for heroin during his interview which, it was 
suggested, had caused him to confess in the hope of obtaining police bail. 
The same point was made in R v. Lovell (1999) unreported (99/3783/Y3) 
(CA) in respect of the accused's mental state as described by a 
psychologist. In R v. Crampton (1990) 92 Cr App R 369 the Court of 
Appeal doubted whether holding an interview while the accused was 
suffering from withdrawal symptoms was something done within the 
meaning of s. 76(2)(b). The question whether a drug addict was fit to be 
interviewed was said to be a matter for the officers and the police doctor 
who had been there at the time of the interview; but, even if it was to be 
accepted that holding an interview while the accused was suffering from 
withdrawal symptoms could amount to a thing done, as the officers and 
doctor had considered the accused fit to be interviewed the judge had been 
entitled to admit the confession. The Court went on to approve the dictum 
of Lord Lane CJ in R v. Rennie [1982] 1 WLR 64 (CA) (at p. 69): 
`Very few confessions are inspired solely by remorse. Often the motives 
of an accused person are mixed and include a hope that an early 
admission may lead to an earlier release or a lighter sentence. If it were 
the law that the mere presence of such a motive, even if prompted by 
something said or done by a person in authority, led inexorably to the 
exclusion of a confession, nearly every confession would be rendered 
inadmissible. That is not the law. In some cases the hope may be self-
generated. If so, it is irrelevant, even if it provides the dominant motive 
for making the confession. In such a case the confession will not have 
been obtained by anything said or done . . .' 
Given the purpose of s. 76(2)(b) it would be absurd if the effects of 
drugs or withdrawal symptoms were to be entirely disregarded, but it may 
be that such effects can be taken into account as a relevant circumstance 
just as the accused's mental or physical weaknesses may be taken into 
consideration. In R v. McGovern (1990) 92 Cr App R 228 (CA), for 
example, it was felt the accused's pregnancy and the fact she had been 
vomiting prior to the interview ought to have been taken into 
consideration by the judge. 
In R v. Everett [1988] Crim LR 826 (CA) the accused's confession was 
held to be inadmissible because, although he was 42 years old, he had an 
IQ of 61 and a mental age of an eight-year-old. A similar approach was 
taken in R v. Raghip (1991) The Times 6.12.91 (CA) where it was held the 
19-year-old accused's IQ of 74, his mental age of nine and his 
susceptibility ought to have been taken into consideration, supported by 
appropriate medical evidence (see also 12.2.1 post). A further example is 
provided by R v. Delaney (1988) 88 Cr App R 338 (CA), a case in which 
the 17-year-old accused's IQ of 80 and his emotional personality meant he 
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might have confessed to get the interview over with as quickly as possible. 
These mental characteristics, together with the fact the interviewing 
officers had played down the gravity of the offence (an indecent assault on 
a young girl) and had failed to record what precisely was said to him, 
meant his confession should have been excluded. 
In R v. Walker [1998] Crim LR 211 expert psychiatric evidence 
suggested that the accused suffered from a personality disorder which 
might have led her to elaborate inaccurately on events without under-
standing the implications of what she was saying, particularly as she was a 
user of crack cocaine. The Court of Appeal held that any mental or 
personality abnormalities may be of relevance and this included the 
accused's personality disorder. As such, it should have been taken into 
consideration by the trial judge when deciding the question of 
admissibility under s. 76(2)(b), and her conviction was therefore quashed 
(see also R v. Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619 (CA)). The Court of Appeal did not 
feel the need to consider fresh evidence suggesting that she had been under 
the influence of drugs at the time of the interview, although in principle it 
is difficult to see why the effect of drugs should not also be regarded as a 
relevant circumstance. Some authority for this proposition can be found in 
R v. Sat-Bhambra (1988) 88 Cr App R 55 (CA) where the trial judge 
excluded a confession made while the accused was under the influence of 
Valium (although as this drug had been prescribed by the police doctor it 
could have been considered a `thing done') and was possibly also under 
the influence of the medication he had taken for his diabetes. Moreover, in 
R v. Barry (1991) 95 Cr App R 384 (CA) it was accepted that the accused's 
`urgent desire for bail' (so that he would not lose custody of his young son) 
could amount to a circumstance. There would seem to be no reason why a 
craving for heroin should not also be taken into consideration. 
A thing said or done will justify exclusion under s. 76(2)(b) only if the 
prosecution are unable to prove that it did not cause the accused's 
confession to be made. In other words, a confession will be admissible if 
was not caused by the thing said or done. Thus, in R v. Tyrer (1989) 90 Cr 
App R 446 (CA) although the police had done something by bringing in a 
blanket and a mattress, implying that the accused would have to stay in 
the cells overnight away from her children and kittens, the judge decided 
as a question of fact that it was not that conduct which had caused her to 
confess. Rather, she had confessed because the interviewing officer had 
exposed her story as nonsense. In R v. Weeks [1995] Crim LR 52 (CA) the 
accused made a confession following a police officer's comments 
suggesting that if a confession was not forthcoming he would remain in 
custody. Although there was a `clear risk' that the comments might have 
caused the accused to admit more than his true involvement, the accused's 
astute personality, experience of being interviewed by the police and denial 
of other allegations meant that causation could be disproved. 
An omission to do something the police are under a duty to do, for 
example non-compliance with provisions of the PACE Codes of Practice, 
may amount to a thing said or done for the purposes of s. 76(2)(b) (R v. 
Doolan [1988] Crim LR 747 (CA)). A breach of Code C may therefore lead 
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to the exclusion of a confession under s. 76(2) (or s. 78(1)) but, again, there 
must be causation. In R v. Alladice (1988) 87 Cr App R 380 (CA) the 
accused confessed to his part in a robbery after the police had refused him 
access to a solicitor (in breach of Code C and s. 58 of PACE). This breach, 
though a thing done, had not caused the accused to confess. The accused 
had understood the caution, had admitted that he was well able to cope 
with interviews and had been aware of his rights, including his (then) right 
to remain silent. 
In some circumstances even a technical breach of Code C may lead to 
the exclusion of a confession under s. 76(2)(b) if it has given rise to 
potential unreliability. In DPP v. Blake [1989] 1 WLR 432 the accused, a 
16-year-old juvenile who refused to have anything to do with her parents, 
was interviewed with her father present as the `appropriate adult' required 
under (what is now) C-11.15. The police had tried to obtain a social 
worker but no-one was willing to attend if a parent was available. The 
police therefore had no choice but to go ahead with the father, even 
though the absence of any empathy between him and his daughter meant 
he could not adequately perform the advisory function required of an 
appropriate adult (see C-11.17). The magistrates excluded her confession 
under s. 76(2)(b), a decision upheld by the Divisional Court on the ground 
that the accused had not benefited from the presence of an appropriate 
adult. Breaches of Code C were also relevant in R v. Chung (1990) 92 Cr 
App R 314 (CA) where the accused's oral admission at his flat regarding 
stolen motor insurance notes was held to be inadmissible under s. 76(2)(b). 
He had been refused legal advice in breach of s. 58 of PACE and there had 
been a number of breaches of Code C: no contemporaneous record had 
been kept of the alleged conversation, the eventual note of the 
conversation had not been shown to the accused and his solicitor had 
not been informed of the conversation. This does not mean that any 
breach of Code C will justify exclusion under s. 76(2)(b), however, as the 
Divisional Court made clear in DPP v. Blake [1989] 1 WLR 432. The 
question is always whether the breach renders the confession potentially 
unreliable. 
Finally, it has been held that advice properly given to the accused by his 
solicitor will not normally provide a basis for excluding a subsequent 
confession under s. 76(2)(b), but the position might be different if the 
accused was particularly vulnerable (R v. Wahab [2003] 1 Cr App R 
232 (CA)). 
7.1.3.3 Section 78(1) of PACE: Unfairness 
Section 78(1) provides the trial judge (or magistrates) with a discretion to 
exclude evidence on which the prosecution propose to rely if, having 
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained, its admission would have `such an adverse effect 
on the fairness of the proceedings' that it ought not to be admitted. In R v. 
Mason [1988] 1 WLR 139 (CA) it was held that s. 78(1) could also be 
applied to exclude confessions. A confession prima facie admissible under 
s. 76(1) of PACE may therefore be excluded by the judge under s. 78(1) 
Admissions 221 
where, for example, there has been a significant breach of PACE and/or its 
Codes of Practice prior to or during the interrogation, so long as that 
breach is such that the proceedings would be rendered sufficiently unfair if 
the confession were admitted. 
Section 78(1) is a statutory discretion, and ultimately every case will 
turn on its own facts, but it seems that there is a presumption in favour of 
excluding confessions where the police have been guilty of deliberate 
misconduct. In R v. Alladice (1988) 87 Cr App R 380 (CA), a case 
concerning a breach of s. 58 of PACE, the Court of Appeal said (at p. 386): 
`If the police have acted in bad faith, the court will have little difficulty 
in ruling any confession inadmissible under section 78, if not under s. 76. 
If the police, albeit in good faith, have nevertheless fallen foul of section 
58, it is still necessary for the court to decide whether to admit the 
evidence would adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings, and 
would do so to such an extent that the confession ought to be excluded.' 
Section 58(1) provides that a suspect who is under arrest and being 
questioned in custody is entitled to consult a solicitor in private, save that 
access may be delayed for up to 36 hours in certain circumstances (see 
s. 58(5)±(11)). A breach of s. 58 of PACE (and/or Code C-6 and Annex B) 
may result in a confession being excluded under ss. 76(2)(b) or 78(1), albeit 
for different reasons. Section 58 does not apply to persons detained under 
the Terrorism Act 2000 (see s. 58(12) of PACE and Schedule 8 to the 2000 
Act, allowing a delay of up to 48 hours). 
The suspect's right to legal advice is `one of the most important and 
fundamental rights of a citizen' (R v. Samuel [1988] 2 WLR 920 (CA) at 
p. 934) ± a fortiori if the suspect is mentally ill (R v. Aspinall [1999] 2 Cr 
App R 115 (CA) at p. 122) ± and the European Court of Human Rights 
has accepted that this right is implicit in Article 6(3)(c) of the European 
Convention, exemplifying the fact that pre-trial irregularities may have a 
bearing on whether there has been a breach of Article 6(1) (Murray v. 
United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 29 at pp. 64±7, Magee v. United 
Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 822 at pp. 831±5, Averill v. United Kingdom 
(2000) 31 EHRR 839 at pp. 855±7). As with the subsidiary rights expressly 
set out in Article 6, however, this implicit pre-trial right to legal advice is 
not absolute. In Magee v. United Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 822 the 
European Court of Human Rights said (at p. 834) that although Article 6 
normally requires that the accused be allowed to benefit from the 
assistance of a lawyer at the initial stages of police interrogation: `this right 
. . . may be subject to restrictions for good cause', the question in each case 
being `whether the restriction, in the light of the entirety of the 
proceedings, has deprived the accused of a fair hearing'. In that case, 
the accused was arrested early in the morning of 16 December 1988 in 
connection with an attempted terrorist offence and interrogated for 
extended periods by alternating pairs of detectives until the end of the 
following day. While in detention he was held incommunicado in austere 
conditions and prevented from contacting a solicitor and, on 17 December, 
he finally made oral admissions during his sixth interview (09:30 to 13:00) 
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and signed a lengthy statement explaining his involvement later that 
afternoon (14:00 to 16:20), which statement subsequently formed the basis 
of the prosecution case against him. It was only after that statement had 
been signed that he was allowed to consult with his solicitor. The 
Strasbourg Court concluded that the austerity of the conditions of his 
detention and his exclusion from outside contact were intended by the 
police to be psychologically coercive and conducive to breaking down any 
resolve he may have manifested at the beginning of his detention to remain 
silent. The Court held that, in the light of those circumstances, the accused 
should have been given access to a solicitor at the initial stages of the 
interrogation `as a counterweight to the intimidating atmosphere 
specifically devised to sap his will and make him confide in his 
interrogators'. Even though the accused had not been ill-treated during 
his detention, the offence was one of alleged terrorism and the confession 
had been given voluntarily it was held that there had been a violation of 
Article 6(1) in conjunction with Article 6(3)(c). According to the Court (at 
p. 835), `to deny access to a lawyer for such a long period and in a 
situation where the rights of the defence were irretrievably prejudiced is ± 
whatever the justification for such denial ± incompatible with the rights of 
the accused under Article 6'. 
The accused's conviction may be quashed, therefore, if there has been a 
breach of s. 58 and the sole ground of appeal is that the trial judge refused 
to exclude his confession under s. 78(1). In R v. Walsh (1989) 91 Cr App R 
161 (CA) Saville J said (at p. 163): 
`The main object of section 58 of the Act and indeed of the Codes of 
Practice is to achieve fairness . . . To our minds it follows that if there 
are significant and substantial breaches of section 58 or the provisions 
of the Code, then prima facie at least the standards of fairness set by 
Parliament have not been met. So far as a defendant is concerned, it 
seems to us also to follow that to admit evidence against him which has 
been obtained in circumstances where these standards have not been 
met, cannot but have an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings. This does not mean, of course, that in every case of a 
significant or substantial breach of section 58 or the Code of Practice 
the evidence concerned will automatically be excluded. Section 78 does 
not so provide. The task of the court is not merely to consider whether 
there would be an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings, but 
such an adverse effect that justice requires the evidence to be excluded 
. . . However, although bad faith may make substantial or significant 
that which might not otherwise be so, the contrary does not follow. 
Breaches which are in themselves significant and substantial are not 
rendered otherwise by the good faith of the officers concerned.' 
It should always be remembered, however, that s. 78(1) gives the judge a 
discretion and any appeal on the ground of its misapplication is unlikely 
to be successful unless it can be shown that he acted perversely in the sense 
of being `Wednesbury unreasonable' (R v. O'Leary (1988) 87 Cr App R 
387 (CA)). In other words, the appeal will fail unless it can be shown that 
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the judge failed to take into consideration relevant matters (such as 
breaches of the Codes of Practice) or took into consideration irrelevant 
matters or his decision was one which no reasonable judge could have 
reached. In R v. Jelen (1989) 90 Cr App R 456 (CA) Auld J said (at 
pp. 464±5): 
`[T]he decision of a judge whether or not to exclude evidence under 
section 78 of the 1984 Act is made as a result of the exercise by him of a 
discretion based upon the particular circumstances of the case and upon 
his assessment of the adverse effect, if any, it would have on the fairness 
of the proceedings. The circumstances of each case are almost always 
different, and judges may well take different views in the proper exercise 
of their discretion even where the circumstances are similar. This is not 
an apt field for hard case law and well-founded distinctions between 
cases.' 
The question of causation is as relevant to the determination of fairness 
under s. 78(1) as it is to the question of admissibility under s. 76(2). If it 
can be shown that the breach of s. 58 or any other provision in PACE or 
the Codes of Practice would have made no difference to how the accused 
conducted himself then, in the absence of bad faith on the part of the 
police, an application to exclude a confession under s. 78(1) is unlikely to 
succeed. In R v. Dunford (1990) 91 Cr App R 150 (CA) the police had 
refused the accused access to his solicitor in breach of s. 58, but his 
experience of having been arrested and detained (as exemplified by his 
previous convictions) and his awareness of his rights entitled the judge to 
conclude that a solicitor's advice would probably have caused him to 
behave no differently. There had been no bad faith and his admissions 
during the interview had been properly relied on at his trial. Similarly, in R 
v. Oliphant [1992] Crim LR 40 (CA) it was held that the accused had 
confessed because that was what he had wanted to do. The breach of s. 58 
and Code C had made no difference as the accused had been aware of his 
rights. Conversely, it has been said that where the accused was given the 
opportunity to consult with his solicitor, but the solicitor acted wholly 
improperly by, for example, persuading the accused to confess in order 
that he, the solicitor, could obtain a bribe from a police officer or some 
advantage for another client, s. 78(1) `would provide an ample basis for 
exclusion, notwithstanding that the reliability of the confession was not in 
doubt' (R v. Wahab [2003] 1 Cr App R 232 (CA) at p. 242). 
The dictum of Saville J in R v. Walsh (1989) 91 Cr App R 161 (CA) 
(above) sets out another principle which may determine how s. 78(1) is 
applied. If the breach of PACE or the Codes is of a technical or de minimis 
nature not involving any bad faith on the part of the police (that is, a 
breach which is not `significant and substantial') there will be insufficient 
unfairness to justify the exclusion of the accused's confession (see also R v. 
Keenan [1989] 3 WLR 1193 (CA) at p. 1206). 
One particular breach of Code C which is likely to be considered 
significant and substantial is a failure to caution the accused before 
questioning him about the alleged offence, as required by C-10.1 (R v. Pall 
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[1992] Crim LR 126 (CA)). The caution is given to ensure that the suspect 
is aware of his privilege against self-incrimination. Code C-10.1 provides 
that if there are grounds to suspect a person has committed an offence he 
must be cautioned (in accordance with C-10.5) before any questions are 
put to him regarding his involvement or suspected involvement in that 
offence. The provision goes on to state that a caution need not be given if 
the questions are put to a person for `other necessary purposes' such as to 
establish his identity or his ownership of any vehicle. The test set out in 
C-10.1 is an objective one: the caution need be given only where there are 
`grounds to suspect', first, that an offence has been committed and, 
second, that the person being questioned committed that offence. If the 
officer is merely acting on a subjective hunch there is no need to give the 
caution prior to questioning (R v. Shah [1994] Crim LR 125 (CA)). In 
other words, `grounds to suspect' means `reasonable grounds for 
suspicion' (R v. James [1996] Crim LR 650 (CA)). It is to be noted that, 
in determining whether a police officer had reasonable grounds for 
suspicion, the judge is entitled to consider evidence which is protected 
from disclosure by public interest immunity (R v. Smith [2001] 1 WLR 
1031 (CA)). Furthermore, the suspect should be told the true nature of the 
investigation being conducted, in line with the purport of C-10.1 and 
Article 5(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, so that he can 
give proper weight to that factor when deciding whether to seek legal 
advice and/or respond to the questions put to him. In R v. Kirk [2000] 1 
WLR 567 the police questioned the accused about the theft of a bag, 
which had been snatched from an elderly lady in the street, without telling 
him that the lady had fallen over and subsequently died. The accused 
admitted that he had snatched a bag in the vicinity without knowing the 
true gravity of the situation, and his confession was adduced by the 
prosecution at his trial for robbery and manslaughter. The Court of 
Appeal quashed his convictions on the ground that in normal 
circumstances s. 78(1) should be applied to exclude a confession which 
has been given by the accused in ignorance of the offence being 
investigated and which might not have been given if he had been aware 
of the true nature of the investigation. Code C-11.1A now provides that 
the interviewee must be informed of the `nature of the offence, or further 
offence'. 
A clear example of the application of s. 78(1) where there has been a 
failure to caution is R v. Hunt [1992] Crim LR 582. A police officer saw the 
accused putting a flick-knife into his pocket and he was searched. Without 
cautioning him the officer asked him what the knife was for, to which the 
accused responded that it was his and he would carry it if he wanted. The 
Court of Appeal quashed his conviction for possessing an offensive 
weapon on the ground, inter alia, that the conversation ought to have been 
excluded under s. 78(1) (see also Batley v. DPP (1998) The Times 5.3.98 
(DC)). In R v. Okafor (1993) 99 Cr App R 97 (CA) uniformed customs 
officers at Gatwick Airport found that a bag of stewed snails in the 
accused's luggage contained packages of cocaine, but without giving the 
caution they asked him questions about the snails and he admitted that he 
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had bought them and that they were his. It was held that his admission of 
ownership ought to have been excluded. The extent to which customs 
officers can question a suspect about his luggage before cautioning him 
arose again in R v. Nelson [1998] 2 Cr App R 399. Two sisters, N and R, 
entered the UK from Jamaica with cocaine secreted in their luggage. By 
the time N was questioned the customs officer had already developed a 
suspicion that she was carrying drugs because he had seen that the metal 
stiffeners on her suitcase were thicker than usual, and this was a known 
method by which to smuggle drugs. He should not therefore have asked 
her questions about her luggage until he had cautioned her, even though 
he had not at that stage conducted a field test for drugs. (The Court of 
Appeal conceded that a simple question tying her to the suitcase such as 
`This is your suitcase is it?' would not need to have been preceded by a 
caution.) As a caution should have been given before N was questioned 
the whole of her interview ought to have been excluded under s. 78(1). By 
contrast, the objective ground for suspecting R's involvement, the new 
riveting and thick stiffeners on her suitcase, was noticed by the officer only 
after R had been questioned. There had therefore been no breach of 
C-10.1 in her case and her interview had been properly admitted. More 
prosaically, in McNamara v. Television Licensing Region [2002] EWHC 
2798 Admin (QBD) it was held that, because an offence under s. 1(1) of 
the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 is committed only if a television is used 
without a licence, an enquiry officer may ask a householder whether he 
has a television set and whether he has a licence without first cautioning 
him. The questions are asked to establish `primary facts' rather than self-
incriminating answers. 
A breach of C-10.1 will not lead to the exclusion of a confession, 
however, unless its admission would have a sufficiently adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings. In R v. Hoyte [1994] Crim LR 215 (CA), 
for example, although a caution should have been given to the accused 
following an overheard conversation between him and his co-accused 
which suggested their involvement in a conspiracy, the judge's decision to 
allow his subsequent confession to be admitted was upheld on appeal. The 
police had acted in good faith and there had been no unfairness to the 
accused. Similarly, in R v. Doyle [2002] EWCA Crim 1176, a case of 
alleged benefit fraud where D had telephoned the local authority's 
investigator with a view to exculpating himself following a request to make 
contact, but had not been cautioned at the outset of the call, it was held 
that even if a caution had been required the judge had been entitled to 
admit the record of D's incriminating comments. D (a senior police 
officer) had been aware of his right not to incriminate himself; he had 
known to whom he was talking and the reason for his having been 
contacted; he had not been placed under any pressure to make the 
telephone call or incriminate himself; and the investigator had not acted in 
bad faith. 
Formal interviews in police stations relating to indictable offences are 
now contemporaneously recorded on audio tape, in accordance with Code 
E, but there is still the risk of `verballing' in other contexts. Many of the 
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provisions in Code C-11 were introduced to minimise the risk of 
confessions being fabricated or inaccurately recorded in such circum-
stances and have therefore come to be known as the `verballing 
provisions'. They have three purposes: first, to eliminate the possibility 
of fabricated confessions; second, to ensure that what the accused said was 
accurately recorded; and third, to ensure that the accused will not be able 
to make a false allegation of police impropriety (see R v. Ward (1993) 98 
Cr App R 337 (CA) at pp. 340±1 and R v. Canale (1989) 91 Cr App R 1 
(CA) at p. 5). Briefly, an accurate record must be made at the same time as 
the interview or as soon afterwards as is practicable (C-11.7 to 11.9); this 
record must be shown to the suspect for him to indicate whether or not he 
agrees with it (C-11.11) and to his solicitor or appropriate adult if any such 
person is present (C-11.12); and a record should be made of the suspect's 
comments outside the context of the interview, which should also be 
shown to him for his approval (C-11.13). Code C-11.1A defines an 
interview as `the questioning of a person regarding [his] involvement or 
suspected involvement in a criminal offence or offences', and it is now 
clear that even a single question may amount to an interview for this 
purpose. In R v. Miller [1998] Crim LR 209 the accused was arrested and 
cautioned, and upon arrival at the police station was seen to drop a 
package on to the floor. The officer who saw this said that she had asked 
him whether the package contained ecstasy tablets and he had replied in 
the affirmative. The Court of Appeal held that this exchange amounted to 
an interview. 
Although bad faith on the part of the police may lead to the exclusion 
of a confession, surreptitious methods of criminal investigation will not 
fall foul of s. 78(1) so long as the undercover tactics were legitimate and 
not employed simply to avoid the application of PACE and the Codes of 
Practice. In 1990 the police established a mock jewellery shop (`Stardust 
Jewellers') for three months in north London for the purpose of 
apprehending criminals wishing to dispose of stolen goods. Video cameras 
and audio equipment were installed to record those who entered and what 
they said, and the shop was staffed by undercover officers purporting to be 
dishonest jewellers. The officers entered into friendly banter with their 
customers, and in order to maintain their cover asked the sort of questions 
shady jewellers would be expected to ask, such as questions about the 
parts of London where it would be unwise to try to resell the goods. 
Everything was contemporaneously recorded by the equipment concealed 
for that purpose. The operation resulted in many persons being charged, 
including two men who eventually pleaded guilty to handling following a 
failed application to have the evidence of their conversations excluded. 
Nevertheless they appealed on the ground that as they had been tricked 
into incriminating themselves in informal interviews, and the police 
officers had not cautioned them beforehand in accordance with C-10.1, 
the evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 78(1) or at common law 
(R v. Christou [1992] 3 WLR 228). The Court of Appeal dismissed their 
appeals holding, first, that they had voluntarily applied themselves to the 
trick and had done nothing which they would not have done anyway; and, 
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second, Code C did not apply to undercover operations of this kind where 
the police officer and suspect were on `equal terms'. The Code was 
intended to protect suspects who were vulnerable to abuse or pressure 
from police officers perceived to be in a position of authority. The 
situation in Stardust Jewellers was quite different as the police officers had 
not been overtly acting as such. Moreover, the undercover officers had not 
been asking questions `about' the offence (C-10.1) but had merely asked 
the sort of questions to be expected of a shady jeweller in order to 
maintain their cover. However, the Court of Appeal did add the important 
caveat that it would be wrong for police officers to adopt covert 
techniques for the purpose of circumventing the Code. 
The absence of independent evidence (such as a tape recording) 
supporting the undercover officer's version of events will militate against 
the admission of any incriminating remarks made by a suspect. The 
absence of such evidence certainly influenced the Court of Appeal in R v. 
Bryce (1992) 95 Cr App R 320. In that case, the accused was alleged to 
have made incriminating comments while negotiating the sale of a stolen 
car. The officer had called the accused on his mobile phone and asked him 
`how warm' the car was, to which the accused had replied that it was a 
`couple of days old'. The two men met the next afternoon and the officer 
expressly asked, `How long has it been nicked?' to which the accused 
replied, `Two to three days.' The accused was convicted of handling stolen 
goods and appealed on the ground that those conversations ought to have 
been excluded under s. 78(1). Although it was accepted that Code C did 
not apply to undercover officers acting on equal terms with a suspect, the 
Court of Appeal held that the incriminating remarks should have been 
excluded for two reasons. First, the questions asked by the officer had 
gone directly to the issue of mens rea ± they had not been oblique in nature 
or necessary for the officer's cover. Second, the accused had denied giving 
the answers he was alleged to have made and yet there was no 
contemporaneous record to support the officer's version of what had 
happened. The risk of concoction could not therefore be eliminated. 
In R v. Kosten [1993] Crim LR 687 there was a ruse which provided the 
accused (K) with an opportunity to incriminate himself but he was not 
compelled to do so, as in R v. Christou [1992] 3 WLR 228 (CA). Customs 
officers had tricked K into thinking he was dealing with the car salvage 
operator who had taken control of his courier's car and drugs, and during 
telephone conversations with an officer he disclosed incriminating 
information which was tantamount to a confession and subsequently 
admitted at his trial. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence had been 
properly admitted. K had initiated contact with his courier's relatives to 
find out where the car was being kept, he had freely volunteered the 
incriminating information to the undercover officer, he and the customs 
officer had been speaking on equal terms and their telephone conversa-
tions had been contemporaneously recorded on audio tape (see also R v. 
Lin [1995] Crim LR 817 (CA) and R v. Edwards [1997] Crim LR 348 (CA)). 
A surreptitious recording of an undercover operation will reduce the 
scope for a successful submission that admissions obtained as a result 
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ought to be excluded under s. 78(1); and if the presence of a police officer 
might cause the suspect to incriminate himself, as in R v. Bryce (1992) 95 
Cr App R 320 (CA), it would seem to make sense, at least from the point 
of view of law enforcement, to remove that human factor from the 
equation and rely entirely on a hidden microphone. In R v. Ali (1991) The 
Times 19.2.91 (CA) a recording of inculpatory comments made by the 
accused in conversation with his family the day after he had been charged 
with murder, while they were together in a bugged interview room, was 
held to be admissible as a matter of law and the judge had been entitled 
not to exclude it under s. 78(1). In R v. Bailey (1993) 97 Cr App R 365 the 
police bugged a cell and induced the two co-accused to share it, having 
pretended that this was contrary to the wishes of the investigating officers 
to allay their suspicions. Duly duped, and despite a warning from a 
solicitor, the two co-accused made a number of damaging admissions to 
each other which were recorded and subsequently adduced at their trial by 
the prosecution. The Court of Appeal held that the judge had properly 
exercised his discretion not to exclude the evidence as it had been lawfully 
obtained notwithstanding the measure of trickery employed (see also R v. 
Parker [1995] Crim LR 233 (CA)). 
In R v. Roberts [1997] 1 Cr App R 217, `C', a suspect who had agreed 
with the police to stay in the accused's bugged cell to elicit admissions 
from him, caused the accused to make admissions which were recorded. 
The Court of Appeal held that it was not the function of Code C to protect 
one suspect in relation to questioning by another suspect, and though 
there had been breaches of Code C in respect of what had passed between 
the police officers and `C' those breaches had been `insignificant' as they 
had not caused the accused's admissions. The Court added that the trial 
judge was given a `wide margin of discretion' under s. 78(1) which would 
be disturbed on appeal only if it could be shown that he had erred in 
principle or was plainly wrong. It seems that it was `C' who initiated his 
agreement with the police, but if the police had approached him the result 
would probably have been no different. Such a chain of events occurred in 
R v. Jelen (1989) 90 Cr App R 456 (CA) where the trial judge allowed a 
recorded conversation to be admitted notwithstanding the fact that the 
police had asked another suspect, `D', to record the accused's comments 
with the aid of a concealed tape recorder (though it should be noted that 
the accused was not under arrest at the time). The ruling was upheld on 
appeal as the judge had been entitled to conclude that the tactics used had 
not had such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings to 
warrant the exclusion of the evidence. 
The foregoing cases were decided prior to the quasi-incorporation into 
English law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8(1) 
of which provides that everyone has the right to respect for his private life 
(subject to permissible interference `in accordance with the law' by virtue 
of Article 8(2)). Nevertheless it is clear that a breach of Article 8 does not 
compel the judge to apply s. 78(1) in the accused's favour. The test for the 
application of s. 78(1) remains the same, and if the breach has not resulted 
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in the requisite degree of unfairness to justify exclusion the confession will 
be admitted. 
In R v. Khan [1996] 3 WLR 162 police officers placed a listening device 
on the outside wall of a suspect's flat, trespassing on and damaging his 
property in the process. A recording of the inculpatory comments made by 
the accused, a visitor at the flat who was suspected of being involved in an 
importation of heroin a few months earlier, was ruled admissible and not 
excluded under s. 78(1). The House of Lords upheld this ruling on the 
ground that the gravity of the offence (the large-scale importation of 
heroin) outweighed the invasion of privacy, the civil trespass and the 
possible breach of Article 8 of the European Convention. The case was 
considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Khan v. United 
Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 1016, the conclusion being that while there had 
been a violation of Article 8 there had been no violation of Article 6(1). It 
was conceded by the Crown that there had been a breach of Article 8(1) 
but it was argued that Article 8 as a whole had not been infringed because 
the conduct of the police had been justified by virtue of Article 8(2). This 
submission was rejected because at the time of the operation there was no 
statutory system in place to regulate the use of covert listening devices (see 
also PG v. United Kingdom (2001) Application No. 44787/98 (ECtHR)). 
According to the European Court of Human Rights in Khan v. United 
Kingdom (at pp. 1026±7): 
`[T]he admissions made by the applicant . . . were made voluntarily . . . 
the applicant being under no inducement to make such admissions. The 
unlawfulness of which complaint is made . . . relates exclusively to the 
fact that there was no statutory authority for the interference with the 
applicant's right to respect for private life . . . [T]he applicant had ample 
opportunity to challenge both the authenticity and the use of the 
recording . . . The Court would add that it is clear that, had the domestic 
courts been of the view that the admission of the evidence would have 
given rise to substantive unfairness, they would have had a discretion to 
exclude it under section 78 of PACE.' 
Police surveillance operations which do not involve covert entry upon 
or interference with property (or interference with wireless telegraphy), 
such as surveillance operations in police cells or the recording of a 
telephone conversation by one of the parties to the call, are now governed 
by Part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the 
Codes of Practice issued under s. 71: the Covert Surveillance Code of 
Practice and the Covert Human Intelligence Sources Code of Practice. 
Surveillance operations involving interference with property (or wireless 
telegraphy), such as the operation undertaken in R v. Khan [1996] 3 WLR 
162 (HL), are now governed by Part III of the Police Act 1997 and the 
Covert Surveillance Code of Practice. 
Thus, if for some reason the accused's confession was obtained by the 
police in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention, or indeed some 
other rule of law, he is not (as a general rule) entitled to have that evidence 
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excluded. What he is entitled to is an opportunity to challenge its use and 
admission in evidence and a judicial assessment of the effect of its 
admission upon the fairness of the trial as provided for by s. 78(1) (R v. P 
[2001] 2 WLR 463 (HL) at p. 474, R v. Bailey [2001] EWCA Crim 733, R 
v. Wright [2001] EWCA Crim 1394). In R v. Mason [2002] 2 Cr App R 628 
three suspected robbers and gang members were placed in a bugged cell 
resulting in a number of conversations and admissions being covertly 
recorded, but the decision to undertake this surveillance operation was not 
in strict accordance with the (then) non-statutory guidelines. Having 
assumed for the sake of argument that the Human Rights Act 1998 
applied (even though the trials took place before the Act came into force) 
the Court of Appeal held that the confessions had been properly admitted. 
There had been proper grounds for the arrests, the police had acted in 
good faith, and if there had been a breach of the guidelines it was of no 
significance. It was accepted that there had been a violation of Article 8 of 
the European Convention, and that this was a matter which the trial judge 
was required to take into consideration when exercising his discretion 
under s. 78(1), but it was nonetheless recognised that such a breach should 
not mean that evidence must automatically be excluded. There were other 
remedies available to the accused, including a finding that there had been a 
breach or an award of compensation. To insist on the exclusion of 
evidence could lead to greater injustice to the public than the infringement 
of Article 8 had created for the accused. Nor, it was felt, had the accused's 
right to remain silent or privilege against self-incrimination been breached, 
for the police had done no more than arrange a situation which was likely 
to result in a confession being volunteered. (The Court of Appeal did 
recognise, however, that a covert surveillance operation undertaken in bad 
faith might lead to a different result.) The same approach was adopted in 
R v. McLeod [2002] EWCA Crim 989, where it was held that the trial 
judge had been entitled to admit a covertly recorded confession made by 
the accused to one of his associates in the back of a police van, 
notwithstanding the `probable breach of Article 8'. Authority for the 
surveillance had been granted in accordance with the non-statutory 
guidelines then in force, in respect of an alleged murder; there had been no 
illegality in the gathering of the evidence; the accused had not been tricked 
or pressurised into making his comments; there was an accurate record of 
what he had said; and the offences he had been charged with were very 
serious. 
Each case will turn on its own facts, so where the police or their civilian 
stooges exceed what the trial judge considers to be acceptable practice 
there will always be a real risk that any confession obtained in 
consequence will be excluded (or that the proceedings will be stayed as 
an abuse of process) even if a contemporaneous recording of the 
confession was made and the charge is serious. An important considera-
tion is whether the conduct of the police violated the accused's right not to 
incriminate himself by inducing him to say something he would not 
otherwise have said. In the context of s. 78(1), if the police play a trick 
which affects the mind of the suspect and so causes him to incriminate 
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himself his inculpatory remarks are likely to be excluded, as in R v. Bryce 
(1992) 95 Cr App R 320 (CA)). In R v. Hall (1994) The Times 11.3.94 
(news report) (CC) an undercover female police officer seduced the 
accused in a car and managed to elicit a statement from him that he had 
strangled his wife and incinerated her body. Waterhouse J excluded the 
confession under s. 78(1) (as well as s. 76(2)(b)) even though it had been 
contemporaneously recorded and the charge was murder, because the 
seduction had in effect amounted to an interview and the accused had 
neither been cautioned nor given the opportunity to have a solicitor 
present (see also Sharpe, `Covert Police Operations and the Discretionary 
Exclusion of Evidence' [1994] Crim LR 793 at p. 801). 
If the police employ a civilian agent instead, the risk of exclusion will be 
just as real. In R v. H [1987] Crim LR 47 (CC) the complainant in a rape 
case had been asked to telephone her alleged rapist (her erstwhile 
boyfriend) and record their conversation in order to elicit a confession 
from him. The accused made inculpatory comments having been told by 
the complainant that the call was not being recorded. That evidence was 
excluded. In R v. Allan (1999) unreported (98/1754/Y2) the Court of 
Appeal refused D's application to appeal against his conviction, where he 
had made admissions during his incarceration to an informant (H) being 
handled by the police with a view to eliciting such admissions, and the 
prosecution had been permitted to rely on those admissions at D's trial for 
murder. D had refused to co-operate with the police, availing himself of 
his pre-trial right of silence, so H had been coached by the police `to push 
him for what you can get' following lengthy police interrogations which, it 
seems, were designed to unsettle D into being more talkative and 
vulnerable to H's questioning when they were alone together in their cell. 
However, the European Court of Human Rights in Allan v. United 
Kingdom (2002) Application No. 48539/99 held that there had been a 
breach of Article 6 of the European Convention because the essence of D's 
privilege against self-incrimination had been extinguished. The persistent 
questioning of D by H pursuant to the police's instructions, channelling 
their conversations into discussions of the murder, could be regarded `as 
the functional equivalent of interrogation, without any of the safeguards 
which would attach to a formal police interview, including the attendance 
of a solicitor and the issuing of the usual caution'; and D `would have been 
subject to psychological pressures which impugned on the voluntariness of 
the disclosures'. The Strasbourg Court therefore held that the evidence 
had been `obtained in defiance of the will of the applicant' and its use by 
the prosecution had `impinged on the applicant's right to silence and 
privilege against self-incrimination'. 
The above cases should be contrasted with R v. Cadette [1995] Crim LR 
229 (CA). A drugs courier intercepted at Heathrow Airport was asked to 
telephone C, who was expecting a call in relation to those drugs, and to 
pretend that she had not been arrested. The call was made and their 
conversation was recorded and admitted at C's trial. Although the courier 
had in effect been an agent of Customs at the time the call was made it was 
held that their subterfuge did not mean that the evidence obtained as a 
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result had to be excluded. This is not surprising. C had been expecting the 
telephone call and the only difference between what had been expected 
and what had happened was that her conversation with the courier was 
being recorded. 
Undercover operations must be distinguished from deliberate mal-
practice during the formal interview which could result in any confession 
made in consequence being excluded under ss. 76(2) and/or 78(1) of 
PACE. A good example is provided by R v. Mason [1988] 1 WLR 139. 
Someone had set fire to the car, and M fell under suspicion because of the 
hostility between him and the owner and his obvious motive. M was 
questioned but denied any involvement and, as there was no other 
evidence against him, the police decided to pretend that his fingerprints 
had been found on fragments of glass recovered from the petrol bomb, 
hoping that this would elicit a confession. The same lie was told to M's 
solicitor and consequently he advised M to admit his involvement. The 
Court of Appeal had no hesitation in quashing M's conviction on the 
ground that the judge should have excluded the evidence under s. 78(1). 
Watkins LJ said (at p.144): 
`[The judge] omitted a vital factor from his consideration, namely, the 
deceit practised upon the appellant's solicitor . . . [W]e hope never again 
to hear of deceit such as this being practised upon an accused person, 
and more particularly possibly on a solicitor whose duty it is to advise 
him unfettered by false information from the police.' 
That said, the police may use inadmissible evidence during the 
interrogation process as a means by which to encourage the suspect to 
confess. If, for example, D1 and D2 are both questioned about a crime, 
D2's statement blaming D1 may be read to D1 during his interview in the 
hope that D1 will confess, even though that statement would be 
inadmissible against D1 at his subsequent trial. In R v. Sargent [2001] 3 
WLR 992 (HL) the accused was charged with conspiracy to commit arson 
on the basis of a confession he had given to the police. The confession had 
been elicited by the revelation that an inculpatory conversation between 
the accused and his lover had been surreptitiously recorded by the victim, 
a telephone engineer, who had unlawfully tapped the lover's telephone 
line. Although the fact of the interception, and the recording and 
transcript of what was said during the telephone conversation, should not 
have been admitted, by virtue of a prohibition in the (then) Interception of 
Communications Act 1985, the confession to the police was prima facie 
admissible, so long as any references to the inadmissible evidence were 
removed. 
Finally, it should be noted that where the police impropriety in 
obtaining the accused's confession is so grave that it would be 
inappropriate even to allow the trial to continue the judge may stay the 
proceedings as an abuse of process rather than exclude the confession 
under s. 78(1). This was the approach adopted in the Crown Court by 
Newman J in R v. Sutherland (2002) The Times (news report) 30.1.02 
(T/2002/7203) when it was discovered that the police had surreptitiously 
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recorded the privileged conversations between the five co-accused and 
their solicitors and thereby obtained confidential information (albeit not 
necessarily admissions). Given the importance attached by the law to the 
privilege between lawyers and their clients and the statutory right to 
consult a solicitor privately this is not a surprising decision. Indeed the 
European Court of Human Rights has acknowledged that, in the absence 
of a compelling countervailing consideration, the accused's implicit Article 
6(3)(c) right to legal advice before his trial requires that there should be no 
surveillance (Brennan v. United Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 507, Lanz v. 
Austria (2002) Application No. 24430/94). 
7.1.3.4 The Judge's Common-law Exclusionary Discretion 
The judge may also exclude a confession tendered or already adduced by 
the prosecution at common law to ensure the accused receives a fair trial, 
or because the accused's privilege against self-incrimination has been 
violated. These two discretions were recognised by the House of Lords in 
R v. Sang [1979] 3 WLR 263 (10.1 post) and have been preserved by s. 82(3) 
of PACE. One can quite clearly see the application of the principles 
underlying the common-law discretions in the way the judiciary have 
applied s. 78(1), which has effectively supplanted the common law in this 
field. That said, the Sang discretions are of continuing importance as they 
may be applied to withdraw a confession which has been erroneously 
placed before the jury. Sections 76(2) and 78(1) of PACE may be utilised 
only to exclude confessions which have not yet been adduced. If the judge 
decides that a confession ought not to have been admitted he may 
withdraw the confession from the jury's consideration (with an appro-
priate direction) or, if that would not be an effective remedy, he may 
discharge the jury from reaching a verdict and order a re-trial (R v. Sat-
Bhambra (1988) 88 Cr App R 55 (CA)). 
7.1.3.5 The Role of the Judge and Jury 
If the question of admissibility under s. 76(2) of PACE arises it will be 
decided by the judge following a hearing on the voir dire in the absence of 
the jury. (A similar procedure is adopted in magistrates' courts: R v. 
Liverpool Juvenile Court ex parte R [1987] 3 WLR 224 (DC).) The judge 
will also take advantage of this opportunity to consider the application of 
s. 78(1). Witnesses, including the accused, may be called to give evidence 
of the circumstances surrounding the confession to enable the judge to 
ascertain whether the prosecution have proved beyond reasonable doubt 
that the confession was not obtained in one of the ways set out in s. 76(2). 
The question of admissibility under s. 76(2) does not arise if the sole 
question is whether the accused actually made the confession, which is a 
question of fact for the jury (Ajodha v. The State [1981] 3 WLR 1 (PC)). If, 
however, the accused denies he made the confession and also alleges that 
he was ill-treated prior to or at the time the purported confession was 
made, the judge should still determine the question of admissibility under 
s. 76(2). If the confession is ruled admissible it will be adduced in evidence 
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for the jury to decide whether it was actually made by the accused and, if 
so, whether it is true (Thongjai v. R [1997] 3 WLR 667 (PC), Timothy v. 
The State [2000] 1 WLR 485 (PC)). If the sole ground for arguing that a 
confession should be excluded turns on the application of the judge's 
exclusionary discretion, a voir dire will need to be held if there is a 
disagreement as to what occurred (although in summary proceedings this 
will not always be necessary: Halawa v. Federation Against Copyright 
Theft [1995] 1 Cr App R 21 (DC)). In the absence of any such 
disagreement it will be sufficient for the judge to hear submissions on 
unfairness in the absence of the jury. 
It is for the judge to decide the question of admissibility and, if the 
confession is admitted, for the jury to decide whether or not the confession 
is true. Thus, if the accused raises the question of unreliability under 
s. 76(2)(b) of PACE the judge is not to decide whether the confession is 
reliable in the sense of actually being true, for that would be to usurp the 
jury's role. The judge should therefore disregard any admission by the 
accused on the voir dire that the confession is true (R v. Cox [1991] Crim 
LR 276 (CA)). If the confession is admitted the judge will direct the jury 
on the factors which they ought to take into consideration when 
evaluating its reliability in the sense of being true. This division of 
functions has been held to comply with the requirements of Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, as the accused is able to present 
his objections to the evidence being admitted without being inhibited by 
the presence of the jury, and the judge must give a reasoned judgment 
which may be scrutinised by the Court of Appeal (R v. Mushtaq [2002] 
EWCA Crim 1943). The judge's decision on the admissibility of a 
confession following a voir dire should not be revealed to the jury for they 
might be influenced by his findings of fact (Mitchell v. R [1998] 2 WLR 
839 (PC)). 
At common law it was held that whatever the accused said on the voir 
dire could not be raised by the prosecution during the trial, save that if the 
confession was ruled admissible the accused could be cross-examined 
during the trial on any inconsistent statement he had made on the voir dire 
(Wong Kam-Ming v. R [1979] 2 WLR 81 (PC)). There was also a dictum to 
the effect that a `boast' by the accused on the voir dire that he had 
committed the alleged crime would be admissible in the trial as evidence of 
his guilt (R v. Brophy [1981] 3 WLR 103 (HL) at p. 107). An admission by 
the accused on the voir dire that the confession is true would now be prima 
facie admissible under s. 76(1) as it is unlikely s. 76(2) could be applied to 
exclude it, but the judge would be entitled to apply s. 78(1) or his common-
law discretion to prevent its admission in an appropriate case. In Wong 
Kam-Ming v. R [1979] 2 WLR 81 it was also thought that the accused 
should not be asked on the voir dire whether his confession was true, 
concluding in the process that the decision of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal to the contrary in R v. Hammond (1941) 28 Cr App R 84 was 
wrong. Recent dicta suggest that the Privy Council's view will be followed 
should the question arise again (R v. Liverpool Juvenile Court ex parte R 
[1987] 3 WLR 224 (DC), R v. Davis [1990] Crim LR 860 (CA)). 
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7.1.3.6 The Tainting Principle 
In R v. McGovern (1990) 92 Cr App R 228 the accused was aged 19, six 
months' pregnant, physically ill and of limited intelligence. In breach of 
s. 58 of PACE and Code C she was denied access to a solicitor during an 
emotional interview in which she confessed to being involved in the killing 
of another young woman. In further breach of Code C no contempora-
neous record was made of the interview. The next day she was interviewed 
again, in the presence of her solicitor, and again she made admissions, 
although this time they were more coherent and there were no further 
breaches of the Code. The trial judge refused to exclude the confession 
evidence and she was convicted of manslaughter. The Court of Appeal 
quashed her conviction on the ground that the breach of s. 58 and the 
Code during the first interview meant that her first confession was likely to 
be unreliable, and therefore inadmissible under s. 76(2)(b); this in turn had 
`tainted' her subsequent confession which was therefore also inadmissible 
under s. 76(2)(b). Importantly, the solicitor at the second interview had 
not been told the accused had confessed during her first interview. If the 
solicitor had been aware of the earlier breach there can be little doubt that 
she would have prevented the subsequent interview from taking place. The 
Court of Appeal emphasised that the very fact that the accused's first 
confession had been made was likely to have had an adverse effect upon 
her during the course of her second interview. In other words, once the 
accused had already confessed she would have felt there was little if 
anything to lose by repeating her admission. According to the Court (at 
p. 234): 
`One cannot refrain from emphasising that when an accused person has 
made a series of admissions as to his or her complicity in a crime at a 
first interview, the very fact that those admissions have been made [is] 
likely to have an effect upon her during the course of the second 
interview.' 
At common law a different approach was taken. A subsequent 
confession would be admissible so long as the threat or inducement 
which rendered the first confession involuntary (and therefore inadmis-
sible) was no longer operating on the accused at the time of his subsequent 
confession. So in R v. Smith [1959] 2 WLR 623 (C-MAC) the mere fact the 
accused had had his earlier confession put to him at the start of his second 
interview did not prevent his subsequent confession from being voluntary; 
the inducement or threat which had elicited his first confession the day 
before had by then dissipated. 
In R v. Glaves [1993] Crim LR 685 the 16-year-old accused's first 
confession, excluded at his trial under s. 76(2) of PACE on account of the 
manner of the interrogation (in the absence of an appropriate adult), was 
made over a week before his subsequent confession to different officers. 
The Court of Appeal held that the second confession should also have 
been excluded, but the reasoning is far from clear. The judgment itself 
suggests that the conduct which had caused the first confession to be 
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inadmissible had still been operating on him at the time of his second 
interview, and in this sense the test is similar to that which was applied at 
common law. However, given the duration of the intervening period a 
more plausible explanation is that the accused felt he had nothing to lose 
by repeating what he had said earlier, particularly as he had not consulted 
a solicitor prior to his second interview. 
Where an act of oppression or `anything said or done' renders an earlier 
confession inadmissible under s. 76(2) of PACE, any subsequent 
confession is likely to be regarded as tainted and similarly inadmissible 
for one or more reasons. It has already been mentioned that the accused 
may feel he has nothing to lose by repeating himself, particularly if he has 
not benefited from informed legal advice prior to the second interview (as 
in R v. McGovern (1990) 92 Cr App R 228 and R v. Glaves [1993] Crim LR 
685), so the second confession should be considered as unreliable as the 
first. To commence the second interview with a recapitulation by the 
interviewing officers of what was admitted in the first interview is likely to 
reinforce this taint, and this was accepted by the Court of Appeal in R v. 
Wood [1994] Crim LR 222. (Code C-11.4 requires the interviewing officer 
to put any previously made `significant statement' to the suspect at the 
beginning of an interview.) Second, a subsequent confession may be 
tainted on account of the interview during which it was made and its 
surrounding circumstances being inextricably connected with the im-
proper circumstances of the first interview. (In R v. Glaves [1993] Crim LR 
685 the accused's answers in an interview, in the presence of his father, 
conducted soon after the first interview were also excluded at his trial.) 
Third, the earlier taint may remain operative on the mind of the accused 
during his subsequent interview. This represents the approach adopted at 
common law, and it is no less valid today. Fourth, the courts may refuse to 
allow a subsequent confession to be adduced on the ground that any 
alternative approach would allow police officers to circumvent s. 76(2) 
with impunity, safe in the knowledge that any misconduct applied to elicit 
an initial confession would not prevent a subsequent confession from 
being admitted (see R v. Ismail [1990] Crim LR 109 (CA)). 
In R v. Canale (1989) 91 Cr App R 1 it was alleged that the accused had 
confessed during interviews which had not been contemporaneously 
recorded in compliance with Code C and that he had subsequently 
repeated his confessions at properly recorded interviews. The accused 
admitted making his earlier oral admissions but asserted they were false 
and had been made in consequence of certain promises. Because of the 
police officers' cynical disregard for the rules and the breaches of Code C 
the Court of Appeal held that the unrecorded interviews had been `fatally 
flawed'. The breaches had `affected the whole series of purported 
admissions', so s. 78(1) should have been applied to exclude them all. 
The Court would seem to have been influenced by two separate 
considerations: the need to ensure future compliance with Code C and, 
secondly, the possibility that promises may indeed have been made to the 
accused (the nature of which could not be ascertained because of the 
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failure to record what had happened in the earlier interviews) and that 
such promises had still been operating on the accused's mind during the 
recorded interviews. Similarly, in R v. Kirk [2000] 1 WLR 567 (CA) 
(7.1.3.3 ante) it was held that s. 78(1) should have been applied to the 
accused's subsequent confession, which (unlike his initial confession) had 
been made when he was in full possession of the facts, as his position had 
by then been `hopelessly compromised' and it was impossible to say what 
(if any) admission would have been made if he had been made aware of the 
gravity of the situation from the outset. 
Section 78(1) gives the trial judge a discretion, so `there can be no 
universal rule that whenever the Code has been breached in one or more 
interviews, all subsequent interviews must be tainted and therefore 
should be excluded' (R v. Gillard (1990) 92 Cr App R 61 (CA) at p. 65). 
Where the initial confession is tainted by breaches of Code C justifying its 
exclusion under s. 78(1), the judge retains a discretion as to whether any 
subsequent confession ought to be excluded too, and how his discretion is 
exercised will depend on all the circumstances of the case. In Y v. DPP 
[1991] Crim LR 917, for example, the accused made a spontaneous 
confession before being cautioned and subsequently, having been 
cautioned, confessed again, although no contemporaneous note was 
made. A formal interview was eventually held in compliance with Code C 
and the accused confessed again. The Divisional Court upheld the 
magistrates' decision to admit the final confession despite their having 
excluded the earlier confessions under s. 78(1). The magistrates had been 
entitled to take into account the spontaneous nature of the first confession 
and the absence of bad faith on the part of the police officers involved. In 
R v. Neil [1994] Crim LR 441 the Court of Appeal reviewed the authorities 
and held that where a first interview has been excluded under s. 78(1) the 
question whether a later interview should also be excluded was a matter of 
fact and degree: 
`It is likely to depend on a consideration of whether the objections 
leading to the exclusion of the first interview were of a fundamental and 
continuing nature, and, if so, if the arrangements for the subsequent 
interview gave the accused a sufficient opportunity to exercise an 
informed and independent choice as to whether he should repeat or 
retract what he said in the excluded interview . . .' 
In R v. Nelson [1998] 2 Cr App R 399 (CA) (7.1.3.3 ante) it was felt the 
mere fact the accused had been reminded of what she had said in her first 
interview, which should have been excluded under s. 78(1) because of the 
breach of Code C-10.1, was not sufficient to justify the exclusion of the 
subsequent properly conducted interview under s. 78(1). This is not 
surprising. Code C-11.4 obliges interviewing officers to remind their 
suspects of inculpatory remarks made on an earlier occasion. If 
compliance with C-11.4 were enough to demand the exclusion of the 
subsequent interview the judge would have no discretion to exercise. 
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7.1.3.7 The Fruit of Inadmissible Confessions 
Section 76 of PACE provides as follows: 
(4)	 The fact that a confession is wholly or partly excluded in pursuance 
of this section shall not affect the admissibility in evidence (a) of  
any facts discovered as a result of the confession; or (b) where the 
confession is relevant as showing that the accused speaks, writes or 
expresses himself in a particular way, of so much of the confession 
as is necessary to show that he does so. 
(5)	 Evidence that a fact . . . was discovered as a result of a statement 
made by an accused person shall not be admissible unless evidence 
of how it was discovered is given by him or on his behalf. 
(6)	 Subsection (5) above applies (a) to any fact discovered as a result of 
a confession which is wholly excluded in pursuance of this section; 
and (b) to any fact discovered as a result of a confession which is 
partly so excluded, if the fact is discovered as a result of the 
excluded part of the confession. 
The mere fact that the accused's confession has been ruled inadmissible 
under s. 76(2) does not prevent the prosecution from adducing non-
confessional evidence of facts discovered as a result of that confession, but 
only the accused or his agent may reveal to the court how such evidence 
came to be discovered. Section 76(4)(a) represents the pre-PACE position 
at common law. In R v. Warickshall (1783) 1 Leach 263 (CCC) the accused 
was induced to confess to a charge of receiving stolen goods by assurances 
given to her, but as her confession had not been made voluntarily it was 
ruled inadmissible. This did not preclude the prosecution from adducing 
evidence that the stolen goods had been found hidden in her bed, so long 
as it was not revealed that the evidence had been discovered as a result of 
her inadmissible confession. Although the reliability of the confession was 
in doubt, the reliability of any tangible evidence discovered as a result was 
unaffected `for a fact, if it exist at all, must exist invariably in the same 
manner, whether the confession from which it is derived be in other 
respects true or false'. 
Similarly, in R v. Berriman (1854) 6 Cox CC 388 (Assizes), a case in 
which the accused faced a charge of concealing the birth of her child, it 
was permissible for the prosecution to elicit evidence from their witness 
that an infant's corpse had been found, but the witness was not allowed to 
reveal that the corpse had been found in consequence of the accused's 
inadmissible confession. In Lam Chi-Ming v. R [1991] 2 WLR 1082 the 
three co-accused had confessed to murder, but at their trial the confessions 
were ruled inadmissible as the prosecution could not prove they had not 
been extracted by force. The Privy Council held that evidence should not 
have been given of how they had subsequently led the police to the place 
where the murder weapon was found. Evidence of their conduct, taking 
the police to the water-front and then gesturing to show how the weapon 
had been disposed of, amounted to an extension of the inadmissible 
confessions and was equally inadmissible. The fact that the murder 
weapon was later discovered off the water-front was prima facie 
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admissible, but not how the police came to find it there. Interestingly, as 
the weapon bore no identifying marks linking any of the accused to it, it 
had no inherent probative value and could have been ruled inadmissible 
on the ground of irrelevance. The extremely high probative value of the 
weapon lay in the fact that the accused had shown the police where they 
had disposed of it, and yet the conduct which gave the weapon that value 
was inadmissible. Moreover, the conduct of the accused in taking the 
police to where the knife had been disposed of demonstrated the reliability 
of their inadmissible confessions; but nonetheless their confessions 
remained inadmissible. As the Privy Council conceded, the decision can 
only be justified if it is accepted there is a reason other than the risk of 
unreliability which justifies the exclusion of involuntary confessions. This, 
it was said, is the desirability of preventing the police from subjecting 
persons in their custody to ill treatment or improper pressure in order to 
extract confessions from them, the privilege against self-incrimination and 
`fairness' (see also Wong Kam-Ming v. R [1979] 2 WLR 81 (PC) and R v. 
Sang [1979] 3 WLR 263 (HL)). This application of the `protective' 
principle justified the exclusion of highly probative and reliable evidence 
identifying the persons who had committed a most brutal murder. At face 
value the exclusion of such evidence is an affront to common sense: if the 
police use brutal measures against the accused and thereby elicit a 
demonstrably reliable confession, justice would be best served by allowing 
the evidence to be admitted and prosecuting the police officers involved 
for their own criminal conduct. The flaw in this analysis is the failure to 
recognise how difficult it can be to prove police impropriety beyond 
reasonable doubt. Other considerations are the importance of ensuring 
that the police do not act oppressively in the belief that the end justifies the 
means and the desirability of maintaining the moral integrity of the trial 
process and the final verdict. 
Section 76(4)(b) reaffirms the position at common law that an 
inculpatory statement may still be admissible as original evidence even if 
it is held to be inadmissible hearsay (by the application of s. 76(2)). A 
useful illustration of how the written word may be admissible as original 
evidence is provided by R v. Voisin [1918] 1 KB 531 (CCA). The headless 
trunk of a woman's body had been found in a parcel with a piece of paper 
bearing the words `Bladie Belgiam' enclosed with it. The accused was 
interviewed, without having been cautioned, during which he wrote 
`Bladie Belgiam' upon being asked to write out `Bloody Belgian'. This 
writing was held to have been properly admitted against him at the trial as 
evidence of his handwriting and spelling. This evidence, together with the 
fact the deceased's head and hands had been found in the accused's cellar, 
identified him as the murderer. 
If a confession tendered by the prosecution has been ruled inadmissible 
under s. 76(2) of PACE or otherwise excluded by the judge in the exercise 
of his discretion, the prosecution cannot cross-examine the accused on it; 
in fact `nothing more ought to be heard of it' as between the prosecution 
and the accused (R v. Treacy [1944] 2 All ER 229 (CCA), Lui Mei-Lin v. R 
[1989] 2 WLR 175 (PC)). 
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7.1.4 Confessions Tendered by the Accused 
In R v. Myers [1997] 3 WLR 552 the House of Lords held that the accused 
is entitled to adduce in support of his defence his co-accused's confession, 
to prove the truth of the matters stated, even if it would have been 
excluded by virtue of s. 78(1) of PACE if tendered by the prosecution, so 
long as it is relevant to his defence and was voluntarily made by the 
co-accused (in the sense that it was not made in consequence of oppression 
or anything said or done which was likely in the circumstances to render it 
unreliable). 
Since the case of R v. Miller (1952) 36 Cr App R 169 (Assizes) it has 
been accepted that the accused has an absolute right to elicit or adduce 
admissible evidence which is relevant to his defence even though such 
evidence might unduly prejudice his co-accused. This general principle was 
reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Lobban v. R [1995] 1 WLR 877, and the 
decision in R v. Myers [1997] 3 WLR 552 (HL) is a further application of 
it. Q and M were tried together for the murder of a mini-cab driver who 
had died from a single stab wound to the heart, an application for separate 
trials having been made to and rejected by the trial judge. M had told the 
police prior to being cautioned that it was she who had stabbed the 
deceased, but at the trial M blamed Q who in turn blamed M. Because of 
the breach of Code C-10.1 (7.1.3.3 ante) the prosecution did not even seek 
to adduce evidence of M's confession as it would inevitably have been 
excluded under s. 78(1) of PACE. However, the trial judge allowed Q to 
elicit the confession during his counsel's cross-examination of the police 
officers to whom it had been made. Consequently M was convicted of 
murder and Q was convicted of manslaughter. The House of Lords 
dismissed M's appeal, and Lord Slynn said (at p. 564): 
`For Myers to deny the confession in evidence would have allowed the 
police officers to be called by Quartey pursuant to s. 4 of [the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1865]. It seems to me that it was also relevant and 
admissible for the police officers . . . to be asked about the confession on 
behalf of Quartey. It was not suggested that the confessions were 
obtained in the circumstances referred to in section 76(2) of the Act of 
1984, and the fact that the prosecution was not able to introduce the 
evidence because of breaches of the police Code did not preclude 
Quartey's counsel from doing so.' 
Lord Slynn's speech was approved by Lords Steyn and Hutton and as 
such must be accepted as the law. M had been a party to the proceedings 
and her confession was therefore prima facie admissible by way of the 
confessions exception to the rule against hearsay. While there is nothing to 
suggest that a co-accused's confession should not be admitted by the 
accused under s. 76(1) of PACE, Lord Slynn refused to decide whether the 
subsection could be relied on by the accused or whether the confession was 
admissible at common law. M's confession had been made voluntarily (in 
the sense of there having been no breach of requirements analogous to 
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those found in s. 76(2)) and was relevant to Q's defence. As the trial judge 
had no discretion to prevent him from adducing it either at common law 
or under s. 78(1) (which applies only to evidence tendered by the 
prosecution) it was admissible at his behest. Although Lord Slynn was 
deliberately circumspect and did not expressly say that the old common-
law test of voluntariness applied, the fact that s. 76(2) was inapplicable 
leads to no other conclusion. In any event this is a distinction without a 
difference as the common-law test (if that is what it is) would now seem to 
be the same as that found in s. 76(2). The Law Commission had already 
recommended that the admissibility of a co-accused's confession tendered 
by the accused should be governed by provisions similar to s. 76(2) (Law 
Com No. 245 (1997) at p. 118) and Lord Slynn was mindful of that. 
Accordingly, so long as the accused can prove on the balance of 
probabilities that considerations analogous to those in s. 76(2) do not 
apply, and so long as the confession is relevant to his own defence, he has 
an absolute right to adduce it or to elicit it in cross-examination of the 
persons to whom it was made. He can of course also cross-examine the 
co-accused on it if he decides to testify. 
Lord Hope (with whom Lord Mustill concurred) agreed with the 
majority view that Q had been entitled to adduce M's confession in 
support of his own defence. However, rather than suggesting a common-
law test of admissibility analogous to s. 76(2) (and no doubt aware that 
such a test could be said to conflict with the principle reaffirmed in Lobban 
v. R [1995] 1 WLR 877 (PC)) he preferred to rely on the trial judge's 
common-law discretion to exclude any evidence of insufficient probative 
value (3.1.3 ante). According to this view, a confession which has been 
made in consequence of oppression or anything said or done which was 
likely in the circumstances to render it unreliable (that is, in breach of the 
requirements set out in s. 76(2)) is likely to be so lacking in probative value 
as to be `worthless' and therefore inadmissible. Notwithstanding the view 
of the Privy Council in Lobban v. R that there is no discretion to exclude 
admissible evidence tendered by an accused, this must be read in the light 
of the judge's discretion to exclude any evidence, no matter by whom it is 
tendered, if it is deemed to be `irrelevant'. This itself is not controversial, 
and was actually recognised by the Privy Council in Lobban v. R where it 
was said that the accused's absolute right to deploy his case asserting his 
innocence was `subject to considerations of relevance'. Unfortunately, 
Lord Hope's approach does not provide a satisfactory test. A confession 
made by a co-accused in circumstances such as to be excluded under 
s. 76(2) may be both true and highly probative evidence in support of the 
accused's defence; indeed this is expressly recognised in s. 76(2) which 
states that `the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence 
. . . notwithstanding that it may be true'. 
The decision of the House of Lords in R v. Myers [1997] 3 WLR 552, 
while establishing that a co-accused's confession may be adduced by the 
accused, fails to explain how such confessions fall to be admitted. It is not 
even clear whether they are admissible by virtue of s. 76(1), which does not 
refer to the prosecution, or at common law. The test for admissibility is 
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found in s. 76(2), but as this subsection applies only to evidence tendered 
by the prosecution the test would seem to be the common-law test of 
voluntariness, reinterpreted to mean the same as the statutory test. It 
should also be noted that if M and Q had been tried separately M's 
confession would not have been admissible at Q's behest as M would not 
have been a party to the proceedings. The absurd consequence is that 
where joint trials are ordered and a co-accused has made a confession 
following a significant breach of Code C that confession will be admissible 
against her. If, however, they are tried separately the jury will never hear 
about the confession. 
R v. Myers was concerned with a co-accused's confession which would 
have been excluded under s. 78(1) of PACE. If the co-accused's confession 
had been (or would have been) ruled inadmissible under s. 76(2) it would 
not have been admissible as evidence of the truth of the matters stated at 
the behest of the accused. Yet even exclusion under s. 76(2) will not 
prevent the accused from relying on a co-accused's confession for all 
purposes. In Lui Mei-Lin v. R [1989] 2 WLR 175 the Privy Council held 
that so long as a co-accused's confession is relevant to the accused's own 
defence the accused may cross-examine him on it, as a previous 
inconsistent statement, even though it is inadmissible on the ground of 
having been made involuntarily (see also R v. Rowson [1985] 3 WLR 99 
(CA)). In such a case the judge must explain to the jury why the confession 
was originally excluded and warn them that the confession is not evidence 
of the truth of the matters stated but is relevant only to the co-accused's 
credibility as a witness. The Court of Appeal has recently confirmed that 
these principles have not been affected by the decision of the House of 
Lords in R v. Myers (R v. Corelli [2001] Crim LR 913). 
7.1.5 Reform 
In the context of formal interviews the risk of fabricated or otherwise 
untrue confessions being considered by the jury has been significantly 
reduced by the introduction of PACE and its Codes of Practice. This is 
particularly so now that Code E-3 requires interviews relating to any 
indictable offence to be recorded on audio tape if the machinery is 
working and it is possible a prosecution will ensue (save that the audio 
recording of interviews under the Terrorism Act 2000 is governed by a 
separate code). However, despite these reforms it is still possible that some 
false confessions will slip through the net and be admitted. In particular, it 
remains the case that no audio recording is required if the interview relates 
to a summary offence; such interviews are governed by the manual 
recording requirements of Code C-11. Nor does Code E apply in other 
contexts, such as where an admission is purported to have been made on 
the way to the police station or during an informal conversation. The 
potential for unreliability is greatest in these situations and an obvious 
further safeguard would be to extend the application of Code E to cover 
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them. After all, there is no good reason why all formal interviews should 
not be contemporaneously recorded on audio tape (and on video tape for 
that matter); and, given the portability of pocket cassette recorders, it 
should be possible to record informal interviews too. 
To eliminate the possibility of fabrication, it should be a prerequisite to 
admissibility that any confession made outside the formal environment of 
the interview room should be repeated and recorded on tape as soon as 
possible thereafter. If the accused fails to repeat his confession on tape it 
should be inadmissible unless there is some other independent evidence of 
his having made it, such as the testimony of a disinterested third party. In 
fact the Court of Appeal has already held that the trial judge is entitled to 
take into consideration the presence of other safeguards or supporting 
evidence when deciding whether or not breaches of Code C justify the 
exclusion of a confession under s. 78(1) of PACE. In R v. Dunn (1990) 91 
Cr App R 237 (CA) clear breaches of the Code C `verballing' provisions 
could not justify the exclusion of the confession, which the accused denied 
having made, because his solicitor's clerk had been present throughout his 
interview. It has also been seen that independent evidence is an important 
consideration for the purpose of s. 78(1) where a confession is alleged to 
have been made to an undercover police officer in a situation not covered 
by the Codes of Practice (R v. Bryce (1992) 95 Cr App R 320 (CA), 
7.1.3.3 ante). 
However, while the existence of independent confirmation that a 
purported confession was made may be a relevant consideration for 
determining whether it should be excluded under s. 78(1), once a 
confession has been admitted the accused may be convicted despite the 
absence of any independent evidence tending to show the confession is 
true. One suggestion for reform which has been mooted is that there 
should always be some other supporting evidence independent of the 
confession suggesting not only that the confession was made by the 
accused but also that it is true. A corroboration requirement of sorts exists 
in some other jurisdictions, for example in Scotland and the USA, and it 
has been argued that a requirement of supporting evidence would act as a 
further safeguard against miscarriages of justice in England and Wales. 
Unfortunately, it is questionable whether any such reform would really 
provide an effective safeguard. The supporting evidence itself could be 
unreliable and its existence may in fact have the effect of bolstering an 
otherwise unreliable confession. The `Birmingham Six' were convicted on 
the basis of their confessions to murder supported by what seemed to be 
incontrovertible scientific evidence that two of them had been in contact 
with nitroglycerine, but their convictions were subsequently quashed 
because of doubts about the reliability of their confessions and the 
scientific evidence in support (R v. McIlkenny (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 
(CA)). The scientific evidence in that case was unreliable on account of 
the fallibility of the test used for detecting nitroglycerine, but it is not 
difficult to envisage corrupt police officers manufacturing supporting 
evidence. There is also a danger that a requirement of supporting evidence 
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independent of the confession would suggest a general disbelief in police 
testimony, undermining public confidence in the police force. Perhaps the 
strongest argument against any such reform lies in the fact that it would 
allow offenders to walk free despite their having made voluntary 
confessions in the presence of independent witnesses and in circumstances 
where the likelihood of falsity could be discounted. Nor should one be 
overly influenced by the existence of a corroboration requirement in other 
jurisdictions. In the USA a confession may generally be corroborated by 
mere evidence that the crime has actually been committed, while in 
Scotland the requirement has almost disappeared in practice. The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) Cm 2263 (at pp. 49±68) rejected a 
supporting evidence requirement for England and Wales, proposing 
instead that there should be a judicial warning similar to that which has 
been introduced for visual-identification evidence (11.1.1 post). In other 
words, there should be a mandatory direction to the jury of the special 
need for caution before convicting solely on the basis of the accused's 
confession, supplemented by a direction on the reasons why the accused 
might have falsely confessed. As the law stands the judge is not obliged to 
warn the jury of any need for caution ± although such a warning may 
occasionally be required if the accused is mentally handicapped (s. 77(1) of 
PACE, 11.9 post) or the person to whom the confession was purportedly 
made is an unreliable witness (11.8 post); but there is nothing to prevent 
the judge giving a warning in the exercise of his discretion. The question is 
whether a warning should be mandatory in all cases where the prosecution 
case depends wholly or substantially on the accused's confession. 
Given the possible reasons for making a false confession there is some 
force in the analogy with visual-identification evidence. In each case the 
evidence may be false but there is a risk that the jury will accept it at face 
value and treat it as compelling evidence of guilt unless warned of the 
reasons why it might be unreliable. The likelihood of false confessions is 
clearly high for certain types of vulnerable individual such as the mentally 
ill and juveniles and such persons ought to be brought within the scope of 
s. 77(1) of PACE. However, the risk of falsity may be very low in other 
situations and a direction in all cases might lead to the sort of absurd 
directions judges were obliged to give prior to the abolition of mandatory 
corroboration warnings. In the final analysis the best approach would 
seem to be for the judge to give a warning whenever there is a significant 
possibility that the accused might have falsely confessed. If, taking all the 
circumstances into account, such a risk cannot be discounted the judge 
ought to warn the jury of the possibility of falsity, explaining why a person 
might confess to a crime he has not committed and pointing out the 
factors in the instant case (such as the character of the accused and the 
method by which he was interrogated) which might have caused the 
accused falsely to confess. There should be no such warning or direction if 
the risk of falsity can be entirely discounted. 
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7.2 Civil Proceedings: Informal Admissions 
The admissibility of informal admissions (out-of-court statements made 
by a party to the proceedings which are adverse to his case) is now 
governed by the Civil Evidence Act 1995 (ss. 1(1) and 7(1), see generally 
8.1 post). Informal admissions are therefore prima facie admissible in civil 
proceedings (so long as the maker was competent as a witness when the 
statement was made) and the tribunal of fact will take into consideration 
any relevant circumstances, including the particular factors specified in 
s. 4(2) of the Act, when determining how much weight the admission 
should be given. 
For the purposes of the 1995 Act, a statement is defined in s. 13 as `any 
representation of fact or opinion, however made', which would seem to 
cover admissions which may properly be inferred from conduct, such as a 
motorist's act of running away from the scene of the road accident in 
which he has just been involved (Holloway v. MacFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 
470 (HCA), 5.6.1.2 ante) or a failure to respond to an allegation in a 
business letter (Wiedemann v. Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534 (CA), 9.2.1 post). 
At common law an informal admission could be made directly by the 
party himself or vicariously by someone in privity with him (such as 
someone who shared a common interest with the party or acted as his 
agent). As hearsay is now generally admissible in civil proceedings a 
relevant out-of-court statement adverse to a party is prima facie admissible 
no matter who the maker is. 
Chapter Summary 
.	 A confession is an out-of-court statement made by the accused which is self-
incriminating (at the time of the trial). A confession made by the accused is 
admissible against him at the behest of the prosecution under s. 76(1) of PACE 
(an exception to the rule against hearsay) so long as the prosecution have been 
able to discharge their burden of proof in respect of the oppression and reliability 
provisions of s. 76(2). 
.	 If the prosecution are able to prove that s. 76(2) does not render the confession 
inadmissible, the judge may nonetheless exclude it in the exercise of his discretion 
under s. 78(1) or at common law. The judge will take into consideration all 
relevant circumstances when determining whether the confession is inadmissible 
or ought to be excluded, including breaches of PACE and significant breaches of 
Code C of the PACE Codes of Practice. Particularly important considerations are 
whether the police cautioned the accused before he made his confession, whether 
the police acted in bad faith and whether the police tricked the accused into 
confessing in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
.	 If a confession is ruled inadmissible under s. 76(2) a subsequent confession is 
likely to be ruled inadmissible on the ground that it is `tainted'. If a confession is 
excluded under s. 78(1) a subsequent confession may be excluded depending on 
the circumstances. 
.	 The fact that a confession is inadmissible under s. 76(2) does not prevent the 
prosecution from adducing real evidence found as a result of the confession, save 
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that they may not disclose to the jury how that evidence came to be discovered. 
An inadmissible confession may also be admitted as original evidence to show 
how the accused expresses himself. 
.	 The accused may adduce a co-accused's voluntarily made confession (as 
admissible hearsay) if it is relevant to his defence, even if the prosecution could 
not adduce it by virtue of the application of s. 78(1) of PACE. The accused may 
also cross-examine the co-accused on his involuntarily made confession to 
undermine his credibility (if it is relevant to the accused's defence). 
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Hearsay in Civil Proceedings

In Ventouris v. Mountain (No. 2) [1992] 1 WLR 887 (CA) Balcombe LJ 
said (at p. 899): 
`The modern tendency in civil proceedings is to admit all relevant 
evidence, and the judge should be trusted to give only proper weight to 
evidence which is not the best evidence . . .' 
There has been a general trend in favour of the principle of free proof in 
civil proceedings, and this is exemplified by Parliament's approach to the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence. Judges sitting alone as the tribunal of 
fact are, on account of their experience, regarded as better able to assess 
the probative value of hearsay evidence than their lay counterparts in 
criminal proceedings. Part I of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 first provided 
for the admissibility of much hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, subject 
to compliance with complicated procedural rules, but this statutory 
scheme was considered unsatisfactory and has now been repealed and 
replaced by the simpler but more comprehensive Civil Evidence Act 1995 
in line with recommendations made by the Law Commission in 1993 (Law 
Com No. 216). The provisions of the 1995 Act are complemented by Part 
33 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (or, in the case of magistrates' courts, 
by the Magistrates' Courts (Hearsay Evidence in Civil Proceedings) Rules 
1999 (SI 1999 No. 681)). 
By virtue of s. 1(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995, the exclusionary rule 
no longer applies to hearsay evidence tendered in civil proceedings which 
falls within the scope of the definition in s. 1(2); and although there are 
still some pre-trial procedural requirements, non-compliance goes to 
weight rather than admissibility. If hearsay evidence is admissible by 
virtue of some other statutory or retained common-law exception the 
notice requirements and safeguards in ss. 2 to 6 of the Act do not need to 
be complied with (s. 1(4)). Should a hearsay statement not fall within the 
scope of s. 1(2) of the Act it will remain inadmissible ± the common-law 
exclusionary rule applies in civil as well as criminal proceedings (Bradford 
City Metropolitan Council v. K (Minors) [1990] 2 WLR 532 (FD)). 
8.1 The Civil Evidence Act 1995 
Section 1 of the Act provides as follows: 
(1)	 In civil proceedings evidence shall not be excluded on the ground 
that it is hearsay. 
(2)	 In this Act ± 
(a) ``hearsay'' means a statement made otherwise than by a 
person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings which is 
tendered as evidence of the matters stated; and 
(b)	 references to hearsay include hearsay of whatever degree. 
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The definition of hearsay in s. 1(2)(a) is similar to that accepted by the 
House of Lords in R v. Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7 (5.1 ante). Given that 
inferred (`implied') assertions are more likely to be reliable than express 
assertions, and that the Law Commission has recently recommended that 
implied assertions should be admissible in criminal proceedings (5.6.2 
ante), the statutory definition will presumably be interpreted to 
accommodate such evidence. Indeed, although in Law Com No. 216 (at 
p. 34) the Law Commission left open the question whether `implied 
assertions' should be admissible in civil proceedings, `statement' is defined 
in s. 13 to mean `any representation of fact or opinion, however made'. 
Hearsay evidence falling within the scope of s. 1(2) is admissible in civil 
proceedings before magistrates as well as in the county courts and the 
High Court (s. 11). 
Subject to the provision governing exclusion or waiver in s. 2(3) of the 
Act, and the limited exceptions set out in r. 33.3 of the Civil Procedure 
Rules 1998, any party wishing to adduce evidence at the trial pursuant to 
s. 1(1) is under an obligation, first, to identify the evidence as hearsay and, 
second, to give the other party or parties notice of that fact and (if 
requested) provide `such particulars of or relating to the evidence, as is 
reasonable and practicable in the circumstances for the purpose of 
enabling him or them to deal with any matter arising from its being 
hearsay' (s. 2(1)). This prevents the other party or parties being taken by 
surprise at the trial and provides them with the opportunity to demand the 
particulars they require to be able to make a proper assessment of the 
weight of the evidence (see Law Com No. 216 at p. 26). The notice 
requirements are set out in r. 33.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. 
Importantly, a failure to comply with the requirements of s. 2(1) or the 
relevant procedural rules does not affect the admissibility of the evidence 
but, inter alia, `may be taken into account by the court . . . as a matter 
adversely affecting the weight to be given to the evidence in accordance 
with section 4' (s. 2(4)(b)). It should be borne in mind, however, that 
r. 32.1(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 provides the judge with a 
general discretion to exclude any admissible evidence, including hearsay 
evidence admissible by virtue of s. 1(1) of the Act. 
Section 4(1) obliges the judge to take into account `any circumstances 
from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the reliability or 
otherwise of the evidence' when estimating the weight (if any) to be 
attached to an item of hearsay evidence admissible under s. 1(1). Section 
4(2) provides a list of six factors the judge should take into consideration 
when assessing the weight of the evidence: (a) whether it would have been 
reasonable and practicable for the party by whom the evidence was 
adduced to have produced the maker of the original statement as a 
witness; (b) whether the original statement was made contemporaneously 
with the occurrence or existence of the matters stated; (c) whether the 
evidence involves multiple hearsay; (d) whether any person involved had 
any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters; (e) whether the original 
statement was an edited account, or was made in collaboration with 
another or for a particular purpose; and (f) whether the circumstances 
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in which the evidence is adduced as hearsay are such as to suggest an 
attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight. Needless to say, the 
safeguards in s. 4 of the Act ensure that the party against whom the 
hearsay is admitted has a fair hearing in the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations for the purposes of Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (a point noted by Lord Hutton in 
R (McCann) v. Crown Court at Manchester [2002] 3 WLR 1313 (HL) at 
p. 1352). 
Rule 32.5(5) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 provides that where a 
party has served a witness statement on the other parties in advance of the 
trial, but that party neither calls the witness to give oral evidence nor 
adduces the witness statement as hearsay evidence, any other party may 
adduce that statement as hearsay evidence. This provision has not affected 
the rule of evidence which prohibits a party from impeaching his own 
witness (16.4.3 post), so if C has a witness statement served on him in 
advance of the trial by D, but ultimately D decides not to call that witness 
or adduce the statement as hearsay evidence, it is open to C to adduce that 
statement as hearsay evidence on his own behalf, but he cannot then assert 
that much of what is said in the statement is untrue (McPhilemy v. Times 
Newspapers (No. 2) [2000] 1 WLR 1732 (CA)). Rule 33.4(1) provides that 
where a party proposes to rely on a hearsay statement, and does not 
propose to call the person who made that statement to give oral evidence, 
any other party may apply to call that person to be cross-examined on the 
contents of his statement. Rules 32.5(5) and 33.4(1) may be read together, 
so, for example, if D adduces a witness statement served on him by C 
under r. 32.5(5) as hearsay evidence, it is open to C to apply for that 
absent witness to be called for cross-examination on his statement 
(Douglas v. Hello! [2003] EWCA Civ 332). 
If an absent witness is not called for cross-examination, and a hearsay 
statement made or reported by him has been adduced in evidence, this 
usual forensic tool for undermining a witness's credibility is unavailable. 
Section 5(2)(a) therefore allows the opposing party to adduce any 
admissible evidence which would undermine that person's credibility, 
and, in particular, the opposing party may call evidence to prove that he 
has made a statement inconsistent with his hearsay statement (s. 5(2)(b)). 
The opposing party must, however, give notice of his intention to attack 
the credibility of an absent person (CPR 1998 r. 33.5), and the rule on the 
finality of answers on collateral matters (16.5.2 post) continues to apply 
(s. 5(2)). Section 5(2)(a) also allows the party adducing the hearsay 
statement to adduce admissible evidence to support his absent witness's 
credibility (see 16.4.2.1±6 post). 
Hearsay evidence is inadmissible to the extent that it consists of (or 
needs to be proved by means of) a statement made by a person who at the 
time he made the statement was not competent as a witness (s. 5(1)). A 
child is competent if he satisfies the test in s. 96 of the Children Act 1989 
(16.3.3 post). Section 6 of the 1995 Act governs the admissibility and 
evidential value of admissible previous statements made by a person who 
has given evidence as a witness in the proceedings. 
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If a hearsay statement is contained in a document, the statement may be 
proved by the production of the document (s. 8(1)(a)) or the production of 
an authenticated copy of the document, whether or not the document is 
still in existence (s. 8(1)(b)). It is immaterial how many removes there are 
between a copy and the original (s. 8(2)). Section 13 of the Act provides 
that a `document' is `anything in which information of any description is 
recorded', and a `copy' is `anything onto which information recorded in 
the document has been copied, by whatever means and whether directly or 
indirectly'. Section 9 governs the proof of documents (as opposed to 
statements contained therein) which form part of the records of a business 
or public authority (see also r. 33.6 of the CPR 1998). 
In short, hearsay evidence is not inadmissible merely because it is 
hearsay, but the judge will take into consideration the factors which 
justified the common-law exclusionary rule when he determines how much 
weight, if any, the evidence should be given. Accordingly, s. 1(1) of the Act 
will be relied on primarily where the hearsay evidence is relatively 
uncontroversial, and is likely to be given sufficient weight notwithstanding 
the absence of the (available) witness, or in cases where it is impossible or 
impracticable to call the witness but his evidence is likely to be accepted as 
reliable. If the hearsay evidence is inherently unreliable it may be given no 
weight at all, meaning in effect (if not in theory) that it remains 
inadmissible despite s. 1(1) of the Act. A recent example is provided by 
Owen v. Brown [2002] EWHC 1135 (QBD) where a faxed letter from `Fish 
Insurance' offering the claimant insurance for driving a vehicle, was given 
no weight. First, the letter did not address the concerns raised by a medical 
expert as to whether the claimant would be able to maintain the necessary 
level of concentration for safe driving; second, there was no evidence of 
the experience or authority of the person who wrote the letter; third, there 
was no evidence as to whether it would have been practicable and 
reasonable to have called the writer to give oral evidence; fourth, the 
claimant had not revealed to Fish Insurance the nature of his disability; 
and, fifth, the writer appeared to be under the (probably erroneous) 
impression that the claimant had already disclosed his condition to the 
licensing authority (the DVLA). Suggesting that similar reasoning must 
apply to the application of the 1995 Act, the trial judge (Silber J) referred 
with approval to the dictum of Brandon J in The Ferdinand Retzlaff [1972] 
2 Lloyd's Rep 120 (QBD) (at p. 127): 
`I cannot think that the Civil Evidence Act 1968 was intended, in 
general, to change the long-established system by which seriously 
disputed central issues in civil cases are tried on oral evidence, given on 
oath and capable of being tested by cross-examination, and to 
substitute for it a system of trial on unsworn documents brought into 
existence by parties to the proceedings post litem mortam, and I do not 
think the Act should be used, or rather abused, so as to produce such a 
result.' 
Support for this view may also be found in the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, 
r. 32.2(1) of which provides, as a general rule, that where any fact needs to 
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be proved during a trial by the evidence of witnesses, they should give their 
evidence orally. 
Another recent case where hearsay evidence admissible under s. 1(1) of 
the Act was disregarded is Brownsville Holdings v. Adamjee Insurance 
[2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 803 (QBD). The informal admission purportedly 
made by the owner of a yacht to a witness called by the insurers, to the 
effect that the owner had ordered that the ship be scuttled in order to 
recover the insurance proceeds, was given no weight at all on account of 
the witness's evident motive not to tell the truth, her unreliability in other 
respects and the inherent improbability that the owner would have 
confessed to her in the circumstances existing at that time. 
8.2 Other Statutory Exceptions 
The Children (Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence) Order 1993 (SI 1993 
No. 621) made under s. 96(3) of the Children Act 1989 permits the 
admission of hearsay evidence in the High Court, county courts and 
magistrates' courts if the case is concerned with the upbringing, 
maintenance or welfare of a child. A number of other statutory provisions 
provide for the admissibility of more specific types of hearsay in civil (and 
criminal) proceedings. For example, s. 34(6) of the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act 1953 provides, inter alia, that a certified copy of an entry 
in the register of births or deaths is admissible to prove the occurrence of a 
birth or death, so long as certain conditions have been satisfied; s. 65(3) of 
the Marriage Act 1949 provides that a sealed or stamped certified copy of 
an entry in the register of marriages is admissible to prove the marriage, 
and under s. 3 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act 1879 a copy of an entry 
in a bankers' book is evidence of the matters recorded therein (so long as 
certain conditions set out in s. 4 are satisfied). It should also be noted that 
where a witness is called to give oral evidence in civil proceedings, his out-
of-court witness statement will generally stand as his evidence in chief (see 
r. 32.5(2) of the CPR 1998). 
8.3 Common-law Exceptions 
Section 7 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 preserves certain common-law 
exceptions, but expressly provides that the admissibility of informal 
admissions is now governed by the general provisions of the Act (s. 7(1)). 
An informal admission may be made expressly or be inferred from a 
party's words, conduct or silence (so-called `implied' admissions). Express 
admissions are clearly covered by s. 1(1); presumably s. 1(2)(a) covers 
`implied' admissions too. 
Three common-law exceptions to the hearsay rule are preserved by 
s. 7(2): (a) published works dealing with matters of a public nature (such 
as histories, scientific works, dictionaries and maps); (b) public documents 
(such as public registers); and (c) records (such as records of courts and 
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treaties). Evidence of reputation is still admissible at common law for the 
purpose of proving good or bad character (s. 7(3)(a)); and evidence of 
reputation or family tradition is admissible (i) for the purpose of proving 
or disproving pedigree or the existence of a marriage and/or (ii) for the 
purpose of proving or disproving the existence of any public or general 
right or of identifying any person or thing (s. 7(3)(b)). 
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Inferences from Silence

9.1 The Relevance of Silence 
A party's silence in the face of an allegation or question may be of 
evidential significance if a response could reasonably have been expected 
in the circumstances. The party's failure to respond may amount to a tacit 
acceptance of an allegation made against him or demonstrate his 
consciousness of guilt, or it may simply undermine the credibility of a 
defence raised for the first time by him at the trial. In the absence of a 
credible alternative explanation, the party's silence (or rather the inference 
drawn from it) may be significant enough to amount to a confession, or it 
may support his opponent's case as just another item of circumstantial 
evidence. Subject to any legal restriction on the nature of the inference 
which may properly be drawn, the tribunal of fact must rely on its 
experience of human nature to determine whether any inference should be 
drawn and, if so, its nature and cogency, taking into consideration all 
relevant factors such as the silent party's personality, his innocent 
explanation, the context in which the question or allegation was put and 
the seriousness of the occasion. Silence is generally an unreliable source 
from which to draw inferences because an individual may remain silent in 
the face of questioning for any of a wide range of reasons, so extreme 
caution needs to be exercised before any such inference is drawn, 
particularly in criminal proceedings: 
`While it may no doubt be expected in most cases that innocent persons 
would be willing to co-operate with the police in explaining that they 
were not involved in any suspected crime, there may be reasons why in a 
specific case an innocent person would not be prepared to do so. In 
particular, an innocent person may not wish to make any statement 
before he has had the opportunity to consult a lawyer.' (Averill v. 
United Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 839 (ECtHR) at p. 853) 
9.2 Silence Before the Trial 
The admissibility and evidential value of a party's pre-trial silence, when 
some response could reasonably have been expected, is governed by the 
common law and legislation. 
9.2.1 The Position at Common Law 
A person's statement (for example, an allegation) made in the presence 
and hearing of a party to civil or criminal proceedings is admissible against 
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that party as evidence of the facts stated (or alleged) if, by his demeanour, 
conduct or words, he can reasonably be taken to have accepted the truth 
of those facts (R v. Christie [1914] AC 545 (HL)). In R v. Christie it was 
also held that a denial by the party would not render the statement 
inadmissible in law, for the manner of the denial could constitute evidence 
from which an acknowledgement could be inferred, save that in criminal 
proceedings the trial judge would be expected to exercise his discretion and 
exclude an accusation denied by the accused as its evidential value would 
generally be outweighed by its unduly prejudicial effect. Where in criminal 
proceedings the accused has accepted the truth of an accusation made 
against him, that acceptance will fall within the definition of a confession 
(7.1.1 ante) and be capable of corroborating other evidence against him (R 
v. Cramp (1880) 14 Cox CC 390 (Assizes)). 
Whether a party can be taken to have accepted the truth of an 
accusation by his silence will depend on whether it would have been 
reasonable to expect a denial from him in the circumstances. In R v. 
Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox CC 503 (Assizes) Cave J said (at p. 508): 
`Now the whole admissibility of statements of this kind rests upon the 
consideration that if a charge is made against a person in that person's 
presence it is reasonable to expect that he or she will immediately deny 
it, and that the absence of such a denial is some evidence of an 
admission on the part of the person charged, and of the truth of the 
charge. Undoubtedly, when persons are speaking on even terms and a 
charge is made, and the person charged says nothing, and expresses no 
indignation, and does nothing to repel the charge, that is some evidence 
to show that he admits the charge to be true.' 
It is for the tribunal of fact to determine whether the party has accepted 
the truth of an accusation in whole or in part, the test being one of 
common sense based on logic and human experience. The status of the 
accused and the accuser (that is, that they should be on equal terms) is a 
relevant factor, but all the circumstances should be taken into considera-
tion when determining whether it would have been reasonable to expect 
some form of denial. A particularly taciturn person is less likely to react 
than most people in any circumstances, and even the most reasonable 
person is unlikely to respond to an allegation made by a drunken, 
obnoxious or hysterical accuser. The test is therefore a subjective one: 
whether it would have been reasonable for that accused to respond to that 
accuser in the circumstances then present. 
In R v. Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox CC 503 a woman lying on her death bed 
was having her evidence formally taken in the presence of a number of 
persons including the accused and her solicitor. In such circumstances it 
was not unreasonable that the accused should have remained silent, so the 
allegation and the accused's silence were inadmissible. In the Australian 
case of Thatcher v. Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57 (HCA) the infant plaintiff 
was injured when the defendant reversed his car into her. Immediately 
after the accident the child's mother alleged that the defendant generally 
drove too fast, but that statement and the defendant's silence were not 
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admissible as evidence of his negligence. The defendant had been very 
upset following the accident and would naturally have been most 
unwilling to enter into an argument with the injured girl's distraught 
mother. (Moreover, the accusation related to the defendant's general 
driving and not to the incident in question.) Those two cases should be 
contrasted with Parkes v. R [1976] 1 WLR 1251. A mother found her 
daughter bleeding from stab wounds and went up to the accused, who 
lived in the same house as her daughter, and asked him why he had 
stabbed her. The accused, holding a closed flick-knife, remained silent and 
when the mother seized him, saying she would hold him until the police 
came, he opened the knife and tried to stab her. The Privy Council 
concluded that in those circumstances, with the mother and accused 
speaking on equal terms, the jury had been entitled to take into account 
both the accused's silence and his subsequent attempt to stab the mother 
as evidence that he had stabbed and murdered her daughter (see also R v. 
Cramp (1880) 14 Cox CC 390 (Assizes)). Similarly, in Bessela v. Stern 
(1877) 2 CPD 265 (CA), a civil action for breach of promise of marriage, 
evidence was admissible to show that the defendant had made no denial 
when scolded by the plaintiff for having repeatedly promised to marry her 
and then failing to do so. In Wiedemann v. Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534 (CA) 
it was felt that a failure to respond to a letter on a matter of business could 
be regarded as evidence that the truth of its content had been accepted by 
the recipient, but that, in other contexts, a failure to respond to a letter 
alleging `some offence or meanness' would not allow any such inference to 
be drawn as it was the ordinary practice of mankind not to answer such 
letters. 
More recently, in Freemantle v. R [1994] 1 WLR 1437 (PC) a man's 
failure to deny a statement identifying him as `Freemantle' allowed an 
inference to be drawn that he had accepted the truth of that identification. 
The accused was charged with the murder of a woman who had been shot 
while watching a film. His defence was that he had been elsewhere, but a 
prosecution witness testified that he had recognised the gunman as he was 
making off and had shouted, `Freemantle, me see you!' The gunman's 
retort (`Go suck your mumma!') was felt to be capable of amounting to 
`an implied acknowledgement by the defendant that he had been correctly 
identified by way of recognition and as an expression of the defendant's 
resentment of [the witness's] public disclosure of the identification'. 
If, in criminal proceedings, the allegation against the accused was made 
by a person on equal terms with him, the mere presence of a police officer 
at the scene is a factor to be weighed in the balance as part of the 
circumstances (R v. Christie [1914] AC 545 (HL), R v. Horne [1990] Crim 
LR 188 (CA)); but if the allegation was made by a police officer or some 
other agent of the state there is authority for the view that his silence 
should not be regarded as an acceptance by him of the charge because an 
officer of the law is not on equal terms with a suspect (Hall v. R [1971] 1 
WLR 298 (PC)). In R v. Chandler [1976] 1 WLR 585, however, the Court 
of Appeal refused to accept that this was an absolute rule, holding that 
silence in such circumstances could amount to an acceptance of the 
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allegation if made prior to the caution being given and in circumstances 
where the police officer and accused could in fact be said to have been on 
equal terms, such as where the accused was in the presence of his solicitor. 
This decision has not been applied, however, because the police are 
obliged to caution a suspect before he is interrogated (see 7.1.3.3 ante). 
In R v. Christie [1914] AC 545 (HL) Lord Reading added (at pp. 565±6) 
that a statement made in the presence of the accused could be admissible 
for the prosecution, even if his response (if any) did not amount to an 
acknowledgment of its truth, in order `to prove the conduct and 
demeanour of the accused when hearing the statement'. The accused's 
exculpatory response to an allegation is admissible evidence of his 
consistency and reaction (16.4.2.4 post), but Lord Reading had in mind 
evidence of the accused's conduct and demeanour being admissible to 
show he was conscious of his guilt at the time he heard the statement. The 
accused's silence in the face of an allegation may therefore be evidence of 
his admission of guilt (if he can be deemed to have accepted the truth of 
the allegation) and/or evidence of his conscious awareness of guilt. 
If the accused was found in possession of recently stolen goods and 
failed to give any (or any plausible) explanation prior to his being 
cautioned as to how he came to have those goods, it is permissible for the 
jury to infer, as a matter of common sense, that he was handling the goods 
knowing or believing them to be stolen (R v. Ball [1983] 1 WLR 801 (CA)) 
or that he had stolen the goods himself (R v. Seymour [1954] 1 WLR 678 
(CCA)). It is the failure to offer a plausible explanation in a situation 
where an explanation is clearly called for that logically allows an inference 
to be drawn. For similar reasons the common law also recognises that a 
person found in a compromising position should explain himself or suffer 
the risk of an adverse inference being drawn from his silence. In R v. Wood 
(1911) 7 Cr App R 56 (CCA) the accused had been found in the front hall 
of a house by the householder's chauffeur. The jury were therefore entitled 
to infer an intent to commit a felony on account of his failure to give a 
satisfactory explanation to the chauffeur for his being there. It has also 
been held that an adverse inference may be drawn from the accused's pre-
trial refusal to stand in an identification parade, so long as the evidence is 
presented to the jury in a fair way (R v. Doyle [2001] EWCA Crim 2883). 
At common law a suspected offender was recognised to have the right 
to remain silent in the face of an interrogation by an agent of the State. In 
other words, a suspect could not be compelled to speak to the 
investigating authority (usually the police) and his silence under caution 
could not subsequently be regarded as evidence against him (as the 
accused) or be adversely commented upon by the trial judge (see, for 
example, R v. Gilbert (1977) 66 Cr App R 237 (CA) and R v. Alladice 
(1988) 87 Cr App R 380 (CA)). The second limb has now been curtailed by 
s. 34 and ss. 36±37 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, but 
even before those provisions came into force it was clear that this aspect of 
the `right of silence' represented a general rather than an absolute 
prohibition. The accused who had answered some but not other questions 
under caution ran the risk of having his whole interview admitted (R v. 
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Mann (1972) 56 Cr App R 750 (CA)); and even a limited degree of judicial 
comment on the accused's silence was permissible. In R v. Gerard (1948) 
32 Cr App R 132 (CCA), where the accused (as a suspect) had stated that 
he would reserve his comments for the court, it was held that the judge had 
been entitled to comment that it was perhaps `a little odd' for him to have 
made that comment before being charged (see also R v. Tune (1944) 29 Cr 
App R 162 (CCA)). The trial judge also had a limited discretion to 
comment on the accused's failure to disclose his defence during the pre-
trial proceedings, thereby preventing the police from being able to 
investigate it, as a factor affecting the weight of his evidence in support of 
that defence (R v. Littleboy [1934] 2 KB 408 (CCA)). In R v. Ryan (1964) 
50 Cr App R 144 (CCA) this principle was extended to a situation where 
there could have been no police investigation, although the reasoning was 
subsequently criticised by the Court of Appeal in R v. Gilbert (1977) 66 Cr 
App R 237 where it was felt that a trial judge's discretion was limited to 
commenting that the accused's defence had been put forward for the first 
time at the trial. (R v. Littleboy was not mentioned in R v. Gilbert, 
however, and, since it can be distinguished from R v. Ryan, it was 
probably still good law when the 1994 Act came into force.) 
9.2.2 Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
This provision, like s. 35 of the 1994 Act (9.3.2 post), has its origins in the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eleventh Report (Cmnd 4991 (1972) 
at pp. 16±34). In short, it provides the prosecution with an additional 
evidential factor in support of their case if the accused failed to mention 
his defence when interrogated by the police; that is to say, the jury or 
magistrates are entitled to draw an adverse inference from the accused's 
silence when questioned by the police under caution if his defence could 
reasonably have been mentioned during that interview. Section 34 applies 
whether the accused is interviewed (charged or informed) by police officers 
or other persons charged with the duty of investigating offences such as 
customs officers (s. 34(4)). The caution now reads: `You do not have to 
say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when 
questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do 
say may be given in evidence.' 
Although s. 34 has curtailed the accused's pre-trial right of silence, the 
right has not been abolished (see 9.5 post). Subject to any legitimate 
statutory interference with the privilege against self-incrimination, a 
suspect cannot be compelled to answer any questions put to him; and it is 
not silence per se which allows an adverse inference to be drawn under this 
provision. 
Section 34 provides, inter alia, that where evidence is given that the 
accused `failed to mention any fact relied on in his defence' when 
questioned under caution before he was charged with the offence (or on 
being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be 
prosecuted for the offence) and the fact was one `which in the 
circumstances existing at the time the accused could reasonably have 
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been expected to mention when so questioned, charged or informed, as the 
case may be', then the tribunal of fact `may draw such inferences from the 
failure as appear proper' in determining whether the accused is guilty of 
the offence (s. 34(1) and 34(2)(d)). However, it is not permissible to convict 
the accused solely on the basis of any such inference (s. 38(3)). 
With regard to the pre-trial stage, if a suspect has not had the 
opportunity to give his own version of events, it is permissible for the 
police to question him notwithstanding the belief of the custody officer or 
the officer in charge of the investigation that, in the absence of an 
exculpatory explanation from the suspect, there is already sufficient 
evidence for a prosecution to succeed, for the suspect may give an 
exculpatory account which reduces or extinguishes the prospects of a 
successful conviction (Code C-11.6, following a line of cases from R v. 
McGuinness [1999] Crim LR 318 (CA) to R v. Elliott [2002] EWCA Crim 
931 (C-MAC)). It has also been held that, if the accused was silent during 
his police interview but the interview record is excluded under s. 78(1) of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 because of breaches of Code C 
of the PACE Codes of Practice ± preventing any inference from being 
drawn from that silence ± it may nevertheless be possible to allow an 
inference to be drawn from the accused's subsequent silence at the time he 
was charged, so long as this would not have the effect of nullifying the 
safeguards contained in the 1984 Act and its Codes (R v. Dervish [2002] 2 
Cr App R 105 (CA)). 
An adverse inference may be drawn at the trial only if a `fact' has been 
`relied on' by the accused in his defence, so no such inference may be 
drawn from the accused's failure to admit part of the case against him if he 
subsequently makes a bare admission at his trial (R v. Betts [2001] 2 Cr 
App R 257 (CA)). It is important to note, however, that a fact may be 
`relied on' by the accused even if he does not give oral evidence. A fact 
relied on may be established `by the accused himself in evidence, by a 
witness called on his behalf, or by a prosecution witness' (R v. Bowers 
(1998) 163 JP 33 (CA)) or where `a co-accused gives evidence and his 
evidence is adopted in counsel's closing speech or where . . . suggestions are 
put to witnesses albeit that they are not accepted' (R v. Webber [2002] 
EWCA Crim 2782). 
The word `fact' has been interpreted to mean not only `an actual deed or 
thing done', but also `something that is actually the case . . . as opposed to 
. . . a conjecture'; so it is wide enough to encompass a previously 
undisclosed explanation for aspects of the prosecution case which are not 
in dispute at the trial, such as the defence of `innocent association' (R v. 
Milford [2001] Crim LR 330 (CA)). In R v. Nickolson [1999] Crim LR 61 
(CA) it was held that the accused's conjectural explanation in the witness 
box as to how his step-daughter's night-dress might have come to be 
stained with semen could not be construed as a `fact'. However, in R v. 
B(MT) [2000] Crim LR 181 the Court of Appeal acknowledged that a 
suggested explanation cannot always be divorced from `facts'. If the 
accused's explanation at trial was in his mind when interviewed, and was 
based on a specific incident of which he was also then aware, then both his 
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explanation and the preceding incident could be `facts', and an adverse 
inference would be permissible if he could reasonably have been expected 
to mention them to the police. 
In R v. Ali [2001] EWCA Crim 863 it was held that, if the accused 
provided `no comment' responses to the questions put to him by the police 
during his interview, but he did (at that time) provide the police with a 
prepared statement which disclosed the essential facts of his defence, then 
it was not permissible to draw an adverse inference under s. 34. It would 
seem, moreover, that no inference will be drawn where there has been 
unequivocal pre-interview disclosure of the `fact' relied on by the accused 
(see R v. O(A) [2000] Crim LR 617 (CA)). 
In R v. Mountford [1999] Crim LR 575 (CA) and R v. Gill [2001] 1 Cr 
App R 160 (CA) it was held that where the fact relied on is so central to 
the accused's defence that its rejection would inevitably lead to a verdict of 
guilty, and the s. 34 issue cannot therefore be resolved as an independent 
issue, no adverse inference should be drawn. This approach (for which no 
support can be found in the Act) has now been rejected, for if it were to be 
applied generally to cover the range of cases in which innocent 
explanations are belatedly advanced at trial, the very purpose of the 
provision would be defeated (R v. Hearne (2000) unreported (99/4240/Z4) 
(CA), R v. Milford [2001] Crim LR 330 (CA) (99/07176/Y4), R v. 
Gowland-Wynn [2002] 1 Cr App R 569 (CA), R v. Daly [2002] 2 Cr App R 
201 (CA), R v. Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 83 (CA)). 
9.2.2.1 The Propriety of Drawing an Inference 
Section 34(1) expressly provides that an inference may be drawn only if the 
fact relied on by the accused in his defence, but not mentioned in his police 
interview, is one `which in the circumstances existing at the time the 
accused could reasonably have been expected to mention'. A suspect 
cannot reasonably be expected to mention a fact of which he is unaware, 
so where the accused was charged with a sexual offence, and at the time of 
his interview neither the police nor he knew of the seminal staining on the 
complainant's clothes, his failure to explain the stain to the police could 
not permit an adverse inference to be drawn (R v. Nickolson [1999] Crim 
LR 61 (CA)). Similarly, in R v. Stocker [2001] EWCA Crim 1334 no 
adverse inference could be drawn from the accused's failure to explain the 
presence of his fingerprints at the scene of two burglaries, as it had not 
been proved that he knew his fingerprints had been found by the police 
(see also R v. B(MT) [2000] Crim LR 181 (CA)). It would not be 
reasonable to expect a suspect to mention a specific fact which he was 
aware of if he was unaware of its significance and the police did not 
expressly ask him about it; but this does not mean that a specific question 
pertaining to the fact must always be put during the interview. If it can be 
proved that the accused knew of the fact and its significance, and he could 
reasonably have been expected to mention it during the interview, an 
adverse inference may be drawn if that fact was subsequently relied on in 
his defence. Thus, in R v. Flynn [2001] EWCA Crim 1633 an adverse 
inference could be drawn from the accused's failure to mention his defence 
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that, at the time of the fatal road accident caused by his driving, he had 
not been affected by alcohol, because the police had begun his (first) 
interview by setting out what he had said at the scene and explaining that 
his roadside breath test had proved positive. 
The most important question in practical terms is the extent to which a 
suspect may rely on his solicitor's advice not to answer police questions as 
a reason in support of a submission that the judge should direct the jury 
not to draw an adverse inference. This question first arose in R v. Condron 
[1997] 1 WLR 827, where the Court of Appeal held that the key issue was 
not so much the advice given by the solicitor as the reason why the accused 
had chosen to remain silent, which was generally a question for the jury. 
The fact that the accused had acted on his solicitor's advice could be put 
forward as an argument to dissuade the jury from drawing an adverse 
inference, but this would usually require the reason for that advice to be 
revealed too. It was recognised, however, that it would be possible to have 
a `no comment' interview excluded (following a voir dire if necessary) if 
there had been significant breaches of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 Codes of Practice, justifying the application of s. 78(1) of that 
Act, or where it `would be perverse of a jury to draw an adverse inference', 
such as where the accused was `of very low intelligence and understanding 
and [had] been advised by his solicitor to say nothing'. In other cases a 
submission that the jury should be directed not to draw an adverse 
inference would have to be made at the end of the defence case, although it 
was thought that `the judge is likely to consider that the question why the 
defendant did not answer is one for the jury'. 
In R v. Argent [1997] 2 Cr App R 27 the accused was questioned by the 
police as to whether he had been involved in the death by stabbing of a 
man outside a London nightclub. The interview followed an identification 
parade at which he had been positively identified, but his solicitor felt that 
as the police had failed to make full disclosure of their case he would be 
well-advised to remain silent, this advice being in line with the Law 
Society's guidelines. The accused gave a `no comment' interview, but 
testified at trial that he had not been involved in any act of violence after 
leaving the nightclub. The judge therefore directed the jury that they were 
entitled to draw an adverse inference from his pre-trial silence, and the 
accused was convicted of manslaughter. Dismissing his appeal, the Court 
of Appeal reiterated its position that, as a general rule, the question of 
drawing inferences under s. 34 should be left to the jury with a careful 
direction from the judge. The jury would be directed to take account of all 
the relevant circumstances existing at the time of the interview, and the 
advice given to the accused by his solicitor was only one factor amongst 
many others. Lord Bingham CJ usefully summarised the correct approach 
(at p. 33): 
`The courts should not construe the expression ``in the circumstances'' 
restrictively: matters such as time of day, the defendant's age, 
experience, mental capacity, state of health, sobriety, tiredness, knowl-
edge, personality and legal advice are all part of the relevant 
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circumstances; and those are only examples of things which may be 
relevant. When reference is made to `the accused' attention is directed 
not to some hypothetical, reasonable accused of ordinary phlegm and 
fortitude but to the actual accused with such qualities, apprehensions, 
knowledge and advice as he is shown to have had at the time. It is for 
the jury to decide whether the fact (or facts) which the defendant has 
relied on in his defence in the criminal trial, but which he had not 
mentioned when questioned under caution . . . is (or are) a fact (or facts) 
which in the circumstances as they actually existed the actual defendant 
could reasonably have been expected to mention. Like so many other 
questions in criminal trials this is a question to be resolved by the jury in 
the exercise of their collective common-sense, experience and under-
standing of human nature. Sometimes they may conclude that it was 
reasonable for the defendant to have held his peace for a host of 
reasons, such as that he was tired, ill, frightened, drunk, drugged, 
unable to understand what was going on, suspicious of the police, afraid 
that his answer would not be fairly recorded, worried at committing 
himself without legal advice, acting on legal advice, or some other 
reason accepted by the jury. In other cases the jury may conclude, after 
hearing all that the defendant and his witnesses may have to say about 
the reasons for failing to mention the fact or facts in issue, that he could 
reasonably have been expected to do so. This is an issue on which the 
judge may, and usually should, give appropriate directions. But he 
should ordinarily leave the issue to the jury to decide. Only rarely would 
it be right for the judge to direct the jury that they should, or should 
not, draw the appropriate inference.' 
Accordingly, the jury are not concerned with the correctness of the 
solicitor's advice to remain silent, nor with whether the advice complied 
with the Law Society's guidelines. The question they need to answer is 
simply whether the accused's decision to remain silent was reasonable in 
all the circumstances. Neither the allegation against Argent nor his 
defence was particularly complex, so it would have been reasonable for 
him to give his account notwithstanding the inadequate disclosure by the 
police, particularly as he already knew the main thrust of the case against 
him and that he had been positively identified. In different circumstances, 
though, a refusal to comment following legal advice on the basis of 
inadequate police disclosure may well persuade the jury that the accused's 
silence was reasonable. In R v. Roble [1997] Crim LR 449 (CA) Rose LJ 
commented that it could be reasonable to remain silent where `the 
interviewing officer has disclosed to the solicitor little or nothing of the 
nature of the case against the defendant, so that the solicitor cannot 
usefully advise his client, or where the nature of the offence or the material 
in the hands of the police is so complex, or relates to matters so long ago, 
that no sensible immediate response is feasible'. However, in R v. Beard 
[2002] Crim LR 684 the Court of Appeal held that it had been appropriate 
to allow the jury to draw an adverse inference from B's `no comment' 
interviews, even though his solicitor had not understood the nature or 
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relevance of the seized documents which had been disclosed and had 
advised B to remain silent. Most of the disclosed documents had been 
recovered from B himself, so he could have explained to his solicitor what 
each of them meant; and the majority of the unanswered questions did not 
even relate to the disclosed documents. (Another reason for the solicitor's 
advice was that the police should not be given an opportunity to link the 
instant allegation with a separate allegation the accused faced, but as there 
was nothing to suggest that any of the questions put to B were irrelevant 
to the instant allegation that argument for not drawing an inference was 
also rejected.) 
In Condron v. United Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 1 (at p. 21) the 
European Court of Human Rights said: `[T]he very fact that an accused is 
advised by his lawyer to maintain his silence must . . . be given appropriate 
weight by the domestic court. There may be good reason why such advice 
may be given.' The same point was made in Averill v. United Kingdom 
(2000) 31 EHRR 839 (at p. 854), where the Court said that `due regard' 
must be given to whether the accused's silence is based on bona fide advice 
received from his lawyer; and in Beckles v. United Kingdom (2002) 
Application No. 44652/98 the Court held that the trial judge's direction to 
the jury had failed to give appropriate weight to the accused's explanation 
that he had remained silent on the advice of his solicitor and the 
background matters which made that explanation plausible. Following the 
decision in Condron v. United Kingdom, the Court of Appeal concluded in 
R v. Betts [2001] 2 Cr App R 257 that no adverse inference should be 
drawn from the accused's silence under s. 34 if `it is a plausible explanation 
that the reason for not mentioning facts is that [he] acted on the advice of 
his solicitor and not because he had no, or no satisfactory, answer to give'. 
However, in R v. Howell [2003] EWCA Crim 1, a case where the 
allegation was that the accused had seriously assaulted the complainant, 
the Court of Appeal noted that the European Court of Human Rights had 
referred to remaining silent for `good reason', and rejected the view that 
adverse comment is disallowed merely because it is shown that a solicitor's 
advice (of whatever quality) had genuinely been relied on. Giving the 
judgment of the Court, Laws LJ said (at para. 24): 
`[T]he public interest that inheres in reasonable disclosure by a 
suspected person of what he has to say when faced with a set of facts 
which accuse him is thwarted if currency is given to the belief that if a 
suspect remains silent on legal advice he may systematically avoid 
adverse comment at his trial. And it may encourage solicitors to advise 
silence for other than good objective reasons. . . . What is reasonable 
depends on all the circumstances. We venture to say, recalling the 
circumstances of this present case, that we do not consider the absence 
of a written statement from the complainant to be good reason for 
silence (if adequate oral disclosure of the complaint has been given), and 
it does not become good reason merely because a solicitor has so 
advised. Nor is the possibility that the complainant may not pursue his 
complaint good reason, nor a belief by the solicitor that the suspect will 
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be charged in any event whatever he says. The kind of circumstance 
which may most likely justify silence will be such matters as the 
suspect's condition (ill-health, in particular mental disability; confusion; 
intoxication; shock and so forth . . .), or his inability genuinely to 
recollect events without reference to documents which are not to hand, 
or communication with other persons who may be able to assist his 
recollection. There must always be soundly based objective reasons for 
silence, sufficiently cogent and telling to weigh in the balance against the 
clear public interest in an account being given by the suspect to the 
police. Solicitors bearing the important responsibility of giving advice 
to suspects at police stations must always have that in mind.' 
It follows that, regardless of any legal advice he has received, a suspect 
may be obliged to provide a response to a bare allegation, even if it is 
unsubstantiated by any other evidence and there is a risk that it has been 
concocted or embellished by the complainant. 
9.2.2.2 The Nature of the Inference Drawn 
No guidance is given in the Act as to what amounts to a `proper' inference 
under s. 34, but, as noted in R v. Self (1999) unreported (98/6128/W2) 
(CA), it would not assist the jury to speak generally of inferences without 
indicating what those inferences might be. Silence in response to police 
questioning followed by an explanation at trial is most likely to lead to an 
inference that the explanation was subsequently fabricated, allowing the 
jury to infer that the accused has no true defence and, therefore, that he is 
more likely to have committed the offence charged. It now seems to be 
established, however, that post-interview fabrication is not the only 
permissible inference which may be drawn (notwithstanding the contrary 
view expressed in R v. Samuel (1997) unreported (97/1143/Z2) (CA)). It is 
also permissible for the jury to infer that the accused had already prepared 
his false account by the time of the interview, knowing that it was one 
which would not withstand scrutiny if revealed in advance of the trial (R v. 
Randall (1998) unreported (97/05960/X4) (CA)). In R v. Daniel [1998] 2 Cr 
App R 373 the Court of Appeal stated that in appropriate cases the jury 
would be entitled to conclude that the accused's silence could only sensibly 
be attributed to his unwillingness to be subjected to further questioning 
when in a compromising position or to his having no innocent explanation 
when questioned or to his not having thought out all the facts (see also R 
v. Argent [1997] 2 Cr App R 27 (CA) at p. 34 and R v. Beckles [1999] Crim 
LR 148 (CA)). In R v. Milford [2001] Crim LR 330 (99/07176/Y4) the 
Court of Appeal reviewed the authorities and approved the broader 
approach, stating (at para. 33) that the inference which may be drawn is 
not limited to one of recent fabrication, but `extends to a fact or 
explanation tailored to fit the prosecution case or which the defendant 
believed would not stand up to scrutiny at the time'. 
9.2.2.3 Establishing a Case to Answer 
Inferences from the accused's failure `to mention any fact relied on in his 
defence' may also be drawn by the judge (or magistrates) at `half time' to 
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see whether the prosecution have established a case to answer (s. 34(2)(c)), 
although it is not permissible to rely solely on any such inference (s. 38(3)). 
Because the defence case is not heard prior to a submission of no case to 
answer, there will be few opportunities for the courts to rely on s. 34(2)(c); 
but this does not mean the provision is otiose. In R v. McLernon [1992] NI 
168 (NICA) it was accepted that an inference could be drawn (under an 
equivalent provision) where `defence counsel suggested a fact, which 
assisted the accused, to a prosecution witness in the course of cross-
examination and the witness accepted it'. In R v. Bowers (1998) 163 JP 33 
the Court of Appeal was of the view that a fact relied on may be 
established by a prosecution witness in evidence in chief or in cross-
examination; and in R v. Webber [2002] EWCA Crim 2782 it was held that 
a fact relied on could be a suggestion put to a prosecution witness in cross-
examination whether or not that witness accepted it. In R v. Hart [1998] 
CLY 374 (97/03362/W4) the Court of Appeal envisaged that s. 34(2)(c) 
could also be triggered where the accused `has chosen to refuse to answer 
questions when initially interviewed but some time later, after consulting 
his solicitor, has produced a prepared statement or has given later 
answers'. In R v. McLernon [1992] NI 168 the accused had refused to 
answer police questions for several days but subsequently prepared an 
exculpatory written statement prior to his trial. The Northern Ireland 
Court of Appeal held that the judge had been entitled to draw a half-time 
adverse inference from the accused's refusal to speak when interviewed as 
his exculpatory statement contained facts he was relying on in his defence 
which he could reasonably have been expected to mention in the course of 
his interviews. At the trial defence counsel had expressly conceded that the 
accused was relying on the facts in the exculpatory statement as part of his 
defence, and for this reason it was felt an inference could be drawn even 
though the statement had been adduced by the prosecution as part of their 
case. Arguably, though, it should not be possible to draw a `proper' 
inference if the prosecution have adduced an exculpatory or mixed 
statement and there has been no such concession from the defence. For 
one thing, a purely exculpatory statement would be admissible only as 
evidence of the accused's reaction and not as evidence of any facts stated 
(16.4.2.4 post); and the exculpatory part of a mixed statement, though 
admissible hearsay, has `minimal' weight in the absence of other 
supporting evidence (Western v. DPP [1997] 1 Cr App R 474 (DC)). 
If the accused manages to get to half time without triggering s. 34(2)(c), 
but the judge rules that there is a case to answer, the accused may decide to 
`put the prosecution to proof' by refusing to testify and adducing no 
evidence. If the accused does this it will not be permissible for the jury to 
draw an inference under s. 34(2)(d) as he will not have relied on any facts 
in his defence (R v. Moshaid [1998] Crim LR 420 (CA)); but his failure to 
testify may allow an adverse inference to be drawn under s. 35 of the Act 
(9.3.2 post). The situation may be different, however, if the accused is tried 
with a co-accused who adopts a more active line of defence. If the judge 
rules that the accused has relied on facts relied on by his co-accused, it is 
possible that s. 34(2)(d) will be triggered and an adverse inference drawn 
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from his pre-trial silence, notwithstanding his own refusal to testify (R v. 
Reader (1998) unreported (97/06342/W2) (CA)). 
9.2.2.4 Directing the Jury 
Guidelines for directing the jury on s. 34 were first established in R v. 
Condron [1997] 1 WLR 827 (CA), where it was held that the judge should 
explain the basis for drawing an inference under s. 34; that the burden of 
proof remains with the prosecution; that the accused was entitled to 
remain silent during his interview (or when charged); that the jury are 
entitled but not obliged to draw an adverse inference from his silence; and 
that, if an adverse inference is drawn, it cannot of itself prove the accused's 
guilt but may be taken into account as some additional support for the 
prosecution case (in line with s. 38(3) of the Act). The Court of Appeal 
also thought it would be `desirable' for the judge to explain to the jury that 
an adverse inference may be drawn only once they have concluded that the 
accused's silence `can only sensibly be attributed to [his] having no answer, 
or none that would stand up to cross-examination'. In Condron v. United 
Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 1, however, the European Court of Human 
Rights held that this last direction was more than merely desirable. 
Indeed, the absence of this additional restriction on the jury's discretion to 
draw an adverse inference had been incompatible with the exercise by the 
applicants of their right to silence at the police station, meaning that there 
had been a violation of their Article 6(1) right to a fair trial. Accordingly, 
the Court of Appeal has now held that the trial judge must also direct the 
jury that, before they are able to draw an adverse inference under s. 34, 
they must be satisfied that the real reason for the accused's silence is that 
he had no innocent explanation to offer (R v. Milford [2001] Crim LR 330, 
R v. Morgan [2001] EWCA Crim 445, R v. Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 83 
(CA)); or, to put it another way, the jury must be satisfied that the only 
sensible explanation for the accused's silence is that he had no answer to 
the charge or none that would stand up to questioning and investigation 
(R v. Betts [2001] 2 Cr App R 257 (CA), R v. Daly [2002] 2 Cr App R 201 
(CA), R v. Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 83 (CA)). 
The jury must be referred to any fact which the accused has relied on in 
his defence but which was not mentioned during his interview or when 
charged (see, for example, R v. Gill [2001] 1 Cr App R 160 (CA)). A 
direction must also be given, in line with the guidance provided in R v. 
Argent [1997] 2 Cr App R 27 (CA) and subsequent cases (9.2.2.1 ante), 
that an inference may be drawn only if the jury are satisfied that the fact 
relied on is one which, in the circumstances existing at the time, the 
accused could reasonably have been expected to mention; and the jury 
must be told that appropriate weight is to be given to the accused's 
explanation that he remained silent on the advice of his solicitor. Where 
the jury are being asked to infer that the accused has lied, it may also be 
appropriate to supplement the s. 34 direction with a Lucas direction (R v. 
O(A) [2000] Crim LR 617 (CA); see also 11.6 post). 
As noted above, the jury must be told that an adverse inference from 
silence cannot of itself prove the accused's guilt; but the jury should also 
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be directed that an inference may be drawn only if they are first satisfied 
that there is a prima facie case against the accused on the basis of other 
evidence (R v. Milford [2001] Crim LR 330, R v. Morgan [2001] EWCA 
Crim 445, R v. Gill [2001] 1 Cr App R 160 (CA)). This further safeguard 
reflects the view of the European Court of Human Rights that the extent 
to which adverse inferences may be drawn from the accused's failure to 
respond to police questioning `must be necessarily limited' (Averill v. 
United Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 839 at p. 853). In effect, though, it is no 
more than a restatement of the requirement that an adverse inference 
should provide no more than `some additional support' for the 
prosecution case, ensuring that a conviction will not be based only or 
even mainly on the accused's pre-trial silence (R v. Everson [2001] EWCA 
Crim 896). 
Where there are inconsistencies between the accused's version of events 
at trial and the version given by him during his interview, the trial judge 
has a discretion to give a direction on the relevance of those 
inconsistencies to the accused's credibility rather than a s. 34 direction 
(R v. McCaffrey [2003] EWCA Crim 970). Where, however, the 
requirements in s. 34(1) have not been satisfied, and no inference may 
therefore be drawn under s. 34(2)(d), it is incumbent on the trial judge to 
direct the jury not to draw an adverse inference from the accused's pre-
trial silence (R v. McGarry [1999] 1 Cr App R 377 (CA)). That said, a 
failure to give such a `counterweight direction' is unlikely to affect the 
safety of the conviction if the accused refused to say anything before the 
trial and refused to testify in his own defence (R v. La Rose [2003] EWCA 
Crim 1471). The Court of Appeal has also said that `it may well be that in 
many cases where the guilt or innocence of two or more defendants stands 
or falls together' it `will generally be desirable' to direct the jury that an 
adverse inference drawn from the silence of one should not be held against 
the other (R v. McClean (1999) unreported (98/01354/R2)). 
9.2.2.5 Privilege and Waiver 
If the accused's reason for remaining silent in the face of police 
interrogation is that he followed his solicitor's advice and it was 
reasonable for him to do so, his assertion will need to be supported by 
admissible evidence. The accused and/or his solicitor will therefore need to 
give evidence of what passed between them; but by giving such evidence 
the accused will be deemed to have waived his legal professional privilege 
(14.2.3 post) and he (and his solicitor, if called) will face cross-examination 
on all aspects of the advice which was given, including any tactical reasons 
for giving it. In R v. Bowden [1999] 1 WLR 823 the Court of Appeal held 
that legal professional privilege could be waived whether the explanation 
was given by the accused or his solicitor, regardless of whether it was given 
during the interview or at the trial, save that a `simple statement' at the 
trial to the effect that the accused did not answer questions following legal 
advice (or a statement at the interview to the same effect) would not 
amount to waiver. Where the accused makes such a `simple statement' 
during cross-examination, the privileged nature of the matter means that it 
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should not be pursued by the prosecution or the judge; it is for defence 
counsel to decide whether to question the accused during re-examination 
on the advice he was given (R v. Wood [2002] EWCA Crim 2474). 
In R v. Fitzgerald (1998) unreported (97/2011/W5) F's solicitor made a 
statement at the start of the police interview to explain why F would 
remain silent. He said that he had spoken to F and was concerned `that the 
possible involvement of other parties . . . may prevent him from putting his 
defence fully and frankly'. At his trial for robbery F gave evidence that he 
had simply been in the area by chance to meet friends in a local public 
house and had not been involved in the offence. The Court of Appeal held 
that the prosecution had been entitled to adduce in evidence the solicitor's 
statement as it was relevant to whether an adverse inference should be 
drawn under s. 34 and it had been made in the presence and hearing of F. 
F had therefore impliedly accepted the truth of his solicitor's statement by 
not dissenting from it (see 9.2.1 ante). Moreover, by making that 
statement to the police the solicitor had waived the privilege which had 
hitherto attached to what F had told him in confidence. 
9.2.3 Sections 36 and 37 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994 
Section 36 of the 1994 Act provides that where at the time of the accused's 
arrest there was an object, substance or mark (or a mark on any such 
object) (i) on his person or (ii) in or on his clothing or footwear or 
(iii) otherwise in his possession or (iv) in any place in which he was at the 
time of his arrest, which the arresting officer or another investigating 
officer reasonably believed might be attributable to his participation in the 
commission of a specified offence, then so long as he was told of the 
officer's belief, asked to account for the presence of the object (etc.) and 
warned of the consequences of his failing or refusing to comply with the 
request, evidence of his failure or refusal to comply will allow the tribunal 
of fact to draw such inferences as appear proper in determining whether he 
is guilty of the specified offence (s. 36(2)(d)). Section 36 inferences may 
also be drawn by the court in determining whether there is a case to 
answer (s. 36(2)(c)). However, it is not permissible to determine that there 
is a case to answer, or find the accused guilty, solely on the basis of any 
such inference (s. 38(3)). Section 36 applies equally to the condition of 
clothing or footwear as it applies to any substance or mark thereon 
(s. 36(3)). 
The drawing of adverse inferences under s. 36 was recently considered in 
R v. Compton [2002] EWCA Crim 2835, where the Court of Appeal came 
to the following conclusions. First, it is sufficient if the accused was 
informed by the officer of the `offence-context' (`drug-trafficking') even if 
he was not informed of the particular offence with which he was ultimately 
charged (conspiracy to supply drugs). Second, the accused must account 
`for a specific state of fact' and not merely refer to `other states of fact, 
from which it can be inferred what his account might be'. Thus, when D1 
was re-interviewed and provided `no comment' responses following the 
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detection of heroin on the substantial amount of money found at his 
address, his statement at an earlier interview (prior to the discovery of the 
contamination) to the effect that his wife was a heroin addict and he had 
received the money from his father, a known dealer, meant that he had not 
accounted for the presence of heroin on the money. Third, a relevant 
response from the accused will not necessarily prevent an adverse 
inference being drawn. D2, in whose safe the contaminated sum of 
£30,000 was found, had responded to questions relating to the 
contamination by stating that he was a heroin addict. It was held that 
he had not accounted for the presence of heroin on the money by this bare 
assertion that he used heroin. Finally, with regard to the direction to be 
given if the accused gave a `no comment' interview following legal advice, 
the Court of Appeal held that the judgment in R v. Betts [2001] 2 Cr App 
R 257 (CA) on directions under s. 34 was also relevant to the judge's task 
under s. 36. The jury must be told that they can hold the accused's failure 
to give an explanation against him only if they are sure that he had no 
reasonable explanation to offer: they have `to be sure both that the 
solicitor's advice was not an adequate explanation for the silence and that 
there was no innocent explanation' (see now R v. Howell [2003] EWCA 
Crim 1, 9.2.2.1 ante). 
Section 37 allows inferences to be drawn from the failure of the accused 
to explain his presence at a particular place (defined in s. 38(1)) at or about 
the time of the offence. The provision is very similar to s. 36: the accused 
must have been arrested, the arresting or investigating officer must have 
reasonably believed his presence at that place and at that time was 
possibly attributable to his participation in the commission of the offence, 
the accused must have been informed of the officer's belief and asked to 
account for his presence, and he must have failed or refused to give an 
explanation. If these conditions are satisfied such inferences as appear 
proper may be drawn from the accused's silence. Again, any inference may 
be taken into account by the tribunal of fact in determining whether the 
accused is guilty (s. 37(2)(d)) or by the court when determining whether 
there is a case to answer (s. 37(2)(c)); but neither of these decisions may be 
reached solely on the basis of the inference (s. 38(3)). 
Sections 36 and 37 allow inferences to be drawn from silence in a variety 
of situations whether or not the accused gives an innocent explanation at 
his trial. An example would be where the accused failed to explain his 
presence near the scene of a pub `glassing' soon after the offence was 
committed (s. 37) and/or failed to explain the blood and shards of glass on 
his clothes (s. 36). The tribunal of fact will of course need to consider all 
the circumstances before drawing an adverse inference, particularly the 
accused's explanation; but there is no requirement in either section that 
the accused should reasonably have been expected to explain the object or 
mark, or his presence, before an inference can be drawn. Where the 
prosecution seek to rely on these provisions the jury will be invited to 
conclude that the accused had no innocent explanation to give the police. 
They will then be entitled to infer that he is more likely to be guilty of the 
offence charged. 
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9.2.4 Other Provisions 
The accused's failure to provide a `defence statement' to the prosecution 
prior to trial on indictment, in accordance with the requirements of s. 5 of 
the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, allows the jury to 
draw an adverse inference when deciding whether he is guilty (s. 11). 
Adverse inferences may also be drawn if the accused's defence at trial is 
inconsistent with that disclosed in his statement, or where he relies on an 
alibi at trial which was not disclosed in his statement (see generally 13.1.2 
post). The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows the police to take 
an intimate sample (defined in s. 65) so long as the accused has given his 
consent, but if the accused refuses to give such consent without good cause 
the tribunal of fact may draw `such inferences from the refusal as appear 
proper' in determining whether he is guilty of the offence charged 
(s. 62(10)(b)). An adverse inference may also be drawn in determining 
whether there is a case to answer (s. 62(10)(a)(ii)). In civil proceedings, 
s. 23(1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 provides that, where the 
court gives a direction under s. 20(1)(b) for the taking of a bodily sample 
from a person to determine parentage, and that person fails to take any 
step required of him for the purpose of giving effect to that direction, the 
court may draw from his failure `such inferences . . . as appear proper in 
the circumstances'. 
9.3 Silence During the Trial 
Over the last century or so there has been a marked change in attitude 
towards the accused's absence from the witness box in criminal 
proceedings. Before 1898 the accused did not enjoy the general right to 
testify in his own defence. This was altered by s. 1 of the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898 which made him competent, but not compellable, 
raising the issue of what (if anything) could be inferred from his refusal to 
testify and what (if any) comments could legitimately be made by the trial 
judge. (The prosecution were prohibited from commenting by s. 1(b) of the 
1898 Act.) Section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
now expressly permits the tribunal of fact to draw adverse inferences from 
the accused's failure to testify; and s. 1(b) of the 1898 Act has been 
repealed. The position in civil proceedings continues to be governed by the 
common law. 
9.3.1 The Position at Common Law 
In civil proceedings the failure of the defendant to testify or call evidence 
to rebut a prima facie case established by the claimant allows the tribunal 
of fact to draw an inference strengthening the claimant's case. A recent 
example is provided by Francisco v. Diedrick (1998) The Times 3.4.98 
(QBD), where the plaintiff established a prima facie case that the 
defendant had committed a tort on her daughter ± that he had assaulted 
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and killed her ± but the defendant refused to give evidence in his own 
defence. Alliott J held that the effect of the defendant's refusal to testify 
was to turn the prima facie case into a very strong case against him. 
In an appropriate case the trial judge in criminal proceedings may 
comment on the accused's failure to call a material witness in support of 
his defence, certainly if that witness could not have been called by the 
prosecution and there is no good reason for his absence. In R v. Khan 
[2001] EWCA Crim 486 the Court of Appeal noted that, in the absence of 
guidance from the judge, the jury would inevitably speculate as to why a 
witness had not given evidence and as to the evidence the witness might 
have given, and recognised that there are situations where the jury would 
be entitled to ask themselves why a witness had not been called. (Examples 
are R v. Gallagher [1974] 1 WLR 1204 (CA), where the prosecution could 
not have known before the close of their case that the absent witness had 
relevant evidence to give, and R v. Wilmot (1988) 89 Cr App R 341 (CA), 
where the absent witness, the accused's solicitor, could not have been 
called by the prosecution to give evidence of what he had been told by the 
accused.) It was also noted, however, that an adverse comment on the 
accused's failure to call a witness might lead to injustice in some cases as 
there could be a good reason for the witness's absence. According to the 
Court, the dangers of making adverse comments and of failing to warn the 
jury not to speculate would usually be the paramount consideration; but it 
was also recognised that the case for permitting a comment on the 
accused's failure to call an available witness might be stronger now that 
adverse comments are permissible under s. 34 of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 (9.2.2 ante) and s. 11 of the Criminal Procedure 
and Investigations Act 1996 (13.1.2 post). In the final analysis, `much 
depends on the judge's sense of fairness in the particular situation', save 
that the judge should invite submissions from both parties in the absence 
of the jury before deciding whether to make an adverse comment; and if 
the judge does comment it would in some cases be appropriate to refer to 
the burden of proving the case remaining with the prosecution. These 
guidelines were approved by the Court of Appeal in R v. G(R) [2003] 
Crim LR 43. 
The trial judge's entitlement to comment on the accused's failure to 
testify in his own defence is now governed by s. 35 of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 (9.3.2 post); but even before the Act came into 
force the judge was entitled at common law to comment on the accused's 
failure to testify once he had become a competent witness (R v. Rhodes 
[1899] 1 QB 77 (CCCR)). In the light of the judge's comments, an 
appropriate inference strengthening the prosecution case could be drawn. 
The nature and degree of the judge's comments were regarded as matters 
within his discretion, so long as it was made clear that the accused was 
entitled not to give evidence and that guilt could not be assumed merely 
because he had exercised that right (see R v. Martinez-Tobon [1994] 1 
WLR 388 (CA)). It has been noted above that the prosecution could not 
comment on the accused's failure to testify; but no such restriction 
operated against a co-accused (R v. Wickham (1971) 55 Cr App R 199 
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(CA)). Further, regardless of whether the judge or counsel for the 
co-accused commented on the accused's refusal to testify, there can be 
little doubt that the jury would often apply their collective common sense 
and draw an adverse inference in any event. 
9.3.2 Section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
Section 35, implementing a recommendation in the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee's Eleventh Report ((1972) Cmnd 4991 at pp. 68±70), 
provides a further evidential factor in support of the prosecution case 
where the accused either fails to testify or does testify but refuses to answer 
some of the questions put to him. The accused's common-law `right of 
silence' remains, however, to the extent that he cannot be compelled to 
testify in his own defence (s. 35(4)). Section 35 is not a particularly radical 
departure from the position at common law, but it does give the judge a 
far wider discretion as to the comments he may properly make. Section 
168(3) of the Act (and Schedule 11 thereto) repealed s. 1(b) of the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898, which formerly prohibited the prosecution from 
commenting on the accused's failure to testify. 
Subsections (1) and (3) provide that where an accused is on trial for a 
criminal offence then, unless his physical or mental condition makes it 
undesirable for him to give evidence, his failure to give evidence or his 
refusal without good cause to answer any question once sworn permits the 
tribunal of fact to `draw such inferences as appear proper' from such 
failure or refusal when determining whether he is guilty of the offence. If 
the accused has been sworn and he refuses to answer any question, such 
refusal will be without good cause unless he is entitled to refuse on the 
ground of privilege or any enactment, or he is excused from answering the 
question by the court (s. 35(5)), or there is no issue calling for a factual 
explanation or answer from the accused (R v. McManus [2001] EWCA 
Crim 2455). (For the relevant procedural rules, see s. 35(2) and Practice 
Direction (Criminal Proceedings: Consolidation) [2002] 1 WLR 2870 (SC) 
at pp. 2902±3.) The court must satisfy itself that the accused is aware of 
his right to testify and the adverse consequences of failing to do so, even if 
he has voluntarily absconded (R v. Gough [2002] 2 Cr App R 121 (CA); see 
also Radford v. Kent County Council (1998) 162 JP 697 (DC)). 
In R v. Cowan [1995] 3 WLR 818, the leading case on s. 35, the Court of 
Appeal held that apart from the mandatory exception in s. 35(1)(b) ±  
where the accused's physical or mental condition makes it undesirable for 
him to give evidence ± the judge has a `broad discretion' as to whether and 
in what terms he should direct the jury, save that while it would generally 
be open to the judge to direct the jury against drawing an adverse 
inference, `there would need either to be some evidential basis for doing so 
or some exceptional factors in the case making that a fair course to take'. 
(It is not permissible for the accused's advocate to give theoretical reasons 
for his silence in the absence of supporting evidence.) It was further held 
that the judge should explain in his summing-up that the accused is 
entitled not to testify and that an adverse inference can be drawn by the 
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jury only if they are first satisfied that the prosecution have established a 
case to answer. If this is done and, in spite of any evidence relied upon by 
the accused to explain his silence, the jury conclude that his silence can 
only sensibly be attributed to his having no answer or none that would 
stand up to cross-examination, they may draw an adverse inference. It was 
stressed that so long as an adequate direction on the law is given, the 
Court of Appeal will not lightly interfere with the way the judge has 
exercised his discretion. The importance of an adequate direction, 
particularly in respect of the jury being satisfied that there is a case to 
answer before drawing an adverse inference, was reaffirmed by the Court 
of Appeal in R v. Birchall [1999] Crim LR 311 (96/2301/W5) where Lord 
Bingham CJ noted that `logic demands that a jury should not start to 
consider whether they should draw inferences from a defendant's failure to 
give oral evidence at his trial until they have concluded that the Crown's 
case against him is sufficiently compelling to call for an answer by him'. If 
the accused were to be required to provide an explanation before a prima 
facie case has been established, he would in effect be under an obligation 
to prove his innocence in violation of Article 6(2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Telfner v. Austria (2001) Application 
33501/96 (ECtHR); see also Murray v. United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 
29 (ECtHR) at pp. 62±3). That said, a failure to provide any aspect of the 
s. 35 direction will not necessarily result in a successful appeal: if it is plain 
on the evidence, in the light of the directions which were given, that the 
conviction is safe, it will stand notwithstanding the judge's omission (R v. 
Bromfield [2002] EWCA Crim 195). 
Where the accused is so mentally disturbed as to be unfit to plead, s. 35 
is of course irrelevant. However, in the situation where a mentally sub-
normal accused is fit to stand trial, the judge must determine whether he 
falls within the s.35(1)(b) exception. A situation of this sort arose in R v. 
Friend [1997] 1 WLR 1433. The accused, who did not give evidence, was a 
15-year-old boy with a mental age lower than that of a 10-year-old and an 
IQ lower than 70. These facts comprised the evidential basis for the 
defence submission that the accused's mental condition made it undesir-
able for him to give evidence and that no adverse inference should be 
drawn. The judge rejected the submission, having taken into account the 
accused's responses in his interviews with the police and a clinical 
psychologist, and expert evidence that the accused was less suggestible 
than average people, and directed the jury that they could draw an adverse 
inference. The Court of Appeal, dismissing the appeal, held that the judge 
had been entitled to consider not only the clinical psychologist's evidence 
and the other evidence in the case, but also the accused's conduct before 
and after the offence was committed and the answers he had given in his 
police interview. The judge's exercise of his discretion could be impugned 
only if it was `Wednesbury unreasonable', but in this case the judge had 
reached his conclusion in a balanced and proper manner, taking into 
account relevant matters and disregarding irrelevant matters. The Court 
did, however, give examples of when it might be undesirable for an 
accused to testify: `A physical condition might include a risk of an 
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epileptic attack; a mental condition, latent schizophrenia where the 
experience of giving evidence might trigger a florid state.' In R v. Lee 
[1998] CLY 320 (CC) the trial judge observed that it could be undesirable 
for an accused to testify if the act of giving evidence itself would be likely 
to cause his mental state to deteriorate or be likely to lead to embarrassing 
outbursts which could prejudice the jury against him. 
The Court of Appeal has declined to give examples of what might 
prevent an adverse judicial comment on the accused's silence on the 
ground that each case must turn on its own facts. Any reason put forward 
for not drawing an inference must of course be relevant to the accused's 
failure to testify, but relevance will not necessarily guarantee that the 
judge's discretion will be exercised in the accused's favour. In R v. Cowan 
[1995] 3 WLR 818 the Court of Appeal rejected one of the most obvious 
reasons for not testifying when it stated that the risk of the accused being 
cross-examined on his bad character under s. 1(3)(ii) of the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898 was not a sufficiently good reason for directing the jury 
against drawing an adverse inference. Moreover, Northern Ireland case-
law suggests that neither the fact that the accused has made a statement to 
the police (R v. Hamill [1994] 5 BNIL 51 (NICA)) nor that the accused is 
afraid of having an adverse inference drawn under s. 34 of the Act (R v. 
McAnoy [1996] 6 BNIL 50 (NICA)) will prevent the court from applying 
s. 35 if he refuses to testify. If the accused is particularly inarticulate or 
nervous it may be possible to persuade the judge to rule that the accused 
falls within s. 35(1)(b) of the Act, but evidence will have to be adduced in 
the absence of the jury to support the submission. However, if the 
submission fails there is nothing to prevent the same evidence being 
adduced before the jury to support a closing speech explaining why the 
accused has failed to give evidence (R v. A [1997] Crim LR 883 (CA)). 
Needless to say, any purported reason for not drawing an adverse 
inference which has no logical bearing on the accused's failure to testify 
will get short shrift from the judge and the Court of Appeal. In R v. 
Napper (1995) 161 JP 16 (CA) the accused refused to testify at his trial in 
1995 on the ground that the police had only questioned him in 1992 about 
one of the eight counts on the indictment and that it was now too late for 
him to remember clearly what had happened. This argument failed 
because the crucial issues in the trial involved matters which the accused 
would have been able to remember without difficulty, and in any event he 
could have prepared a memory-refreshing statement soon after being 
charged with the offences. 
The judge is perhaps more likely to direct the jury that an adverse 
inference can be drawn from silence if there is a strong case against the 
accused. In other words, if the prosecution case is just sufficient to 
overcome a submission of no case to answer the judge may feel it would be 
inappropriate for any adverse inference to be drawn. If the judge does 
direct the jury that they are entitled to draw an adverse inference from the 
accused's failure to testify, the jury must consider whether they should 
draw such an inference and, if so, its nature. The only guidance provided 
by s. 35 is that the jury `may draw such inferences as appear proper', but 
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in Murray v. DPP [1994] 1 WLR 1 (HL), a Northern Ireland case, Lord 
Mustill said (at p. 5): 
`[T]he fact-finder is entitled as a matter of common sense to draw his 
own conclusions if a defendant who is faced with evidence which does 
call for an answer fails to come forward and provide it . . . It is, however, 
equally a matter of common sense that even where the prosecution has 
established a prima facie case . . . it is not in every situation that an 
adverse inference can be drawn from silence . . . . Everything depends on 
the nature of the issue, the weight of the evidence adduced by the 
prosecution upon it . . . and the extent to which the defendant should in 
the nature of things be able to give his own account of the particular 
matter in question. It is impossible to generalise, for dependent upon 
circumstances the failure of the defendant to give evidence may found 
no inference at all, or one which is for all practical purposes fatal.' 
In the same case, Lord Slynn said (at p. 11): 
`The accused cannot be compelled to give evidence but he must risk the 
consequences if he does not do so. Those consequences are not simply 
. . . that specific inferences may be drawn from specific facts. They 
include in a proper case the drawing of an inference that the accused is 
guilty of the [offence] with which he is charged . . . [I]f parts of the 
prosecution case had so little evidential value that they called for no 
answer, a failure to deal with those specific matters cannot justify an 
inference of guilt. On the other hand, if aspects of the evidence taken 
alone or in combination with other facts clearly call for an explanation 
which the accused ought to be in a position to give, if an explanation 
exists, then a failure to give any explanation may as a matter of 
common sense allow the drawing of an inference that there is no 
explanation and that the accused is guilty.' 
If there is an evidential basis for not drawing an adverse inference, but 
the judge nonetheless decides to direct the jury that an adverse inference 
may be drawn, it will be incumbent on him to remind the jury of the 
defence's explanation (and supporting evidence) so they can take it into 
account when deciding whether or not to draw an inference. In the 
absence of any evidence the judge is under no obligation to suggest 
possible innocent reasons for the accused's failure to testify. 
9.4	 Silence and Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
In Murray v. United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 29, a case concerning 
Northern Ireland's silence provisions, the European Court of Human 
Rights held (at p. 60) that, while the right to remain silent under police 
questioning and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally 
recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of 
fair procedure under Article 6 of the European Convention, providing 
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protection against improper compulsion by the authorities, they are not 
absolute immunities. It was further held that, so long as the accused is not 
convicted solely or mainly on the basis of inferences drawn from his 
silence, and those inferences are used for the limited purpose of `assessing 
the persuasiveness' of the prosecution evidence, the right to remain silent 
and the privilege against self-incrimination should not prevent the 
accused's silence in the face of police questioning, or his refusal to testify 
in his own defence, from being taken into account `in situations which 
clearly call for an explanation from him'. The Court added that whether 
the drawing of adverse inferences from silence infringes Article 6 is a 
matter to be determined in the light of all the circumstances of the case, 
having particular regard to the situations where inferences may be drawn, 
the weight attached to them and the degree of compulsion inherent in the 
situation. In the instant case adverse inferences had been drawn from the 
applicant's refusal to answer police questions and his refusal to testify in 
his own defence, but there had been no infringement of Article 6(1) or 
6(2). The applicant had been under no direct compulsion (on pain of 
punishment) to speak to the police or testify; he had been warned of the 
legal consequences of maintaining his silence; the prosecution had 
established a prima facie case against him on the basis of other evidence; 
the tribunal of fact, an experienced judge, had been entitled rather than 
obligated to draw an inference, had given his reasons for drawing 
inferences, and the exercise of his discretion could be reviewed by the 
appellate courts; and, finally, the only inferences which could be drawn 
were `common sense inferences' arising from the adduction of evidence 
which was `sufficiently strong to require an answer'. 
Most of the safeguards referred to in Murray v. United Kingdom (1996) 
22 EHRR 29 (ECtHR) apply equally to the silence provisions in ss. 34±37 
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, although the 
impossibility of ascertaining what weight, if any, is given to the accused's 
silence by a jury, and the Court of Appeal's inability to review the jury's 
approach, meant there had been a violation of Article 6(1) in Condron v. 
United Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 1, where the trial judge had failed to 
give an appropriate direction on s. 34 of the Act (see 9.2.2.4 ante). 
According to the European Court of Human Rights in that case, the 
absence in England and Wales of these additional safeguards made it `even 
more compelling' that the jury should be properly advised on how to 
address the accused's silence; and the trial judge's omission to restrict the 
jury's discretion was therefore `incompatible with the exercise by the 
applicants of their right to silence at the police station'. The importance of 
a carefully framed direction to the jury when drawing an adverse inference 
from the accused's silence was reiterated by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Beckles v. United Kingdom (2002) Application No. 
44652/98, and has been stressed by the Court of Appeal on a number of 
occasions (see, for example, R v. Birchall [1999] Crim LR 311 and R v. Gill 
[2001] 1 Cr App R 160). 
In Averill v. United Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 839 the Strasbourg Court 
noted that an innocent person may not wish to make any statement before 
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he has had the opportunity to consult a lawyer, and held that the absence 
of a solicitor during a suspect's interrogation by the police is a relevant 
factor to be weighed in the balance when assessing the fairness of a 
decision to draw an adverse inference from silence in that context. It was 
further held that, because the applicant had been denied access to his 
solicitor during the first 24 hours of his interrogation by the police, and an 
adverse inference could be (and indeed was) drawn from his silence during 
that period, there had been a violation of Article 6(1) and (3)(c) of the 
European Convention (see also Murray v. United Kingdom (1996) 22 
EHRR 29 (ECtHR)). Accordingly, ss. 34(2A), 36(4A) and 37(3A) of the 
1994 Act have been brought into force to prohibit the drawing of adverse 
inferences from pre-trial silence if the accused was at an authorised place 
of detention at the time of his failure or refusal and he had not been 
allowed an opportunity to consult a solicitor (see s. 58 of the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (and SI 2003 No. 707)). 
9.5 The Right to Remain Silent 
The suspect's right to remain silent in the face of police questioning and 
the accused's right not to testify in his own defence may be seen, in a broad 
sense, as two facets of a single privilege against self-incrimination (14.1 
post). Alternatively, these specific entitlements and the privilege against 
self-incrimination may be regarded as separate facets of a general `right of 
silence'. In R v. Director of Serious Fraud Office ex parte Smith [1992] 3 
WLR 66 (HL) (at p. 74) Lord Mustill described the common-law `right of 
silence' as a `disparate group of immunities' comprising: 
`(1) A general immunity, possessed by all persons and bodies, from 
being compelled on pain of punishment to answer questions posed by 
other persons or bodies. (2) A general immunity, possessed by all 
persons and bodies, from being compelled on pain of punishment to 
answer questions the answers to which may incriminate them. (3) A 
specific immunity, possessed by all persons under suspicion of criminal 
responsibility whilst being interviewed by police officers or others in 
similar positions of authority, from being compelled on pain of 
punishment to answer questions of any kind. (4) A specific immunity, 
possessed by accused persons undergoing trial, from being compelled to 
give evidence, and from being compelled to answer questions put to 
them in the dock. (5) A specific immunity, possessed by persons who 
have been charged with a criminal offence, from having questions 
material to the offence addressed to them by police officers or persons 
in a similar position of authority. (6) A specific immunity . . . possessed 
by accused persons undergoing trial, from having adverse comment 
made on any failure (a) to answer questions before the trial, or (b) to 
give evidence at the trial.' 
In this generic sense the common-law `right of silence' continues to exist, 
save that some of its component immunities have been diminished or 
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removed by legislation. An individual or suspect may be compelled to 
answer questions put to him by the police only in limited circumstances; 
and a self-incriminating answer may be used against him in a subsequent 
trial only if the permitting provision was enacted to achieve a legitimate 
objective and is a proportionate response to the aim which was sought to 
be achieved (see 14.1 post). In other respects, a suspect may still refuse to 
answer questions put to him during police interrogation in the knowledge 
that he will not thereby commit an offence; and the accused may still 
refuse to testify in his own defence in the knowledge that he will not be in 
contempt of court or charged with a further offence for that refusal 
(16.3.1 post). 
As a general rule, then, the privilege against self-incrimination means 
that there can be no direct compulsion to answer questions put by the 
police or to testify. Nor, as a general rule, is a suspect under any indirect 
compulsion to answer police questions, in the sense that an adverse 
inference might be drawn from his refusal to co-operate should he 
subsequently be put on trial. Where neither ss. 36 nor 37 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 applies, an adverse inference from 
silence in the face of police interrogation may be drawn by a jury only if 
the strict requirements of s. 34(1) have been satisfied, although it is true to 
say that this possibility places the suspect under `a certain level of indirect 
compulsion' to co-operate (Murray v. United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 
29 (ECtHR) at p. 61). The second aspect of Lord Mustill's sixth immunity 
has been removed, however. The accused is now indirectly compelled to 
testify in his own defence, for a failure to do so is likely to result in an 
adverse inference being drawn. 
A suspect's pre-trial entitlement to refuse to co-operate with the police 
and, in particular, his entitlement not to incriminate himself, may be 
justified at three levels. First, every person has a right to privacy and to 
live his life free from the interference of others, at least to the extent set out 
in Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Accordingly, it is for the police to substantiate their allegation and 
ultimately for the prosecution to prove their case in accordance with 
Article 6(2) of the European Convention. It should not be for the suspect, 
who is presumed to be innocent, to disprove the allegation let alone 
provide evidence against himself, so as a matter of principle no adverse 
inference should be drawn from a suspect's refusal to respond to police 
questions. Second, a suspect should be protected from the possibility of 
brutal or oppressive police questioning by a right which not only reduces 
the likelihood of such tactics being adopted but also provides a legal 
justification for resisting them if they are. Third, since there may be a wide 
range of reasons for remaining silent in the face of police questioning, the 
jury may draw an erroneous inference from a suspect's refusal to 
co-operate and convict on a mistaken basis. 
The first of these justifications does not prevent State interference in all 
aspects of citizens' private affairs, however; and, notwithstanding the 
presumption of innocence, it would be absurd if the right to privacy could 
prevent the fair questioning of suspects with a view to eliciting relevant 
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evidence, particularly as there may be no other available source of 
information as to what happened (and the suspect may be willing to 
volunteer a confession if given the opportunity). It is to be noted that 
Article 8(2) of the European Convention expressly permits state 
interference in the right to have one's private life respected insofar as it 
is necessary in a democratic society for, inter alia, the prevention of 
disorder or crime or the protection of the rights and freedom of others 
(such as victims). The second justification now carries little weight, given 
the reforms introduced by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, its 
Codes of Practice and subsequent legislation. The suspect's right to have a 
solicitor (and, where relevant, an appropriate adult) present during his 
interview, the routine tape-recording of what is said and done, and the 
likelihood that any interview record will be excluded under ss. 76(2) or 
78(1) of the 1984 Act if there is a breach of one of its provisions or Code C 
all militate against the risk of oppressive questioning or any other type of 
maltreatment. The third justification does nothing more than raise 
concerns about how silence should be approached as circumstantial 
evidence and the necessity of forensic safeguards such as an appropriate 
direction from the judge. It provides no argument for a blanket 
prohibition on the drawing of adverse inferences, for in some cases the 
nature of the inference will be apparent. 
Ultimately, then, whether the accused's pre-trial silence should be used 
against him depends, first, on the nature of the inference which it is 
suggested should be drawn; second, on whether society's general interest 
in bringing criminals to justice is sufficient to override the individual's 
personal right to privacy to the extent proposed; and, third, on whether it 
is possible to put in place sufficient safeguards to ensure that the accused 
receives a fair trial. As interpreted by the judiciary, the relevant provisions 
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, including the most 
controversial provision, s. 34, strike the right balance. After all, s. 34 
merely encourages a suspect to reveal any assertions he intends to rely on 
in his defence, should the matter proceed to trial, so that they can be 
investigated and tested and the jury can have the benefit of the 
prosecution's informed response (R v. Betts [2001] 2 Cr App R 257 
(CA)), which is hardly a radical departure from the common law. 
Furthermore, adverse inferences may be drawn under ss. 34 and 36±37 
only in very limited circumstances, due weight having been given by 
Parliament to the autonomy of the individual and the right to privacy. The 
prosecution must prove that the accused was warned by the police of the 
consequences of failing to co-operate; and the jury must be given a 
carefully framed direction to ensure that any inference drawn from the 
accused's silence is actually reliable, reflecting a culpable reason for his 
refusal to co-operate, and that the inference may be used only to support 
an already established prima facie case against him. A further body of 
safeguards is provided by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and 
its Codes of Practice, for a significant breach of Code C may result in any 
record of the accused's interview being excluded under s. 78(1) of that Act, 
preventing an adverse inference from being drawn under s. 34(1)(a) of the 
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1994 Act. Moreover, in R v. Dervish [2002] 2 Cr App R 105 the Court of 
Appeal said that if the police acted in bad faith, deliberately breaching the 
safeguards in the 1984 Act and its Codes, so that the accused's interview 
record would be excluded under s. 78(1), `it would be likely that the judge 
would not invite consideration of any adverse inference' under s. 34(1)(b) 
if the accused was also silent when charged. 
In the light of the limited infringements of the right of silence under the 
1994 Act, and the numerous safeguards against unfairness with which the 
provisions are hedged, the most cogent argument which may be directed 
against s. 34 is, in the words of Professor Di Birch, `whether the game of 
drawing inferences from silence is worth the candle' ([1999] Crim LR 78). 
The provision has generated a vast body of case-law, the result being that 
juries must now be given a lengthy and somewhat complicated, if not 
confusing, direction (see 9.2.2.4 ante and the Judicial Studies Board 
specimen direction at www.jsboard.co.uk); and yet, as Professor Birch 
points out, the inference drawn often has little weight by comparison with 
other evidence before the jury. Indeed, given that the jury must be satisfied 
that there is a prima facie case against the accused before the provision can 
be utilised, any s. 34 adverse inference can have no more than a supporting 
or `corroborative' role. A cost-benefit analysis of the provision has led 
Professor Birch to conclude that it is `too expensive' and may need to be 
repealed (see Birch, `Suffering in Silence' [1999] Crim LR 769). 
By contrast, the accused's right not to testify ± justified on the ground 
that the prosecution, bearing the legal burden of proof, should convince 
the jury of his guilt without his help ± has generally been regarded as less 
fundamental than the pre-trial right of silence, primarily because there is 
little if any risk of impropriety in open court. Factors such as the presence 
of the judge, jury and public, the high standard of proof, pre-trial 
disclosure, the requirement of a case to answer, the availability of publicly-
funded legal representation and the time available for preparation all 
make silence in court difficult to justify once a prima facie case has been 
established against the accused. 
Chapter Summary 
.	 At common law a party's pre-trial silence in the face of an allegation made against 
him may allow the inference to be drawn that he accepted the truth of the 
allegation if he and his accuser were on equal terms and it would have been 
reasonable to expect a denial from him in the circumstances. 
.	 An adverse inference may also be drawn at common law from the accused's 
failure to explain himself when found in a compromising position. Sections 36±37 
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 now allow adverse inferences 
to be drawn from the accused's failure to explain (when arrested) incriminating 
substances or marks or his presence at a particular place. 
.	 Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 allows the jury or 
magistrates to draw an adverse inference from the accused's failure to mention to 
the police when interviewed a fact subsequently relied on by him in his defence, 
so long as the other evidence provides a prima facie case against him and it would 
280 Evidence 
have been reasonable in the circumstances to expect him to mention the fact to 
the police when questioned. 
.	 An adverse inference may also be drawn from the accused's pre-trial refusal to 
allow an intimate sample to be taken from him (s. 62(10)(b) of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984); or from his refusal to provide a satisfactory defence 
statement before his trial on indictment (s. 11 of the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996). 
.	 Section 35 of the of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 provides that 
an adverse inference may be drawn from the accused's failure to testify, or to 
answer questions while testifying, if there is a prima facie case against him on the 
other evidence, unless the circumstances are such that the judge should direct the 
jury against drawing any such inference. An adverse inference may also be drawn 
in certain circumstances from the accused's failure to call a witness to testify on 
his behalf. 
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Evidence Obtained by 10 
Unlawful or Unfair Means 
10.1 The General Rule 
The admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence was addressed by the 
Privy Council in the original leading case of Kuruma v. R [1955] 2 WLR 
223. K had been searched by Kenyan police officers and, it was alleged, 
found to be in unlawful possession of two rounds of ammunition, a capital 
offence under the Emergency Regulations then in force. The law provided 
that only an officer of or above the rank of assistant inspector could 
lawfully search persons suspected of being in possession of ammunition, 
yet neither officer involved was of such rank. Consequently the evidence 
purportedly found on K had been obtained unlawfully and he appealed 
against his conviction on the ground that it should not have been 
admitted. Dismissing the appeal Lord Goddard CJ said (at pp. 226±7): 
`In their Lordships' opinion the test to be applied in considering 
whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in 
issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the 
evidence was obtained . . . There can be no difference in principle for 
this purpose between a civil and a criminal case. No doubt in a criminal 
case the judge always has a discretion to disallow evidence if the strict 
rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against an accused . . . If, 
for instance, some admission of some piece of evidence, e.g., a 
document, had been obtained from a defendant by a trick, no doubt 
the judge might properly rule it out.' 
Thus, the unlawful search did not justify the exclusion of evidence, 
reaffirming the principle asserted by Crompton J in R v. Leatham (1861) 8 
Cox CC 498 (DC) at p. 501: `It matters not how you get it; if you steal it 
even, it would be admissible in evidence.' Yet according to Lord Goddard 
the ammunition might have been excluded if it had been obtained by mere 
trickery. This apparent paradox was reinforced by subsequent cases where 
unlawful conduct was held to be insufficient to justify exclusion, whereas 
lawful impropriety which had misled the accused into revealing evidence 
could justify its exclusion. An assurance made to the accused by the police 
before a medical examination, which the police subsequently reneged on 
prior to his trial, justified the exclusion of evidence obtained in 
consequence of that examination in R v. Payne [1963] 1 WLR 637 
(CCA). The accused, having been involved in a road accident and charged 
with drink-driving, was induced to submit himself to the medical 
examination on the understanding that he would not be examined for 
the purpose of determining his fitness to drive. At the trial the doctor gave 
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evidence, based on what he had observed during the examination, that the 
accused was under the influence of drink to such an extent as to be unfit to 
drive. His conviction was quashed as the judge ought to have exercised his 
discretion to exclude that evidence (see also R v. Court [1962] Crim LR 697 
(CCA)). In Jeffrey v. Black [1977] 3 WLR 895 (DC), however, the fact that 
the accused's lodgings had been unlawfully searched by the police could 
not justify the exclusion of cannabis found during that search at his trial 
for unlawful possession of that drug. Evidence obtained in consequence of 
an unlawful search was admissible and there was no discretion to exclude 
it, save that Lord Widgery CJ felt able to recognise the existence of an 
exclusionary discretion in exceptional cases where the police `have been 
guilty of trickery or they have misled someone, or they have been 
oppressive or they have been unfair, or in other respects they have 
behaved in a manner which is morally reprehensible'. A similar discretion 
had been recognised in Callis v. Gunn [1963] 3 WLR 931 (DC) where Lord 
Parker CJ suggested that prosecution evidence could be excluded if it was 
obtained in consequence of oppression, false representations, tricks, 
threats or bribes. 
The apparent paradox was finally explained by the House of Lords in R 
v. Sang [1979] 3 WLR 263. S was charged with offences relating to 
counterfeit US dollar bank-notes and at his trial sought a ruling that there 
existed a judicial discretion to exclude evidence obtained as a result of 
incitement by an agent provocateur acting for the police. The judge ruled 
that he had no such discretion and consequently S decided to plead guilty 
to challenge the ruling on appeal. The House of Lords dismissed his 
appeal on the ground that, while a trial judge (or magistrates' court) had a 
discretion to exclude prosecution evidence if its admission would prevent 
the accused from receiving a fair trial ± in particular because the unduly 
prejudicial effect of the evidence would outweigh its probative value ± 
there was no broader discretion to exclude evidence just because it had 
been obtained by improper or unfair means (for example by an agent 
provocateur). However, a limited exclusionary discretion unrelated to trial 
fairness was recognised, explaining the decision in R v. Payne [1963] 1 
WLR 637 (CCA) and the dicta in Kuruma v. R [1955] 2 WLR 223 (PC), 
Jeffrey v. Black [1977] 3 WLR 895 (DC) and Callis v. Gunn [1963] 3 WLR 
931 (DC). There was a discretion to exclude confessions and analogous 
evidence tantamount to a self-incriminatory admission (such as finger-
prints or medical evidence) which had been obtained unfairly or by 
trickery from the accused after the commission of the offence in violation 
of his privilege against self-incrimination (`nemo tenetur se ipsum prodere'). 
With regard to any other evidence the judge was not concerned with how 
the evidence had been obtained; the question was whether its use by the 
prosecution would prevent the accused from receiving a fair trial. 
In R v. Fox [1985] 1 WLR 1126 the House of Lords considered the 
scope of the common-law discretion in the context of reliable evidence 
which might be regarded as analogous to a confession. Following a road 
accident in which the accused, as the driver of a vehicle, was involved, two 
police officers trespassed on his premises and asked him to provide a 
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breath specimen. The accused refused to comply with their request, so he 
was arrested and taken to a police station where a sample was eventually 
obtained. The House of Lords held that as the result of the breath test had 
not been obtained by any `inducement, threat . . . trick or other 
impropriety', and as the police officers had been acting in good faith 
when committing their civil trespass, the evidence had been properly 
admitted by the magistrates even though it had been obtained unlawfully. 
The fact that the police officers had done nothing more than `make a bona 
fide mistake as to their powers' meant that the evidence could not be said 
to fall within the scope of the Sang discretion. 
Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (`PACE'), 
which came into force in 1986, now provides as follows: 
In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, 
having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in 
which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would 
have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the 
court ought not to admit it. 
By virtue of s. 82(3) the common-law basis for excluding admissible 
prosecution evidence remains unaffected. However, since the statutory 
discretion is `at least as wide as that conferred by the common law' (R v. 
Khan [1996] 3 WLR 162 (HL) at p. 172) the Sang discretion has in effect 
been rendered otiose (save that, unlike s. 78(1), it may be applied to 
withdraw evidence from the jury's consideration if it has already been 
adduced). For present purposes the fundamental question is whether the 
statutory discretion is wider than the Sang discretion and, in particular, 
whether it is wide enough to exclude reliable evidence (in addition to 
confessions and analogous evidence) on the ground that it was obtained 
unlawfully or unfairly. A relevant consideration is whether a wider 
discretion is necessary to ensure compliance with the requirements of 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights has held that, since the question 
of admissibility is primarily a matter for regulation under national law it 
will not, as a matter of principle and in the abstract, regard evidence as 
inadmissible merely on the ground that it was obtained unlawfully; its role 
is limited to ascertaining whether the particular applicant's proceedings as 
whole were fair (Schenk v. Switzerland (1988) 13 EHRR 242 at pp. 265±6). 
Needless to say, if the impropriety in the way the evidence was obtained 
adversely affects its reliability, or prevents the accused from being able 
effectively to challenge its reliability, there is likely to be a breach of 
Article 6 if the evidence is admitted against the accused. But Article 6 is 
concerned not only with fairness of this sort (what might be called 
`forensic fairness') but also with fairness at a more abstract level (what 
might be called `visceral unfairness'). In the light of the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal (1998) 
28 EHRR 101 (at p. 116) it is clear that there may be a breach of Article 6 
regardless of the fact that the trial itself would be forensically fair if the 
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impropriety gives rise to an instinctive (visceral) feeling of unfairness. 
Accordingly, when determining whether there has been a violation of 
Article 6 it is necessary to examine any unlawfulness by the police and, 
where there has been a violation of another Convention right, the nature 
of that violation (Khan v. United Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 1016 
(ECtHR), PG v. United Kingdom (2001) Application No. 44787/98 
(ECtHR), Allan v. United Kingdom (2002) Application No. 48539/99 
(ECtHR)). 
Confessions aside, relevant evidence obtained in consequence of 
breaches of the civil and/or criminal law remains prima facie admissible 
in England and Wales, even if there has also been a breach of Article 8 of 
the European Convention (R v. Khan [1996] 3 WLR 162 (HL), R v. 
Sargent [2000] 3 WLR 992 (HL), R v. P [2001] 2 WLR 463 (HL)). But it 
has been seen that evidence which is reliable and prima facie admissible 
can be excluded at common law and under s. 78(1) of PACE. In other 
words English law already recognises that visceral unfairness is a sufficient 
reason for excluding some admissible evidence, as demonstrated by the 
decision in R v. Payne [1963] 1 WLR 637 (CCA). The question is whether 
the need to avoid visceral unfairness for the purposes of Article 6 is wider 
than the equivalent common-law principle and, if so, whether exclusion is 
the most appropriate way of ensuring that the requirements of Article 6 
are met. 
It will be seen below that the response to visceral unfairness in England 
and Wales is not markedly different from the position in Strasbourg, save 
that the national courts have approached the problem from two different 
directions. Some types of police impropriety may be so egregious that it 
would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow the trial to proceed, 
regardless of how cogent or reliable the evidence against the accused might 
be. Visceral unfairness is obviated by preventing the trial from proceeding 
± the proceedings are `stayed' as an `abuse of process' (10.4 post). Less 
serious types of police misconduct will not justify a stay, in which case 
s. 78(1) may be applied to exclude improperly obtained evidence if the 
impropriety has rendered the evidence unreliable (or of unascertainable 
reliability) or of course if the visceral unfairness comes from a violation of 
the accused's privilege against self-incrimination (10.3 post). However, it 
will also be seen that the subsection is wide enough to exclude evidence on 
the basis that the defence's application under s. 78(1) is in effect a belated 
application that the proceedings be stayed as an abuse of process (10.5 
post). Section 78(1) is therefore primarily (but not exclusively) concerned 
with forensic fairness, complementing the doctrine of abuse of process to 
ensure that the accused does not receive an unfair trial. 
In the context of civil proceedings, there is no common-law discretion to 
exclude evidence merely because of the improper or unlawful way in which 
it was obtained. However r. 32.1 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 now 
provides the trial judge with the power to exclude admissible evidence, the 
only limitation being that it must be exercised in accordance with the 
`overriding objective' in r. 1.1(1)±(2) to deal with cases justly (Grobbelaar 
v. Sun Newspapers (1999) The Times 12.8.99 (CA)). In Jones v. University 
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of Warwick [2003] 1 WLR 954 (CA) it was held that an unlawful act by a 
party in the way evidence was obtained (such as a breach of Article 8 of 
the European Convention) is a relevant circumstance to be weighed in the 
balance by the judge when coming to a decision as to how he should 
properly exercise his discretion in making orders as to the management of 
the proceedings, but the fact that Article 8 has been breached does not 
require the judge to exclude the evidence for it would be `artificial and 
undesirable' for relevant evidence not to be placed before the judge who 
has the task of trying the case. According to the Court, the judge may give 
effect to the overriding objective, take into account the wider interests of 
the administration of justice, deter improper conduct and do justice 
between the parties by admitting the evidence and making an order for 
costs against the malefactor. 
10.2	 Reasons for Excluding Illegally or Unfairly Obtained 
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings 
There are several principles which might be relied on to justify the 
exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of police impropriety ± the 
reliability principle, the disciplinary principle, the protective principle, the 
integrity principle and the self-incrimination (`nemo tenetur') principle. 
10.2.1 The Reliability Principle 
If the method by which an item of evidence was obtained has adversely 
affected its reliability or, if admitted, would prevent the accused from 
being able to challenge its reliability, the evidence can be excluded to 
ensure forensic fairness. Conversely, the reliability principle militates 
against the exclusion of any demonstrably reliable evidence. 
Any prosecution evidence may be excluded if its admission would deny 
the accused a forensically fair trial, on the basis that the evidence is 
manifestly unreliable or because in other respects its unduly prejudicial 
effect would outweigh its probative value. The general nature of this 
exclusionary discretion was not recognised until the decision of the House 
of Lords in R v. Sang [1979] 3 WLR 263. If it had been recognised earlier it 
would no doubt have been applied in Kuruma v. R [1955] 2 WLR 223 (10.1 
ante) where there was a very real possibility that the ammunition found on 
K had been planted, as he had claimed. K had knowingly cycled into a 
road block when he could have taken an alternative route, three witnesses 
to the search were not called by the prosecution, and a knife allegedly 
found with the ammunition was not adduced in evidence (the police 
officers having claimed that it had been returned to K while he was still in 
custody). As Heydon points out, the reason the Emergency Regulations 
required searches to be conducted by a senior police officer was 
presumably to prevent the possibility of evidence being planted (`Illegally 
Obtained Evidence' [1973] Crim LR 603 at p. 607). However, despite the 
capital nature of the offence, the unreliability of the evidence and the 
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recognition of a common-law discretion `to disallow evidence if the strict 
rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against an accused' the Privy 
Council refused to hold that the evidence should have been excluded. 
It might be argued that as real evidence exists independently of the 
impropriety which leads to its discovery, and as the forensic fairness of the 
trial cannot be affected by its admission, the interests of justice favour the 
admission of any real evidence found during an unlawful search (R v. 
Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 (SCC) at p. 284, R v. Grayson [1997] 1 NZLR 399 
(NZCA) at pp. 406 and 412). However, while there is force in this view if it 
is not disputed that the accused was actually in possession of the real 
evidence, it can hardly justify the admission of real evidence which the 
accused alleges was planted on him (as, for example, in Kuruma v. R [1955] 
2 WLR 223). 
10.2.2 The Disciplinary Principle 
This principle could justify the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence 
on the ground that it would deter police officers from adopting the same 
tactics again. Its application is exemplified by the way the United States 
Supreme Court has dealt with violations of the Fourth Amendment to the 
US Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures (see, for 
example, United States v. Leon (1984) 468 US 897 at p. 906 and Arizona v. 
Evans (1995) 514 US 1 at pp. 10±11). 
The problem with this principle is its lack of practical utility. The risk of 
exclusion may be too remote to have a significant effect on the 
investigating officers and other factors may therefore override it, for 
example the need to obtain results quickly. In fact the officers' behaviour 
may never even be called into question by a court: the suspect may accept 
a caution or plead guilty without contesting the police action, particularly 
if there is other evidence suggesting his guilt or he has previous convictions 
which could be brought out during a trial. In any event the appellate 
courts of England and Wales have expressly stated on a number of 
occasions that it is not their business to discipline the police. In R v. Sang 
[1979] 3 WLR 263 (HL) Lord Diplock said (at p. 271): 
`It is no part of a judge's function to exercise disciplinary powers over 
the police or prosecution as respects the way in which evidence to be 
used at the trial is obtained by them. If it was obtained illegally there 
will be a remedy in civil law; if it was obtained legally but in breach of 
the rules of conduct for the police, this is a matter for the appropriate 
disciplinary authority to deal with.' 
The same point has also been made on several occasions since the 
enactment of s. 78(1) of PACE (for example R v. Mason [1988] 1 WLR 139 
(CA) at p. 144, R v. Delaney (1988) 88 Cr App R 338 (CA) at p. 341, R v. 
Keenan [1989] 3 WLR 1193 (CA) at p. 1206 and R v. Oliphant [1992] Crim 
LR 40 (CA) at p. 41). The disciplinary principle may therefore be 
discounted as a factor to be taken into consideration when s. 78(1) or its 
common-law counterpart is applied. Nor is it a factor to be taken into 
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consideration by the court when considering whether to stay a prosecution 
as an abuse of process, although it has been recognised that a stay may 
have this effect in practice (R v. Looseley, Attorney General's Reference 
(No. 3 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 2061 (HL) at pp. 2067 and 2073, R v. 
Mullen [1999] 3 WLR 777 (CA) at p. 789). 
10.2.3 The Protective Principle 
The protective principle demands respect for the suspect's fundamental 
human rights, militating against the admission of evidence obtained in a 
way which violates any such right. This principle, if applied, would also 
have the effect of deterring police misconduct; and would operate to 
exclude even demonstrably reliable evidence, trumping the competing 
reliability principle. 
One can recognise the operation of this principle most clearly in a case 
such as Lam Chi-Ming v. R [1991] 2 WLR 1082 (7.1.3.7 ante) where 
demonstrably true confessions to murder were held to be inadmissible at 
common law because the prosecution had failed to prove that they had 
been provided voluntarily (see also Timothy v. The State [2000] 1 WLR 
485 (PC)). The principle underpins s. 76(2)(a) of PACE but is also of 
relevance to s. 76(2)(b), for a confession can be inadmissible under either 
or both limbs of the subsection even if it is true (7.1.3.1±2 ante). The 
decision in Lam Chi-Ming v. R illustrates a problem with this rationale for 
excluding evidence, however. The persons against whom there was cogent 
evidence of complicity in a brutal murder walked free because of the need 
to give express recognition to, and provide protection for, the rights of 
detainees and suspects. The application of the protective principle may 
therefore fail adequately to protect the human rights of the victim, his 
family and other members of society, and may for that reason bring the 
law into disrepute. 
The privilege against self-incrimination (the nemo tenetur principle) is a 
particular facet of the protective principle. The nemo tenetur principle was 
cited with approval by the majority of the House of Lords in R v. Sang 
[1979] 3 WLR 263 as the justification for the common-law discretion to 
exclude confessions and analogous evidence obtained by police trickery. 
Given that the disciplinary principle has been expressly rejected as a 
relevant consideration when determining whether a prosecution should be 
stayed as an abuse of process, the protective principle also has a role to 
play in this aspect of procedural law. In R v. Looseley, Attorney General's 
Reference (No. 3 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 2061 (HL) (at p. 2063) Lord 
Nicholls explained that the doctrine is available to ensure that executive 
agents of the state do not misuse their powers and thereby oppress its 
citizens. 
10.2.4 The Integrity Principle 
This principle could operate to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence on 
the ground that the integrity of the criminal justice system would be 
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brought into disrepute if such evidence were allowed to be admitted 
against the accused. Closely allied with this notion of judicial integrity is 
what Dennis refers to as the moral authority of the verdict, that is, the 
need to ensure that any verdict of guilt is morally as well as factually 
sound (Dennis, `Reconstructing the Law of Criminal Evidence' (1989) 42 
CLP 21 at pp. 34±40). 
If integrity is to be regarded as a relevant consideration when deciding 
whether to exclude prosecution evidence it would, as a general rule, be 
necessary to weigh the nature of the unlawful conduct and the attitude of 
the state agents involved against the gravity of the alleged offence. 
Breaches of the criminal law by the police would be looked upon with 
particular disfavour, but other types of unlawful behaviour might equally 
justify the exclusion of evidence if the police acted in bad faith, for 
example by deliberately disregarding the PACE Codes of Practice. 
The importance of the integrity principle as a factor justifying the 
exclusion of evidence has been expressly recognised in Canada (s. 24(2) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights 1982, R v. Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 (SCC) 
at pp. 280±8), Australia (Bunning v. Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 (HCA), 
s. 138 of the Australian Evidence Act 1995), New Zealand (R v. Shaheed 
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (NZCA)) and the USA (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 US 
643 (USSC)). In England and Wales it is a consideration to be weighed in 
the balance when deciding whether a prosecution ought to be stayed as an 
abuse of process (R v. Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104 (HL) at pp. 112±13, R v. 
Looseley, Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 
2061 (HL) at pp. 2073 and 2091). 
10.3 Section 78(1) of PACE 
Section 78(1) of PACE provides trial judges (and magistrates) with a 
discretion to exclude any evidence on which the prosecution propose to 
rely if it appears, having regard to all the circumstances, including the 
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, that the admission of the 
evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. Proceedings means 
criminal proceedings (s. 82(1)). 
There was until recently considerable uncertainty over the meaning of 
`fairness' in this context. One interpretation was that the subsection was 
limited to forensic fairness, save that (in line with the common-law 
discretion) the reliability principle could be overridden by the nemo tenetur 
principle if the evidence was a confession (or analogous to a confession). 
Thus, in R v. McCarthy [1996] Crim LR 818 (CA) it was held that the 
discovery of real evidence during a search could not be excluded under 
s. 78(1) merely because the police had acted in breach of s. 2 of PACE. On 
this view, s. 78(1) was no more than a statutory restatement of the Sang 
discretion; and the term `proceedings' rather than `trial' had been used by 
Parliament to ensure that both aspects of that common-law discretion 
were covered. In R v. Mason [1988] 1 WLR 139 (CA) (at p. 144) it was said 
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that s. 78(1) `does no more than to re-state the power which judges had at 
common law'; and in R v. Christou [1992] 3 WLR 228 (CA) (at pp. 234±5) 
Lord Taylor CJ expressed the view that `the criteria of unfairness are the 
same whether the trial judge is exercising his discretion at common law or 
under the statute'. Similarly, in R v. Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104 (at p. 113) the 
House of Lords would appear to have accepted that as the co-accused, a 
dealer in heroin, `was not in any way prejudiced in the presentation of his 
defence' by the subterfuge used to get him to enter the UK to face trial, an 
argument based on s. 78(1) to exclude the evidence of prosecution 
witnesses involved in that operation could not succeed (see also R v. Khan 
[1996] 3 WLR 162 (HL)). 
The alternative interpretation was that s. 78(1) allowed the criminal 
courts to consider fairness beyond the extent recognised in R v. Sang 
[1979] 3 WLR 263 (HL) and thus exclude prosecution evidence if there had 
been a violation of principles other than reliability or the privilege against 
self-incrimination. First, there were dicta to the effect that s. 78(1) was 
considerably broader in scope than the common-law discretion (DPP v. 
McGladrigan [1991] RTR 297 (DC) at p. 300, R v. Cooke [1995] 1 Cr App 
R 318 (CA) at p. 328); and in R v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex 
parte Bennett [1993] 3 WLR 90 (HL) (at p. 103) Lord Griffiths was of the 
view that s. 78(1) `enlarges a judge's discretion to exclude evidence 
obtained by unfair means'. Second, in R v. Smurthwaite, R v. Gill (1993) 
98 Cr App R 437 the Court of Appeal expressed the view that the evidence 
of an undercover police officer could be excluded under s. 78(1) if he had 
acted as an agent provocateur and enticed the accused into committing an 
offence he would not otherwise have committed. Third, there were dicta 
suggesting that s. 78(1) could be applied to exclude confessions where 
there had been a breach of s. 58 of PACE and/or Code C of the PACE 
Codes of Practice associated with bad faith on the part of the police (R v. 
Alladice (1988) 87 Cr App R 380 (CA) at p. 386) or identification evidence 
where there had been a `complete flouting' of Code D (R v. Nagah (1990) 
92 Cr App R 344 (CA) at p. 348) or `an abuse of process, e.g. because 
evidence has been obtained in deliberate breach of procedures laid down 
in an official code of practice' (R v. Quinn [1990] Crim LR 581 (CA) at 
p. 583). 
The problem with the third argument, however, is that the cases referred 
to do not necessarily support the view that s. 78(1) is broader than the 
discretion available at common law. Confessions have always been treated 
as a special type of evidence, and it is difficult to draw any conclusions from 
the confession cases about the application of s. 78(1) at a more general level. 
Further, the fact that a confession could be excluded following a breach of 
s. 58 or Code C might just as easily be said to reaffirm the common-law 
principle that a confession should not be admitted if its reliability cannot be 
effectively challenged or the accused's privilege against self-incrimination 
has been violated. Similarly, while identification evidence may be excluded 
following a breach of Code D of the PACE Codes of Practice, it is likely 
that the breach will have affected the reliability (or the accused's ability to 
challenge the reliability) of that evidence. 
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Reliability is an important consideration when determining whether a 
confession ought to be excluded under s. 78(1) where there has been a 
breach of the Code C `verballing' provisions or s. 58 of PACE, or if the 
confession was elicited during a covert operation (7.1.3.3 ante). Breaches 
of these provisions, or a failure to make a contemporaneous audio 
recording of what was said during a covert operation, take on a special 
significance because the accused may be prevented from challenging the 
admissibility of his confession under s. 76(2) of PACE. But even reliable 
confessions may be excluded if the accused has been tricked (or forced) 
into incriminating himself in contravention of his privilege against self-
incrimination. 
Similarly, a number of cases concerning drink-driving demonstrate that 
reliability is not the sole criterion for excluding evidence under s. 78(1) 
where the evidence is analogous to a confession. In Matto v. Wolver-
hampton Crown Court [1987] RTR 337 two police officers entered the 
accused's private land and requested a breath test from him even though 
they were aware they had no authority to make that request, having 
already been told to leave. The officers simply told the accused that he 
would be free to sue them for wrongful arrest if he felt aggrieved by their 
conduct. The accused therefore agreed to undergo a screening breath test 
which proved positive and he was arrested. At the police station a further 
test was administered and the positive result was used by the prosecution 
at his trial for driving with excess alcohol. He appealed to the Crown 
Court against his conviction in the magistrates' court and, though it was 
accepted that the police had acted in bad faith prior to the screening test, 
his application to have the results of the second test excluded under s. 78(1) 
failed. The Divisional Court quashed his conviction on the ground that, as 
the police had acted in bad faith and oppressively to obtain the screening 
test, it had been open to the Crown Court to exclude the result of the 
second test under s. 78(1) notwithstanding its reliability. Woolf LJ clearly 
had in mind the common-law discretion to exclude improperly obtained 
evidence tantamount to a confession, so this decision may be seen as a 
further example of the application of the nemo tenetur principle, as in R v. 
Payne [1963] 1 WLR 637 (CCA) (10.1 ante). In R v. Fox [1985] 1 WLR 
1126 the House of Lords regarded the absence of bad faith on the part of 
the police as a relevant criterion at common law (and the Court of Appeal 
has since emphasised the relevance of bad faith when considering the 
application of s. 78(1) to confessions). It is true that in DPP v. Godwin 
[1991] RTR 303 the Divisional Court held that s. 78(1) could be applied to 
exclude the result of a breath test notwithstanding the absence of bad faith 
on the part of the police, but this decision is also in line with the approach 
taken in the context of confessions. While bad faith on the part of the 
police will certainly justify the exclusion of a confession where there has 
been a breach of s. 58 of PACE or Code C, this does not mean that the 
absence of bad faith will prevent a confession from being excluded where 
there has been such a breach. In DPP v. Godwin there had been a breach 
of s. 6(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, requiring reasonable cause to 
suspect the accused had been drinking, which is not dissimilar to an 
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important aspect of Code C-10.1. A breach of Code C-10.1 will often 
result in the exclusion of a confession under s. 78(1) (see 7.1.3.3 ante). 
The importance attached by the courts to the nemo tenetur principle 
also explains the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v. Nathaniel [1995] 2 
Cr App R 565. The accused in that case was charged with raping two 
women in 1991 and consented to having a blood sample taken from him 
for the purpose of establishing his DNA profile, having been informed in 
advance that the sample would be destroyed following an acquittal. He 
was acquitted of those rapes following a trial in 1992 but the police failed 
to destroy the DNA profile obtained from his blood sample (in breach of 
what was then s. 64 of PACE and contrary to the assurances given to him), 
and that evidence was used by the prosecution at his trial in 1994 for the 
rape in 1989 of a different woman. The Court of Appeal quashed his 
conviction on the ground that the DNA evidence ought to have been 
excluded under s. 78(1), notwithstanding the trial judge's conclusion that 
there had been no bad faith on the part of the police, the very serious 
nature of the offence in question and the reliability of the evidence. 
However, utilitarian considerations of what is in the public good, or 
what common sense requires, may occasionally be allowed to override the 
nemo tenetur principle, notwithstanding serious police impropriety, if the 
reliability of the evidence has not been affected and the exclusion of the 
evidence in question would lead to the acquittal of an obviously guilty 
person. In R v. Cooke [1995] 1 Cr App R 318 the DNA evidence relied on 
by the prosecution at the accused's trial for rape and kidnapping had been 
obtained by the police from samples of hair sheath taken from the hair 
plucked from his scalp following a threat that it would be taken by force if 
he did not comply with their request. This threat was reinforced by the 
presence of three police officers wearing riot gear. The Court of Appeal 
held that if the sample had not been taken in accordance with the 
procedural requirements of PACE ± that is, even if the method of 
extraction had amounted to an assault ± the judge had been right not to 
apply s. 78(1) to exclude the evidence as it was highly probative of the 
accused's guilt and its reliability had not been affected. Given the threat to 
use force, and the fact that this must have operated on the accused's mind, 
this is a somewhat surprising decision, particularly as the House of Lords 
was clearly of the view in R v. Fox [1985] 1 WLR 1126 that the use of a 
threat or other oppressive behaviour by the police to obtain a breath 
specimen might justify the exclusion of such evidence, and the Court of 
Appeal accepted that the statutory discretion was `substantially wider' 
than that available at common law. The reason for the Court's approach 
would seem to lie in its view that `the fairness of proceedings involves both 
fairness to the accused person and fairness to the public good', implying 
that the trial judge should enter into some kind of balancing exercise when 
considering whether to exclude prosecution evidence under s. 78(1). The 
desirability of ensuring that persons who are obviously guilty of serious 
offences are convicted would also seem to explain the decision in R v. 
Apicella (1985) 82 Cr App R 295. The accused in that case consented to a 
sample of gonorrhoea being taken from his penis by a consultant 
292 Evidence 
physician because he had been told by a prison officer that, as a prisoner, 
he had no choice. The doctor obtained the sample in good faith for a 
therapeutic purpose, assuming the accused had been freely consenting. 
The unusual strain of the disease he was suffering from matched the 
infections contracted by the three women he was alleged to have raped and 
the evidence was adduced at his trial. The Court of Appeal held that the 
judge was right not to have excluded the evidence (at common law) just 
because it was a bodily sample obtained without the accused's true 
consent, the justification being that `the law of evidence should not stray 
too far from commonsense' and a sample could just as easily have been 
obtained by examining the accused's underpants or urine. The Court was 
willing to accept, however, that if the accused had been tricked into 
submitting to the medical examination (as in R v. Payne [1963] 1 WLR 637 
(CCA)) the common-law discretion could have been applied to exclude the 
evidence. 
In any event, not every type of police trickery after the commission of 
the offence is to be regarded as improper. Post-offence trickery which is 
considered to be a proportionate response by the police to the problems 
they face in combating crime will not lead to the exclusion of evidence 
obtained as a consequence even if it led to a degree of self-incrimination. 
In R v. Christou [1992] 3 WLR 228 the Court of Appeal gave as an 
example the blackmailer who is lured out and identified by the bait of 
marked money or by the victim's having arranged an appointment with 
him, and held that incriminating comments made to undercover police 
officers had been properly admitted even though the offences charged 
(burglary and handling in the alternative) had been committed prior to 
those conversations (see 7.1.3.3 ante). Nor will relatively minor 
impropriety or trickery by the police justify the exclusion of a reliable 
confession (or analogous evidence) if there has been no violation of the 
nemo tenetur principle. This is evident from the decision of the House of 
Lords in R v. Khan [1996] 3 WLR 162 where it was held that the accused's 
admissions, recorded by a listening device which had been attached to a 
suspect's home, could not be excluded under s. 78(1) as he had not been 
`induced' to make them. 
The importance attached to the reliability principle in cases such as R v. 
Cooke [1995] 1 Cr App R 318 (CA) and R v. Apicella (1985) 82 Cr App R 
295 (CA) makes sense given the seriousness of the offences and the nature 
of the impropriety, although in the absence of any safeguards it might be 
seen as sanctioning a doctrine of `the end justifies the means'. It has been 
noted that in R v. Cooke the Court of Appeal seemed to suggest that it was 
necessary to balance fairness to the accused against fairness to the public, 
and this same point has been made by the Court of Appeal on other 
occasions (see, for example, R v. Smurthwaite, R v. Gill (1993) 98 Cr App 
R 437 at p. 440). A balancing exercise would certainly provide a safeguard 
against a doctrine that any impropriety may be excused if the offence is 
sufficiently serious, but until recently the absence of any clear guidance as 
to what should be taken into consideration left judges and magistrates 
with nothing but their own subjective feeling of whether it would be `fair' 
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to allow the evidence to be adduced (see Hunter, `Judicial Discretion: 
Section 78 in Practice' [1994] Crim LR 558). The only general guidance 
available to magistrates and trial judges was that s. 78(1) was at least as 
wide as the common-law exclusionary discretions recognised in R v. Sang 
[1979] 3 WLR 263 (HL) and that it was potentially available to exclude 
evidence obtained in the course of an entrapment operation (R v 
Smurthwaite, R v. Gill, 10.5 post) and/or where there had been an abuse 
of process (R v. Quinn [1990] Crim LR 581 (CA)). 
The Court of Appeal could have recognised an explicit balancing of 
competing principles whenever s. 78(1) was being considered. In other 
words, the application of s. 78(1) could have been governed by a guided 
discretion whereby the reliability principle (reflecting the need to convict 
the guilty) was expressly weighed against the protective and integrity 
principles in the light of all the circumstances of the case (see Bunning v. 
Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 (HCA) at pp. 72±80 and R v. Shaheed [2002] 2 
NZLR 377 (NZCA) at pp. 419±21). Alternatively, the Court of Appeal 
could have held that fairness for the purposes of s. 78(1) was limited to 
forensic fairness with other types of unfairness (that is, breaches of 
principles other than the reliability principle) being rectified by the 
balancing exercise which is applied when determining whether a 
prosecution should be stayed as an abuse of process. In R v. Chalkley 
[1998] 3 WLR 146 the Court of Appeal adopted the latter alternative. The 
police suspected C of conspiring to commit robberies and so arrested him 
and his girlfriend in respect of unrelated matters in order to sneak into his 
home to plant a battery-powered bugging device. As a result the police 
were able to record C conspiring with his co-accused to commit robberies 
as well as their admissions relating to robberies they had already 
committed. The trial judge exercised his discretion under s. 78(1) by 
weighing in the balance a number of competing principles ± including the 
seriousness of the crimes and danger to the public, the absence of any 
inducement by the police, the reliability of the evidence, the unlawful 
conduct of the police and the need to uphold the integrity of the criminal 
justice system ± and concluded that in all the circumstances the evidence 
ought to be admitted. The judge's ruling was upheld on appeal, but the 
Court of Appeal held that the test which should have been applied was 
simply that of reliability and forensic fairness. According to Auld LJ (at 
pp. 169±71): 
`The determination of the fairness or otherwise of admitting evidence 
under section 78 is distinct from the exercise of discretion in 
determining whether to stay criminal proceedings as an abuse of 
process. Depending on the circumstances, the latter may require 
consideration, not just of the potential fairness of the trial, but also 
of a balance of the possibly countervailing interests of prosecuting a 
criminal to conviction and discouraging abuse of power. However 
laudable the end, it may not justify any means to achieve it . . . 
At first sight, the words in section 78 ``the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained'' might suggest that the means by which the 
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evidence was secured, even if they did not affect the fairness of 
admitting it, could entitle the court to exclude it as a result of a 
balancing exercise analogous to that when considering a stay for abuse 
of process. On that approach, the court could, even if it considered that 
the intrinsic nature of the evidence was not unfair to the accused, 
exclude it as a mark of disapproval of the way in which it had been 
obtained. That was certainly not the law before the Act of 1984. And we 
consider that the inclusion in section 78 of the words the circumstances 
in which the evidence was obtained was not intended to widen the 
common law rule in this respect as stated by Lord Diplock in Reg. v. 
Sang [1980] AC 402. That is that, save in the case of admissions and 
confessions and generally as to evidence obtained from the accused after 
the commission of the offence . . . there is no discretion to exclude 
evidence unless its quality was or might have been affected by the way in 
which it was obtained . . . 
Because of our unease about the possible effect on the reasoning of 
the judge of his adoption of the balancing exercise appropriate to abuse 
of process cases, we consider that the proper course is to make our own 
decision about the fairness of admitting this evidence. We have no 
doubt whatever about the fairness of doing so. As we have said, there 
was no dispute as to its authenticity, content or effect; it was relevant, 
highly probative of the defendants' involvement in the conspiracy and 
otherwise admissible; it did not result from incitement, entrapment or 
inducement or any other conduct of that sort; and none of the unlawful 
conduct of the police or other of their conduct of which complaint is 
made affects the quality of the evidence.' 
The broad distinction drawn by Auld LJ between the function and remit 
of s. 78(1) of PACE and the common-law doctrine of abuse of process was 
accepted as the correct approach by the Court of Appeal in R v. Bray 
(1998) unreported (98/04661), R v. Shannon [2001] 1 WLR 51 and R v. 
Hardwicke [2001] Crim LR 220 (99/06296/Z2), and has now been 
approved by the House of Lords (R v. Looseley, Attorney General's 
Reference (No. 3 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 2061, 10.5 post). 
It is therefore now clear (in the context of evidence other than 
confessions and analogous evidence) that the primary purpose of s. 78(1) 
is to ensure forensic fairness in line with the scope of the general common-
law discretion. Generally speaking the subsection should be applied to 
exclude improperly or unlawfully obtained evidence only if that 
impropriety has so affected the reliability of that evidence (or has so 
undermined the accused's ability to challenge its reliability) that its 
admission would prevent the accused from receiving a fair trial. It is not 
the appropriate mechanism for registering the court's disapproval of the 
techniques used by the police or protecting the rights of the state's citizens 
or upholding the integrity of the criminal justice system. If the executive 
agents of the State misuse their powers to such an extent that the criminal 
justice system would be brought into disrepute by allowing a trial to take 
place at all, the judge should stay the proceedings as an abuse of process. 
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That said, in R v. Looseley, Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 
2000) [2001] 1 WLR 2061 the House of Lords accepted ± explaining R v. 
Smurthwaite, R v. Gill (1993) 98 Cr App R 437 (CA) and approving the 
analysis of the Court of Appeal in R v. Shannon [2001] 1 WLR 51 ± that 
evidence may properly be excluded under s. 78(1) if the behaviour of the 
police or prosecuting authority has been such as to justify a stay on the 
grounds of abuse of process. Accordingly, while the accused should 
usually apply to have the proceedings stayed at the beginning of the trial, 
s. 78(1) may be relied on subsequently if it amounts to a belated 
application to have the proceedings stayed, in which case the Latif 
balancing exercise appropriate to abuse of process cases should be 
conducted to determine whether the evidence ought to be excluded (10.4 
post). In cases where the prosecution evidence has been obtained 
unlawfully or unfairly it is likely that the principal or only evidence of 
the accused's guilt will be that improperly obtained evidence; after all, 
covert operations are conducted because of the difficulty obtaining 
evidence by more conventional methods. The use of s. 78(1) to exclude the 
evidence will therefore result in the collapse of the prosecution case and a 
direction from the judge to acquit. In the unlikely event that there is some 
other cogent evidence against the accused which would justify a conviction 
at the end of the trial, the judge would be able to exclude all the 
prosecution evidence if the impropriety of the police is regarded as 
sufficiently grave to have justified a finding of abuse of process at the 
beginning of the trial. 
The decisions in R v. Cooke [1995] 1 Cr App R 318 (CA) and R v. 
Apicella (1985) 82 Cr App R 295 (CA) would now seem to exemplify the 
new approach as applied to evidence which is analogous to a confession, 
where the degree to which the accused has been unfairly treated and the 
seriousness of the offence need to be balanced to achieve a result which is 
fair to the public and not contrary to common sense. In cases of this sort a 
successful application during the trial to exclude the evidence under s. 78(1) 
would amount (in effect) to a belated application to have the proceedings 
stayed as an abuse of process, given the absence of any other evidence 
against the accused. The court should therefore take into consideration the 
accused's privilege against self-incrimination, the nature of the police 
misconduct, the seriousness of the alleged offence and the reliability of the 
evidence. The importance of the last two factors is apparent from the 
decision of the House of Lords in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 of 
1999) [2001] 2 WLR 56. That case concerned the interpretation of (what 
used to be) s. 64(3B)(b) of PACE, which provided that where DNA 
samples are required to be destroyed under (what was) s. 64(1) following 
the accused's acquittal, information derived from that sample `shall not be 
used . . . for the purposes of any investigation of an offence'. The accused 
(D) was arrested in respect of a burglary and a sample of his saliva was 
lawfully obtained from him. D was subsequently acquitted of that offence 
and the sample should have been destroyed under s. 64(1). It was not 
destroyed, however, and the DNA profile derived from it remained on the 
national DNA database. In contravention of s. 64(3B)(b) it was  
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subsequently found that the DNA profile obtained from D's sample 
matched the profile of the man who had brutally raped a 66-year-old 
women in 1997 and D was arrested in relation to that offence. A non-
intimate sample of plucked head hair was then lawfully taken from D and 
(unsurprisingly) the DNA profile obtained from it matched the DNA 
sample obtained from samples of semen left behind by the rapist. D was 
accordingly charged with that rape but, following submissions from 
counsel, the judge ruled that the evidence of the match between the DNA 
profile obtained from D's hair and the rapist's DNA profile was 
inadmissible. The prosecution case collapsed and the judge directed an 
acquittal. The Attorney-General referred the matter to the Court of 
Appeal, which upheld the trial judge's approach and quashed a conviction 
for murder in the conjoined appeal of R v. Weir ([2000] 2 Cr App R 416). 
The House of Lords had no hesitation in holding that the trial judge and 
Court of Appeal had erred in their interpretation of the provision. 
Evidence obtained in breach of s. 64(3B)(b) was not automatically 
inadmissible; rather, the judge had a discretion to exclude it under s. 78(1). 
In reaching this decision Lord Steyn, having noted that the purpose of the 
criminal law is to permit everyone to go about their daily lives without fear 
of harm to person or property, emphasised that there must be fairness to 
all sides and that this requires the court to consider a `triangulation of 
interests' involving the position of the accused, the victim (and his or her 
family) and the public. The interpretation of the Court of Appeal and trial 
judge was not only in conflict with the plain words of the statute but had 
produced results which were contrary to good sense. Lords Cooke, Clyde 
and Hutton agreed with this analysis, with Lord Hutton stating that the 
interests of the victim and the public must be taken into account, as well as 
the interests of the accused, when the application of s. 78(1) is considered. 
(In the light of the decision of the Court of Appeal in the two cases before 
it Parliament has made substantial amendments to s. 64 of PACE.) 
10.4 The Doctrine of Abuse of Process 
The civil and criminal courts have an inherent jurisdiction to stay 
proceedings as an abuse of process. This common-law power (indeed duty) 
is part of the law of civil and criminal procedure rather than the law of 
evidence, but it is necessary to have an understanding of the doctrine on 
account of its increasing importance as a remedy for the accused in cases 
where prosecution evidence has been obtained unlawfully and the extent 
to which it overlaps with s. 78(1) of PACE. 
In the context of criminal proceedings a prosecution will be stayed if the 
accused cannot receive a (forensically) fair trial or if it would be 
(viscerally) unfair for the accused to be tried at all (R v. Horseferry Road 
Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett [1993] 3 WLR 90 (HL), R v. Beckford 
[1996] 1 Cr App R 94 (CA)). In practice the two categories will often 
overlap. It is for the accused to prove on the balance of probabilities that 
he would suffer such serious prejudice that a fair trial cannot be held 
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(Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1990) (1992) 95 Cr App R 296 
(CA)) or the factual circumstances which render the prosecution itself 
unfair (R v. Mullen [1999] 3 WLR 777 (CA)). 
A trial should be stayed on the ground that a fair trial is not possible 
only in exceptional circumstances, for in most cases forensic fairness can 
be provided by the application of s. 78(1) and appropriate directions to 
the jury (Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1990) (1992) 95 Cr App R 
296 (CA)); but both the Crown Court and magistrates' courts are 
empowered to stay a prosecution on this ground (R v. Horseferry Road 
Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett [1993] 3 WLR 90 (HL)). An example 
is provided by R v. Birmingham [1992] Crim LR 117 (CC) where, despite 
receiving specific requests for unused material, the police failed to provide 
the accused with the videotape from a closed-circuit television camera 
which was trained on the scene of the incident and would have contained 
matters of relevance to the accused. The judge stayed the case because the 
tape had disappeared by the time the matter came to be tried (see also R 
(Ebrahim) v. Feltham Magistrates' Court [2001] 1 WLR 1293 (DC)). 
Similarly, where there is adverse pre-trial publicity the prosecution will be 
stayed if, notwithstanding the safeguards inherent in the trial process and 
the measures the judge would take to ameliorate forensic unfairness, the 
risk of prejudice to the accused remains serious enough to render a fair 
trial impossible (Montgomery v. HM Advocate [2001] 2 WLR 779 (PC)). 
The same principle applies if the time which has elapsed between the 
commission of the alleged offence and the trial would so prejudice the 
accused that he would be unable to receive a fair trial (Attorney-General's 
Reference (No. 1 of 1990); see also 11.10 post). 
The second ground for staying a prosecution as an abuse of process is 
concerned not with the fairness of the trial itself but with the serious 
misconduct of agents of the executive, most obviously the police, customs 
officers and the CPS (though it may be that equivalent misconduct by an 
ordinary citizen will justify a stay in certain circumstances). Thus, 
regardless of whether the accused would actually receive a fair trial, a 
prosecution will be stayed if, for example, the police deliberately 
disregarded the accused's human rights and the state's international legal 
obligations by forcibly bringing the accused into the jurisdiction (R v. 
Mullen [1999] 3 WLR 777 (CA)) or the police brought about the 
commission of a crime which would not otherwise have been committed 
(R v. Looseley, Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 2000) [2001] 1 
WLR 2061 (HL), 10.5 post). The Crown Court has jurisdiction to stay a 
prosecution as an abuse of process on this ground; but where the 
allegation involves an infraction of the rule of law outside the narrow 
confines of the actual trial or court process a magistrates' court should 
adjourn the case so that an application may be made to the Divisional 
Court for the issue to be addressed there (R v. Belmarsh Magistrates' 
Court ex parte Watts [1999] 2 Cr App R 188 (DC)). The rationale 
underlying this aspect of the doctrine is threefold. First, citizens should be 
protected from agents of the executive (such as police officers) who might 
abuse their executive power; second, agents of the executive should be 
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discouraged from abusing their power; and, third, the courts must 
maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system by refusing to allow 
their coercive, law enforcement functions to be misused (see R v. 
Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett [1993] 3 WLR 90 
(HL) at pp. 104±5, R v. Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104 (HL) at p. 112, R v. 
Looseley, Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 
2061 (HL) at pp. 2063, 2067, 2069, 2073±5, 2080 and 2090±1). 
Where the accused argues that it would be `unfair' (that is, 
inappropriate) to try him, even though a trial would be (forensically) 
fair, the judge must weigh countervailing considerations and determine 
whether the proceedings, if allowed to continue, would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. In R v. Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104, 
a case where it was submitted that the proceedings should be stayed (or the 
prosecution evidence excluded under s. 78(1) of PACE) on the ground that 
a customs officer and his informer had incited L's co-accused, S, to 
commit the offence of being knowingly involved in the fraudulent 
importation of heroin and had lured him into the jurisdiction, Lord Steyn 
explained the general approach which should be adopted (at pp. 112±13): 
`The court has a discretion: it has to perform a balancing exercise. If the 
court concludes that a fair trial is not possible, it will stay the 
proceedings. That is not what the present case is concerned with . . . In 
this case the issue is whether, despite the fact that a fair trial was 
possible, the judge ought to have stayed the criminal proceedings on 
broader considerations of the integrity of the criminal justice system. 
The law is settled. Weighing countervailing considerations of policy and 
justice, it is for the judge in the exercise of his discretion to decide 
whether there has been an abuse of process, which amounts to an 
affront to the public conscience and requires the criminal proceedings to 
be stayed . . . General guidance as to how the discretion should be 
exercised in particular circumstances will not be useful. But it is possible 
to say that in a case such as the present the judge must weigh in the 
balance the public interest in ensuring that those that are charged with 
grave crimes should be tried and the competing public interest in not 
conveying the impression that the court will adopt the approach that 
the end justifies the means.' 
The reference to grave crimes would appear to suggest that the seriousness 
of the offence is a relevant consideration. Indeed in R v. Mullen [1999] 3 
WLR 777 the Court of Appeal held that `great weight' must be attached to 
the fact that the accused was charged with a terrorist offence, and 
emphasised that there may be cases where the seriousness of the offence is 
so great relative to the nature of the abuse of process that it would 
nonetheless be a proper exercise of judicial discretion to permit the 
prosecution to proceed. This is no doubt the case where the impropriety is 
wholly extraneous to the commission of the offence, as in R v. Mullen, but 
it seems the seriousness of the offence will not be given much (if any) 
weight as a factor militating against a stay if the allegation of impropriety 
is that agents of the executive deliberately brought about that offence as 
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agents provocateurs (R v. Looseley, Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 
2000) at pp. 2070, 2079 and 2090). 
Although the justification for the second ground in criminal proceed-
ings turns on the need to control the agents of the state so that they do not 
violate the rights of its citizens, it may be that the balancing exercise is to 
be undertaken if the allegation is merely that an ordinary citizen instigated 
the commission of the offence, save that lawlessness of this sort is to be 
given less weight than executive lawlessness (see R v. Hardwicke [2001] 
Crim LR 220 (CA)). If this is a general principle it is one which is difficult 
to understand, unless of course the citizen is acting in league with agents of 
the executive as their stooge. A more appropriate solution would be to 
prosecute the agent provocateur for incitement or as an accessory in respect 
of the offence allegedly committed by the accused (the person incited), and 
to take into consideration the degree of incitement as a mitigating factor 
for the accused in the event that he is convicted. 
Civil courts also have an inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings as an 
abuse of process if it would be manifestly unfair to a party to allow the 
proceedings to continue or the proceedings would otherwise bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people 
(Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1981] 3 WLR 906 
(HL) at p. 909, Re Barings (No. 2) [1999] 1 All ER 311 (CA) at pp. 335±6 
and 339; see also r. 3.4(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998). In Arrow 
Nominees v. Blackledge [2000] 2 BCLC 167 (CA) Chadwick LJ said (at 
pp. 193±4): 
`where a litigant's conduct puts the fairness of the trial in jeopardy, 
where it is such that any judgment in favour of the litigant would have 
to be regarded as unsafe, or where it amounts to such an abuse of the 
process of the court as to render further proceedings unsatisfactory and 
to prevent the court from doing justice, the court is entitled, indeed . . . 
bound, to refuse to allow that litigant to take further part in the 
proceedings and (where appropriate) to determine the proceedings 
against him.' 
10.5 Entrapment 
In R v. Sang [1979] 3 WLR 263 (HL) it was held there was no discretion at 
common law to exclude prosecution evidence merely because the accused 
had been incited to commit the offence by a police agent provocateur. Since 
there was no defence of entrapment in English law there could be no 
discretion to exclude such evidence as that would amount to the defence 
being made available through the back door. However, in R v. 
Smurthwaite, R v. Gill (1993) 98 Cr App R 437, two cases (consolidated 
on appeal) in which the prosecution depended on the evidence of 
undercover police officers who had posed as contract killers, the Court of 
Appeal recognised that s. 78(1) of PACE is available to exclude 
prosecution evidence obtained by police agents provocateurs, providing 
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authority for the view that reliable evidence might fall within the 
exclusionary remit of that subsection. The Court listed some of the 
factors the trial judge ought to consider when deciding whether to apply 
s. 78(1) (at pp. 440±1): 
`Was the officer acting as an agent provocateur in the sense that he was 
enticing the defendant to commit an offence he would not otherwise 
have committed? What was the nature of any entrapment? Does the 
evidence consist of admissions to a completed offence, or does it consist 
of the actual commission of an offence? How active or passive was the 
officer's role in obtaining the evidence? Is there an unassailable record 
of what occurred, or is it strongly corroborated? . . . [Has the officer] 
abused his role to ask questions which ought properly to have been 
asked as a police officer and in accordance with the [PACE] Codes [?]' 
In each of these two cases the accused had sought to hire a killer to 
murder his or her spouse, and they were both convicted on the evidence of 
what they had said to undercover police officers. S had offered an officer 
£20,000 to kill his wife and subsequently paid him £10,000 up front. He 
had approached the officer of his own volition and all the conversations 
had been recorded by concealed recording equipment. G had first 
telephoned an acquaintance and asked him to kill her husband, but prior 
to their meeting the acquaintance had contacted the police and was 
therefore accompanied by an undercover officer when he met her. The 
officer gave evidence that G had discussed the murder of her husband and 
although there was no recording of what was said (nor any independent 
confirmation from the acquaintance) their subsequent recorded meetings 
corroborated the officer's account of what had been said during their first 
meeting. In each case the officer had been a passive listener whom the 
accused had voluntarily approached and solicited. Neither officer could be 
described as an agent provocateur and, unsurprisingly, the Court of 
Appeal held that their evidence had been properly admitted (see also R v. 
Mann [1995] Crim LR 647 (CA)). 
It is to be noted that some of the factors cited in R v. Smurthwaite, R v. 
Gill (1993) 98 Cr App R 437 (CA) are nothing other than well-established 
principles. The desirability of having an `unassailable record' represents 
the continuing importance of the reliability principle; and the significance 
of the evidence consisting of `admissions to a completed offence' lies in the 
importance attached to the privilege against self-incrimination. Never-
theless, the Court's observations represented a departure from the 
common-law discretion, as it was accepted that reliable evidence could 
be excluded under s. 78(1) if it related to an offence which had been incited 
by a police officer. 
Prior to the decision in R v. Looseley, Attorney General's Reference 
(No. 3 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 2061 (HL) it was clear that if the police 
merely provided the accused with an opportunity to commit an offence the 
evidence obtained in consequence would not be excluded under s. 78(1). 
This was the approach adopted by the Divisional Court in Williams v. 
DPP (1993) 98 Cr App R 209, a case following a police `manna from 
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heaven' operation in which officers had parked an insecure and 
unattended van, containing what appeared to be a load of cigarette 
cartons, on a busy high street where there had been a high rate of vehicle 
crime. The police ensured that the cartons were visible to the general 
public through the partly-opened roller shutter at the rear of the van, and 
then withdrew to keep watch from a distance. A large number of 
pedestrians passed the van during the next hour without showing any 
interest in it or its contents, but a little later the two accused arrived and 
began to assess the situation. They removed some of the cartons about 10 
minutes later and were subsequently arrested and charged. At their trial 
they argued that as they had not set out to commit the crime but had been 
tempted by the police, the evidence of the observing officers ought to be 
excluded under s. 78(1). This submission was rejected by the magistrates 
and the Divisional Court, the latter holding that the police had not acted 
as agents provocateurs as they had done nothing to force, persuade, 
encourage or coerce the accused to do what they had done. Rather, the 
accused had acted voluntarily in the absence of any pressure and with full 
understanding of their own dishonesty. Wright J drew an analogy with the 
situation where a policewoman dresses in plain clothes and walks around a 
particular neighbourhood to attract a molester thought to be operating in 
the area. Just as there would be no unfairness in admitting evidence that 
an alleged sex offender had been seen to attack an undercover 
policewoman, there was no unfairness in admitting the officers' evidence 
that the accused had removed cartons from the van. The problem with this 
analysis is that it failed to consider whether the accused would have 
committed the offence even without the police trickery. In fact there was 
nothing to suggest that they would have interfered with a vehicle if the 
trap had not been set for them, the implication being that the police were 
entitled to create crime in order to secure convictions. A particular locality 
is unlikely to have many sex offenders who are willing to attack women in 
public, but it is likely that many citizens will be tempted by an opportunity 
to commit petty theft; and, while theft is to be deprecated, one might 
question police tactics which are designed to encourage rather than 
prevent the commission of crime. 
Thus, in the absence of active incitement there was an unwillingness to 
consider anything but the reliability principle when considering the 
application of s. 78(1). Another example is DPP v. Marshall [1988] 3 All 
ER 683 (DC), where it was held there had been nothing to justify the 
exclusion of the evidence of undercover police officers who had made a 
`test purchase' of four cans of lager and a bottle of wine from the accused, 
causing him to be in breach of his licence to sell liquor by the case (see also 
London Borough of Ealing v. Woolworths [1995] Crim LR 58 (DC)). 
The extent to which it is permissible for the police to obtain evidence by 
setting up an undercover operation in relation to prospective criminal 
conduct, where they become involved in the criminal conduct of the 
accused and then testify against him at his trial, was considered by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal (1998) 
28 EHRR 101, a case which concerned an act of incitement by undercover 
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police officers on a man who was previously unknown to them and who 
had no criminal record. Following a request for drugs by the officers the 
applicant obtained heroin for them and was subsequently charged and 
convicted on the basis of their evidence. The European Court of Human 
Rights held there had been a violation of Article 6 of the European 
Convention, notwithstanding the reliability of the evidence and the fact 
that the accused had had a trial which was (forensically) fair, as the 
officers had not acted pursuant to an authorised undercover operation 
and there had been no evidence that the applicant was predisposed to 
commit the offence. According to the Court (at pp. 115±16): 
`The . . . Government have not contended that the officers' intervention 
took place as part of an anti-drug-trafficking operation ordered and 
supervised by a judge. It does not appear either that the competent 
authorities had good reason to suspect that Mr Teixeira de Castro was a 
drug-trafficker; on the contrary, he had no criminal record and no 
preliminary investigation concerning him had been opened . . . There is 
no evidence to support the Government's argument that the applicant 
was predisposed to commit offences. The necessary inference from these 
circumstances is that the two police officers did not confine themselves 
to investigating Mr Teixeira de Castro's criminal activity in an 
essentially passive manner, but exercised an influence such as to incite 
the commission of the offence . . . [T]he Court concludes that the two 
police officers' actions went beyond those of undercover agents because 
they instigated the offence and there is nothing to suggest that without 
their intervention it would have been committed. That intervention and 
its use in the impugned criminal proceedings meant that, right from the 
outset, the applicant was definitively deprived of a fair trial.' 
The judgment in Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal was considered by the 
Divisional Court in the `test purchase' case of Nottingham City Council v. 
Amin [2000] 1 WLR 1071. D was in the centre of Nottingham driving a car 
which was licensed as a taxi, but not for that particular area. The car was 
fitted with a roof light, which was not lit, and hailed by two special 
constables in plain clothes. D took the constables to their destination and 
was paid his fare, following which he was spoken to by enforcement 
officers acting for Nottingham City Council and prosecuted for plying for 
hire without the appropriate licence. The stipendiary magistrate relied on 
Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal and s. 78(1) of PACE to exclude the 
constables' evidence on the ground that they had incited D to commit the 
offence, and the prosecution appealed by way of case stated. Allowing the 
appeal the Divisional Court held that, while it would be `deeply offensive 
to ordinary notions of fairness' if a person were to be convicted of a crime 
which he committed only because he had been incited, D had not been 
persuaded to commit the offence. It was unobjectionable for law 
enforcement officers to provide an opportunity to break the law in 
circumstances where the accused would have behaved in the same way if 
the opportunity had been offered by anyone else, and the decision of the 
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European Court of Human Rights in Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal had to 
be understood in the context of the particular facts of that case. 
Accordingly, the stipendiary magistrate should not have excluded the 
evidence. 
The degree to which undercover police officers might properly become 
involved in the commission of an offence, and the appropriate remedy for 
the accused if they went beyond what could be justified, was finally 
resolved by the House of Lords in R v. Looseley, Attorney General's 
Reference (No. 3 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 2061. The following principles 
may be derived from their Lordships' speeches. 
First, while entrapment is not a substantive defence to criminal liability, 
it is nonetheless unacceptable for the state, through its agents, to lure or 
entrap its citizens into committing crimes and then to prosecute them for 
their criminal conduct. To allow such prosecutions to take place would be 
to condone the executive's abuse of its power, compromise the integrity of 
the criminal justice system, result in an abuse of the process of the court 
and possibly lead to a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (as in Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal). Such 
prosecutions should therefore be stayed as an abuse of process, in line 
with the approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Mack 
[1988] 2 SCR 903 and favoured by McHugh J in his dissenting judgment in 
Ridgeway v. R (1995) 184 CLR 19 (HCA) at pp. 91±2. The test to be 
applied is the balancing exercise identified by Lord Steyn in R v. Latif 
[1996] 1 WLR 104 (HL) at pp. 112±13 (10.4 ante) and reaffirmed by Lord 
Hutton at p. 2090: `[I]t is necessary to balance the competing requirements 
that those who commit crimes should be convicted and punished and that 
there should not be an abuse of process which would constitute an affront 
to the public conscience.' When ordering a stay on the ground of abuse of 
process the court is not disciplining the police, although it may have that 
effect in practice. The reason for the stay is to prevent any prosecution 
which would be an affront to the public conscience. In other words, the 
accused should not be tried if it would be (viscerally) unfair to do so, even 
though he would receive a (forensically) fair trial. 
Second, s. 78(1) of PACE, being primarily concerned with forensic 
fairness, is an appropriate remedy where police impropriety is alleged in 
two situations: (i) where the admission of the evidence would lead to a 
(forensically) unfair trial; and, (ii) where the application to exclude 
evidence under s. 78(1) is in effect a belated application to have the 
proceedings stayed. Accordingly, it is permissible to exclude prosecution 
evidence under s. 78(1) if the behaviour of the police or prosecuting 
authority has been such as to justify a stay on grounds of abuse of process, 
in which case the Latif balancing exercise should be undertaken. In 
particular, it is permissible to exclude prosecution evidence (indeed all the 
prosecution evidence) under s. 78(1) in cases of entrapment (in line with R 
v. Smurthwaite, R v. Gill (1993) 98 Cr App R 437 (CA)), save that the 
grant of a stay on the ground of abuse of process should be the 
appropriate response in most cases. 
304 Evidence 
Third, not every type of active involvement by the police (or similar 
agency) in the commission of a crime is to be regarded as unacceptable. In 
the context of regulatory offences, random test purchases from persons 
such as traders and taxi drivers fall within this category of permissible 
conduct, so long as the accused was approached in a way which is no 
different from the way in which any ordinary customer might have 
approached him (as, for example, in Nottingham City Council v. Amin 
[2000] 1 WLR 1071 (DC)). Proactive investigatory techniques are also 
permissible in relation to other types of crime, such as offences concerning 
the supply of drugs, so long as the conduct of the police does not amount 
to `state-created crime'. Thus, if the accused already had the intention to 
commit an offence of the same or a similar kind to that ultimately 
committed, and the police merely provided him with the opportunity to 
put his intention into effect, an argument to stay the proceedings or 
exclude the prosecution evidence under s. 78(1) on the ground of 
entrapment would fail. 
Fourth, state-created crime covers the sort of situation where the police 
implanted the intent in the accused's mind so that he committed a crime 
which would otherwise not have been committed. It would, for example, 
be objectionable for an undercover officer to coerce a vulnerable drug-
addict into supplying drugs by repeatedly badgering him with offers of 
excessive and increasing amounts of money. This does not mean that the 
presence or absence of a predisposition to commit the crime is a criterion 
by which the acceptability of police conduct is to be assessed, however, for 
a predisposition to commit crime does not negative the misuse of state 
power. Accordingly, the appropriate test will generally be `whether the 
police did no more than present the defendant with an unexceptional 
opportunity to commit a crime', that is, `whether the police conduct 
preceding the commission of the offence was no more than might have 
been expected from others in the circumstances' (per Lord Nicholls at 
p. 2069). The following dictum of McHugh J was approved: 
`The state can justify the use of entrapment techniques to induce the 
commission of an offence only when the inducement is consistent with 
the ordinary temptations and stratagems that are likely to be 
encountered in the course of criminal activity. That may mean that 
some degree of deception, importunity and even threats on the part of 
the authorities may be acceptable. But once the state goes beyond the 
ordinary, it is likely to increase the incidence of crime by artificial 
means.' (Ridgeway v. R (1995) 184 CLR 19 (HCA) at p. 92) 
Accordingly, because a dealer will not voluntarily offer drugs to a stranger 
unless the stranger first makes an approach to him, and the stranger may 
need to persist in his request for drugs before they are supplied, a 
persistent request by an undercover officer for drugs may not amount to 
entrapment if the accused (supplier) already had the intention to supply. 
Fifth, in some situations the proceedings should be stayed as an abuse 
of process (or the evidence excluded under s. 78(1)) even if the police 
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merely provided the accused with an opportunity to commit the crime, if 
that crime was artificially created by the state. An example would be where 
a police officer seeks to increase his arrest rate by planting a wallet in an 
obvious location in a park with a view to arresting the person who steals it. 
A relevant factor is whether the officer concerned was acting in the course 
of an officially authorised investigation (Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal). 
Such unacceptable conduct should be contrasted with bona fide, 
authorised investigations where the police have reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that an individual is committing crime, or that crime is being 
committed in a certain place or area, and it is necessary to set a trap (in the 
form of an opportunity) to catch the offender. For example, it would be 
permissible to leave a handbag in a bus terminal where numerous thefts 
have recently taken place or an unattended van with cigarette cartons in 
the back in an area where thefts from vehicles is commonplace (as in 
Williams v. DPP (1993) 98 Cr App R 209 (DC)). 
Sixth, ultimately the test for whether the proceedings should be stayed 
as an abuse of process (or s. 78(1) applied) is whether the conduct of the 
police or similar agency was so seriously improper as to bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. To determine this a number of 
factors need to be brought into the Latif balancing exercise, the weight 
and importance of which will depend on the particular facts of the case. 
The judge should consider the nature of the offence (in the sense that 
proactive investigatory techniques are necessary); the reason for the 
operation (for example whether there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting criminal activity, save that random testing may be the only 
practicable way of policing some activities); the intrusiveness of the 
investigatory technique used by the police (a factor which incorporates the 
Convention question of proportionality); whether the operation was bona 
fide and authorised; and the nature and extent of police participation in 
the crime, including the significance of any inducement (for which the 
accused's circumstances and vulnerability are relevant factors). It would 
not normally be objectionable for the police to behave like any ordinary 
customer of a (lawful or unlawful) trade being carried on by the accused. 
The accused's criminal record may be relevant as a factor giving rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that he is currently engaged in similar activity, but 
otherwise it should be disregarded. Nor in itself is the seriousness of the 
offence a relevant factor. 
Seventh, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as 
interpreted in Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, includes the right not to be 
tried at all if the prosecution would amount to an abuse of state power. 
Accordingly there is no appreciable difference between the requirements of 
Article 6 and English law. Section 78(1) of PACE and the common-law 
doctrine of abuse of process are sufficient safeguards to ensure that the 
accused receives a fair trial and that he will be tried only when it is fair 
(that is, appropriate) to do so. 
In R v. Looseley the police were concerned about the trade in class A 
drugs in their area and had reason to believe that a public house in 
Guildford was the focal point of the trade. They therefore set up an 
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undercover operation involving an officer known as `Rob' who spent time 
in that public house. While there, Rob was provided with the name and 
telephone number of a possible supplier. He called that person (who 
turned out to be L) and said, `Hello, mate, can you sort us out a couple of 
bags?' L agreed and gave Rob directions to his flat. At the flat L agreed to 
provide Rob with some heroin for £30, and the two of them went to 
another flat where the heroin was obtained. On two further occasions Rob 
bought small quantities of heroin from L and ultimately L was charged 
with supplying or being concerned in the supplying to another of a class A 
controlled drug. Following a voir dire the judge rejected the application to 
stay the proceedings (or apply s. 78(1) to exclude Rob's evidence) and this 
ruling was upheld by the House of Lords. The covert operation had been 
authorised and supervised by a senior officer; there was reason to believe 
that L was involved in the heroin trade; Rob had presented himself to L as 
nothing other than a heroin addict and prospective customer; and Rob 
had not incited the commission of a crime (indeed there was evidence to 
suggest that L had encouraged Rob to take more heroin). 
The facts in R v. Looseley were described by Lord Hoffmann as `miles 
away' from what had happened in Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, but the 
same cannot be said of the covert operation which led to the stay in 
Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 2000). In that case the accused was 
approached by undercover officers and sold some purportedly contraband 
cigarettes. The officers subsequently asked him whether he could provide 
them with heroin, and he eventually obtained some for them, even though 
he had made it clear that he was not `into' that drug. The House of Lords 
held that the judge had been entitled to exercise his discretion to stay the 
proceedings in the accused's favour, even if it had been an authorised 
operation. The accused, who had made it clear that he was not involved in 
the heroin trade, had been repeatedly offered (and supplied with) cut-price 
cigarettes as an inducement and he had felt obliged to return this favour 
by obtaining what the officers had asked for. In short, the officers had 
instigated an offence which the accused would not otherwise have 
committed. Only Lord Scott was of the view that the officers' conduct had 
not been sufficiently grave to amount to an abuse of process, although it 
was accepted that the trial judge's decision was one that he was entitled to 
reach on the facts. 
Lord Hoffmann pointed out that while the court's inherent jurisdiction 
to stay proceedings is said to be on the ground that the proceedings are an 
abuse of process it would be more accurate to describe the jurisdiction 
more broadly as one to prevent abuse of executive power. It follows that if 
the accused was incited to commit the offence charged by an ordinary 
citizen, the submission that the proceedings should be stayed ought to fail. 
This would appear to have been accepted in R v. Shannon [2001] 1 WLR 
51 where the accused was encouraged to supply drugs to an undercover 
newspaper reporter posing as an Arab sheikh. The Court of Appeal stated 
that an abuse of process argument was unavailable unless there was 
impropriety on the part of `the police (or someone acting on behalf of or in 
league with the police) and/or the prosecuting authority'. However, in R v. 
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Hardwicke [2001] Crim LR 220 the Court of Appeal accepted that 
commercial unlawfulness might justify staying criminal proceedings as an 
abuse of process (in the absence of forensic unfairness); and in R v. 
Marriner [2002] EWCA Crim 2855 the Court of Appeal would appear to 
have assumed that journalistic entrapment could lead to a stay. 
With regard to the way in which other common-law jurisdictions have 
addressed the problem of police entrapment, the approach consistently 
adopted by the US Supreme Court since its decision in Sorrells v. United 
States (1932) 287 US 435 is that it amounts to a substantive defence to an 
allegation of criminal liability (so long as the accused was not predisposed 
to commit the offence), save that sufficiently outrageous conduct by 
the police may justify a decision to halt the proceedings on `due process 
principles' (United States v. Russell (1973) 411 US 423 (USSC) at 
pp. 431±2). In Ridgeway v. R (1995) 184 CLR 19 the majority of the High 
Court of Australia held that where the commission of the offence was 
procured by unlawful conduct, evidence of the accused's guilt could 
properly be excluded `on public policy grounds' (applying or extending the 
general discretion to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence recognised in 
Bunning v. Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 (HCA)). A discretion to exclude 
evidence in such circumstances `to prevent an abuse of process by the 
avoidance of unfairness' has also been recognised in New Zealand (Police 
v. Lavalle [1979] 1 NZLR 45 (NZCA) at p. 48). 
10.6 Exceptions to the General Rule 
Although the general rule is that unlawfully or unfairly obtained evidence 
is prima facie admissible in any proceedings, whether civil or criminal, 
there are a number of exceptions, three of which are worth noting. First, a 
confession excluded in criminal proceedings by virtue of s. 76(2) of PACE 
is inadmissible as a matter of law (see 7.1.3.1±2 ante). Second, in civil 
proceedings where one party has by stealth or by trick taken possession of 
documents brought into court by his opponent he will not be able to 
adduce such evidence: the public interest which favours a litigant's 
freedom to bring documents into court safe in the knowledge that they will 
not be taken by his opponent outweighs the principle of free proof (ITC 
Film Distributors v. Video Exchange [1982] 1 Ch 431 (ChD)). Third, by 
virtue of s. 17 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(supplanting s. 9 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985) 
evidence which discloses any of the contents of an intercepted commu-
nication (that is, any communication intercepted in the course of its 
transmission by means of a postal service or telecommunication system) is 
generally inadmissible in civil or criminal proceedings, the rationale being 
the desirability of keeping the nature of such surveillance operations secret 
(see R v. P [2001] 2 WLR 463 (HL) at pp. 475±9). An intercepted 
communication does not include the recording of a telephone conversa-
tion by one party to the call (R v. Hardy [2003] 1 Cr App R 494 (CA)). 
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Chapter Summary 
.	 As a general rule evidence which is admissible remains admissible if it has been 
obtained unlawfully or unfairly by the police or a party to civil proceedings. 
.	 At common law and under s. 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
the criminal courts may exclude prosecution evidence which has been unlawfully 
obtained if the manner in which it was obtained has adversely affected its 
reliability (or the accused's ability to test its reliability) or the evidence is 
analogous to a confession obtained by trickery in violation of the accused's 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
.	 The criminal courts have a discretion to `stay' proceedings as an abuse of process 
to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system if the police acted 
unlawfully in obtaining the evidence against the accused, for example where the 
accused was incited by the police to commit an offence so that he could be 
prosecuted for it. The court will balance countervailing considerations of policy 
and justice to determine whether it is appropriate for the accused to be tried. An 
application to exclude prosecution evidence during the trial under s. 78(1) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 may be treated as a belated application to 
stay the proceedings as an abuse of process. 
.	 Civil courts have a discretion to stay proceedings as an abuse of process, and may 
exclude admissible evidence, but if evidence has been obtained unlawfully by one 
party it would be undesirable to exclude it for that reason. 
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Safeguards Against 11 
Unreliability and Error 
It has been seen that hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings because it is not possible to cross-examine the person who 
made the statement to test the reliability of his evidence (5.2 ante). It has 
also been seen that there are exceptions to the hearsay rule, and that if a 
hearsay statement is admitted in criminal proceedings the judge will 
comment on the unavailability of the person who made it and point out 
any specific weaknesses in the evidence (6.3 ante). The need to give some 
form of direction or cautionary warning arises in respect of other types of 
evidence too, either on account of its inherent unreliability or because of 
some other risk associated with it; but, unlike hearsay evidence, no blanket 
exclusionary rule applies and the jury will usually be entitled to consider 
the evidence at the end of the trial. 
It is difficult to generalise about the various types of evidence covered in 
this chapter, apart from the fact that there is a risk in each case that the 
jury might draw an erroneous inference if allowed to consider it in the 
absence of a safeguard. Unreliability may be an inherent and latent quality 
of the evidence, or may lie in the number of alternative inferences capable 
of being drawn from it; or there may be a danger associated with the 
evidence simply because of its complexity (and the risk that its true 
probative value will be misunderstood) or because of the possibility that a 
witness is lying. It should not be assumed, however, that every item of 
evidence falling within one of the categories covered here is inherently 
weak or unreliable. The potential for unreliability and error is a matter of 
degree, and some such evidence will in fact be highly reliable (and highly 
probative). Visual-identification evidence, the category covered here in 
most depth, is a good example. As a general rule evidence of this sort is 
notoriously unreliable, and has been the cause of a number of miscarriages 
of justice; but the risk of a mistaken identification (or recognition) will 
occasionally be negligible. For example, the victim of a kidnapping who 
has spent several weeks in close proximity to his captor may be able to 
give irrefutable eye-witness testimony identifying the accused as the 
perpetrator. 
11.1 Visual-identification Evidence 
If it is not in dispute that an offence has occurred, the only remaining 
issue at the trial will often be the identity of the perpetrator. The class of 
possible candidates may be narrowed down by drawing inferences 
from circumstantial evidence (such as fingerprints, footprints, DNA, 
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handwriting, fibres, scent, motive, opportunity and so on) or, of course, by 
calling a witness to testify that he saw the accused committing the offence. 
There seems to be a general assumption by lay triers of fact that eye-
witness testimony is one of the safest bases for any identification; there 
have certainly been convictions based on very weak visual-identification 
evidence (for example, R v. Mattan (Deceased) (1998) The Times 5.3.98 
(97/6415/S2) (CA) and R v. Ross [1960] Crim LR 127 (CCA)). In fact 
visual-identification evidence is often unreliable, and is therefore a 
potentially hazardous way of connecting a person to an offence. The 
classic example is where a witness testifies that he saw the offence being 
committed by a stranger some distance away, for a relatively short period 
of time, in far from ideal conditions. But it is not just such `fleeting glance' 
identification evidence which can lead to miscarriages of justice. Even 
what appears to be highly reliable recognition evidence may in fact be 
quite erroneous, and there is no better illustration of this than the tale of 
Mr Adolf Beck. 
Adolf Beck lived in South America for many years towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, during which time a man, who called himself John 
Smith, and who resembled Beck, was convicted of a number of deception 
offences against women in London. In 1895, after Beck had returned to 
London and Smith had been released from prison, similar deceptions on 
women again began to occur. The offender would visit women in their 
homes, become intimate with them, gain their confidence and then 
defraud them of money and jewellery. Beck was identified as the culprit by 
one of the women and arrested. Subsequently he was positively identified 
by a further eleven women who had been defrauded and by two former 
police officers as the John Smith in whose case they had been involved in 
1877. Beck was convicted and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. In 
1904, within three years of Beck's release, the same sort of offences once 
again began to be committed. Beck was arrested, identified by four women 
and again convicted. However, during the period while Beck was in 
custody further frauds were perpetrated and Smith was finally arrested. It 
subsequently became apparent that it was Smith who had committed the 
offences Beck had been convicted of; so, despite the numerous and 
apparently reliable visual identifications, Beck had been wrongly 
convicted on two occasions (see The Trial of Adolf Beck, Notable British 
Trials (1924)). 
The Beck case is not an isolated example for there have been numerous 
other cases of mistaken identifications resulting in a conviction. For 
example, a Mr Oscar Slater spent almost two decades in prison, having 
been mistakenly identified by fourteen witnesses, before his conviction was 
quashed in 1928. A Committee of Inquiry set up following the Beck 
miscarriage concluded that identifications based on subjective personal 
impressions were inherently unreliable ((1904) Cd 2315). This view was 
endorsed by the Criminal Law Revision Committee in its Eleventh Report 
((1972) Cmnd 4991, p. 116) which stated that `the greatest cause of actual 
or possible wrongful convictions' was mistaken visual-identification 
evidence. There are a number of reasons why this is so. 
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First, the physical and psychological condition of the witness, as a 
fallible human being, militates against an accurate identification. To 
identify a suspect or the accused by sight as the same person seen on a 
previous occasion is, after all, no more than the witness's personal opinion 
based on his subjective perception of apparent similarities between two 
images on his retina. The reliability of the witness's opinion depends 
entirely on the reliability of the visible features of the first image which 
were actually seen and mentally recorded by him (which in turn depends 
on the extent to which he was paying attention, his physical and 
psychological powers of perception at that time and his memory) together 
with the reliability of his comparison of the stored image with the visible 
features of the second image. 
Identifying witnesses may focus on broad impressions or features which 
stimulate their own subjective preferences rather than on the multitude of 
specific physical details, so markedly different facial characteristics 
between the offender and the accused may go unnoticed while vague 
similarities may be given undue weight. The problem becomes even more 
acute when the identifying witness and the identified person (the offender) 
are from different racial groups or generations. Another problem, which 
may arise in a case of purported recognition, is that of `unconscious 
transference' where the witness confuses the offender with a different 
person seen in some other context. Conversely, if the witness claims never 
to have seen the offender before, the reliability of his identification is likely 
to decrease with time as his memory fades. 
Second, the eye-witness may be honestly mistaken but sincerely 
convinced that his identification is correct. In R v. Fergus (1993) 98 Cr 
App R 313 (CA), for example, the sole prosecution witness was said to 
have felt an `invincible conviction in the correctness of his identification' 
of the accused even though the witness had poor eyesight, did not take 
much notice of the offender's face and first described the offender as 5' 11'' 
tall with a light complexion and stubble, when the accused was 5' 7'' tall, 
dark-skinned and had not yet started shaving. 
The conventional forensic tool for revealing weaknesses in testimony is 
cross-examination, but where visual-identification evidence is concerned 
this tool may be singularly ineffective and, ironically, may indirectly 
buttress the witness's testimony. In other words, a mistaken witness may 
become more convinced that he is right, and therefore appear even more 
convincing to the jury, the more his identification evidence is challenged 
(as indeed happened when Adolf Beck was tried). Alternatively, the 
witness may convince himself of the accuracy of his identification the more 
he thinks about it, or the more he discusses it with other individuals, 
particularly if those individuals also claim to have seen what happened 
and the witness is suggestible. The witness's memory may be distorted not 
only by the passage of time but by his having rehearsed the matter in his 
own mind, or in response to questions, or by his having been 
subconsciously influenced by the suggestions of other individuals. 
Marcus Stone (Proof of Fact in Criminal Trials (1984), pp. 76±7) notes 
that errors in the witness's identification may become `frozen' the more he 
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recalls the incident he observed, with the witness recalling what he 
previously said or thought (rather than what he actually saw), becoming 
more confident about the accuracy of his identification on each 
subsequent occasion. Other factors include the tendency for evidence to 
become `coherent, consistent and integrated over a period, so that doubts 
and gaps are eliminated and it becomes streamlined', and the witness's 
anxiety about the consequences of his being inconsistent. An example is 
provided by R v. Johnson [2001] 1 Cr App R 408, where the eye-witness's 
perception of the accuracy of her observation on 5 January varied from 
`I don't think I would know him again' in her first statement to the police 
on the same date, to `I'm not quite sure' at the identification parade on 
2 March (when she picked out the accused), to `I am quite certain that the 
man I picked out was the man I saw on January 5' in her statement of 
6 March and `I recognise the defendant Johnson as the driver . . . I stared 
at the driver and he stared back at me' in her deposition of 29 March. The 
Court of Appeal noted that it is `common experience that a witness who is 
perfectly honest can become more positive in their identification as time 
passes, when it is well-known that identification becomes more difficult 
after a lapse of time'. 
Third, the circumstances and duration of the observation may adversely 
affect the reliability of the eye-witness's evidence. In addition to the 
problems associated with the witness's own physical and psychological 
ability (and willingness) to perceive, remember and compare, features may 
go unnoticed at the time of the identification because of extraneous factors 
such as movement, poor lighting, the distance involved and obstructions 
along the line of sight. A visual identification made over a lengthy period 
of time in conditions of good visibility is less likely to be unreliable but, 
even then, the possibility of mistake cannot always be discounted. It 
should be remembered that John Smith was seen at close quarters by all 
the women he defrauded, and yet sixteen of them were able to misidentify 
Adolf Beck as the offender. 
The accused's advocate will of course focus on the circumstances of any 
visual identification to show that they were not conducive to accurate 
observation, but lay triers of fact will not necessarily be able to translate 
court-room descriptions into an accurate picture of the real circum-
stances. The problem can be overcome to some extent by having the jury 
visit the site as, for example, in R v. Sawoniuk [2000] 2 Cr App R 220 
(CA), a recognition case where the court visited the scene of a wartime 
massacre of Jewish women in eastern Europe, but it will only rarely be 
possible to recreate the exact circumstances of the witness's observation, 
particularly as the description of the circumstances may depend on 
nothing more than the eye-witness's own recollection. Unless the 
circumstances were so poor as to make any purported identification 
patently absurd, there is always a risk that the jury or magistrates will 
instead rely on the demeanour and apparent self-confidence of the witness 
standing before them to determine whether his identification was 
accurate; but, as explained above, the witness's self-confidence may be 
no more than honest self-delusion. The Supreme Court of Victoria 
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summarised the problems associated with visual-identification evidence in 
R v. Dickson [1983] 1 VR 227 (at p. 231): 
`Jurors, who . . . have not given thought to the way in which evidence of 
visual identification depends on the witness receiving, recording and 
recalling accurately a fairly subjective impression on the mind, are 
unlikely to be aware of the extent of the risk that honest and convincing 
witnesses may be mistaken, especially where their opportunities for 
observing a previously unknown offender were limited.' 
In the mid-1970s further miscarriages of justice based on visual-
identification evidence came to light, resulting in the formation of the 
Devlin Committee and its subsequent report on identification evidence in 
criminal trials ((1976) HC 338). The Devlin Report recommended that in 
all cases where the prosecution had to rely wholly or mainly on disputed 
visual-identification evidence the jury should be warned of its hazardous 
nature. Another recommendation was that convictions based on such 
evidence should be permissible only if the identification was supported by 
additional evidence, unless there were `exceptional circumstances' to 
justify a conviction without supporting evidence, for example where the 
identification evidence comprised a recognition by someone who knew the 
accused well, or the accused admitted that he had been one of a small 
group at the scene of the offence and the prosecution could prove one of 
that group had committed the offence. The Devlin Committee gave as 
examples of additional evidence an identification by the witness of a 
distinctive feature on the offender or an inference drawn from the accused 
himself, and envisaged the introduction of legislation to implement its 
recommendations. However, within a few months of the Committee's 
findings being published Parliament was pre-empted by the Court of 
Appeal in R v. Turnbull [1976] 3 WLR 445. Cynics might suggest that the 
speed with which the Court of Appeal acted demonstrated its fear of 
Devlin-inspired legislation and its desire to introduce a watered-down 
version in its place. 
11.1.1 The Turnbull Guidelines 
The judgment of the five-member Court of Appeal in R v. Turnbull [1976] 
3 WLR 445 (at pp. 447±9) represents one of the landmark decisions in the 
law of evidence. Lord Widgery CJ, giving the Court's judgment, suggested 
the following guidelines to prevent miscarriages of justice caused by 
unreliable visual-identification evidence: 
`Firstly, whenever the case against an accused depends wholly or 
substantially on the correctness of one or more identifications of the 
accused which the defence alleges to be mistaken, the judge should warn 
the jury of the special need for caution before convicting the accused in 
reliance on the correctness of the identification or identifications. In 
addition he should instruct them as to the reason for the need for such a 
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warning and should make some reference to the possibility that a 
mistaken witness can be a convincing one and that a number of such 
witnesses can all be mistaken. Provided this is done in clear terms the 
judge need not use any particular form of words. 
Secondly, the judge should direct the jury to examine closely the 
circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be 
made. How long did the witness have the accused under observation? 
At what distance? In what light? Was the observation impeded in any 
way, as for example by passing traffic or a press of people? Had the 
witness ever seen the accused before? How often? If only occasionally, 
had he any special reason for remembering the accused? How long 
elapsed between the original observation and the subsequent identifica-
tion to the police? Was there any material discrepancy between the 
description of the accused given to the police by the witness when first 
seen by them and his actual appearance? If in any case, whether it is 
being dealt with summarily or on indictment, the prosecution have 
reason to believe that there is such a material discrepancy they should 
supply the accused or his legal advisers with the particulars of the 
description the police were first given. In all cases if the accused asks to 
be given particulars of such descriptions, the prosecution should supply 
them. Finally, he should remind the jury of any specific weaknesses 
which had appeared in the identification evidence. 
Recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger; 
but even when the witness is purporting to recognise someone whom he 
knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in recognition of 
close relatives and friends are sometimes made. 
All these matters go to the quality of the identification evidence. If 
the quality is good and remains good at the close of the accused's case, 
the danger of mistaken identification is lessened; but the poorer the 
quality the greater the danger. 
In our judgment when the quality is good, as for example when the 
identification is made after a long period of observation, or in 
satisfactory conditions by a relative, a neighbour, a close friend, a 
workmate and the like, the jury can safely be left to assess the value of 
the identifying evidence even though there is no other evidence to 
support it: provided always, however, that an adequate warning has 
been given about the special need for caution . . . 
When, in the judgment of the trial judge, the quality of the identifying 
evidence is poor, as for example when it depends solely on a fleeting 
glance or on a longer observation made in difficult conditions, the 
situation is very different. The judge should then withdraw the case 
from the jury and direct an acquittal unless there is other evidence 
which goes to support the correctness of the identification . . . The trial 
judge should identify to the jury the evidence which he adjudges is 
capable of supporting the evidence of identification . . . 
A failure to follow these guidelines is likely to result in a conviction 
being quashed and will do so if in the judgment of this court on all the 
evidence the verdict is . . . unsafe.' 
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The Court of Appeal departed from the Devlin recommendation that 
visual-identification evidence, upon which the prosecution were heavily 
dependent, should in all but exceptional circumstances be supported by 
other evidence, holding instead that a case would need to be withdrawn 
from the tribunal of fact only if the sole evidence against the accused 
comprised an unsupported poor-quality identification. The reason given 
for imposing a less onerous burden on the prosecution was to ensure that 
an offender could still be convicted on the basis of one eye-witness's good-
quality identification evidence. The Turnbull guidelines therefore represent 
the judiciary's age-old attempt to reconcile two competing principles ± the 
need on the one hand to admit evidence to ensure that the guilty are 
convicted (the principle of free proof); and the competing principle that 
unduly prejudicial evidence ought to be excluded to ensure that the 
innocent are acquitted. 
The view of the Devlin Committee was that visual-identification 
evidence is, as a general rule, so unreliable and prejudicial that it should 
form the substance of the prosecution's case only in exceptional 
circumstances. The Court of Appeal in R v. Turnbull decided instead that 
evidence of this sort is to be regarded as unduly prejudicial only if it is of 
`poor quality'. The Court's wider test is a significant improvement over its 
previous approach (in R v. Long (1973) 57 Cr App R 871 (CA)) but it is 
debatable whether the guidelines go far enough to prevent the innocent 
from being convicted following a misidentification. The quality of visual-
identification evidence has been defined in terms of duration, lighting, 
distance and so on, but the most notorious miscarriages occurred 
notwithstanding such `good-quality' evidence. Extraneous circumstances 
are of course relevant, but the inherent unreliability of visual-identification 
evidence stems from the fallibilities of the human mind. Trial judges have 
been given no guidance on whether or how this problem ought to be 
explained to the jury, although it has been recognised that one weakness 
which ought to be drawn to their attention is the extent to which the eye-
witness was distracted at the time of the identification (R v. Langley [2000] 
All ER (D) 55 (99/2017/Z5) (CA)). 
The problems associated with visual-identification evidence and `similar 
fact evidence' are not dissimilar. Evidence of the accused's extraneous 
misconduct is generally inadmissible because its probative value in most 
cases is outweighed by the unduly prejudicial effect its admission would 
have on the accused and his defence (3.3 ante). Jurors and magistrates are 
thought to be unable to separate the probative wheat from the prejudicial 
chaff, so such evidence is admissible only exceptionally. Similarly, jurors 
and magistrates cannot be expected to ascertain the true probative value 
of visual-identification evidence because of its latent unreliability. There is 
a real risk that they will assume it to be of high probative value, even when 
it is unreliable, thereby prejudicing the accused's right to a fair trial. If this 
analogy is accepted then the appropriate test for the admissibility of 
visual-identification evidence should be similar to that proposed by the 
Devlin Committee: in cases where a visual identification comprises an 
important element of the prosecution case, the presumption of inherent 
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unreliability would justify exclusion unless it could be rebutted by 
additional evidence supporting the identification or by the exceptional 
circumstances of the identification. A test along these lines is unlikely to be 
introduced, however, because numerous offenders would go unpunished. 
The Turnbull guidelines are the product of a cost-benefit analysis aimed at 
minimising (as opposed to eliminating) wrongful convictions while 
ensuring that the guilty are brought to account. In fact within a year of 
R v. Turnbull the Court of Appeal stated that its guidelines were `intended 
primarily to deal with the ghastly risk run in cases of fleeting encounters' 
(R v. Oakwell [1978] 1 WLR 32). The `fleeting glance' cases have been 
targeted for the obvious reason that the possibility of a wrongful 
conviction in such circumstances is very high. On the other hand the 
type of misidentification which led to Adolf Beck's convictions is regarded 
as highly improbable (see, for example, R v. Ryan [1990] Crim LR 50 
(CA)). This improbability is considered to be incapable of justifying a 
change in the law which would seriously affect the ability of the criminal 
justice system to convict offenders. In the final analysis this is a utilitarian 
approach which accepts the occasional misidentification and wrongful 
conviction as the price society has to pay to guarantee its safety. This is 
perhaps why the Court of Appeal in R v. Constantinou (1989) 91 Cr App R 
74 held that a photo-fit picture compiled from eye-witness descriptions of 
the offender, and admissible as real evidence at the accused's trial, did not 
warrant a Turnbull direction even though it clearly represented a form of 
visual-identification evidence. 
In R v. Forbes [2001] 2 WLR 1 the House of Lords recognised that the 
Court of Appeal as constituted in R v. Turnbull [1976] 3 WLR 445 was `of 
exceptional strength'; and the Privy Council has approved the Turnbull 
guidelines on a number of occasions, holding that a failure to give a 
Turnbull direction where the prosecution case has depended wholly or 
substantially on visual-identification evidence will in all but exceptional 
circumstances result in the conviction being quashed (see, for example, 
Reid v. R [1989] 3 WLR 771 and Beckford v. R (1993) 97 Cr App R 409; 
see also Domican v. R (1992) 173 CLR 555 (HCA)). Exceptional 
circumstances were found in Freemantle v. R [1994] 1 WLR 1437 (PC) 
and Shand v. R [1996] 1 WLR 67 (PC), though it is to be noted that in each 
case the jury had been entitled to find supporting evidence in the 
inculpatory words attributed to the accused. In Freemantle v. R the 
offender was recognised as the accused by two prosecution witnesses in 
bright moonlight, from less than 50 feet away and for between one and 
two minutes. Moreover, the offender's reaction when the accused's name 
was shouted out allowed an inference to be drawn that he had 
acknowledged the recognition to be correct (9.2.1 ante). The Privy 
Council considered the identification evidence to be `exceptionally good' 
and upheld the conviction, despite the judge's failure to give a Turnbull 
direction, as the jury would inevitably have convicted even if the direction 
had been given. In Shand v. R two eye-witnesses recognised the accused in 
daylight from four and 30 feet away respectively and, though the Privy 
Council felt a Turnbull direction should have been given, the conviction 
Safeguards Against Unreliability and Error 317 
was upheld. There was nothing to suggest that the witnesses had 
mistakenly identified the accused, and there was evidence before the jury 
that he had subsequently confessed his guilt. 
The Turnbull direction is also necessary in cases where the identification 
evidence is a disputed recognition (R v. Bowden [1993] Crim LR 379 (CA), 
R v. Rodrigues [2001] EWCA Crim 444). However, because of the higher 
likelihood that recognition evidence is reliable, it was accepted in Beckford 
v. R (1993) 97 Cr App R 409 (PC) that there could be `very rare' 
exceptions to this general rule. This is not surprising. In certain 
circumstances, where the possibility of mistake can be entirely discounted, 
the accused who disputes recognition evidence will be questioning nothing 
other than the witness's veracity. A Turnbull direction in such cases would 
be meaningless. Thus, although a direction of some sort is nearly always 
required, even in recognition cases, it should be tailored according to the 
facts of the case to prevent the jury being given unnecessary or irrelevant 
advice. As noted in R v. Bentley (1991) 99 Cr App R 342 (CA) (at p. 344): 
`[Visual identification] cases . . . may vary from one extreme to another: 
from the fleeting sight of a stranger in a moving car in indifferent light 
on the one hand to the purported recognition of a familiar face which 
has taken place over a considerable period of time in perfectly good 
conditions of lighting and so on. The former will obviously require the 
full Turnbull direction. It contains all the classic identification pitfalls to 
which the human witness is susceptible. But, if the judge were to give 
that full Turnbull direction in the latter type of case, the jury would 
rightly wonder whether he, the judge, has taken leave of his senses, 
because most of the Turnbull direction would in those circumstances be 
quite unnecessary.' 
In R v. Taal [2002] EWCA Crim 1953 the Court of Appeal reaffirmed 
that the judge should explain the dangers associated with recognition 
evidence but, noting that the judge was entitled to bring to the jury's 
attention that a recognition might be more reliable than an identification 
of a stranger, concluded that a failure to do so would not affect the safety 
of the conviction if the evidence was presented in a neutral way. 
Ultimately, the form and content of the summing-up in any case involving 
a visual-identification depends on the circumstances of the case (R v. 
Qadir [1998] Crim LR 828 (CA), R v. Beckles [1999] Crim LR 148 (CA)). 
11.1.1.1 Turnbull and the Defence of `Frame-up' 
If the circumstances of a witness's recognition are such as to dispel any 
risk of mistake, the accused will have no option but to suggest that the 
witness is lying. In such cases it will not be necessary to give the jury a 
Turnbull direction. In Beckford v. R (1993) 97 Cr App R 409 the Privy 
Council gave the example of a witness conversing for half an hour, face to 
face, with a colleague known to him for 20 years. The only question for the 
jury would be whether to believe the witness, as there could be no question 
of a mistaken identification. In R v. Cape [1996] 1 Cr App R 191 an 
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incident of violent disorder in a public house was witnessed by the 
publican, and the prosecution case relied wholly on his testimony. There 
was no dispute that the publican knew each of the co-accused and that 
they had all been in his pub at the time; the defence case was that he was 
motivated by malice and lying on oath. The Court of Appeal held that as 
the sole issue had been the veracity of the publican, a Turnbull direction 
had been unnecessary (see also R v. Courtnell [1990] Crim LR 115 (CA)). 
That said, where the defence comprises an attack on the eye-witness's 
veracity there will often be the secondary possibility, once the jury have 
accepted his truthfulness, that he could have made an honest mistake. In 
such cases it is necessary to give the Turnbull direction. A good example is 
Beckford v. R (1993) 97 Cr App R 409. The prosecution witness testified 
that from his hiding place by the road he had recognised the accused 
murdering a motorist. The accused sought to counter this by alleging that 
the witness was either a compulsive liar or susceptible to mental 
aberrations because of his past mental illness. The Privy Council held 
that a Turnbull direction should have been given. 
11.1.1.2 Turnbull and Police Officers' Evidence 
A Turnbull direction should be given even if the prosecution eye-witness is 
a police officer (Reid v. R [1989] 3 WLR 771 (PC), R v. Bowden [1993] 
Crim LR 379 (CA)). Police officers are not infallible observers and may, 
like any other witness, make honest mistakes. However they do differ from 
eye-witnesses generally in that their training and experience encourages 
them to be more observant and to focus on detail, and there is no reason 
why this should not be taken into account when assessing the reliability of 
their evidence (see R v. Tyler (1992) 96 Cr App R 332 (CA) at pp. 342±3). 
In R v. Williams (1994) The Times 7.10.94 (CA) a police officer made a 
conscious effort to remember the face of the person he was observing and, 
though he was able to watch the person for only a short while, the 
enhanced reliability of his evidence took it outside the fleeting-glance type 
of case (see also R v. Ramsden [1991] Crim LR 295 (CA)). 
11.1.1.3 Turnbull and Undisputed Presence 
The mere fact that the accused admits his presence along with others at the 
scene of a crime does not obviate the need for a Turnbull direction if he 
denies participating in the offence and the issue is mistaken identification. 
In R v. Thornton [1995] 1 Cr App R 578 several people attacked a man at a 
wedding reception and, though the accused admitted being there, he 
denied any involvement in the offence. The case against him comprised the 
disputed visual-identification evidence of two witnesses, but no Turnbull 
direction was given. The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction as the 
full Turnbull direction ought to have been given, including a reminder to 
the jury that several other people at the reception had been dressed like the 
accused (see also R v. Suleiman [2000] All ER (D) 1840 (CA)). 
In R v. Slater [1995] 1 Cr App R 584 the Court of Appeal stated that 
whether a full Turnbull direction is necessary in cases of undisputed 
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presence depends on all the circumstances and, in particular, on whether 
there was a possibility of one person being mistaken for another. S was a 
man of unusually large size who had allegedly inflicted grievous bodily 
harm on another person in a crowded nightclub. S admitted his presence 
in the nightclub but claimed he had not been involved in the assault. The 
Court of Appeal rejected the argument that a full Turnbull direction ought 
to have been given as S's unusual size and the absence of anyone else of 
similar build in the nightclub precluded the possibility of a mistaken 
identification. The judge had fairly summarised the circumstances of the 
identification and the possibility that the witness's judgment had been 
impaired through drink, and on the facts there had been no need for a 
reference to the possibility of an honest witness being mistaken and 
convincing (see also R v. Oakwell [1978] 1 WLR 32 (CA) and R v. Curry 
[1983] Crim LR 737 (CA)). 
11.1.1.4 Turnbull and the Submission of No Case to Answer 
The tribunal of law is obliged to accede to a submission of no case to 
answer at the end of the prosecution case if the prosecution have relied 
wholly or substantially on disputed visual-identification evidence of poor 
quality and there is no additional evidence supporting the correctness of 
that identification (R v. Turnbull [1976] 3 WLR 445 (CA), R v. Weeder 
(1980) 71 Cr App R 228 (CA)). On the other hand, if the visual-
identification evidence is of good quality the tribunal of fact should be 
allowed to consider it even in the absence of supporting evidence. In 
determining whether the evidence is good or poor it is necessary to 
consider not only the circumstances of the original observation but also 
any subsequent factors, such as breaches of Code D-3 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Codes of Practice (11.1.2 post) which might 
have affected the reliability of the evidence (see R v. Hutton [1999] Crim 
LR 74 (CA)). There has been some reluctance to accept that recognition 
evidence can fall within the category of `poor quality' evidence. In R v. 
Ryan [1990] Crim LR 50 the prosecution case relied entirely on a 
schoolgirl who testified that she had recognised the accused as a man she 
had seen outside her school on two or three previous occasions. The 
accused's submission of no case to answer failed and he was convicted. 
The Court of Appeal, dismissing his appeal, stated that it `was rare for the 
court to feel concern about the rightness of a conviction based on evidence 
of recognition as opposed to that of identification of a stranger'. 
In Daley v. R [1993] 3 WLR 666 the Privy Council sought to reconcile 
the decision in R v. Turnbull [1976] 3 WLR 445 with that of the Court of 
Appeal in R v. Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039, the principal authority on 
submissions of no case to answer (16.7 post). The Galbraith guidelines are 
intended to ensure that the question of a witness's veracity will be left to 
the tribunal of fact. In cases of poor visual-identification evidence, the 
question is not one of veracity but of honest reliability, and the latent 
hazards associated with such evidence justify the judge's wider powers 
under the Turnbull guidelines. 
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11.1.1.5 The `Reverse Turnbull' Direction 
Just as a person may mistakenly identify the accused, a witness may 
mistakenly identify a person other than the accused at an identification 
parade. It seems that so long as the judge sums up fairly, and points out 
the weaknesses in the prosecution case, he is entitled to point out the 
circumstances surrounding the identification parade which could suggest 
to the jury that the witness made a mistake on that occasion (R v. Trew 
[1996] Crim LR 441 (CA)). 
11.1.1.6 Turnbull and Vehicles 
In R v. Browning (1991) 94 Cr App R 109 the Court of Appeal considered 
whether the Turnbull direction had to be given if the disputed visual 
identification related to a car as opposed to a person. Clearly there is a risk 
of misidentification, but different considerations must apply because of 
the important differences between cars and people. There are only so 
many types of car, their structures do not vary in the way human features 
and expressions can, and some people find it far easier than others to 
differentiate between the various models. Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeal held that trial judges ought to give some form of direction on the 
witness's opportunity to identify the car in question, and on his knowledge 
of different types of car and their characteristics, but the Turnbull direction 
itself was said to be unnecessary. 
11.1.1.7 Photographic Evidence 
If there is video or photographic evidence of the offender, the members of 
the tribunal of fact are entitled to act as the identifying witnesses, 
comparing the accused with the photographic image before them (R v. 
Dodson (1984) 79 Cr App R 220 (CA)). The accused is entitled to refuse to 
provide assistance to the tribunal of fact, and it would appear that no 
adverse inference may be drawn from this (R v. McNamara [1996] Crim 
LR 750 (CA)); but his refusal to assist may not prevent a comparison 
being made in practice. It would appear to be necessary for the trial judge 
to explain to the jury that they need to exercise particular care, and that 
there is a possibility of making a mistake, when comparing the accused 
with a photographic image of the offender (R v. Blenkinsop [1995] 1 Cr 
App R 7 (CA); cf. R v. Downey [1995] 1 Cr App R 547 (CA)). A witness 
who knows the accused is entitled to give evidence that he recognised him 
as the offender from a video recording, even though the photographic 
evidence is available and could instead be placed before the jury without 
the witness being called (Attorney-General's Reference (No. 2 of 2002) 
[2003] 1 Cr App R 321 (CA)). 
In R v. Clare [1995] 2 Cr App R 333 the Court of Appeal held that a 
police officer who had studied the video evidence closely and analytically 
had properly been allowed to give an expert opinion on whether the 
recorded images showed the accused, as it would have been impracticable 
for the jury to conduct similar research during the trial (see also R v. 
Breddick (2001) The Independent 21.5.01 (CA)). Further, where a video 
image is alleged to be the accused in disguise, or the accused has changed 
Safeguards Against Unreliability and Error 321 
his appearance since the commission of the offence, the expertise of a 
facial-mapping specialist may be called upon to provide the tribunal of 
fact with information and assistance (R v. Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 
260 (CA), R v. Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 (CA)). Indeed it has been 
held that the evidence of such an expert may be sufficient to justify a 
conviction even in the absence of any other evidence of the accused's guilt 
(see R v. Hookway [1999] Crim LR 750 (CA)). 
11.1.1.8 Supporting Evidence 
Supporting evidence must identify the accused as the offender and not 
merely show that an offence has been committed or demonstrate the 
identifying witness's honesty (which will rarely be in issue). In R v. 
Turnbull [1976] 3 WLR 445 the Court of Appeal gave some examples of 
what might amount to such evidence: (i) the accused's false alibi (11.6 
post), (ii) unexplained `odd coincidences' and (iii) the fact the offender was 
seen to run into the accused's father's house. It was also said that the 
accused's failure to testify could not amount to supporting evidence, but 
this must now be read in the light of s. 35 of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994. An inference drawn under ss. 34±37 of the 1994 
Act is capable of providing supporting evidence (see Chapter 9). The mere 
fact that the witness testifies that the offender had a particular feature such 
as a spotty face, which the accused shares, will not support his 
identification if there is no independent evidence to show the offender 
actually had that feature and the witness was not mistaken (R v. 
Willoughby (1988) 88 Cr App R 91 (CA)). 
Any sufficiently probative circumstantial evidence identifying the 
accused (such as fibres and fingerprints) will amount to supporting 
evidence. In R v. Sadler [2002] EWCA Crim 1722, for example, the fact 
that the accused's shirt was heavily stained with the blood of the person he 
had allegedly attacked supported that person's identification evidence; 
and in R v. Walters [2001] EWCA Crim 1261 the supporting evidence was 
provided by the accused's access to a car of the same type as that used by 
the murderer, and his telephonic communications with the hostel which 
the murderer had visited just before the victim was stabbed. The accused's 
confession will support a visual identification (Freemantle v. R [1994] 1 
WLR 1437 (PC), Shand v. R [1996] 1 WLR 67 (PC)); and an identification 
by one witness may be supported by another witness's identification, so 
long as the judge emphasises to the jury that even several honest witnesses 
can be mistaken (R v. Weeder (1980) 71 Cr App R 228 (CA)). In R v. 
George [2002] EWCA Crim 1923 identification evidence of the accused as 
the person who shot and murdered a television personality was supported 
by other witnesses' description evidence and qualified identifications 
(11.1.4 post) together with circumstantial evidence comprising, inter alia, 
the accused's fascination with celebrities, his familiarity with firearms, a 
particle of firearm discharge residue found in his coat, and his admitted 
presence in the vicinity at the time the murder was committed. 
Although the Turnbull guidelines include a requirement that the judge 
should identify to the jury the evidence which he adjudges is capable of 
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supporting the evidence of identification, a conviction will not be regarded 
as unsafe if this was not done if an express reference to the supporting 
evidence would have strengthened the prosecution case (R v. Barratt 
(2000) unreported (00/3718/Z5) (CA)). 
11.1.1.9 Circumstantial Description Evidence 
No Turnbull direction is required if the evidence is not an identification of 
a particular person's facial features, but a description of the type of person 
seen and the clothes worn by him. In a case of this sort the witness would 
be unable to identify the offender again at an identification parade, but his 
description, when taken together with other evidence identifying the 
accused, might allow the tribunal of fact to infer that the person described 
was the accused. An example is provided by R v. Gayle [1999] 2 Cr App R 
130 (CA). A handbag was stolen from a school during the afternoon, and 
the caretaker described a stranger he had seen on the premises at about 
3 p.m. as a stocky black man, wearing a black bomber jacket bearing the 
logo `Kangol' on the back, and walking towards a nearby public house. 
The accused, a black man, was subsequently seen by a cook at the public 
house to be acting suspiciously by the dustbins where the handbag was 
later found. His top was described as a black nylon jacket with a brightly 
coloured K on the back. The accused admitted that he was the person by 
the dustbins, but denied any involvement in the theft. He claimed that he 
had gone to the dustbins to urinate, had found the handbag and then 
disposed of it to avoid any trouble. As the caretaker had not purported to 
identify the accused, a Turnbull direction was unnecessary. The caretaker 
had done no more than provide a general description of the stranger he 
had seen on the premises and where he had been heading. This evidence 
made it more likely that the accused, who matched the description, was the 
burglar, but it was not evidence which had to be approached with any 
particular caution. As the caretaker was an independent witness who was 
either telling the truth or fabricating his testimony for no obvious reason, 
no special warning or direction was required (see also R v. Oscar [1991] 
Crim LR 778 (CA), R v. Nicholson [2000] 1 Cr App R 182 (CA) and R v. 
Doldur [2000] Crim LR 178 (CA)). 
A different type of description evidence was considered in R v. White 
[2000] All ER (D) 602 (99/06964/Z2). The eye-witness recognised a youth 
(L) who was well known to her, with another youth who appeared to be his 
friend but whose identity she did not know. She saw the unknown youth 
attack the victim and was able to describe him. The unknown youth 
(allegedly the accused) admitted that he may have been at the scene with L, 
but denied any involvement in the attack. The Court of Appeal held that no 
Turnbull direction had been necessary in respect of the witness's recognition 
of L, as the defence had not challenged the evidence that he had been 
present (see also R v. Bath [1990] Crim LR 716 (CA)). Further, the witness's 
description of the offender, and her evidence that he was associated with L, 
was not relied on as identification evidence. It was circumstantial evidence 
which allowed the jury to infer that the accused was indeed the offender, 
supporting the visual-identification evidence of other witnesses. 
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11.1.1.10 Dock Identifications 
It will usually be highly prejudicial for an accused to be identified by a 
witness for the first time while in the dock because of the real risk that he is 
being identified simply for being in that position. Accordingly a so-called 
`dock identification' is not normally permissible (R v. Cartwright (1914) 10 
Cr App R 219 (CCA), R v. Johnson [2001] 1 Cr App R 408 (CA), R v. 
Conibeer [2002] EWCA Crim 2059). In other words, while evidence of this 
sort is technically admissible, in most cases it will be excluded on the 
ground that its unduly prejudicial effect outweighs its limited probative 
value (R v. Horsham Justices, ex parte Bukhari (1981) 74 Cr App R 291 
(DC)). Generally a controlled identification should take place prior to the 
trial, in accordance with Code D-3 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 Codes of Practice (11.1.2 post) and only if this has been done 
should the witness be permitted to identify the accused in the dock. 
A dock identification is exceptionally permissible in the Crown Court if 
it would not unduly prejudice the accused, such as where the accused is 
well known to the witness and the earlier out-of-court observation was a 
recognition as opposed to an identification of a stranger (R v. Reid [1994] 
Crim LR 442 (CA)). Dock identifications are also permissible in summary 
proceedings, at least in cases where the accused has failed to notify the 
prosecution prior to the trial that identification is in issue (Barnes v. Chief 
Constable of Durham [1997] 2 Cr App R 505 (DC), Karia v. DPP (2002) 
166 JP 753 (QBD)). 
11.1.2 Code D-3 of the PACE Codes of Practice 
The provisions of Code D-3 (formerly Code D-2) of the Codes of Practice 
issued pursuant to s. 66 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(`PACE') complement the Turnbull direction by providing additional 
safeguards designed to ensure that any visual-identification evidence used 
by the prosecution is reliable. The purpose of Code D-3 and its Annexes is 
to ensure that identification evidence is obtained in a controlled 
environment, avoiding practices which might corrupt or devalue the 
evidence. The various procedures set out in the Code have been designed 
to test the ability of the witness to identify the person they saw on a 
previous occasion and to provide safeguards against mistaken identifica-
tion (D-1.2). 
The current version of Code D, which took effect on 1 April 2003, 
provides for the routine use of video identification parades to overcome 
the delays and abuses associated with traditional live identification 
parades (as, for example, in R v. Perry (2000) The Times 28.4.00 (CA), 
Perry v. United Kingdom (2002) Application No. 63737/00 (ECtHR), 
where the accused failed to attend identification parades over a period of 
several months). Code D-3.14 provides that a video identification parade 
will normally be more suitable than a live identification parade if it can be 
arranged and completed sooner; but this does not mean that expediency 
has overridden all other considerations. It is evidently in the interests of 
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justice that an identification procedure should be held as soon as possible 
after the event which the witness observed, while matters are still fresh in 
his mind and any suspect appears much as he did at that time. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that video parades are actually 
a more effective mechanism for testing a witness's identification than live 
parades, as well as being less prejudicial for suspects and less stressful for 
witnesses (Roberts and Clover, `The Government's Consultation Draft on 
PACE±Code D' [2002] Crim LR 873 at pp. 884±5; Tinsley, `The Case for 
Reform of Identification Procedures' (2001) 5 E & P 99). 
Code D-3 is divided into three principal parts: `(a) Cases when the 
suspect's identity is not known' (D-3.2 and D-3.3); `(b) Cases when the 
suspect is known and available' (D-3.4 to D-3.20); and `(c) Cases when the 
suspect is known but not available' (D-3.21 to D-3.24). In all cases the 
police are under a duty to record the description of the offender as first 
given by the eye-witness; and, where a suspect is known, and it is 
practicable to do so, to provide a copy of the description to the suspect or 
his solicitor before the witness's participation in an identification 
procedure under part (b) or part (c) (D-3.1). However, it is not necessary 
that the first description should set out the witness's opportunity to see the 
offender, such as the angle at which he saw the offender's face or the 
distance between them (R v. Nolan [2002] EWCA Crim 464). 
Three alternative identification procedures are described in part (b) for 
the situation where the suspect's identity is known to the police and he is 
available. A suspect is `known' if there is sufficient information to justify 
his arrest for suspected involvement in the offence; he is `available' if he is 
(or soon will be) available to take part in one of the identification 
procedures and he is willing to participate (D-3.4). The witness must not 
be shown photographs, computerised or artist's composite likenesses or 
similar likenesses or pictures prior to the identification procedure (D-3.3). 
The three identification procedures are: first, the video identification 
parade, where the witness is shown moving images of the known suspect 
together with similar images of other people who resemble him (D-3.5, 
D-3.6 and Annex A); second, the live identification parade, where the 
witness sees the suspect in a line of other people who resemble him (D-3.7, 
D-3.8 and Annex B); and, third, the group identification, where the 
witness sees the suspect in an informal group of people (D-3.9, D-3.10 and 
Annex C), for example where the suspect is observed travelling on a public 
escalator with unsuspecting members of the public. (A fourth, less-
desirable option is available under part (c), where the suspect is directly 
confronted by the witness.) The identification procedure must be arranged 
and conducted by an officer or member of the civilian support staff who is 
not involved in the investigation of the offence (D-3.11 and D-3.19). 
If the suspect disputes an identification made (or purported to have 
been made) by an available witness, and it is practicable to hold an 
identification procedure, such a procedure must be held unless `it would 
serve no useful purpose in proving or disproving whether the suspect was 
involved in committing the offence' ± for example, where `it is not disputed 
that the suspect is already well known to the witness' ± or there is no 
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reasonable chance that the witness would be able to identify the suspect 
(D-3.12). In other cases, an identification procedure may be held if the 
officer in charge of the investigation considers that it would be useful 
(D-3.13). The D-3.12 requirement to hold an identification procedure also 
applies if a dispute as to identity is not expressly raised by the suspect but 
may reasonably be anticipated (R v. Rutherford (1993) 98 Cr App R 191 
(CA), R v. Harris [2003] EWCA Crim 174). A `no comment' interview 
does not give rise to the reasonable anticipation that identity is in dispute 
(R v. McCartney [2003] EWCA Crim 1372). 
The exception in D-3.12 for cases where the suspect is `already well 
known to the witness' requires something more than mere recognition. In 
R v. Harris [2003] EWCA Crim 174 two 16-year-old boys were robbed by 
a group of youths, one of whom was purportedly identified by the boys as 
a youth (`T') who had previously been a student at their school. The police 
did not hold an identification procedure on the basis that it was a case of 
recognition, but this was held to be a breach of (what is now) D-3.12. The 
suspect (T) had disputed the claim that he was well known to the boys 
and, in any event, they had not seen him for about two years, a significant 
period of time for a developing teenager, so it was quite possible that one 
or both of the boys might not have picked him out if an identification 
procedure had been held. By way of contrast, in Hawksley v. DPP [2002] 
EWHC 852 Admin (QBD) it was held that an identification procedure had 
not been necessary as the witness, a police officer, had known the suspect 
for more than three years and had seen him with reasonable regularity 
around his housing estate. Similarly, in H v. DPP [2003] EWHC 133 
Admin (QBD) there was no need for an identification procedure because 
the witness had known the suspect for 18 months and the assault had 
lasted for seven minutes. 
Needless to say, where the issue is not one of mistaken identification it is 
unnecessary to comply with Code D-3. In R v. Oscar [1991] Crim LR 778 
(CA) a witness was able to describe an individual offender by the 
distinctive clothes he was wearing and a man fitting that description was 
arrested near the scene of the offence. Because the witness had not 
purported to identify any individual person an identification parade would 
have served no useful purpose and had therefore been unnecessary (for 
other examples see R v. Montgomery [1996] Crim LR 507 (CA), D v. DPP 
(1998) The Times 7.8.98 (DC), R v. Gayle [1999] 2 Cr App R 130 (CA), R 
v. Nicholson [2000] 1 Cr App R 182 (CA) and R v. White [2000] All ER (D) 
602 (CA)). Nor is an identification procedure necessary if there was 
continuity of vision, that is to say, if the witness continuously observed the 
same individual from the moment he committed the offence to the time 
when he was apprehended by the police (R v. Akinyemi [2001] EWCA 
Crim 1948). In R v. Byron (1999) The Times 10.3.99 (CA) it was held that 
evidence of a `factually descriptive nature' was not necessarily identifica-
tion evidence, so the fact that the prosecution had been unable to adduce 
identification evidence, because of a breach of Code D, did not mean they 
should also have been prevented from adducing evidence that a large 
tattoo had been seen on the assailant's upper left arm. 
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In cases where it is necessary or desirable to hold an identification 
procedure, the identification officer should consult the officer in charge of 
the investigation to determine which procedure should be used. There is 
now a presumption that the suspect will initially be offered a video 
identification or, if that would not be practicable, a live identification 
parade (D-3.11 and D-3.14), but a group identification may be offered if 
the officer in charge of the investigation considers that it would be the 
most satisfactory procedure in the circumstances (D-3.16). In any event, if 
there is to be an identification procedure it must be held `as soon as 
practicable' (D-3.11). A suspect who refuses the identification procedure 
which is first offered may himself, or through his solicitor or appropriate 
adult, make representations as to why another procedure should be used, 
and an alternative procedure may be provided if it would be suitable and 
practicable (D-3.15). As a general rule the suspect must be told, in advance 
of the identification procedure, the information enumerated in D-3.17, 
including the fact that a refusal to consent in an identification procedure 
may be given in evidence ± see R v. Doyle [2001] EWCA Crim 2883 (9.2.1 
ante) ± and that, if he refuses to consent, the police may in any event 
conduct a covert procedure or `make other arrangements' to test whether a 
witness can identify him (that is, an arrangement under D-3.21). As a 
general rule the suspect must also be told that if he significantly alters his 
appearance before the identification procedure this may be given in 
evidence and, again, another arrangement may be considered. Under 
D-3.20, it is permissible in certain circumstances for the police to obtain an 
image of the suspect without complying with D-3.17. (Section 64A of 
PACE entitles the police to take photographs of suspects, in accordance 
with Code D-5, for, inter alia, the investigation of offences and the 
conduct of prosecutions, whether or not the suspect consents.) 
Part (c) of Code D-3, which covers cases where the suspect is known but 
not (or no longer) available, such as where the suspect has deliberately 
failed to turn up for a live parade or has taken steps to prevent himself 
from being seen by a witness during such a parade, allows the police to 
proceed with an identification procedure in accordance with Annex A 
using moving or still images, including images of the suspect which have 
been obtained covertly, or a group identification in accordance with 
Annex C (D-3.21 and D-3.22). A non-forceful `confrontation' may be 
arranged if no other alternative is practicable (D-3.23 and Annex D). 
Part (a) of Code D-3 covers cases when the suspect's identity is not 
known. The procedures set out in these paragraphs are intended to cover 
two broad types of situation. The first (covered by D-3.2) is where an 
unknown person has been seen participating in an offence ± for example, 
an attack outside a night club ± and he may still be in the immediate 
vicinity. The witness will be taken round the neighbourhood, or to the 
place where a group of possible suspects is milling, to see whether he can 
informally identify any individual as the offender. Insofar as it is 
practicable, the principles applicable to formal identification procedures 
under Code D-3.5 to D-3.10 should be followed. In particular: a record 
should be made of any initial description given by the witness; care should 
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be taken not to direct the witness's attention to any individual unless this 
cannot be avoided; every effort should be made to keep witnesses apart; 
and once there is sufficient information to justify the arrest of a particular 
individual for suspected involvement in the offence (for example, where 
one witness has made a positive identification) a formal identification 
procedure should be adopted for any other witnesses. The officer (or 
member of the civilian support staff) accompanying the witness must 
make a record in his pocket book of what is said and done. There is no 
breach of D-3.2 where a suspect willingly returns with the police to the site 
of the criminal activity and is in effect confronted by a witness before an 
orderly identification process can be arranged (R v. O'Brien [2003] EWCA 
Crim 1370). The second type of situation (covered by D-3.3 and Annex E) 
is where the witness has seen an unknown person participate in an offence 
and may be able to identify him from photographs, computerised or 
artist's composite likenesses or similar likenesses or pictures the police 
have in their possession. A situation involving the showing of 
photographs, but not covered by D-3.3, arose in R v. Folan [2003] EWCA 
Crim 908. In that case, the remains of the accused's wife were discovered 
in a shallow grave on a building site 17 years after her disappearance in 
1981. There was already a body of circumstantial evidence suggesting that 
the accused had murdered his wife and, following the discovery of her 
remains, the police took steps to determine whether he had been working 
on the building site in 1981, which included showing a photograph of the 
accused from that period to persons involved with the construction 
company renovating the site at that time. Although (what are now) D-3.3 
and Annex E did not apply, as the suspect's identity was known, the Court 
of Appeal was of the view that the procedures set out in the Annex should 
nonetheless have been followed as they provided valuable guidance. 
The latest version of Code D has not addressed the problems which 
arose in R v. Willoughby [1999] 2 Cr App R 82, where one witness 
identified the suspect soon after the identification parade had ended and 
another altered her position from one of uncertainty to one of certainty 
that the man she had picked out was the offender. Although para. 20 of 
Annex B provides that, where a witness identifies the suspect after the 
parade has ended, the suspect and (if present) his solicitor should be 
informed, and that consideration should be given to allowing the witness a 
second opportunity to identify the suspect, there is no guidance as to when 
the suspect or his solicitor should be informed or what should be done if a 
witness's enhanced view as to the correctness of the identification follows 
information from another source that it was correct. The Court of Appeal 
provided the following observations. First, if a witness identifies the 
suspect after the parade has ended, or a witness modifies in any significant 
way the identification made on the identification parade, the suspect or his 
solicitor should be informed as soon as practicable. Second, a witness 
should not be told whether the suspect has or has not been picked out until 
that witness has made any further statement he may wish to make. Third, 
`there would be the utmost ground for concern' if the police had nudged, 
prompted or encouraged a witness to make a more positive identification. 
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11.1.3 Breaches of Code D-3 
A breach of any provision in Code D-3 or its five Annexes (A±E) may be 
taken into consideration at the trial (s. 67(11) of PACE), although whether 
the identification evidence will be excluded under s. 78(1) of the Act 
depends on whether the breach would have such an adverse effect on the 
fairness of the proceedings that it ought not to be admitted. The correct 
approach was summarised by the Court of Appeal in R v. Quinn [1995] 1 
Cr App R 480 (at pp. 488±9): 
`The fact that there have been breaches ± even several breaches ± of the 
Code is not conclusive as to whether or not the evidence should be 
admitted. The judge has a task, if there have been breaches, to consider 
whether those breaches, taken either singly or in the aggregate, are such 
as to make it requisite for him, pursuant to section 78, to exclude the 
evidence. He will only do so if he comes to the conclusion ± it is a matter 
for his discretion ± that to admit the evidence would have an adverse 
effect on the fairness of the proceedings . . . Before this Court could 
reach the conclusion that the judge was wrong in that respect, we would 
have to be satisfied that no reasonable judge . . . could have reached the 
conclusion that he did.' 
In R v. Forbes [2001] 2 WLR 1 the House of Lords agreed with the view 
of the Court of Appeal in R v. Popat [1998] 2 Cr App R 208 that non-
compliance with Code D will not inevitably lead to the evidence being 
excluded. Each case will turn on its own facts, but minor breaches are less 
likely to result in unfairness than more substantial breaches (R v. Grannell 
(1989) 90 Cr App R 149 (CA)); and even significant breaches, such as a 
failure to hold a video or identification parade, will not result in a 
successful appeal if no unfairness resulted. In R v. Rutherford (1993) 98 Cr 
App R 191 (CA), for example, the strength of the other evidence 
implicating the accused and the substance of the judge's summing-up 
meant the accused had not suffered any unfairness despite the breach of 
the Code (see also R v. Kelly (1998) 162 JP 231 (CA)). 
In some cases, however, the breach will be sufficiently serious to 
warrant exclusion. In R v. Conway (1990) 91 Cr App R 143 (CA), for 
instance, the only identification procedure had been a `dock identification' 
at the accused's committal proceedings. The failure to hold a formal 
parade was held to be a `clear breach' of the Code, and the evidence 
should have been excluded. That was a case where there had been no 
satisfactory identification procedure at all, but identification evidence may 
be excluded where there has been a formal procedure which was not 
carried out in accordance with the Code or its Annexes. In R v. Gall (1989) 
90 Cr App R 64 an identification parade was held but the investigating 
officer was present in breach of what is now D-3.8 (and para. 7 of Annex 
B) and had therefore been given the opportunity to talk to the witness. The 
Court of Appeal held that the identification evidence should have been 
excluded (see also R v. Finley [1993] Crim LR 50 (CA)). In R v. Nagah 
(1990) 92 Cr App R 344 (CA) the accused consented to an identification 
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parade, which would have been practicable, but as he left the police station 
he was identified by the complainant whom the police had deliberately 
arranged to be there to have a look at him. This `complete flouting of the 
Code' justified the exclusion of the complainant's identification, particu-
larly as she had previously given a description of her assailant which did 
not match the accused. By contrast, in R v. Penny (1991) 94 Cr App R 345 
the police failed to hold an identification parade, through what would 
appear to be inefficiency, opting instead for a group identification in a 
crowded street. The Court of Appeal accepted that even if there had been 
a breach of the Code the trial judge had been entitled to have regard to all 
the circumstances when exercising his discretion under s. 78(1) and, 
though the street identification had been less satisfactory than a parade, 
the police had not acted improperly. Accordingly the evidence had been 
properly admitted. 
Where there has been a breach of Code D and the identification 
evidence is nonetheless admitted, the judge is obliged to explain the nature 
of the breach and invite the jury to consider its possible effect (R v. Forbes 
[2001] 2 WLR 1 (HL)). The jury should also be told that an identification 
procedure enables suspects to put the reliability of an eye-witness's 
identification to the test, that the suspect has lost the benefit of that 
safeguard, and that they should take account of that fact in their 
assessment of the whole case, giving it such weight as they think fit (R v. 
Harris [2003] EWCA Crim 174). If, however, the accused deliberately 
delayed putting identification in issue before the trial, so that the 
difficulties associated with the evidence would be compounded by the 
passage of time, the judge is entitled to add an appropriate comment to his 
`Forbes direction' to reflect what happened (R v. McCartney [2003] EWCA 
Crim 1372). 
11.1.4 Qualified Identification Evidence 
Where a witness is able to describe the offender's general appearance, or 
the clothes he was wearing, but is unable to describe the offender's face, 
the witness's description is admissible circumstantial evidence implicating 
the accused. Conversely, where a witness claims that he observed the 
offender's face, but was unable to pick out the accused at an identification 
procedure, the non-identification is admissible to support the defence's 
contention that a person other than the accused committed the offence (R 
v. Graham [1994] Crim LR 212 (CA)). However, the witness may still give 
oral evidence to describe the offender and, indeed, to explain the 
circumstances of the identification procedure (R v. George [2002] EWCA 
Crim 1923). 
Another situation is where a witness is able to provide a description of 
the offender, but makes only a partial or qualified identification of the 
accused at the identification procedure. For example, the witness may 
state, following a video identification parade, that he `thinks' a particular 
person is the offender but he cannot be 100 per cent sure. In R v. George 
[2002] EWCA Crim 1923, where the accused had grown a volume of facial 
330 Evidence 
hair during the period between the commission of the crime and the 
identification procedure, it was held that, while a conviction cannot be 
based on a qualified identification alone, such evidence may be admissible 
against the accused if it supports or is consistent with other evidence which 
indicates that he committed the offence (such as another witness's positive 
identification) or if the explanation for the qualified (or non-) identifica-
tion places that qualified (or non-) identification in its proper context, for 
example by showing that the witness's other evidence, such as his initial 
description of the offender, might still be correct. 
11.1.5 Police Photographs 
Police photographs (`mug shots') may be used to help a witness identify an 
offender, but it is important that this initial means of identifying the 
accused is not revealed to the jury lest they infer that the accused has a 
criminal record (R v. Lamb (1980) 71 Cr App R 198 (CA)). However, this 
is not an absolute exclusionary rule for in some circumstances it may be 
appropriate to refer to such an identification, so long as the probative 
value of the evidence outweighs its unduly prejudicial effect. One such case 
was R v. Bleakley [1993] Crim LR 203 where the witness, a shopkeeper, 
first identified the accused from a police photograph and subsequently 
picked him out at an identification parade. The defence sought to explain 
why the accused had been picked out by suggesting that the witness had 
seen him when he had visited his shop the day before the parade. The 
prosecution were then permitted to rebut this suggestion by referring to 
the earlier identification. The Court of Appeal held that the judge had 
exercised his discretion properly for if the defence suggestion had not been 
rebutted by the adduction of such evidence the jury would have been 
misled. It is also permissible for a police officer to give evidence that he 
recognised the accused from a closed-circuit television recording of the 
offence being committed, even though the jury may infer that the accused 
has a criminal record (R v. Caldwell (1993) 99 Cr App R 73 (CA)). 
11.2 Voice-identification Evidence 
If there is a relevant audio recording of an individual's voice, the tape may 
be played before the jury (R v. Bentum (1989) 153 JP 538 (CA)). The jury 
will compare a recording of the offender's voice with a proven recording of 
the accused's voice or, where the accused has testified, his voice when 
giving evidence. In R v. Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 (CA) it was held 
that expert opinion evidence is admissible to assist the jury in determining 
whether two recorded voices belong to the same individual. In that case 
the expert's opinion was based solely on a (subjective) auditory phonetic 
analysis of the two recordings, but it is doubtful whether this approach is 
still permissible. It is now accepted that the more reliable approach, in 
most cases at least, is to supplement any auditory analysis with a 
quantitative acoustic analysis (see R v. O'Doherty [2003] 1 Cr App R 77 
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(NICA) and generally Ormerod, `Sounding Out Expert Voice Identifica-
tion' [2002] Crim LR 771). 
In the absence of a recording of the offender's voice, the principal 
question is likely to be whether the witness who heard the offender, and 
who subsequently relied on his memory to identify the accused as that 
person, is correct in his assertion. As with visual-identification evidence, 
however, there is the very real possibility of error on account of the 
circumstances surrounding the witness's initial perception of the offender's 
voice (and the medium through which it was heard), the witness's ability 
to remember the way the offender spoke and, in particular, his ability 
accurately to compare the offender's voice with that of the accused. 
It was recognised by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v. Waipouri 
[1993] 2 NZLR 410 that voice-identification evidence is generally less 
reliable than visual-identification evidence and that even greater caution is 
required when relying on it. In R v. Roberts [2000] Crim LR 183 (99/0458/ 
X3) the Court of Appeal received expert evidence to the effect that a voice 
identification is more likely to be wrong than a visual identification, that 
ordinary people are as willing to rely on identification by ear-witnesses as 
they are on identification by eye-witnesses and that the identification of a 
stranger's voice is a very difficult task, even if the opportunity to listen to 
the voice was relatively good. Accordingly, in cases where the prosecution 
are permitted to adduce such evidence the jury must be given a direction 
analogous to that established for visual-identification evidence in the case 
of R v. Turnbull [1976] 3 WLR 445 (R v. Hersey [1998] Crim LR 281 (CA), 
R v. Gummerson [1999] Crim LR 680 (CA), R v. Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 
83 (CA)). Indeed it would seem that a more stringent direction is needed. 
In R v. Erskine [2001] EWCA Crim 2513 it was held that the jury should 
have been told `that voice identification can be at least as problematical as 
visual identification, perhaps more so' and in R v. Roberts the Court of 
Appeal noted the view of an expert witness: 
`[T]he warning given to jurors of the danger of a miscarriage of justice in 
relation to witnesses who are identifying by voice should be even more 
stringent than that given to jurors in relation to the evidence of eye-
witnesses. It should be brought home to jurors that there is an even 
greater danger in the first case of the witness believing himself or herself 
to be right and yet in fact mistaken.' 
Further, by analogy with the position for visual-identification evidence 
where the jury compare a photographic image of the offender with the 
accused (11.1.1.7 ante), the jury should be given an appropriate warning 
when they are asked to compare a recording of the offender's voice with 
the accused's voice (Bulejcik v. R (1996) 185 CLR 375 (HCA), R v. 
O'Doherty [2003] 1 Cr App R 77 (NICA)). 
As with visual-identification evidence, some voice identifications may 
be sufficiently reliable to justify a conviction even in the absence of any 
other identifying evidence, such as where a colleague or sibling's quite 
distinctive voice has been overheard and recognised in a context which 
rules out the possibility of a mistaken identification. Generally, however, it 
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should not be possible to found a conviction if there is no identifying 
evidence other than a witness's voice identification, at least in cases where 
the offender was previously unknown to the witness. As noted above, 
there is the possibility of error associated with listening to, remembering 
and comparing two voices heard on different occasions; but even if the 
witness could clearly hear the offender's voice, accurately remember it and 
subsequently identify it as a voice similar to the accused's, and even if the 
possibility of distortion or disguise can be discounted, the voice is unlikely 
to be sufficiently distinctive to rule out the realistic possibility that the 
offender was some other person. The true value of (non-recognition) 
voice-identification evidence therefore lies in the inference which may be 
drawn that the offender belongs to a particular social category, such as a 
regional or ethnic group. 
Code D of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Codes of Practice 
does not cover voice-identification evidence. Accordingly, the police are 
not obliged to hold a voice-identification parade (R v. Deenik [1992] Crim 
LR 578 (CA), R v. Gummerson [1999] Crim LR 680 (CA)), although if 
such a parade is arranged, with the witness listening to recordings of 
several individuals including the suspect, the evidence of what happened is 
admissible (R v. Hersey [1998] Crim LR 281 (CA); see also R v. Khan 
(2002) The Times (news report) 5.12.02 (CCC)). Nor is there a formal 
requirement that a description of the offender's voice be taken by the 
police, although this is something which clearly ought to be done (if the 
witness is capable of describing the voice) if only to establish particulars 
such  as  the offender's  age, sex, social class, regional identity or  
idiosyncratic vocabulary and pronunciation. 
11.3 Olfactory-identification Evidence ± Tracker Dogs 
In R v. Pieterson [1995] 1 WLR 293 the Court of Appeal held that 
evidence of a tracker dog's actions in following a scent was admissible so 
long as the reliability of the dog was first proved to the satisfaction of the 
court. The dog's handler should therefore be called to give detailed 
evidence of its training and of its reactions over a period of time indicating 
its reliability. The judge should also alert the jury to the care needed when 
approaching such evidence, having regard to the fact that tracker dogs 
might not always be reliable and cannot be cross-examined (see also R v. 
Sykes [1997] Crim LR 752 (CA)). 
11.4 Fingerprints, Palm-prints and Ear-prints 
Fingerprint evidence has been admitted to prove guilt since 1902 when one 
Harry Jackson was convicted of a London burglary on the basis of a 
thumbprint left on a windowsill. Seven years later the Court of Criminal 
Appeal affirmed that fingerprint evidence is sufficient, without more, to 
justify a conviction (R v. Castleton (1909) 3 Cr App R 74). 
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Fingerprint (and palm-print) evidence is used primarily in criminal 
proceedings to identify the accused as the offender, although it may also 
be used to eliminate a suspect from the police's enquiries. Where 
fingerprint evidence is relied on to prove the accused's guilt, the 
prosecution will call an expert on the subject to give his opinion that 
the offender's `latent' (and usually incomplete) print ± which has been 
found on (and lifted from) an object associated with the crime ± is the 
same as part of the complete `rolled' print taken from the accused by the 
police (pursuant to their powers under ss. 27, 61 and 63A of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, in accordance with Code D-4 of the Codes of 
Practice). The pre-trial process has come to be known by the acronym 
`ACE-V', representing four consecutive stages: the analysis by a 
fingerprint examiner of the latent print's distinctive patterns of loops, 
whorls, arches and deltas; his comparison of the latent print's patterns with 
those of the suspect's rolled print; his subjective evaluation to determine 
whether the prints are, or are not, impressions made by the same finger; 
and verification (or not, as the case may be) by one or more other 
examiners, having conducted the same three steps. 
Two premises underpin the probative value of fingerprints as evidence 
of identification. The first is that no two individuals share the same 
combination of ridges and troughs which make up a fingerprint. The 
patterns which form on a foetus's fingers and palms during its pre-natal 
development are dependent on both genetic and environmental factors, so 
it is inherently unlikely that two individuals will share exactly the same 
print. There is, moreover, no evidence to suggest that two individuals have 
ever been found to share the same prints (although this does not prove that 
any particular individual's fingerprints are unique). Indeed the result of an 
algorithmic study conducted in the USA was that the probability of 
finding two persons with identical fingerprints was one in ten to the 
ninety-seventh power. The second premise is that an individual's 
fingerprints are permanent. Research on pre-natal development suggests 
that, once a foetus's fingerprints have developed, they do not change with 
time unless affected by a very deep wound. Given this evidence, Pollak J, a  
federal judge in the USA, recently took judicial notice of the uniqueness 
and permanence of fingerprints (USA v. Plaza (No. 1) (7 January, 2002) 
Cr No. 98-362-10; USA v. Plaza (No. 2) (13 March, 2002) Cr No. 98-362-
10 (USDC, ED Pa)). 
The problem with fingerprints as identifying evidence does not lie in the 
validity of these premises, which are universally accepted as valid. If a 
complete, good-quality latent print is found, and it matches the rolled 
print obtained from the accused, there can be no reasonable doubt that the 
latent print was left by the accused. The potential for unreliability, and 
therefore a mistaken identification, comes, first, from the incomplete 
nature of latent prints; second, from the distortion and smearing 
associated with such prints because of the way the underlying surface 
has been touched, the nature of the surface, and the properties of the 
medium used to lift them; and, third, from the possibility of an erroneous 
opinion following the evaluation stage, on account of the subjective nature 
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of the test (and possibly the examiner's insufficient knowledge, ability or 
experience). In R v. McNamee (1998) unreported (97/4481/S2), for 
example, the Court of Appeal heard evidence over seven days from 14 
fingerprint experts in relation to a single thumb print and, save for those 
who said that the print was unreadable, there was no unanimity amongst 
those experts, and very substantial areas of disagreement. 
Given that a small number of ridge characteristics may be shared by a 
considerable number of individuals, the question the courts have had to 
answer is how the reliability of fingerprint evidence can be guaranteed 
when the discernable latent print may represent only a very small fraction 
of the offender's complete print. For many years a national fingerprint 
standard was in place, the consequence being that the prosecution would 
not seek to rely on fingerprint evidence unless at least 16 separate 
matching ridge characteristics could be identified. 
More recently, however, a consensus has developed amongst experts in 
the field that fewer than 16 matching characteristics are needed to 
establish beyond any doubt that the latent print was left by the accused. 
Indeed, according to a study in the late 1980s, there is no scientific, logical 
or statistical basis for the retention of any numerical standard, let alone 
one requiring as many as 16 points of similarity (see R v. Buckley (1999) 
163 JP 561 (CA) at p. 567). After all, a latent print may show only a small 
number of ridge characteristics, but be sufficiently clear to show fine detail 
such as the shapes of the ridges and the structure and location of 
sweat pores. 
Fingerprint evidence showing fewer than 16 matches was tendered by 
the prosecution, and admitted by the judge, in R v. Giles (1998) 
unreported (97/5495/W2) (CA) and in R v. Charles (1998) unreported 
(98/0104/Z2) (CA). In the former case leave to appeal against conviction 
was refused; in the latter case, where the conviction was based on 12 
matching ridge characteristics and the opinion of an expert of long 
experience and high standing, the appeal was dismissed. In R v. Buckley 
(1999) 163 JP 561 the judge allowed the prosecution to rely on fingerprint 
evidence showing a mere nine matching ridge characteristics (although this 
was not the only evidence of the accused's guilt). The accused was 
convicted and appealed on the ground that the fingerprint evidence ought 
not to have been admitted. Dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal 
held that there was nothing to suggest that, in exercising his discretion, the 
judge had erred. The Court explained the position in the following terms 
(at pp. 567±8): 
`Fingerprint evidence, like any other evidence, is admissible as a matter 
of law if it tends to prove the guilt of the accused. It may so tend, even if 
there are only a few similar ridge characteristics, but it may, in such a 
case, have little weight. It may be excluded in the exercise of judicial 
discretion, if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value . . . It 
may be that in the future, when sufficient new protocols have been 
established to maintain the integrity of fingerprint evidence, it will be 
properly receivable as a matter of discretion, without reference to any 
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particular number of similar ridge characteristics. But, in the present 
state of knowledge of expertise in relation to fingerprints, we venture to 
proffer the following guidance . . . If there are fewer than eight similar 
ridge characteristics, it is highly unlikely that a judge will exercise his 
discretion to admit such evidence and, save in wholly exceptional 
circumstances, the prosecution should not seek to adduce such evidence. 
if there are eight or more similar ridge characteristics, a judge may or 
may not exercise his or her discretion in favour of admitting the 
evidence. How the discretion is exercised will depend on all the 
circumstances of the case, including in particular (i) the experience 
and expertise of the witness; (ii) the number of similar ridge 
characteristics; (iii) whether there are dissimilar characteristics; (iv) 
the size of the print relied on, in that the same number of similar ridge 
characteristics may be more compelling in a fragment of print than in 
an entire print; and (v) the quality and clarity of the print on the item 
relied on, which may involve, for example, consideration of possible 
injury to the person who left the print, as well as factors such as 
smearing or contamination.' 
The Government has recently announced that the current standard 
prescribed for fingerprint evidence is the `non-numerical system which was 
introduced from 11 June 2001' (Hansard (HL) 25 February 2002, WA172). 
Furthermore, any fingerprint evidence presented in criminal proceedings 
will have gone through the ACE-V procedure, with verification being 
provided by two further experts (Hansard (HL) 11 March 2002, WA47). 
Fingerprint evidence showing fewer than eight matching ridge character-
istics is prima facie admissible, subject to the judge's discretion to exclude 
it if it is insufficiently reliable. In exercising their discretion judges will 
continue to take into consideration the Buckley guidelines and warn the 
jury that the expert's opinion is not conclusive and that it is for them, the 
jury, to determine whether guilt is proved in the light of all the evidence 
(see R v. Buckley (1999) 163 JP 561 (CA) at p. 568 and, generally, 12.2.4±5 
post). 
Ear-print evidence is also prima facie admissible, although it is unclear 
whether the underlying premises of uniqueness and permanence are valid 
in this context (R v. Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 195 (CA)). Ear-print 
evidence is therefore far more likely to be admitted in cases where it is not 
the only evidence identifying the accused as the offender. 
11.5 DNA-profile Evidence 
It may seem strange that DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) evidence has been 
included in this chapter, for the public perception is that evidence of this 
sort provides an irrefutable way of identifying an offender. However, it is 
this perception which has on occasion given rise to problems. The 
techniques associated with the extraction and analysis of DNA are not free 
from the risk of human error; and, more important, the resulting DNA 
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profile will not necessarily pinpoint the offender's identity with certainty. 
Yet the statistics involved, the possibility of drawing fallacious inferences 
from them, and the danger that the jury will be overwhelmed by their own 
perception of the evidence and its scientific `stamp of approval' may give 
rise to problems if it is not handled, explained and interpreted correctly. 
The problems to which the use of DNA evidence in criminal trials has 
given rise ± principally the so-called `prosecutor's fallacy' ± are not unique 
to evidence of this sort. Any evidence involving a statistical evaluation 
may result in the possibility of an erroneous inference being drawn, if the 
probabilities involved are unusually small and explained with insufficient 
care (as, for example, in the `cot deaths' case of R v. Clark (2000) 
unreported (1999/07459/Y3) (CA), R v. Clark (No. 2) [2003] EWCA Crim 
1020). But it is the cases on DNA evidence which provide the best 
examples of the misuse of statistics in criminal proceedings. That said, 
DNA evidence has the potential to revolutionise criminal detection and, if 
used correctly, can be extremely probative either by exculpating a suspect 
or, particularly in the context of other circumstantial evidence, identifying 
the accused as the offender. It should also be noted that the dangers 
associated with misinterpreting the value of DNA evidence have recently 
fallen with the advent of a more sophisticated profiling technique (the 
`SGM-plus' procedure). 
Sufficient DNA for a profile can now be extracted from a single human 
cell left at the scene of a crime, and it is already possible to draw certain 
conclusions about an offender's ethnic appearance, hair colour and eye 
colour from a sample of his genetic material. Such information can allow 
the police to focus their search for likely suspects. Further, by obtaining a 
DNA profile from a suspect held in custody, or from the Forensic Science 
Service's National DNA Database, and comparing it with the offender's 
profile, it is possible to establish a statistical probability that the two 
samples came from the same individual. It is this probability, calculated by 
a Forensic Science Service expert, which will be relied on by the 
prosecution at the accused's trial. 
The use of DNA as evidence involves three stages: the extraction and 
measuring stage, the statistical evaluation stage, and the inference drawing 
stage. 
The first stage involves extracting a DNA sample from a number of the 
chromosomes in one or more human cells left at the scene of a crime (the 
`crime stain') and a sample from the equivalent chromosome parts taken 
from the suspect's cells. The offender's sample is likely to come from the 
nuclei of cells taken from the root of one of his hairs or from a stain of 
blood, semen or saliva left behind by him, although it is now possible to 
extract and use DNA from cell mitochondria in, for example, hair shafts. 
(An important difference is that nucleus DNA is unique to any individual 
± or a pair of identical twins ± whereas mitochondria DNA is inherited in 
its entirety from the individual's mother.) The suspect's sample will usually 
be obtained by taking a swab from his mouth or by plucking a follicle of 
his hair (see ss. 63, 63A(2) and 65 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984, and Code D-6 of the Codes of Practice). 
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The two samples are broken down into smaller fragments of DNA by 
the application of restriction enzymes, and each collection of fragments is 
separated according to molecular weight by a technique known as gel 
electrophoresis. This technique creates a pattern which is then transferred 
to a nylon membrane. Radioactive `probes' (sequences of DNA bases 
taken from another source) are applied to the pattern on the membrane 
where they bind with regions of repeated sequences of DNA bases in the 
samples ± it is the distribution of repeated sequences of bases which is used 
to identify an individual. An X-ray film is then applied to the membrane 
to produce an `autoradiograph' of bands. The images of the two samples 
are analysed by a computer to produce the two individuals' DNA profiles 
which are then compared. 
If there is an unexplained discrepancy between the two profiles then 
they are not from the same source and this may clear the suspect 
(depending on what other evidence is available and how many persons 
committed the offence). If a large number of the bands correspond exactly 
then there is a high probability that the two samples came from the same 
person: the higher the number of matching bands the higher the 
probability. Only minute samples of DNA are used in the profiling 
technique so the profile produced is unlikely to be unique to the individual 
from whom the sample was taken. A second stage is therefore called for 
and this involves a statistical evaluation of the match based on the number 
of matching bands and the frequency of such band matching in the racial 
group of the suspect (derived from a database of a sizeable number of 
persons drawn from that group). 
The result of the first two stages is a figure ± the match (or random 
occurrence) probability ± representing the number of persons from the 
suspect's racial group and gender who might be expected to have the same 
number of corresponding bands. Like other identifying circumstantial 
evidence, DNA places the offender and the suspect in a smaller class of 
persons than society as a whole. What makes DNA evidence so highly 
probative is that the class of persons in which they are both placed is 
extremely small. 
The third and final stage of the process is where the tribunal of fact 
draws an inference from the expert evidence that the offender and the 
suspect (now the accused) are both members of the same small class of 
persons. Standing alone this evidence may be insufficient to identify the 
accused as the offender, but in the context of some other credible 
prosecution evidence the tribunal of fact would be entitled to infer, as a 
virtual certainty, that the two persons are the same. For example, if the 
accused is a white male and, relatives aside, the probability of the match 
between his and the offender's profile is estimated to be one in a million, 
then out of a population of about 28 million white males in the United 
Kingdom (excluding, for the sake of argument, the possibility of an 
offender from overseas) there is a class of 28 men who could have 
committed the offence. This is not enough to prove the accused is guilty, 
but there is likely to be some other evidence linking him to the crime, such 
as his presence in the region, his accent and an untruthful alibi (as in R v. 
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Doheny [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 (CA)), or his admitted acquaintance with 
the complainant (as in R v. Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 (CA)), or his 
suspicious behaviour and a visual identification (as in R v. Gordon [1995] 1 
Cr App R 290 (CA)). The cumulative effect of the DNA evidence and the 
other evidence will be to narrow the class of possible offenders down to a 
single person, the accused. In R v. Lashley (2000) unreported (99/3890/Y3) 
it was estimated, taking into account the likely age of the offender, that a 
class of about five or six males in the UK could have been responsible for 
the offence, a robbery in Liverpool. In the absence of any other evidence 
linking the accused to the crime it was not possible to justify his 
conviction, but the Court of Appeal noted that the position would have 
been different if there had been evidence linking the accused to Liverpool 
at the time when the offence was committed. 
Of course if the match probability is sufficiently low, for example one in 
200 million, and there is nothing to suggest that the offender was not 
resident in the UK, the DNA evidence will entitle the jury to infer that the 
accused was that person, even in the absence of any other supporting 
evidence (see R v. Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 (CA) and R v. Adams 
(No. 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 (CA)). Indeed, given recent advances in the 
profiling techniques used by the Forensic Science Service (in particular, 
the SGM-plus procedure) match probabilities as low as one in a thousand 
million are now being established (Hansard (HC) 1 March 2001, Column 
747W; R v. Weir (2000) unreported (99/4829/W2) (CA)). In R v. Hanratty 
(Deceased) [2002] 2 Cr App R 419, for example, the Court of Appeal felt 
able to state that `the DNA evidence standing alone is certain proof of 
James Hanratty's guilt'. However, this does not mean that in all future 
cases where DNA evidence is available it will be unnecessary to rely on 
any other evidence linking the accused to the offence. The match 
probability may be considerably higher if the accused's close relatives are 
taken into account, and this will reduce the probative value of the 
matching DNA profiles (as, for example, in R v. Watters [2000] All ER 
(D) 1469 (99/6966/Y4) (CA)). 
DNA evidence is therefore very probative (if not always conclusive) 
evidence of the accused's guilt, but there are dangers. First of all, things 
can go wrong during the process of extracting DNA from human cells at 
the scene of the crime and the subsequent processes that make up the first 
stage. For example, samples may be mixed up or contaminated by other 
DNA from bacteria, viruses, the victim or even laboratory staff; or errors 
may arise during the electrophoresis or comparison stage resulting in an 
erroneous match probability at the statistical evaluation stage. It is 
therefore imperative that the prosecution prove that the samples were 
properly obtained and analysed ± a failure to do this resulted in a 
successful appeal in R v. Loveridge [2001] EWCA Crim 734. A further 
problem is that the ethnic database used for the statistical evaluation may 
not be appropriate for the accused's own ethnicity, again leading to an 
erroneous match probability. The likelihood of this problem arising 
should decrease, however, as the number and variety of ethnic databases 
increases. 
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Given the complexities associated with statistical evaluations, perhaps 
the greatest danger comes from the possibility that the jury will be 
encouraged by the prosecution to draw an erroneous inference from a 
correct match probability. The advent of the SGM-plus procedure has 
reduced the likelihood of an erroneous inference being drawn in many (if 
not most) cases, but the problem may still arise. 
In the example given above the match probability was one in a million, 
leading to the expectation that the accused was one of a class of 28 males 
in the UK who could have committed the offence. This figure of one in a 
million is, however, capable of being twisted into a statement that the odds 
against the accused being innocent are a million to one. This fallacious and 
highly prejudicial reasoning (the `prosecutor's fallacy') has been relied on 
in the past, resulting in several successful appeals against conviction (R v. 
Deen (1993) The Times 10.1.94 (CA), R v. Doheny [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 
(CA), Pringle v. R [2003] UKPC 9). In R v. Doheny, Phillips LJ said (at 
pp. 373±4): 
`The cogency of DNA evidence makes it particularly important that 
DNA testing is rigorously conducted so as to obviate the risk of error in 
the laboratory, that the method of DNA analysis and the basis of 
subsequent statistical calculation should ± so far as possible ± be 
transparent to the defence and that the true import of the resultant 
conclusion is accurately and fairly explained to the jury.' 
11.6 The Accused's Lies 
If the jury or magistrates are satisfied that the accused has lied about 
something relevant to the proceedings it is permissible for them to draw 
from it an inference adverse to the accused, whether the lie occurred before 
the trial or while the accused was in the witness box. The inference will 
amount to an item of evidence against the accused, but its relevance and 
weight will depend on the significance of the lie in the context of the case. 
Its probative value may be such that, without more, it establishes his guilt, 
such as where the jury reject his defence to a charge of handling stolen 
goods that he did not know or believe the goods were stolen. 
Alternatively, the lie may demonstrate the accused's consciousness of 
guilt and support other prosecution evidence. The inference may therefore 
support an eye-witness's identification for the test established in R v. 
Turnbull [1976] 3 WLR 445 (CA) (11.1.1.8 ante) or any suspect witness 
requiring a cautionary warning in accordance with R v. Makanjuola [1995] 
1 WLR 1348 (CA) (11.8 post). Less significant lies may permit a weaker 
inference to be drawn, that is, one which merely undermines the accused's 
credibility without having a more direct bearing on the question of 
his guilt. 
This section is concerned with the second type of lie, where the jury are 
being asked to infer, or might of their own volition infer, that the 
accused's dishonesty does not merely undermine his credibility but 
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provides additional, more direct evidence of his guilt. The problem is that 
an erroneous inference of `consciousness of guilt' might be drawn on the 
basis of a lie told for a quite different reason by a person who is not in fact 
guilty of the allegation. The accused might have lied about a relatively 
peripheral matter in the proceedings or given a false alibi for some entirely 
innocent reason. If the jury are not forewarned of this possibility they may 
draw an erroneous inference of guilt, jumping to the conclusion that the 
accused is guilty simply because of his lie, without paying due regard to 
possible alternative explanations. For example, a fabricated alibi could 
have been the only way for the accused to hide a true but embarrassing 
alibi (such as a visit to a brothel); or he might have felt that no-one would 
believe part of his story, leading him to fabricate something which he 
regarded as more plausible. In R v. Middleton [2001] Crim LR 251 
(99/4593/W3) (CA) Judge LJ said: 
`People do not always tell the truth. Laudable as it may be to do so, 
whatever the circumstances, they do not, or cannot, always bring 
themselves to face up to reality. Innocent people sometimes tell lies even 
when by doing so they create or reinforce the suspicion of guilt. In 
short, therefore, while lying is often resorted to by the guilty to hide and 
conceal the truth, the innocent can sometimes misguidedly react to a 
problem, or postpone facing up to it, or attempt to deflect ill-founded 
suspicion, or fortify their defence by telling lies.' 
In short, if the jury are not directed to consider innocent explanations 
before drawing an inference from the accused's lies there may be an 
erroneous finding of guilt. The jury must therefore be directed not to 
regard the accused's proven or admitted lie as evidence of his guilt unless 
they are sure that it was deliberate, that it related to a material issue and 
that it was told by the accused because of his realisation of guilt and fear 
of the truth as opposed to any innocent reason (R v. Goodway (1993) 98 Cr 
App R 11 (CA)). These three criteria can be traced back to the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in R v. Lucas [1981] 3 WLR 120, a case on whether 
out-of-court lies could amount to technical `corroboration' under the old 
common-law rules (11.12 post). For this reason the warning on lies is still 
generally referred to as the `Lucas direction'. In R v. Goodway (1993) 98 Cr 
App R 11 (CA) it was said that the Lucas direction should be given when 
the prosecution have relied on the accused's lies (or the jury might of their 
own volition rely on his lies) as evidence of his guilt rather than as evidence 
merely reflecting adversely on his credibility. The jury should be reminded, 
in appropriate cases, that people sometimes lie in an attempt to bolster up 
a just cause, or out of shame, or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful 
behaviour from their family. 
It is important to remember, however, that the Lucas direction is a 
safeguard for cases where there is a real possibility the jury might 
erroneously conclude that the accused is guilty just because he has lied 
about something material in the proceedings. The direction is aimed at 
preventing the jury from instinctively jumping to a wrong conclusion 
about the accused's guilt. Accordingly, in R v. Burge [1996] 1 Cr App R 
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163 the Court of Appeal explained that the Lucas direction does not have 
to be given in every trial just because the accused has lied, and that, where 
the direction is necessary, it should be tailored to meet the circumstances 
of the case. Generally a Lucas direction need only be given: (i) where the 
jury are advised to look for supporting evidence or are required to find 
technical `corroboration'; or (ii) where there is a real possibility that the lie 
will be regarded by the jury as evidence of the accused's guilt; or (iii) where 
the defence is one of alibi. In other words, the direction is necessary only if 
the prosecution have suggested, or the jury might infer, that the accused's 
lie is a manifestation of his consciousness of guilt ± an implied admission 
of guilt supporting the other prosecution evidence. In giving the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal in R v. Middleton [2001] Crim LR 251 (99/4593/ 
W3), Judge LJ went on to say: 
`The purpose of giving the Lucas direction . . . is to avoid the risk that 
they may adopt . . . forbidden reasoning . . . that lying demonstrates, and 
is consistent only with, a desire to conceal guilt, or, putting it another 
way, to jump from the conclusion that the defendant has lied to the 
further conclusion that he must therefore be guilty . . . [I]n order to 
avoid the prohibited reasoning, the jury will often need to be warned ± 
perhaps more accurately, reminded ± of the reality, namely that an 
innocent defendant may sometimes lie and that the inference of guilt 
does not automatically follow. Where, however, there is no risk that the 
jury may follow the prohibited line of reasoning, then a Lucas direction 
is unnecessary. On the whole, approaching the matter generally, it is 
inherently unlikely that such a direction will be appropriate in relation 
to lies which the jury conclude that the defendant must have told them 
in his evidence. In this situation, the consequence of the jury rejecting 
the defendant's evidence is usually covered by the general directions of 
law on the burden and standard of proof . . .' 
The type of case which demands a Lucas direction is illustrated by R v. 
Ghilwan Abdullah (1998) unreported (98/2542/Y2) (CA). The accused was 
charged with having wounded another man with a knife during the course 
of a street fight. It was not in issue that the accused had been in possession 
of the knife, but while the prosecution alleged that the accused had been 
the aggressor, it was his defence that he had brought out the knife towards 
the end of the fight in order to defend himself. When the police arrived at 
the accused's home about half an hour after the fight, he told them that he 
did not have a knife. However, the knife used in the fight was found under 
his bed shortly afterwards and, at his trial, it was conceded that he had lied 
to the officers, a fact relied on by the prosecution in their endeavours to 
persuade the jury of his guilt. The accused's explanation for the lie was 
that, although he had acted in self-defence, he was frightened and wanted 
to dissociate himself from the knife. This explanation might well have been 
true given the circumstances, and the jury should have been warned 
against reasoning that his admitted lie was consistent only with a desire to 
conceal guilt. 
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In R v. Middleton [2001] Crim LR 251 the accused was charged with 
burglary and aggravated vehicle-taking. A number of items were stolen 
from a house in west London, along with the occupant's BMW car. The 
accused was arrested in the BMW later the same day, having been pursued 
at speed by the police, and the other property was found in his mother's 
home. The accused's defence was one of alibi. He gave evidence to the 
effect that he had not been involved in the burglary; at the time it took 
place he was with a married woman; he had been paid by someone to drive 
the BMW to a garage outside London; and he had found the items of 
property in the car and left them at his mother's home. A Lucas direction 
was therefore unnecessary. If the jury concluded that the accused had lied 
to them when explaining his involvement with the car and property, the 
obvious inference was that he was lying to conceal his guilt and, according 
to the Court of Appeal, `any attempt to embellish the summing-up with a 
Lucas direction would have served to confuse and complicate an 
essentially simple issue'. The guidance provided by Judge LJ in R v. 
Middleton [2001] Crim LR 251 was approved in R v. Barnett [2002] 2 Cr 
App R 168 (CA), where it was noted that it would be `absurd' to suggest 
that every case of handling stolen goods should require a Lucas direction 
merely because the prosecution have asserted that the accused was lying 
when denying he knew or believed the goods in question were stolen. 
Because the Lucas direction is unnecessary if there is no possibility of 
the jury's adopting the `forbidden reasoning', a direction should not be 
given if the nature of the accused's defence is such that by rejecting it the 
jury are necessarily finding him guilty (R v. Harron [1996] 2 Cr App R 457 
(CA), R v. Quang Van Bui [2001] EWCA Crim 1). If there is a direct and 
irreconcilable conflict between the prosecution witnesses and the accused 
as to the accused's involvement in the offence, an acceptance that the 
prosecution witnesses are telling the truth and not mistaken will 
necessarily mean the accused is lying and therefore guilty. As there is no 
distinction between the issue of guilt and the issue of lies the direction 
would serve only to confuse the jury. This might be the case where the 
accused has relied on an alibi and yet one or more credible eye-witnesses 
have testified that he was physically involved in the commission of the 
offence (as in R v. Harron [1996] 2 Cr App R 457 (CA) and R v. Holden 
(1999) unreported (99/2630/Y2) (CA)), or where the accused has changed 
his version of events as more scientific evidence has come to light (as in R 
v. Hill [1996] Crim LR 419 (CA)). 
11.7 The Accused's Silence 
It is permissible to draw inferences adverse to the accused from his pre-
trial silence in certain circumstances and from his failure to testify in his 
own defence. However, because there are numerous possible reasons for 
remaining silent, the tribunal of fact must be directed to exclude the 
possibility of an innocent explanation before drawing an adverse 
inference. This topic is covered separately in Chapter 9. 
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11.8 Unreliable Witnesses 
In an ideal world all witnesses would be disinterested, medically sound and 
dependable. In practice there will always be some witnesses who have 
either fabricated or embellished their evidence or who have in some other 
way given a distorted account of the circumstances in question. This may 
be through personal interest (such as self-preservation, revenge, spite or 
financial gain) or for a more innocent reason such as genuine confusion or 
error. One of the purposes of cross-examination is to flush out any 
improper motive, bias or innocent mistake, but as a forensic tool this is 
not always effective. The technique of cross-examination may make an 
honest but mistaken witness resentful and seemingly more reliable (as with 
visual-identification witnesses, 11.1 ante), it may provoke resentment in 
the tribunal of fact, or it may simply fail to penetrate the facade which has 
been erected by a dishonest witness. 
At common law persons who fell within one of a number of classes of 
witness in criminal proceedings were deemed to be inherently unreliable 
and worthy of special attention by the trial judge in his summing-up. 
Where any complainant in a sexual case, or an accomplice, or a child gave 
testimony for the prosecution against an accused the judge was obliged, 
first, to give the jury a `full corroboration warning' to the effect that it 
would be dangerous to convict the accused on the basis of the witness's 
uncorroborated testimony and, second, to explain to the jury what 
evidence could properly be regarded by them as `corroborative' (according 
to the technical test adopted in R v. Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 (CCA), 
11.12 post). The reason for this level of distrust stemmed from the belief 
that young children were inherently unreliable because of their youth, that 
complainants often brought false allegations of sexual abuse out of shame, 
spite, neurosis or fantasy, and that accomplices were keen to minimise 
their own role in the alleged offence at the accused's expense. It did not 
matter how reliable the witnesses actually seemed to be, or that there was 
no evidential basis for the presumption that a given witness was unreliable, 
the full corroboration warning was mandatory for any prosecution 
witness who fell within one of these categories. 
A less rigid common-law rule of practice also developed for other 
witnesses, by analogy with the categories of presumed unreliability, where 
there was material to suggest that their evidence might be unreliable. This 
covered certain complainants in non-sexual cases who were unstable or 
resentful, and other witnesses (such as quasi-accomplices) having some 
purpose of their own to serve. In R v. Beck [1982] 1 WLR 461 the Court 
of Appeal recognised that there was an obligation upon a judge to advise 
a jury to proceed with caution where there was material to suggest that a 
witness's evidence might be tainted by an improper motive. The general 
proposition was that it was necessary to give a cautionary warning in 
respect of any witness whose reliability was thrown into doubt by some 
motive which rendered him biased against the accused. Thus, where a 
co-accused testified and implicated the accused, the judge did not have to 
give a full corroboration warning (though he had a discretion to do so) 
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but he was obliged to warn the jury that the co-accused might have a 
purpose of his own to serve in giving such evidence (R v. Knowlden (1981) 
77 Cr App R 94 (CA), R v. Cheema [1994]  1 WLR  147 (CA)). The  
question of unreliable complainants arose in R v. Spencer [1986] 3 WLR 
348, where criminal inmates at a mental hospital alleged ill-treatment by 
the nursing staff. The trial judge had directed the jury to approach the 
inmates' evidence with great caution, had told them it would be wise to 
look for support for their evidence, and had explained the reasons for his 
warning. His direction, and the general proposition in R v. Beck [1982] 1 
WLR 461 (CA), was approved by the House of Lords. The way in which 
the certified point of law was answered suggested that a full corrobora-
tion warning was obligatory, save that the word `dangerous' was 
unnecessary. The better view is that the House of Lords recognised the 
need for a Beck `cautionary warning' in cases where the complainant was 
unreliable, with the jury being additionally required to look for 
supporting evidence (as opposed to `corroboration') to meet the justice 
of the particular case. Lord Ackner certainly deprecated the opening of a 
new category of presumed unreliability for mental patients with criminal 
convictions. 
Section 34(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (and s. 32(3) of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) abrogated the obligatory 
corroboration warning in respect of children. Children's evidence is often 
no less reliable than the evidence of adult witnesses generally, so while 
there will be cases where some warning is appropriate (such as where a 
particular child is unduly suggestible or imaginative) a blanket warning for 
all children was difficult to justify. The same is of course true for 
complainants in sexual cases and accomplices. Some such witnesses may 
warrant a warning but there can be no logical reason for assuming that 
every complainant in a sexual case is untruthful or that every accomplice 
has an axe to grind. The Law Commission (Law Com No. 202 (1991)) 
recommended the abolition of the two remaining categories, and this 
recommendation was effected by s. 32(1) of the 1994 Act. 
The Court of Appeal addressed the impact of s. 32(1) in R v. 
Makanjuola [1995] 1 WLR 1348, where the general principles applicable to 
any witness were set out (at pp. 1351±2): 
`The judge will often consider that no special warning is required at all. 
Where, however, the witness has been shown to be unreliable, [the 
judge] may consider it necessary to urge caution. In a more extreme 
case, if the witness is shown to have lied, to have made previous false 
complaints, or to bear the defendant some grudge, a stronger warning 
may be thought appropriate and the judge may suggest it would be wise 
to look for some supporting material before acting on the impugned 
witness's evidence. We stress that these observations are merely 
illustrative of some, not all, of the factors which judges may take into 
account in measuring where a witness stands in the scale of reliability 
and what response they should make at that level in their directions to 
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the jury. We also stress that judges are not required to conform to any 
formula and this court would be slow to interfere with the exercise of 
discretion by a trial judge who has the advantage of assessing the 
manner of a witness's evidence as well as its content . . . 
It is a matter for the judge's discretion what, if any, warning he 
considers appropriate in respect of . . . any . . . witness in whatever type 
of case. Whether he chooses to give a warning and in what terms will 
depend on the circumstances of the case, the issues raised and the 
content and quality of the witness's evidence . . . There will need to be an 
evidential basis for suggesting that the evidence of the witness may be 
unreliable. An evidential basis does not include mere suggestion by 
cross-examining counsel . . . Where some warning is required, it will be 
for the judge to decide the strength and the terms of the warning.' 
By stating that the Makanjuola guidelines apply in respect of any witness, 
in whatever type of case, the Court of Appeal made it clear that the 
mandatory cautionary warning established in cases such as R v. Beck and 
R v. Knowlden ± and, indeed, in R v. Spencer ± was also being abrogated, 
and this is now the established position (R v. Muncaster [1999] Crim LR 
409 (CA), R v. Causley [1999] Crim LR 572 (CA)). However, the 
Makanjuola guidelines in no way affect the guidelines established in R v. 
Turnbull [1976] 3 WLR 445 (CA), which address the particular problem of 
honest unreliability in the context of visual-identification evidence (11.1.1 
ante), or the warning which may need to be given if the accused has lied 
(11.6 ante). 
Whether the jury ought to be given a Makanjuola direction and, if so, 
the nature of the direction, lie within the judge's discretion, guided by his 
duty to put the accused's case fairly and adequately. It was said in R v. 
Makanjuola that the judge's ruling would not be interfered with on appeal 
unless it was `Wednesbury unreasonable', a point which has been 
reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal on a number of occasions in recent 
years (for example R v. Mountford [1999] Crim LR 575 (98/2930/X4), R v. 
Gregory (2000) unreported (99/4313/Y3) and R v. Whitehouse [2001] 
EWCA Crim 1531). Nonetheless, the duty to put the accused's case fairly 
± described as the `overriding rule' in R v. Spencer ± does have the effect of 
restricting the otherwise broad scope of this judicial discretion. The 
purpose of the Makanjuola direction is to assist the jury to arrive at a safe 
verdict, so if there was evidence at the trial to suggest that a prosecution 
witness was unreliable, but the judge decided not to give a Makanjuola 
direction, this will be regarded as Wednesbury unreasonable if the effect 
was to deny the accused a fair trial. As noted in R v. Hamill [2001] EWCA 
Crim 1922, the accused's trial will not be fair if the judge exercises his 
discretion in an improper manner; and the question whether or not he 
exercised his discretion properly or improperly is determined by reference 
to Wednesbury principles. 
Although there are no longer any formal categories of witness who are 
to be regarded as unreliable, and who might expect to be the subject of a 
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Makanjuola direction, it is possible to identify some obvious situations 
where a direction should be given (or where the judge ought at least to 
consider whether a direction should be given). In R v. Makanjuola Lord 
Taylor CJ referred to cases where a witness is shown to have lied, to have 
made previous false complaints, or to bear the accused a grudge. This non-
exhaustive list includes the sexual complainant who has made and 
withdrawn false allegations of a similar type in the past (R v. F [1999] Crim 
LR 306 (98/893/X3) (CA)) or who has changed her story a number of 
times before the trial (R v. Walker [1996] Crim LR 742 (CA)). It also 
includes the witness who has an improper purpose of his own to serve 
(such as an `axe to grind'); for example the sexual complainant who has an 
improper motive for seeing the accused convicted (R v. B(MT) [2000] 
Crim LR 181 (CA)) and the witness, whether or not a co-accused, whose 
interests are served by deflecting suspicion away from himself (R v. 
Hempton (2000) unreported (99/3835/X2) (CA), R v. Porter [2001] EWCA 
Crim 2699). Indeed, where an accomplice has given evidence for the 
prosecution, it will `usually be necessary' for the judge to give the jury a 
specific warning about the care with which they should approach his 
evidence (R v. Hunter [2002] EWCA Crim 2693). However, where two 
co-accused have testified in their own defence against each other it is not 
appropriate for the judge to give, in respect of each witness, the `normal' 
cautionary warning applicable to cases where a witness has a purpose of 
his own to serve, as this would require the jury to perform mental 
gymnastics; it is sufficient if the trial judge underlines the extreme care 
with which the jury should approach the allegations against each 
co-accused (R v. Burrows [2000] Crim LR 48 (CA)). 
A cautionary Makanjuola direction will almost certainly be required if a 
central plank of the prosecution case is an unrecorded `cell confession' 
purportedly made by the accused to another inmate while he was in prison 
awaiting his trial (R v. Causley [1999] Crim LR 572 (CA), Pringle v. R 
[2003] UKPC 9, Benedetto v. R [2003] 1 WLR 1545 (PC)). None of the 
safeguards in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 or its Codes of 
Practice applies to confessions of this sort, and there will usually be 
evidence that the prosecution witness is a dishonest reprobate or that he 
had an improper motive for assisting the authorities (or both). According 
to the Privy Council in Pringle v. R, if there is evidence to suggest that the 
witness wished to ingratiate himself with the authorities in the hope of 
receiving favourable treatment, the trial judge should draw the jury's 
attention to that evidence (which may be nothing more than the 
surrounding circumstances), explain its significance and then advise the 
jury to be cautious before accepting the witness's testimony. In Benedetto 
v. R the Privy Council expressed the view that, by analogy with the 
situation where the prosecution case depends wholly or substantially on 
the correctness of visual-identification evidence and a Turnbull direction is 
required, in cases where an untried prisoner claims that a fellow untried 
prisoner confessed his guilt, there is an acute problem `which will always 
call for special attention'. 
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11.9 Section 77 of PACE 
Any confession which the prosecution propose to rely on in criminal 
proceedings is inadmissible unless the prosecution can prove it was not 
made `in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the 
circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession 
which might be made by him in consequence thereof' (s. 76(2)(b) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 7.1.3.2 ante). Section 77(1) of 
PACE provides, in addition, that where the prosecution case against a 
mentally-handicapped accused (as defined by s. 77(3)) depends wholly or 
substantially on a confession made by him in the absence of an 
independent person, the tribunal of fact must be warned of the `special 
need for caution' before convicting in reliance on the confession and have 
the reasons explained to them (see also s. 77(2) for summary proceedings). 
A s. 77 warning need not be given if the prosecution case does not depend 
substantially on the confession, the test being whether the prosecution case 
would be `substantially less strong' without it (R v. Campbell [1995] 1 Cr 
App R 522 (CA)). In R v. Bailey [1995] 2 Cr App R 262 (CA) Roch LJ said 
(at p. 275): 
`What is required of a judge in a summing up in such cases, in our 
judgment, is a full and proper statement of the mentally handicapped 
defendant's case against the confessions being accepted by the jury as 
true and accurate. Because the defendant is significantly mentally 
handicapped, this duty will include a duty to see that points made on 
the defendant's behalf and other points which appear to the judge to be 
appropriate to his defence that the confessions are unreliable or untrue, 
are placed before the jury.' 
11.10 Delay in Child Sexual Offence Cases 
Where an adult complainant alleges that the accused sexually abused her 
when she was a child, it will usually be necessary for the judge to direct the 
jury on any prejudice caused to the accused on account of the delay 
between the time when the abuse allegedly occurred and the trial, in 
addition to the usual directions on the burden and standard of proof. An 
additional direction on the prejudicial effects of delay provides a `control 
mechanism' to ensure that the accused who has to face old allegations 
receives a fair trial (R v. Maybery [2003] EWCA Crim 783). Thus, in R v. 
MB [2003] EWCA Crim 1204 where the allegation was of child-rape 
during a 1979 trip in the accused's lorry, the trial judge should have 
directed the jury on the ways in which the substantial delay might have 
affected the accused's ability to counter the allegations, with reference to 
the unavailability of any records relating to the movements of the 
accused's lorry on the date of the alleged rape and any medical evidence 
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relating to the complainant's assertion that she had become pregnant and 
miscarried as a result. Another example is provided by R v. Chapman 
[2001] EWCA Crim 2434, where D's convictions were quashed as the trial 
judge had, inter alia, failed properly to direct the jury on the difficulties D 
had faced in trying to counter, a decade after the alleged incidents, the 
complainant's specific allegations. The Court of Appeal has made it clear 
on a number of occasions that the question whether a direction is 
necessary, and the substance of any direction which is given, depends on 
the particular facts of the case ± although it has also been said that `a clear 
warning will usually be desirable as to the impact which [the purported 
delay] may have had on the memories of witnesses and as to the difficulties 
which may have resulted for the defence' (R v. M [2000] 1 Cr App R 49 
(CA); see also R v. GY [1999] Crim LR 825 (CA)). 
Exceptionally, some cases which depend on nothing more than the 
complainant's oral allegation may relate to events which allegedly occurred 
so long ago that the accused would be unable to defend himself in any 
meaningful sense if he were to be tried. In a case of this sort, where a 
direction from the judge would be an insufficient safeguard, the 
proceedings will be permanently stayed as an abuse of process (see R v. 
Jenkins [1998] Crim LR 411 (CA) and 10.4 ante). In R v. B [2003] 2 Cr App 
R 197 the Court of Appeal stated that the best time to assess whether a 
case is fit to be left to the jury in cases of this sort is not before the trial has 
started but at the end, when the judge is in a position to take into account 
the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defence. Bizarrely, 
although the Court could find no fault with the trial judge's ruling on 
abuse of process (that is, a fair trial was possible) or with the trial process 
and summing-up (that is, the accused received a fair trial), D's convictions 
for alleged acts of indecency between 1969 and 1972 were quashed on the 
ground that there exists a `residual discretion' to set aside a conviction 
which is felt to be unsafe or unfair. Given the dates when the incidents 
allegedly took place and the nature of the prosecution evidence 
(comprising nothing more than the complainant's allegations) the accused 
had been put in an impossible position to defend himself, for all that he 
could do was say that he had not committed the alleged acts. The Court 
therefore felt duty-bound to allow his appeal. In the light of this decision, it 
is doubtful whether any more cases involving inordinate delay will be tried. 
11.11 Demeanour 
The demeanour of a witness while giving evidence is regarded as a form of 
real evidence, which can be scrutinised to help the tribunal of fact decide 
whether the witness is telling the truth. Voluntary and involuntary facial 
expressions, changes in intonation and general body language can, it is 
assumed, give valuable clues to the veracity of the witness. Unfortunately 
there are reasons to believe that such evidence is not a particularly reliable 
indicator of credibility. First of all, because of cultural and/or social 
differences between the witness and the tribunal of fact the witness's non-
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verbal signals may be completely misunderstood. But even where there are 
no such differences, the artificial and controlled environment of the trial 
and the interrogative process between advocate and witness are likely to 
make the untrained witness feel ill at ease, giving a distorted impression of 
his character, particularly during cross-examination. Expressions or 
tremors which might be indicative of guilt in ordinary circumstances 
may be indicative of nothing more than an honest witness's nervousness if 
communicated from the witness box. Conversely, the practised liar may be 
able to appear self-confident and truthful giving an intentionally false 
impression of his credibility. 
At present the relationship between a witness's demeanour and his 
credibility is left to the jury's common sense, with no cautionary warning 
necessary from the judge, but it would be well for jurors ± and other triers 
of fact ± to bear in mind the unreliability of this evidence. Lord Devlin 
(The Judge (1979) p. 63) expressed this view, when he adopted the 
following words of Mr Justice MacKenna: 
`I doubt my own ability . . . to discern from a witness's demeanour, or 
the tone of his voice, whether he is telling the truth. He speaks 
hesitantly. Is that the mark of a cautious man, whose statements are for 
that reason to be respected, or is he taking time to fabricate? Is the 
emphatic witness putting on an act to deceive me, or is he speaking from 
the fullness of his heart, knowing that he is right? Is he likely to be more 
truthful if he looks me straight in the face than if he casts his eyes on the 
ground perhaps from shyness or a natural timidity?' 
11.12 Supporting Evidence and `Corroboration' 
Generally any judgment or verdict may be reached on the unsupported 
evidence of a solitary witness. There are, however, a few statutory 
exceptions to this rule; for example, it is not possible to be convicted of 
perjury solely on the evidence of one witness as to the falsity of the 
statement in question (s. 13 of the Perjury Act 1911) or of speeding solely 
on the opinion evidence of one witness as to the accused's speed (s. 89(2) 
of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984). 
Before the abolition of the categories of presumed unreliability, the test 
for what could properly be regarded as `corroborative evidence' was that 
established in R v. Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 (CCA): it had to be 
admissible `independent . . . evidence . . . which confirms in some material 
respect not only the evidence that the crime has been committed, but also 
that the [accused] committed it'. The evidence also had to be credible 
(DPP v. Kilbourne [1973] 2 WLR 245 (HL) at p. 267). However, in the 
light of R v. Makanjuola [1995] 1 WLR 1348 (CA) (11.8 ante) it is clear 
that the Baskerville test is now to be relied on only in exceptional cases 
where a criminal provision has been interpreted to demand technical 
corroboration. In other words, if the jury are given a Makanjuola direction 
to the effect that it would be wise to look for some `supporting material' 
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before acting on an impugned witness's evidence, it is not necessary that 
the evidence should satisfy the Baskerville test. Although no definition of 
`supporting material' was provided in R v. Makanjuola, the trial judge will 
nonetheless have to explain to the jury what evidence is capable of 
supporting the unreliable witness's testimony, and the jury will have to act 
in accordance with the guidance they are given (R v. B(MT) [2000] Crim 
LR 181 (CA)). It is of course a question of fact for the jury whether any 
such item of evidence should actually be regarded as supporting material. 
The Baskerville test required evidence which came from a source other 
than the suspect witness. There is clear logic in this requirement, and 
judges should be reluctant to identify evidence as supporting if it is not 
independent. In particular, the self-serving nature of a suspect witness's 
repeated claim should prevent it from confirming the truth of his 
testimony. However, it would be wrong to prevent evidence from being 
supportive just because it is not technically independent of the suspect 
witness. For example, if an unreliable young child alleges indecent assault 
by the accused, the fact she and the accused both had gonorrhoea soon 
after the alleged incident should support her testimony (as in R v. Gregg 
(1932) 24 Cr App R 13 (CCA)). 
Independent evidence which merely bolstered the credibility of the 
unreliable witness could not be technical corroboration, but there is no 
reason why sufficiently probative evidence of this sort should be excluded 
from the meaning of `supporting material'. In R v. McInnes (1989) 90 Cr 
App R 99 (CA) the accused was charged with kidnapping and raping a 
seven-year-old girl. The girl had been picked up by a stranger, taken away 
in his car and then sexually assaulted. She was able to describe her 
assailant and the appearance and interior of the car (the interior was said 
to be littered with Fox's glacier mint sweet-wrappers, the base of the gear-
lever was torn and the knob of the gear-lever was off-centre), and she was 
able to pick out both the car and the accused in identification parades. The 
interior of the accused's car was found to match the description given by 
the girl ± the gear-lever and its knob were as described, and a Fox's glacier 
mint wrapper was found too. The accused denied the girl had been in his 
car, but she could hardly have known about the interior unless she had 
been inside it, so her peculiar knowledge showed her to be a truthful 
witness. Her knowledge amounted to circumstantial evidence, `indepen-
dent' of her identification of the accused, which supported that 
identification and amounted to corroboration in respect of the kidnapping 
charge. (This knowledge could not corroborate her evidence with regard 
to the rape, however, as it did not show any such offence had been 
committed by the accused as required by the Baskerville test.) Evidence of 
this sort will now be regarded as `supporting material' for the purposes of 
the Makanjuola direction. In R v. Causley [1999] Crim LR 572 (97/393/X2) 
(CA) the veracity of an unreliable prosecution witness was capable of 
being supported, in respect of whether the accused had confessed to him in 
prison, by his peculiar knowledge of matters which, according to the 
prosecution case, could have come only from the accused. 
A suspect complainant's distressed state following an alleged sexual 
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assault should not be identified as potentially supportive evidence if the 
circumstances were such that the risk of fabrication cannot be excluded. If, 
however, the circumstances suggest that the distress was probably genuine 
the jury should be permitted to consider it even though the evidence is not 
independent of the complainant. This was the approach adopted under the 
old law on corroboration, but the Court of Appeal has recently accepted 
that it remains valid for the modern law on supporting evidence (R v. Venn 
[2003] EWCA Crim 236). In R v. Chauhan (1981) 73 Cr App R 232 (CA), 
for example, an independent witness gave evidence that the complainant 
had cried out and run away from the accused soon after the alleged 
indecent assault on her. The jury were entitled to regard it as 
corroborating the complainant's testimony so long as they first discounted 
the possibility that the distress had been feigned or had resulted from a 
misunderstanding (see also R v. Redpath (1962) 46 Cr App R 319 (CCA) 
where fabrication was improbable given the remoteness of the location 
and the unlikelihood of the complainant being observed by anyone). 
Circumstantial evidence which is independent of the suspect witness and 
implicates the accused in the alleged offence should amount to supporting 
evidence if it is sufficiently probative of his guilt. This could include 
adverse inferences drawn from the accused's silence or his refusal to 
provide a body sample, or his lies, or admissible evidence of his 
disposition, or DNA evidence and so on. Before the jury can treat a lie 
by the accused as supporting evidence (or corroboration) they must be 
directed to be sure that the lie was deliberate, related to a material issue, 
was told by the accused because of his realisation of guilt and fear of the 
truth, and has been established as untrue from evidence other than that of 
the unreliable witness requiring support (R v. Lucas [1981] 3 WLR 120 
(CA)). An innocuous item of circumstantial evidence may not of itself be 
probative enough to support a suspect witness, but several items of 
innocuous circumstantial evidence taken together may amount to 
supporting evidence if the cumulative probative value is sufficiently high 
(R v. Hills (1987) 86 Cr App R 26 (CA) at pp. 30±1). Express or implied 
admissions by the accused which have a bearing on the evidence requiring 
support should suffice, as should an independent witness's testimony. 
Medical evidence of injuries will support a complainant's allegation of an 
act of violence against her, although it may have nothing to say about the 
accused's involvement. 
If the accused is tried on several counts in a single indictment and the 
evidence of several witnesses is ruled to be cross-admissible as similar fact 
evidence (3.3.10 ante), although the risk of collusion between the 
prosecution witnesses is not relevant to the determination of admissibility 
it was, under the old law, relevant to whether the witness's evidence could 
amount to corroboration. Unless the jury were satisfied that the witnesses' 
evidence was free from collusion it could not be regarded as corroborative 
or, indeed, relied on for any other purpose adverse to the accused (R v. H 
[1995] 2 WLR 737 (HL)). Although technical corroboration is no longer 
required, the position must be the same for supporting evidence. 
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Chapter Summary 
.	 The police must gather visual-identification evidence in accordance with the 
provisions of Code D-3 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Codes of 
Practice. Breaches of the Code may result in the exclusion of the identification 
evidence under s. 78(1) of the Act. 
.	 If the case against the accused depends wholly or substantially on the correctness 
of disputed visual-identification evidence, the judge should warn the jury of the 
special need for caution before convicting in reliance on it (the Turnbull 
direction). If the quality of the evidence is good the jury can be left to assess it 
even though there is no supporting evidence; but if its quality is poor the judge 
must withdraw the case from the jury unless there is other evidence to support the 
correctness of the identification. A direction analogous to the Turnbull direction 
should be given in cases where the prosecution rely on voice-identification 
evidence. 
.	 If the accused can be shown to have lied and the prosecution have suggested, or 
the jury might infer, that it is a manifestation of his consciousness of guilt, but the 
inference of guilt does not automatically follow in the circumstances, it is 
necessary for the judge to warn the jury not to assume that the accused is guilty 
because of his lies (the Lucas direction). 
.	 If there is evidence to suggest that a witness is unreliable, the judge may need to 
give the jury a cautionary warning and in some cases suggest that it would be 
wise to look for supporting evidence before acting on the witness's evidence (the 
Makanjuola direction). 
.	 If the prosecution case against a mentally-handicapped accused depends wholly 
or substantially on a confession made by him in the absence of an independent 
person, the judge must warn the jury of the special need for caution before 
convicting in reliance on it (s. 77(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984). 
.	 If it is alleged that the accused sexually abused the complainant many years 
before the trial, it will usually be necessary for the judge to direct the jury on the 
prejudice caused to the accused on account of the (alleged) delay. 
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In any trial it is necessary to determine a number of factual issues ± 
sometimes referred to as the `ultimate' or `material' issues ± upon which 
the final verdict or judgment will depend. In order to come to a decision 
on these issues the tribunal of fact is obliged to consider, and entitled to 
draw inferences from, all the available evidence, including the testimony of 
any witnesses who have been called. Witnesses are generally limited to 
testifying as to facts within their own personal knowledge. As a rule they 
have no right to give their own opinions on the ultimate issues, for the 
determination of the issues is the preserve of the tribunal of fact. 
In most cases, then, witnesses' opinions are regarded as irrelevant and 
so inadmissible, but there are two important exceptions to this rule. First, 
it will often be impossible for witnesses to refrain from stating certain 
inferences of their own when describing facts directly perceived by them, 
at least if they are to give their oral evidence in a natural way. Witnesses, 
whether or not they are experts in any particular field, may therefore 
provide their evidence as if they were describing events in a less formal 
environment, even if this means that certain inferences they have drawn 
will be conveyed as incontrovertible facts. Second, experts in specialised 
fields are allowed to give their own opinions on matters falling within their 
expertise if the tribunal of fact would be unable properly to decide an issue 
without their help. 
This chapter is primarily concerned with the admissibility of expert 
opinion evidence, but also explains the non-expert witness's limited right 
to give his own opinion. The last part of this chapter sets out the rules 
governing the admissibility of judgments from other proceedings. A 
judgment is, after all, nothing more than the opinion of the tribunal of fact 
in an earlier trial (see Hui Chi-Ming v. R  [1991] 3 WLR 495 (PC)). Another 
type of admissible opinion evidence, which is not considered further here, 
is evidence of reputation, which may be given to establish or discredit 
character (3.4.1 and 3.4.5 ante, 16.5.4.3 post) or to prove pedigree or the 
existence of a public right (6.1.2.4±5 ante). 
12.1 Non-expert Opinion Evidence 
Any descriptive testimony such as `she was a young schoolgirl' or `the old 
man was rather upset' is actually a compendious way of summarising a 
number of inferences based on the witness's observations. If witnesses 
were prohibited from drawing any inferences of their own they would have 
to state each and every perceived fact which allowed the inference to be 
drawn. It would not be possible for a witness to say, for example, that the 
person he observed was a `young girl' or an `angry man', or that the 
weather that day was `hot and humid'; he would instead have to list all the 
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specific, perceived facts which allowed him to form his opinion. This 
would be unbearable for all concerned, as well as impracticable. Witnesses 
are therefore allowed to give opinions which are no more than a natural 
way of conveying to the court what they directly perceived. In the 
Northern Ireland case of Sherrard v. Jacob [1965] NI 151 (NICA) Lord 
MacDermott CJ gave some examples (at p. 156): 
`(1) the identification of handwriting, persons and things; (2) apparent 
age; (3) the bodily plight or condition of a person, including death and 
illness; (4) the emotional state of a person ± e.g. whether distressed, 
angry, aggressive, affectionate or depressed; (5) the condition of things 
± e.g. worn, shabby, used or new; (6) certain questions of value; and 
(7) estimates of speed and distance.' 
The law also recognises, however, that some non-expert opinion 
evidence is inherently unreliable, and where the guilt of the accused 
depends on the accuracy of such evidence further considerations come into 
play. If the case against the accused depends wholly or substantially on the 
accuracy of a witness's visual identification of him the judge is obliged to 
give the jury a `Turnbull direction' on the dangers associated with such 
evidence (11.1.1 ante); and, although, by virtue of s. 8 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1865, non-expert opinion evidence is admissible to identify 
the author of disputed handwriting, juries must be given expert guidance 
in criminal trials (R v. Harden [1963] 1 QB 8 (CCA)). Similarly, if the 
accused is charged with driving a vehicle in excess of the speed limit he 
cannot be convicted solely on a single witness's opinion of the speed 
(s. 89(2) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984); and it is permissible to 
give an opinion that the accused had been drinking alcohol only if the 
perceived facts upon which that opinion is based are also provided (R v. 
Davies [1962] 1 WLR 1111 (C-MAC)). 
Section 3(2) of the Civil Evidence Act 1972 has placed the common law 
on non-expert opinions in civil proceedings on a statutory footing; and 
s. 3(3) of the Act makes it clear that non-expert opinions may also be given 
on any issue. In criminal trials non-expert witnesses are not supposed to 
give their opinion on an issue, although this rule is subject to exceptions 
and sometimes ignored in practice. In R v. Beckett (1913) 8 Cr App R 204 
(CCA), for example, a witness was allowed to give his non-expert opinion 
on the cost of the damage done to a window; and in R v. Johnson [1994] 
Crim LR 376 (CA) a witness was permitted to say that she believed the 
complainant was genuinely distressed following admitted sexual inter-
course with the accused, which was in effect an opinion on whether the 
complainant had indeed been raped as alleged. That such opinions are 
occasionally permitted is not surprising, for it may be impossible to 
enforce an absolute prohibition in some contexts. A visual identification 
of the accused is, after all, an opinion on the issue of the offender's 
identity; and to say that the accused had been drinking, when the charge is 
one of driving while unfit through drink, is again to give an opinion on 
one of the facts in issue. In Sherrard v. Jacob [1965] NI 151 (NICA) it was 
accepted that `the non-expert witness is competent to give inferential, or 
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opinion, evidence on certain matters which may very well be matters in 
issue and for decision'. However, it is not for a witness in criminal 
proceedings to give an opinion on whether the accused is guilty of the 
offence charged (R v. Cleeland [2002] EWCA Crim 293 at para. 128). 
12.2 Expert Opinion Evidence 
Specialised areas of knowledge need to be explained by experts to prevent 
erroneous inferences being drawn from certain types of evidence with 
which the tribunal of fact is unfamiliar. Witnesses having a relevant degree 
of expertise are therefore competent to give an opinion on matters which 
lie within their specialisation. Unlike the opinions of non-expert witnesses, 
which are regarded as superfluous and irrelevant, the opinion of an expert 
on the subject of his expertise has a significant degree of probative value 
warranting its admission as evidence. The problem the law has had to 
confront, particularly in the context of criminal proceedings, is the extent 
to which experts should be allowed to influence the tribunal of fact's 
decisions on the disputed issues. The principle of free proof justifies the 
admission of expert opinion evidence to ensure that difficult or unusual 
matters can be properly evaluated; and yet, by allowing such evidence to 
be given, there is a danger that the tribunal of fact's role will be usurped. 
12.2.1 The Admissibility of Expert Opinion Evidence 
An expert is entitled to give an opinion only on relevant matters which are, 
first, within his particular area of expertise and, second, outside the 
general knowledge and understanding of the tribunal of fact. This test 
ensures that superfluous evidence is not received, and enshrines the 
principle that questions of fact should be decided by the tribunal of fact to 
the standard imposed by law and not by witnesses according to their own 
subjective standards: 
`[O]ne purpose of jury trials is to bring into the jury box a body of men 
and women who are able to judge ordinary day-to-day questions by 
their own standards, that is, the standards in the eyes of the law of 
theoretically ordinary reasonable men and women . . . Where the 
matters in issue go outside that experience and they are invited to deal 
with someone supposedly abnormal, for example, supposedly suffering 
from insanity or diminished responsibility, then plainly in such a case 
they are entitled to the benefit of expert evidence. But where, as in the 
present case, they are dealing with someone who by concession was on 
the medical evidence entirely normal, it seems to this Court abundantly 
clear . . . that it is not permissible to call a witness, with whatever his 
personal experience, merely to tell the jury how he thinks an accused 
man's mind ± assumedly a normal mind ± operated at the time of the 
alleged crime with reference to the crucial question of what that man's 
intention was.' (R v. Chard (1971) 56 Cr App R 268 (CA) at pp. 270±1) 
356 Evidence 
`An expert's opinion is admissible to furnish the court with . . . 
information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge 
of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their 
own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is 
unnecessary . . . The fact that an expert witness has impressive . . . 
qualifications does not by that fact alone make his opinion on matters 
of human nature and behaviour within the limits of normality any more 
helpful than that of the jurors themselves; but there is a danger that they 
may think it does.' (R v. Turner [1975] 2 WLR 56 (CA) at p. 60) 
Thus, while expert opinion evidence is admissible (and often necessary) 
on physical illnesses, abnormal mental conditions, science, technology, 
engineering, foreign law, business practices, art and any other matter 
which most people would be unfamiliar with, it is not admissible if the 
tribunal of fact has sufficient understanding to reach a decision on the 
issue without such assistance. For example in R v. Hersey [1998] Crim LR 
281 (CA) an expert in voice identification could not explain the evident 
differences between a recording of the accused's voice and recordings of 
other voices (used on a voice-identification parade) as he would have done 
no more than point out differences which the jury could hear for 
themselves. Conversely, expert evidence is admissible on a matter which 
the tribunal of fact may assume is within their understanding if that 
assumption would be erroneous. In R v. Woods [2003] EWCA Crim 1147 
it was held that the trial judge had been right to allow a medical doctor 
experienced in the field of alleged sexual offences to give evidence to the 
effect that a woman could experience an orgasm during sexual activity 
even if she was not consenting. 
The opinion evidence of psychiatrists and psychologists deserves 
particular attention. The tribunal of fact would not be expected to resolve 
questions relating to a mental illness without the assistance of a suitably 
qualified expert. Expert medical (usually psychiatric) evidence may 
therefore be given on conditions such as automatism (Bratty v. 
Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1961] 3 WLR 965 (HL)) and 
post-traumatic stress disorder (R v. White [1995] Crim LR 393 (CA)). 
Such evidence is necessary if diminished responsibility (R v. Dix (1981) 74 
Cr App R 306 (CA)) or insanity (ss. 1 and 2 of the Criminal Procedure 
(Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991) has been raised, or it has been 
alleged that a person has suffered a psychiatric injury for the purposes of 
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (R v. Chan-Fook (1993) 99 Cr 
App R 147 (CA)). 
There is of course no definitive line separating extreme emotions from 
mild mental illnesses or the mentally normal from the mentally sub-
normal, but the desirability of reserving questions of fact for the tribunal 
of fact, insofar as it is possible to do so, has led to the drawing of arbitrary 
lines. In R v. Masih [1986] Crim LR 395 the Court of Appeal held that the 
dividing line between the mentally normal and sub-normal was to be 
drawn at the IQ value of 70. According to this test, if the accused has an 
IQ below 70 the expert's opinion is deemed to be sufficiently probative to 
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justify its admission even though this will necessarily undermine the jury's 
own fact-finding role. If, however, the accused has an IQ of 70 or above, 
the assistance which the jury could get from the expert's opinion is felt to 
be insufficiently probative to justify its admission ± the principle which 
demands trial by jury rather than by witnesses takes precedence over the 
principle of free proof. M faced an allegation of rape and wished to call a 
psychiatrist to explain how his low IQ would have affected his ability to 
appreciate the absence of consent. This evidence was inadmissible because 
M had an IQ of 72, even though he was `dull-normal', immature, docile 
and had a limited understanding of people. In R v. Weightman (1990) 92 
Cr App R 291 (CA) the accused sought to call a psychiatrist to show that 
her confession was unreliable on account of her `histrionic personality 
disorder'. This evidence was held to be inadmissible on the ground that she 
was neither suffering from a mental illness nor below normal intelligence. 
Her abnormal personality was regarded as something within the 
experience of normal, non-medical people. 
Such an arbitrary and inflexible distinction can lead to injustice in 
borderline cases and a more flexible approach has now been adopted, at 
least where the reliability of a confession is in dispute. In R v. Raghip 
(1991) The Times 9.12.91 the accused was a young abnormally-suggestible 
man, with an IQ of 74 and a level of functioning equivalent to that of a 
9-year-old child, who had been convicted of murdering a police officer on 
the basis of a confession. The Court of Appeal held that psychological and 
psychiatric evidence on the accused's mental condition should have been 
admitted on the issue of the reliability for the purposes of s. 76(2)(b) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (7.1.3.2 ante) and that, even if the 
judge had correctly ruled the confession to be admissible, the expert 
opinion should have been put before the jury to help them assess its 
reliability and probative value. The Court drew a distinction between the 
admissibility of psychiatric and psychological evidence going to the 
reliability of a confession ± it is admissible if the jury would be `assisted in 
assessing' the accused's mental condition ± and the admissibility of such 
evidence in relation to the accused's mens rea (as in R v. Masih [1986] Crim 
LR 395 (CA)). 
In R v. Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619 (at p. 690) the Court of Appeal 
expressed the view that the expert evidence of a psychiatrist or a 
psychologist could properly be admitted, in relation to whether the 
accused's confession was reliable, if it was to the effect that the accused 
was `suffering from a condition not properly described as mental illness, 
but from a personality disorder so severe as properly to be categorised as 
mental disorder'. However, in R v. Roberts (1998) unreported (96/3953/ 
S1) (CA) it was held that the question is not whether the accused's 
personality disorder was so severe that it could be `categorised' as a mental 
disorder, but whether the nature of the disorder might render his 
confession unreliable. Expert opinion evidence was therefore admissible 
on the accused's suggestible and compliant personality. The same 
approach was adopted in R v. O'Brien [2000] Crim LR 676 (CA), where 
it was held that admissibility is dependent on three conditions being 
358 Evidence 
satisfied. First, the disorder must be of a type which might render a 
confession unreliable; second, the accused's condition must show a very 
significant deviation from the norm; and, third, there must be independent 
evidence of a history of disorder pre-dating the making of the confession. 
One of three co-accused, H, had confessed to involvement in a robbery in 
which a newsagent had been killed and implicated O and S at their trial. 
The appeals were allowed on the ground that expert opinion evidence on 
H's mental disorder, a personality associated with those who make false 
confessions which, in his case, was particularly severe, should have been 
admitted. The Court of Appeal also expressed the view that the expert 
opinion evidence should have been admitted on the question whether H's 
testimony was reliable. In other words, if the accused confesses and 
implicates his co-accused, and the three O'Brien conditions are satisfied, 
the expert evidence is admissible not only on the reliability of his 
confession but also on his capacity to give reliable testimony against his 
co-accused. 
Expert evidence is admissible to determine whether a would-be witness 
is competent to give evidence and, if so, whether he should give his 
evidence on oath (ss. 54(5) and 55(6) of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999); and on whether a `special measures direction' should 
be made, varied or discharged (r. 9 of the Crown Court (Special Measures 
Directions and Directions Prohibiting Cross-examination) Rules 2002 (SI 
2002 No. 1688), r. 9 of the Magistrates' Courts (Special Measures 
Directions) Rules 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1687)). Expert evidence is also 
admissible to show that a witness, though competent, is suffering from a 
mental illness rendering him totally or substantially incapable of giving 
reliable evidence (Toohey v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] 2 
WLR 439 (HL) at p. 447, R v. Mackenney (1981) 76 Cr App R 271 (CA), 
R v. Smith [2002] EWCA Crim 2074; see 16.5.4.4 post). 
In R v. Turner [1975] 2 WLR 56 (CA) it was not possible for a 
psychiatrist to give his expert opinion on the accused's veracity as a 
witness. If a witness is mentally capable of giving reliable evidence it is for 
the jury, assisted by appropriate warnings from the judge and counsel, to 
decide whether the witness's evidence is in fact reliable (R v. Mackenney 
(1981) 76 Cr App R 271 (CA), R v. Walsh [2000] All ER (D) 2457 (CA), R 
v. Burton [2002] EWCA Crim 614). Similarly, it has been said that in civil 
proceedings it is for the judge to determine whether a child witness is 
credible without the assistance of an expert opinion on the question (Re N  
(a Minor) (Sexual Abuse: Video Evidence) [1997] 1 WLR 153 (CA)). In 
Re M and R (Child Abuse: Evidence) [1996] 2 FLR 195, however, the 
Court of Appeal suggested that in cases where a child complainant is 
alleging abuse, it is permissible for an expert to give his opinion on the 
accuracy or truthfulness of the child's evidence, the question for the judge 
being one of weight rather than admissibility. 
Different considerations may apply in criminal proceedings if more 
than one accused is being tried for the same offence and they run `cut-
throat' defences. In Lowery v. R [1973] 3 WLR 235 two young men, L and 
K, were jointly charged with the brutal and sadistic murder of a 
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15-year-old girl in Australia for which they blamed each other. The Privy 
Council held that in the special circumstances of the case, and because L 
had already put his character in issue by giving evidence to show he was 
not the sort of person who would commit such an offence, it had been 
permissible for K to call a professional psychologist to give evidence as to 
their respective personalities, showing that L was the more aggressive and 
dominant of the two and supporting K's version of events. In R v. Turner 
[1975] 2 WLR 56 the Court of Appeal stated that the decision in Lowery v. 
R had been `decided on its special facts' and did not set a precedent for the 
general admissibility of psychiatric or psychological evidence to prove the 
accused's veracity. 
Another important aspect of the decision in R v. Turner, a case in which 
the accused's defence to a charge of murder was provocation, was that the 
psychiatrist called by the defence could not give his expert opinion on the 
accused's deep affection for the deceased or his profound grief following 
her death. According to Lawton LJ (at p. 61): `Jurors do not need 
psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who are not suffering from 
any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life.' 
Human emotions such as depression, insecurity and grief must therefore 
be assessed without any expert assistance. In R v. Browning (No. 2) [1995] 
Crim LR 227 (CA) a professor of psychology could not give evidence on 
the deterioration of a prosecution witness's memory with time; in R v. 
Loughran [1999] Crim LR 404 (CA) a psychiatrist, if called, would not 
have been able to give his opinion on the accused's anxiety at the prospect 
of sexual intercourse; in R v. Ugoh [2001] EWCA Crim 1381 it was held 
that, while a psycho-pharmacologist could address the effect of the alcohol 
consumed by a rape complainant on her ability to give informed consent 
to sexual intercourse, he could not give his opinion on whether the accused 
had appreciated that she was unable to give such consent; and in R v. 
Gilfoyle (No. 2) [2001] 2 Cr App R 57 the Court of Appeal doubted 
whether assessing levels of happiness or unhappiness, in this case whether 
the deceased had been suicidal, was a matter which required the expert 
opinion of a psychologist. Psychiatric evidence has also been held to be 
inadmissible in respect of whether or not the accused could differentiate 
between reality and fantasy (R v. Reynolds [1989] Crim LR 220 (CA)) and 
on the likelihood of a suicide pact (R v. Wood [1990] Crim LR 264 (CA)). 
What is a `stress and strain' of life is also a matter of degree, however, 
and an inflexible rule is unlikely to be satisfactory, particularly where 
psychological conditions caused by stresses and strains are now coming to 
be understood as true medical conditions beyond the understanding of 
jurors. In R v. Merry (1993) 99 Cr App R 326 (CA) the accused and her 
boyfriend were jointly charged with offences of manslaughter and cruelty 
against her three-year-old child. The accused wished to call a psychologist 
and a psychiatrist to explain that the reason she had not prevented acts of 
cruelty on her child by her boyfriend was that she herself had been abused 
as a child and an adult, and was suffering psychological damage which 
had prevented her from acting as a normal person would have done in the 
circumstances. Farquharson LJ said (at p. 332): 
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`It is not suggested here that the appellant is suffering from a mental 
illness, but that is not in itself conclusive against the admission of this 
evidence. The law is in a state of development in this area. There may 
well be other mental conditions about which a jury might require expert 
assistance in order to understand and evaluate their effect on the issues 
in a case.' 
In the similar case of R v. Emery (1992) 14 Cr App R (S) 394 the Court 
of Appeal felt that the trial judge had properly allowed experts to give 
evidence of the accused's condition of `learned helplessness' (`battered 
woman syndrome') caused by the routine abuse she herself had suffered at 
the hands of her boyfriend (the co-accused) as the condition was `complex 
. . . not known by the public at large' and relevant to her defence of duress. 
Battered woman syndrome, a form of post-traumatic stress disorder, has 
now come to be recognised as a medical condition for the purposes of the 
Turner test, and is admissible if a woman has pleaded provocation as a 
partial defence to the murder of her alleged tormentor (R v. Thornton 
(No. 2) [1996] 2 Cr App R 108 (CA)). Expert evidence on psychological 
conditions other than battered woman syndrome is now admissible if 
provocation has been raised to show the accused's personality was affected 
at the time of the killing. In R v. Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008 (CA), 
for example, the accused's `attention-seeking traits' amounted to such a 
condition justifying a psychiatrist's expert opinion. Expert opinion 
evidence may also be admissible in respect of the accused's `paranoid 
personality disorder' if he has raised self-defence and the disorder affected 
his perception of the danger he faced at the time the force was used or his 
defence to murder is diminished responsibility (see R v. Martin [2002] 2 
WLR 1 (CA)). 
It is questionable whether an arbitrary line between normality and 
abnormality in the context of psychological or personality disorders is 
conducive to the interests of justice. An alternative test would be to apply 
the general principles governing the admissibility of logically relevant 
evidence (3.1 ante). Admissibility would then be governed by an 
assessment of the probative value of the expert testimony in the context 
of the case when weighed against competing policy considerations such as 
the need to minimise delay, cost, unreliability, the risk of overburdening 
the jury, and so on. The desirability of preventing the jury's role from 
being usurped could be regarded as but one of several considerations 
militating against the admission of the expert's opinion. This discretionary 
approach would not be so straightforward to apply as the Turner test, but 
it would be more likely to guarantee the accused a fair trial. It would also 
be flexible enough to allow for the admission of different types of expert 
testimony as scientific (particularly psychological) knowledge increases. 
Given the inherent unreliability of visual-identification evidence, and 
the guidelines which have been introduced to safeguard the accused (11.1.1 
ante), it might be expected that the expert opinion evidence of 
psychologists would be admissible to explain the reasons for such 
unreliability. After all, the principal reason for the Turnbull direction is 
Opinion Evidence 361 
that the unreliability of visual-identification evidence is not within the 
experience and understanding of lay fact-finders. The question has not 
been addressed in England and Wales, but in Australia the evidence of a 
psychologist on the unreliability of identification evidence has been held to 
be inadmissible (R v. Smith [1987] VR 907 (VSC)). It remains to be seen 
whether English courts will adopt the same approach, but it is to be noted 
that expert opinion evidence is admissible in respect of other types of 
identification evidence, such as fingerprints, DNA profiles and voice 
comparisons. 
Whether a publication is obscene for the purpose of ss. 1 and 2 of the 
Obscene Publications Act 1959 (that is, whether it tends to `deprave and 
corrupt') is generally to be decided by the tribunal of fact without the 
assistance of expert opinion evidence from psychologists, doctors or 
sociologists (R v. Anderson [1971] 3 WLR 939 (CA), DPP v. Jordan [1976] 
3 WLR 887 (HL)), although in the latter case Lord Wilberforce recognised 
a possible exception where the potential readers of such material 
comprised a `special class' upon whom its likely impact would not, in 
the absence of expert assistance, be understood by the jury or magistrates. 
The only example to date of such a special class arose in DPP v. A and BC 
Chewing Gum [1967] 3 WLR 493. A chewing gum company had been 
marketing packets of gum containing cards showing battle scenes and was 
prosecuted under the 1959 Act, but the magistrates refused to hear a 
prosecution expert on child psychiatry who had been called to give his 
opinion on the likely effects of the cards on children. The Divisional Court 
held that the expert should have been allowed to give his opinion on the 
effect certain types of pictures (including some of the battle scenes) would 
be likely to have on the minds of children. It was said (at p. 497) that `when 
you are dealing . . . with children . . . any jury and any magistrates need all 
the help they can get' (see also R v. Skirving [1985] 2 WLR 1001 (CA)). 
Section 4(1) of the 1959 Act provides a statutory defence of `public good' 
to a charge of publishing obscene material contrary to s. 2, obliging the 
accused to show that the obscene material was justified `in the interests of 
science, literature, art or learning, or of other objects of general concern'. 
Expert opinion evidence is admissible under s. 4(2) to prove such grounds. 
Part 35 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 provides that expert evidence 
`shall be restricted to that which is reasonably required to resolve the 
proceedings' (r. 35.1). Accordingly, the court's leave is required in civil 
proceedings before an expert can be called to give evidence or an expert's 
report can be adduced in evidence (r. 35.4(1)). Rule 35.5(1) provides that 
expert evidence is to be given in a written report unless the court directs 
otherwise. This restriction on the admissibility of expert evidence was 
introduced to stem the disproportionate use of experts in civil proceedings 
and the associated expense and delay for the parties concerned. For 
example, in Re B (Minors) (Care Proceedings: Practice) [1999] 1 WLR 
238 (FD) the parties sought to call 13 expert witnesses on the question 
whether a child had been shaken and, if so, by whom; and of those experts 
all seven medical specialists were in agreement on the specific questions 
requiring their expertise. 
362 Evidence 
Civil courts also have the power to direct that evidence be given by a 
`single joint expert' (see CPR 1998 r. 35.7(1) and para. 6 of Practice 
Direction 35). This is a wide discretion, but it would be inappropriate to 
order a single expert in some cases, most obviously where there is more 
than one school of thought on the issue (Oxley v. Penwarden [2001] 
Lloyd's Rep Med 347 (CA)). 
12.2.2 The Competence of Expert Witnesses 
Whether a person who purports to be an expert can properly be regarded 
as such is a question for the judge. It is the expertise itself which 
determines a witness's competence and not the route by which he came to 
have that expertise. As such it is not always necessary to have formal 
qualifications to be an expert, although in practice much will depend on 
the nature of the purported expertise. An amateur study of handwriting 
over several years may qualify a witness to give his opinion on the 
authorship of disputed handwriting (R v. Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766 
(CCCR)); a police officer's careful examination of a closed-circuit 
television film may qualify him to give an opinion on the identity of 
persons filmed (R v. Clare [1995] 2 Cr App R 333 (CA)); a police officer 
with no formal qualifications may be sufficiently experienced and 
knowledgeable to give an expert opinion on ear-print identification 
evidence (R v. Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 195 (CA)) or on whether a 
particular quantity of drugs is too large to be for personal consumption (R 
v. Hodges [2003] 2 Cr App R 247 (CA)); and a professor of the history of 
architecture, though not a qualified architect, may have sufficient 
expertise to give an opinion on architectural questions, such as the design 
of the buildings at Auschwitz (Irving v. Penguin Books [2001] EWCA 
Civ 1197). 
Amateur experience will be insufficient for some other fields of 
knowledge, however. In R v. Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 (CA) 
Bingham LJ felt that the opinion evidence of an amateur psychologist 
would be inadmissible, but went on to hold that a specialist holding a 
minority view in his own field could still be regarded as an expert so long 
as he was not merely `a quack, a charlatan or an enthusiastic amateur'. 
This must now be read in the light of R v. Gilfoyle (No. 2) [2001] 2 Cr App 
R 57, where the Court of Appeal held, in the context of evidence of 
psychological conditions, that `evidence based on a developing new brand 
of science or medicine is not admissible until accepted by the scientific 
community as being able to provide accurate and reliable opinion'. 
According to this test, a would-be expert witness must furnish the court 
with a sufficient database and a substantial body of academic writing 
approving his methodology. In other words, there must be the necessary 
scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of an expert's conclusions, to 
enable the judge or jury to form their own independent judgment by the 
application of those criteria to the facts proved. However, a more flexible 
approach was adopted in R v. Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 195 (CA), a 
case on the admissibility of ear-print evidence, where it was thought that 
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the sole test for admissibility is whether the field of expertise is sufficiently 
well-established to pass the ordinary tests of relevance and reliability. 
In the South Australian case of R v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 
(SASC) (at pp. 46±7) King CJ broke down the test for determining the 
competence of a witness to give an expert opinion into three questions. 
First, is the subject matter of the opinion such that a person without 
instruction or experience in the area would be able to form a sound 
judgment without the assistance of a witness possessing special knowledge 
or experience in the area? Second, does the subject matter of the opinion 
form part of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently 
organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or 
experience? Third, has the witness acquired by study or experience 
sufficient knowledge of the subject matter to render his opinion of value in 
resolving an issue before the court? This test was cited with approval in 
Barings v. Cooper & Lybrand [2001] PNLR 551 (ChD) and Clarke v. 
Marlborough Fine Art (London) (No. 3) [2002] EWHC 11 (ChD), and has 
been tacitly approved by the Court of Appeal (R v. Woods [2002] EWCA 
Crim 3189, R v. Hodges [2003] 2 Cr App R 247 (CA)). To the three 
Bonython criteria may be added a fourth. The expert must be able to 
provide an impartial, objective opinion on the matter within his expertise. 
If the expert is unable to discharge this duty he is not competent to give his 
opinion (Field v. Leeds City Council [2001] 2 CPLR 129 (CA)). 
12.2.3 Primary and Secondary Facts 
In formulating his opinion an expert will naturally have to rely on certain 
facts directly arising out of the case itself (`primary facts'), but to justify 
his opinion he will almost certainly have to refer to extraneous sources of 
information such as articles or data published in reputable journals and 
texts (`secondary facts'). The reliability of an expert's opinion depends to a 
large extent on the reliability of the primary facts upon which that opinion 
has been based. Primary facts, like any other evidence relied on in the 
proceedings, must be proved by admissible evidence, whether or not by the 
expert himself, so the court can ensure that the expert has not been 
misinformed or taken irrelevant facts into consideration (R v. Turner 
[1975] 2 WLR 56 (CA) at pp. 59±61). In R v. Loveridge [2001] EWCA 
Crim 734 the accused was charged with robbery on the basis of DNA 
evidence obtained from a balaclava helmet worn by one of the robbers. 
However, while there was a forensic scientist who was able to interpret 
DNA profiles, the prosecution failed to prove by admissible evidence the 
provenance of the two profiles she had before her. The Court of Appeal 
therefore concluded that there was `no admissible evidence before the 
court to make the DNA evidence admissible' and quashed the conviction 
for robbery (see also R v. Jackson [1996] 2 Cr App R 420 (CA)). 
Different considerations apply to secondary facts because they are 
unlikely to be unreliable. The information and data published in reputable 
journals will already have been scrutinised and commented upon by other 
specialists in the field, and the justifications for excluding hearsay 
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generally do not apply to such evidence. For this reason secondary facts 
are not excluded by the hearsay rule. Such facts are not only admissible 
but ought to be admitted, once the primary facts have been proved, to 
demonstrate to the court how the expert reached his opinion. This was 
made clear in the leading case of R v. Abadom [1983] 1 WLR 126. The 
accused in that case was alleged to have been one of a group of masked 
robbers who had entered an office, broken a window and demanded 
money. The evidence identifying him as one of the offenders included the 
opinion of a forensic scientist who gave evidence that glass fragments 
found on the accused's shoes matched the broken glass at the scene of the 
crime, in that they shared the same refractive index, and that such glass 
was relatively uncommon. In formulating his opinion the expert had relied 
on unpublished Home Office statistics which showed that the refractive 
index of the glass in the two samples had been found in only 4 per cent of 
all glass samples analysed in various forensic laboratories over a number 
of years. The accused appealed on the ground that the scientist should not 
have been allowed to rely on the statistics which, it was submitted, were 
inadmissible hearsay. The Court of Appeal held that the exclusionary 
hearsay rule applied only to primary facts and not to any secondary facts. 
So long as the evidence of the refractive index of each of the two glass 
samples had been proved by the person who had analysed the sample in 
question, the secondary facts (that is, the Home Office data) had been 
properly relied on by the expert in reaching his opinion. 
In H v. Schering Chemicals [1983] 1 WLR 143 (QBD) Bingham J 
suggested that where an expert refers to the results of research published 
by a reputable authority in a reputable journal the court would ordinarily 
regard those results as supporting inferences fairly to be drawn from them, 
unless or until a different approach was shown to be proper. The Home 
Office statistics in R v. Abadom had not been published, but this did not 
seem to trouble the Court of Appeal, suggesting that whether hearsay 
evidence will be ruled admissible as secondary facts is governed by a test of 
apparent reliability. In R v. Edwards [2001] EWCA Crim 2185 the accused, 
charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to supply, sought to call as 
an expert witness an employee of a drug advice charity to testify that some 
users of the drug took substantially more than 12 tablets during a 24-hour 
period, to support his defence that he was a heavy user and that the 29 
tablets found in his possession were for his personal use. The problem for 
the accused was that the would-be expert's knowledge was based on what 
he had been told by drug addicts rather than on his own personal 
experience or academic materials. The basis of his knowledge was 
therefore unreliable hearsay falling outside the scope of the secondary 
facts exception. Indeed, because his knowledge had come from such an 
unreliable source, he could not even be regarded as an expert on ecstasy 
consumption (cf. R v. Smart [2002] EWCA Crim 772). 
The secondary facts exception to the hearsay rule applies only to data 
relied on by an expert. If a non-expert witness wishes to rely on such data 
he will be able to do so only if there is a general exception to the hearsay 
rule which can be relied on. In Dawson v. Lunn [1986] RTR 234 the 
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Divisional Court held that the (non-expert) accused should not have been 
permitted to adduce an extract from the British Medical Journal in 
support of his defence to a charge of drink-driving without a properly-
qualified witness being called to give the magistrates guidance on the 
information contained in it. 
One remaining question is whether an expert who refers to privileged 
primary facts thereby waives his client's legal professional privilege in 
respect of them. In Clough v. Tameside & Glossop Health Authority [1998] 
1 WLR 1478 (QBD), a medical negligence case decided under the old 
Rules of the Supreme Court, the defendant's disclosed expert report (Dr 
H's report) referred to another doctor's undisclosed, privileged report 
(Dr P's report) which Dr H had been sent and seen as part of the 
background documentation in the case. Bracewell J held that by disclosing 
Dr H's expert report, and referring in that report to Dr P's privileged 
report, the defendant had waived the privilege which had hitherto attached 
to Dr P's report, even though Dr H may not have relied on Dr P's report 
in reaching his expert opinion. The justification for this decision was that 
an expert is under a duty to make full disclosure of all facts considered by 
him when reaching his opinion so that the opposing party will be able to 
ascertain whether the opinion was based on a sound factual basis. 
Bracewell J said (at p. 1484): 
`It is only by proper and full disclosure to all parties, that an expert's 
opinion can be tested in court, in order to ascertain whether all 
appropriate information was supplied and how the expert dealt with it 
. . . Fairness dictates that a party should not be forced to meet a case 
pleaded or an expert opinion on the basis of documents he cannot see.' 
In Bourns v. Raychem [1999] 3 All ER 154 (CA), however, it was held 
that mere reference to a document does not waive privilege in it; there 
must at least be reference to the contents and reliance on the document. 
Aldous LJ was not willing to accept Bracewell J's view of the law in Clough 
v. Tameside & Glossop Health Authority (although it was thought that the 
result in that case was probably correct); and Swinton Thomas LJ stated 
that he would wish to reserve for future consideration whether, even on its 
own facts, Clough v. Tameside & Glossop Health Authority had been 
correctly decided. The position in civil proceedings is now governed by the 
Civil Procedure Rules 1998. Rule 31.14(2) provides that, subject to 
r. 35.10(4), a party may apply for an order for inspection of any document 
mentioned in an expert's report which has not already been disclosed. An 
expert's report must state the substance of all written instructions on the 
basis of which the report was written (r. 35.10(3)) but, while the 
instructions are not privileged against disclosure, the court will not order 
disclosure of any specific document (or permit cross-examination in 
court) in relation to those instructions unless there are reasonable grounds 
to consider the statement of instructions to be inaccurate or incomplete 
(r. 35.10(4)). It remains to be seen whether the approach adopted in 
Clough v. Tameside & Glossop Health Authority applies in criminal 
proceedings. In R v. Davies (2002) 166 JP 243 the Court of Appeal left the 
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question open, but noted that, even if it did apply, the court would be able 
to ameliorate any unfairness to the accused by applying s. 78(1) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
12.2.4 Expert Opinions on Ultimate Issues 
At common law it has traditionally been unacceptable for an expert to 
give an opinion on any `ultimate' issue. The view has been that issues of 
fact are ultimately for the tribunal of fact to decide according to the 
standard of proof determined by law; it is not for experts to usurp that 
fact-finding role by applying their own individual standard. Thus in 
Haynes v. Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 (CA) it was not permissible for persons 
involved in a particular trade to give their opinion on the reasonableness 
of a restraint of trade clause in a contract of employment. Similarly, in 
DPP v. A and BC Chewing Gum [1967] 3 WLR 493 (DC) (12.2.1 ante) 
Lord Parker CJ felt that while an expert in child psychiatry was competent 
to give an expert opinion on the effect of battle scenes on children, it 
would be wrong for him to give his opinion on whether any of the 
defendant company's cards actually tended to corrupt or deprave `because 
that final stage was a matter which was entirely for the justices' (see also 
R v. Lupien [1970] SCR 263 (SCC)). 
The ultimate issues rule is unnecessary if its rationale is to prevent the 
usurpation of the tribunal of fact's role. As a general rule, the tribunal of 
fact has the right to ignore any expert opinion evidence (12.2.5 post). 
Perhaps the true justification is to prevent jurors from simply accepting 
expert opinions without question and abrogating their own responsibility 
to find the facts. This fear would seem to be implicit in Lawton LJ's dictum 
in R v. Turner [1975] 2 WLR 56 (CA) (12.2.1 ante), but it is an insufficient 
basis for the rule because any opposing party is able to call his own expert 
to give a conflicting opinion. In fact, given the adversarial system, there 
would seem to be no valid justification for the rule so long as experts 
confine their opinions to questions of fact. After all, experts are better 
qualified to draw appropriate inferences from evidence falling within their 
areas of expertise than lay triers of fact. 
The ultimate issues rule has now been abolished for civil proceedings 
(s. 3(1) and 3(3) of the Civil Evidence Act 1972) and its formal abolition 
was recommended for criminal trials by the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee in its Eleventh Report (Cmnd 4991 (1972) at p. 155). The rule 
has often been disregarded in criminal proceedings anyway, as noted by 
Lord Parker CJ in DPP v. A and BC Chewing Gum [1967] 3 WLR 493 (DC) 
(at p. 497): 
`Those who practise in the criminal courts see every day cases of experts 
being called on the question of diminished responsibility, and although 
technically the final question ``Do you think he was suffering from 
diminished responsibility?'' is strictly inadmissible, it is allowed time 
and time again without any objection.' 
In R v. Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260 the Court of Appeal accepted 
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that if there was a rule prohibiting experts from giving an opinion on an 
ultimate issue `it has long been more honoured in the breach than the 
observance' and went on to hold (at p. 266): 
`In our view an expert is called to give his opinion and he should be 
allowed to do so. It is, however, important that the judge should make 
clear to the jury that they are not bound by the expert's opinion, and 
that the issue is for them to decide.' 
It is now beyond doubt that an expert is able to give his opinion on an 
`ultimate issue' in criminal proceedings, so long as that opinion is within 
the area of his expertise and the judge makes it clear that it is for the jury 
to decide the issue (R v. Gokal (1999) unreported (97/04132/S2) (CA), R v. 
Ugoh [2001] EWCA Crim 1381, R v. KL [2002] EWCA Crim 2171). 
12.2.5 The Status of Expert Opinion Evidence 
As a general rule, it is open to the tribunal of fact to attach to an expert's 
opinion such weight as it thinks fit, or even disregard it, like any other 
item of evidence (R v. Lanfear [1968] 2 WLR 623 (CA), R v. Stockwell 
(1993) 97 Cr App R 260 (CA), R v. Fitzpatrick [1999] Crim LR 832 (CA)). 
In R v. Rivett (1950) 34 Cr App R 87 the Court of Criminal Appeal held 
that the issue of criminal insanity was a question to be determined by the 
jury and that there would be no interference with a finding of guilt merely 
because there had been evidence by medical men of the highest standing 
that the accused was insane at the time of the offence. This is not 
surprising because the defence of insanity is not simply a medical question; 
but in R v. O'Brien [2000] Crim LR 676 (98/06926/S1) the Court of Appeal 
held that where expert evidence of the accused's mental abnormality has 
been placed before the jury, they must be directed that they are not obliged 
to accept it. The same general principle applies in civil proceedings. For 
example, in Fuller v. Strum (2000) The Times 14.2.01 (ChD) the trial judge 
was able to reject the opinion of a handwriting expert, favouring instead 
the evidence of lay witnesses to the effect that a will had not been forged. 
As noted by the judge, a handwriting analyst's opinion is ultimately 
impressionistic, falling outside the `purely scientific category' in respect of 
which the judge would be helpless without expert assistance. It was 
therefore permissible for the judge to draw his own inference from the 
differences between the disputed and genuine signatures and reject the 
opinion of the expert. Where the evidence is of a `purely scientific' type, 
however, the judge will need to provide sound reasons for his decision to 
reject uncontroverted expert opinion evidence in favour of non-expert 
evidence (Re B (a Minor) [2000] 1 WLR 790 (CA)). 
The principle that expert opinion evidence may be rejected is of general 
application, but there is an important exception. In R v. Rivett (1950) 34 
Cr App R 87 the Court of Criminal Appeal recognised that a conviction 
could be quashed on appeal if it was a verdict no reasonable jury could 
have come to on the evidence before them, such as where the jury had 
rejected an opinion which the expert had been able to give with `certainty, 
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as in the case of a bodily disease, from specific symptoms such as a rash, a 
coma or other physical signs that a disease exists'. Similarly, in R v. 
Matheson [1958] 1 WLR 474 a five-member Court of Criminal Appeal 
held that juries were obliged to accept medical expert opinion evidence 
adduced by the defence if there was nothing in the other evidence to lead 
them to a different conclusion. Thus, in R v. Smith [1999] All ER (D) 1455 
the Court of Appeal quashed a conviction for rape where the jury had 
rejected unchallenged medical evidence that the incident could not 
possibly have happened as described by the complainant. Although it 
was accepted that situations might arise where medical evidence was only 
part of the picture, and that there might therefore be a good reason why it 
was rejected by the jury, this was not such a case. The complainant had 
been two years from puberty at the time of the alleged incident, and the 
expert had been firmly of the view that the allegation of vigorous and 
prolonged intercourse could not possibly have occurred without injuring 
her. Similarly, in R v. Bailey (1961) 66 Cr App R 31 (CCA) the accused's 
conviction for murder was quashed as the jury had unreasonably rejected 
the uncontradicted expert evidence of three doctors that the accused had 
been suffering from an abnormality of the mind induced by disease such 
that his mental responsibility for the killing had been substantially 
impaired (in other words, diminished responsibility). 
However, in Walton v. R [1977] 3 WLR 902 (PC) it was held that the 
jury had been entitled to disregard uncontradicted medical evidence. The 
quality and weight of the evidence in that case rendered it `not entirely 
convincing' and the jury had also had before them other (non-medical) 
evidence which could have suggested the absence of any abnormality of 
the mind. A similar approach was adopted by the Court of Appeal in R v. 
Eifinger [2001] EWCA Crim 1855. The jury had been entitled to find the 
accused guilty of murder, notwithstanding the existence of uncontradicted 
medical evidence supporting his defence of diminished responsibility. The 
two psychiatrists who had given that evidence had based their opinions on 
nothing other than what the accused himself had told them, and the jury 
had had the opportunity to see the accused and assess for themselves the 
reliability of his evidence (see also R v. Bradshaw (1985) 82 Cr App R 79 
(CA)). In R v. Sanders (1991) 93 Cr App R 245 (at p. 249) the Court of 
Appeal concluded that there were `two clear principles' in cases of 
diminished responsibility: 
`The first is that if there are no other circumstances to consider, 
unequivocal, uncontradicted medical evidence favourable to a defen-
dant should be accepted by a jury and they should be so directed. The 
second is that where there are other circumstances to be considered the 
medical evidence, though it be unequivocal and uncontradicted, must 
be assessed in the light of the other circumstances.' 
It is often the case that conflicting expert opinion evidence will be 
adduced by the opposing parties. In civil trials where the judge is the sole 
trier of fact he must resolve the conflict and give his reasons (Sewell v. 
Electrolux (1997) The Times 7.11.97 (CA)). In criminal trials if an expert is 
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called by the prosecution to give an opinion on an issue which the 
prosecution must prove, the jury must be sure that his evidence is correct 
before they can rely on it (R v. Platt [1981] Crim LR 332 (CA)). 
12.2.6 The Expert Witness's Duties 
In The Ikarian Reefer [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 68 (QBD) (at pp. 81±2) 
Cresswell J set out the duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses in civil 
litigation. These guidelines have, in effect, been incorporated into the Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998 Practice Direction (PD 35) for experts and 
assessors. Expert evidence must be the independent product of the expert, 
uninfluenced by the pressures of litigation. An expert should assist the 
court by providing an objective, unbiased opinion on matters within his 
expertise, and should consider all material facts including those which 
might detract from his opinion. An expert should make it clear when a 
question or issue falls outside his expertise and when he is not able to 
reach a definite opinion because, for example, he has insufficient 
information; and, if after producing a report, he changes his view on 
any material matter, this should be communicated to all parties without 
delay. An expert should also set out in his written report: the details of any 
literature or other material relied on in preparing it; the substance of the 
material facts and instructions given to him; and which of the facts stated 
in the report are within his own knowledge (see also CPR 1998, 
r. 35.10(3)). 
Rule 35.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 expressly provides that the 
expert's duty to help the court overrides any obligation to the person from 
whom he has received instructions or by whom he is paid. Further, the 
expert must include at the end of his written report a statement to the 
effect that he understands his duty to the court and that he has complied 
with it (CPR 1998, r. 35.10(2)). If an expert fails to comply with this 
requirement the court may exclude his evidence, notwithstanding its 
importance to the case (see Stevens v. Gullis [2000] 1 All ER 527 (CA)). 
Cresswell J's summary of the expert witness's duties was cited with 
approval by the Court of Appeal in The Ikarian Reefer [1995] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 455 (at p. 496) and by Otton LJ in Stanton v. Callaghan [1999] 2 WLR 
745 (CA) (at p. 774) and would, therefore, appear to represent the position 
at common law. It follows that experts in criminal proceedings are, in 
effect, under the same duty as their counterparts in civil proceedings. 
Indeed, one of the successful grounds of appeal in R v. Ward [1993] 1 
WLR 619 (CA) was the fact that government `scientists' had deliberately 
withheld material experimental data in the belief that such data might 
damage the prosecution case, a breach of their `clear duty' to assist the 
court in an impartial way. 
12.3 Previous Judgments as Evidence 
Sections 11 to 13 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 and s. 74 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provide for the admissibility of previous 
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judgments, a form of opinion evidence, in certain circumstances. The 
common-law rule is that previous convictions, and therefore previous civil 
judgments, are inadmissible in subsequent proceedings (Hollington v. 
Hewthorn [1943] 1 KB 587 (CA)). 
12.3.1 Sections 11 to 13 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 
In civil proceedings a subsisting criminal conviction is admissible for the 
purpose of proving that the person convicted, whether or not a party to 
the civil proceedings, committed that offence (s. 11(1)). So, if cars driven 
by P and D were involved in a collision which damaged P's car and/or 
injured him, proof of D's conviction for careless driving arising out of that 
collision will be admissible to prove his negligence in the subsequent civil 
proceedings. This is to be expected because the standard of proof in 
criminal proceedings is higher than in civil proceedings: the fact that D's 
negligence has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, or that he has 
pleaded guilty, is highly probative evidence of his civil negligence. That 
said, the conviction is not conclusive of his civil liability. By virtue of 
s. 11(2)(a) the conviction raises a persuasive presumption that D 
committed the offence, so it is open to D to prove on the balance of 
probabilities that he did not commit it. Although it has been said that `this 
is likely to be an uphill task' (Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West 
Midlands Police [1981] 3 WLR 906 (HL)) and that the burden is `a heavy 
one' (Cooper v. Pitcher (1999) unreported (98/0574/2) (CA)), this should 
not be the case where the burden of proof was on D in the earlier criminal 
proceedings. 
In Stupple v. Royal Insurance [1970] 3 WLR 217, a case where the 
plaintiff sought to disprove his conviction for robbery, there was a 
difference of opinion in the Court of Appeal as to the effect of a conviction 
adduced pursuant to s.11(1). Buckley LJ felt its value was limited to 
reversing the burden of proof, obliging the plaintiff to prove on the 
balance of probabilities that he did not commit the offence. Lord 
Denning MR went further, suggesting that a conviction also amounted to a 
`weighty piece of evidence' in its own right to be considered by the judge 
when deciding whether the burden of proof had been discharged by the 
plaintiff, and the weight to be given to a previous conviction was, like any 
other evidence, a matter for the judge. According to Lord Denning, 
because the plaintiff had been convicted after a month-long trial by a jury 
who were unanimous, his conviction carried `great weight' in his civil 
action. 
In defamation trials proof that a person stands convicted of a criminal 
offence is conclusive evidence that he committed the offence (s. 13(1)). The 
policy behind this provision is to ensure that where a person's criminal 
offence has been reported it should not be open to that person to initiate a 
collateral attack on his conviction by commencing proceedings for 
defamation (Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police 
[1981] 3 WLR 906 (HL) at pp. 915±16). It also guarantees the freedom to 
report that a person has committed an offence once he has been convicted 
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of it. Section 12 governs the admissibility of findings of adultery and 
paternity in subsequent civil proceedings, an exception to the general rule 
that civil judgments are not admissible as evidence in subsequent civil 
proceedings. 
12.3.2 Section 74(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
In criminal proceedings it may be necessary or desirable for the 
prosecution to prove that a crime has been committed by a person other 
than the accused in order to prove that the accused is guilty of the offence 
charged. An obvious example is where the accused faces a charge of 
handling stolen goods. The prosecution must prove the goods were stolen, 
and one way of doing this is to show that another person has already been 
convicted of stealing or handling them. Another example is provided by 
the facts of R v. Gummerson [1999] Crim LR 680 (97/08492/W2) (CA). D1 
and D2 were recognised by the victim, on the basis of their voices, as two 
of the men who had robbed and assaulted him. D1 was convicted 
following a guilty plea, but D2 pleaded not guilty and was tried. The 
prosecution adduced D1's conviction to undermine D2's defence that the 
circumstances of the robbery would have prevented the victim from being 
able to identify any of the offenders (including D2) from their voices. 
Section 74(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 governs the 
admissibility of such convictions which have not been quashed on appeal 
(s. 75(4)). If a conviction is admissible under s. 74(1) there is a persuasive 
presumption that the offence was committed by the convicted person 
(s. 74(2)), so it is still open to the jury to find that he was not guilty (R v. 
Pigram [1995] Crim LR 808 (CA), R v. Dixon (2000) 164 JP 721 (CA)). If 
the judge rules that a conviction is relevant and admissible under s. 74(1), 
and ought not to be excluded by the application of s. 78(1), the contents of 
the relevant information, complaint, indictment or charge-sheet are 
admissible to identify the facts on which the conviction was based 
(s. 75(1)(b)). Section 75(1) does no more than specify the documents which 
are admissible for the purpose of identifying the facts on which a 
conviction is based, once the admissibility of the conviction itself has been 
established under s. 74(1) (R v. Hinchcliffe [2002] EWCA Crim 837). 
In many cases the admission of a conviction under s. 74(1) will not 
unduly prejudice the accused, but where the offence the accused has been 
charged with is inextricably tied up with the offence committed by the 
other person the risk of undue prejudice must be addressed, and it may be 
appropriate in such cases for the judge to exclude a conviction which is 
prima facie admissible. The possibility of undue prejudice is a consequence 
of the Court of Appeal's broad interpretation of s. 74(1) in R v. Robertson 
[1987] 3 WLR 327 where it was held that the provision applied to `any 
issue' in the proceedings and not just issues which were an essential 
ingredient of the offence charged. 
If, for example, D is on trial for conspiring to commit an offence with G 
it is technically open to the prosecution to prove pursuant to ss. 74(1) and 
75(1) that G has already pleaded guilty to that conspiracy. However, it has 
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been held that in cases of this sort s. 78(1) should be applied to exclude G's 
conviction as it would imply that D is guilty unless he can prove the 
contrary (R v. O'Connor (1986) 85 Cr App R 298 (CA)). If s. 78(1) were 
not applied in such cases there would in effect be a reversal of the burden 
of proof, and the common-law principle established in R v. Moore (1956) 
40 Cr App R 50 (CCA), that a plea of guilty by one co-accused is not 
evidence against another, would be significantly undermined. Accordingly 
in R v. Curry [1988] Crim LR 527 the Court of Appeal held that s. 74(1) 
should be sparingly used, particularly in relation to joint offences such as 
conspiracy and affray, and should not be used at all if the conviction 
would necessarily imply the accused's complicity. The Court of Appeal's 
reasoning is of general application; so in R v. Mattison [1990] Crim LR 
117 (CA), where D was charged with an offence of gross indecency with G, 
contrary to s. 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, G's conviction should 
have been excluded as it necessarily implied D's guilt. 
Where, however, G's conviction does not necessarily imply D's guilt 
because of the nature of the offence, or the number of persons alleged to 
have been involved in the conspiracy, there may be no unfairness in 
allowing its admission simply to prove the commission of an offence. In 
R v. Robertson [1987] 3 WLR 327, D faced an allegation of conspiring 
with G1 and G2 to commit burglaries and the prosecution relied on s. 74(1) 
to prove that G1 and G2 had pleaded guilty to the substantive offences of 
burglary, and therefore that there had been a conspiracy. The Court of 
Appeal held that the judge had properly allowed evidence of the 
convictions to be admitted to prove the existence of a conspiracy as it 
did not necessarily imply D's involvement in it, particularly as D's name 
was absent from the counts to which G1 and G2 had pleaded guilty. In R 
v. Lunnon (1988) 88 Cr App R 71 four co-accused were charged with 
conspiracy to steal from shops, but one pleaded guilty on arraignment and 
her conviction was adduced pursuant to s. 74(1) at the trial of the other 
three. The Court of Appeal dismissed D's appeal against conviction as the 
judge had properly exercised his discretion under s. 78(1): G's guilty plea 
had been adduced simply as evidence of the first limb of the prosecution's 
case ± the existence of a conspiracy ± and the judge had made it quite clear 
in his summing-up that the jury had to be sure that each co-accused, 
including D, had actually been involved (the second limb of the 
prosecution case). Similarly, in R v. Bennett [1988] Crim LR 686, where 
D was charged with theft ± a charge to which G had already pleaded 
guilty, in that as a supermarket cashier she had passed goods for less than 
their true price to D ± the Court of Appeal held that G's conviction had 
been properly admitted simply to show there had been a theft. Whether or 
not D had been involved in the theft had been a matter for the jury. D 
could, for instance, have been ignorant of G's culpable conduct. 
As already noted, it is always open to the trial judge to exercise his 
exclusionary discretion under s. 78(1) of PACE to prevent the prosecution 
from relying on s. 74(1) if the admission of a former co-accused's guilty 
plea would adversely affect the fairness of the accused's trial. A relevant 
consideration for the judge will be the strength of the case against the 
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former co-accused and the fact that the remaining accused will be denied 
the opportunity of challenging the prosecution evidence upon which that 
conviction was based (R v. Lee [1996] Crim LR 825 (CA)). The judge 
should also take into account the fact that the former co-accused is not 
available to be cross-examined (R v. Kempster [1989] 1 WLR 1125 (CA)) ± 
although this will be of no consequence if cross-examination would have 
been unlikely (R v. Robertson [1987] 3 WLR 327 (CA)). In R v. Boyson 
[1991] Crim LR 274 the Court of Appeal set out four principles governing 
the admissibility of convictions under s. 74(1): 
`(a) the conviction must be clearly relevant to an issue in the accused's 
trial; (b) section 74(1) must be sparingly used; (c) the judge should 
consider the question of fairness under section 78 of the Act and 
whether the probative value of the conviction outweighs its prejudicial 
[effect]; and (d) the judge must direct the jury clearly as to the issues to 
which the conviction is not relevant and also why the evidence is before 
them and to what issue it is directed.' 
In R v. Stewart [1999] Crim LR 746, however, the Court of Appeal 
reaffirmed the principle that, when considering the application of s. 78(1), 
it is necessary to have regard not only to the interests of the accused but 
also to the interests of the prosecution and justice as a whole. 
In some cases there may be a more fundamental objection to the 
admissibility of a conviction under s. 74(1). In R v. Mahmood [1997] 1 Cr 
App R 414, D, on trial for rape, admitted that he had had sexual 
intercourse with the complainant but contended that she had consented 
or, alternatively, that he had believed she was consenting. The case against 
him was that the complainant had been incapable of consent on account 
of being drunk. The prosecution therefore sought to adduce the fact that 
D's former co-accused (G) had already pleaded guilty on the ground that 
it was relevant to the issue of consent. The judge allowed G's conviction to 
be adduced and D was convicted. The Court of Appeal held that G's 
guilty plea had not been relevant to the issue of consent as G had had sex 
with the complainant some time after D, and it had not even been made 
clear on what basis G had pleaded guilty. Moreover, even if there had 
been any probative value in the conviction it had been `wholly outweighed' 
by the prejudice caused to D. D's conviction was therefore quashed. 
12.3.3 Section 74(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
Section 74(3) provides that `where evidence is admissible of the fact that the 
accused has committed an offence, in so far as that evidence is relevant to 
any matter in issue in the proceedings for a reason other than a tendency to 
show in the accused a disposition to commit the kind of offence with which 
he is charged, if the accused is proved to have been convicted of the offence 
. . . he shall be taken to have committed that offence unless the contrary is 
proved'. This provision, unlike s. 74(1), presupposes that the accused's 
previous conviction is already admissible at common law or pursuant to a 
separate statutory provision (for example, s. 1(3) of the Criminal Evidence 
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Act 1898). The subsection does not itself render previous convictions 
admissible (R v. Harris [2001] Crim LR 227 (CA)). 
The qualification in s.74(3) ± `in so far as that evidence is relevant to any 
matter in issue in the proceedings for a reason other than a tendency to 
show in the accused a disposition to commit the kind of offence with 
which he is charged' ± is, in effect, a restatement of the old `Makin test' for 
the admissibility of similar fact evidence (3.3.4 ante). This suggests that 
similar fact evidence which is admissible by virtue of the test established in 
DPP v. P [1991] 3 WLR 161 (HL) (3.3.6 ante) falls within the scope of the 
subsection, and that inadmissible similar fact evidence remains inad-
missible. On this view (which would appear to have been accepted by the 
Court of Appeal in R v. Shanks [2003] EWCA Crim 680) the accused is 
deemed to have committed the other similar fact offences of which he has 
been convicted, and it is for him to prove the contrary. 
12.3.4 Acquittals as Evidence 
An acquittal usually establishes nothing more than that the tribunal of 
fact was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt, save 
that a defence which has been accepted may in certain circumstances 
amount to a specific finding of fact. Juries (and some lay magistrates) do 
not give reasons for their verdicts or explain their findings of fact, so in 
most cases an acquittal says nothing about any factual issue which had to 
be determined by them. For this reason acquittals are generally 
inadmissible as evidence for the determination of any issue in subsequent 
criminal or civil proceedings as `the verdict reached by a different jury . . . 
in the earlier trial [is] irrelevant' (Hui Chi-Ming v. R [1991] 3 WLR 495 
(PC) at p. 500). Exceptionally, however, an acquittal may be admissible if 
it has sufficient probative value and its exclusion would be contrary to the 
interests of justice. 
In R v. Cooke (1986) 84 Cr App R 286, for example, it was held that the 
circumstances of the trial at which A1 and A2 had been acquitted should 
have been admitted at D's trial. D, A1 and A2 were alleged to have made 
confessions over a short period of time, about the same series of events, to 
a particular police officer and there was a clear inference from the 
acquittals at the earlier trial of A1 and A2 that the officer had been 
disbelieved by the jury. The Court of Appeal provided the following 
analysis (at pp. 291±2): 
`[W]here a police officer has allegedly obtained admissions on interviews 
about the same group of offences from different accused as part of a 
connected series of interviews over a short period, where those 
interviews are alleged to have been fabricated, and where the alleged 
admissions were the essential evidence against one or more of the 
accused who were nevertheless acquitted, justice demands that the jury 
should know this when they are considering a challenge by another 
accused to the truth of evidence of admissions said to have been made 
by him to the same officer at about the same time and about the same 
series of events.' 
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The same approach was adopted in R v. Edwards [1991] 1 WLR 207, 
where the Court of Appeal held that the test was whether the acquittal 
`demonstrated' that the prosecution witness's evidence was disbelieved by 
the jury (see also 3.3.19 ante). 
In R v. Hay (1983) 77 Cr App R 70 the accused was charged with 
burglary and the prosecution relied on the record of his police interview in 
which he had confessed to the burglary and an offence of arson. At the 
accused's (earlier) trial for arson the prosecution case had been based on 
an edited version of the same interview record, and the acquittal in that 
trial followed a defence in which it was alleged that the confession had 
been fabricated by the police. During the trial for burglary the accused 
insisted that the whole record of his interview should go before the jury, 
and sought to adduce evidence of the acquittal to support his defence that 
the confession to burglary had been fabricated. The trial judge refused the 
application and the accused was convicted. The Court of Appeal, relying 
on the decision in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor of Malaya [1950] AC 
458 (PC), held that the jury should have been told that the accused had 
been acquitted of arson and that the acquittal was conclusive evidence that 
he was not guilty of arson and that his confession to that offence was 
untrue (see also R v. Gall (1989) 90 Cr App R 64 (CA)). In Sambasivam v. 
Public Prosecutor of Malaya Lord MacDermott had stated (at p. 479) that 
an acquittal not only prevented the accused from being tried again for the 
same offence but was also `binding and conclusive in all subsequent 
proceedings between the parties to the adjudication'. In R v. Z [2000] 3 
WLR 117, however, the House of Lords held that, so long as the accused 
is not placed in double jeopardy, evidence which is relevant in a 
subsequent trial is not inadmissible merely because it tends to show that 
the accused is guilty of an offence of which he has already been acquitted. 
Although Lord Hutton, who provided the leading speech, declined to give 
an opinion on whether R v. Hay had been correctly decided, it is clear that 
the second limb of Lord Macdermott's dictum (which was relied on in R v. 
Hay) is no longer the law. However, there can be little doubt that evidence 
of an acquittal in a case such as R v. Hay is still admissible to show that a 
confession may be unreliable, just as an acquittal is admissible if it shows 
that a police officer was disbelieved by another jury and is therefore an 
unreliable witness (3.3.19 ante). In other words, an acquittal is not 
conclusive evidence that the accused was not guilty of the earlier offence, 
or that his confession was fabricated, but it is evidence which the jury 
should take into consideration when deciding whether the accused's 
confession is reliable. 
12.3.5 Section 73 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
Section 73(1) provides that where the fact that a person has been convicted 
or acquitted of an offence is admissible in criminal proceedings, it may be 
proved by producing a certificate of conviction or acquittal. For 
convictions or acquittals following trial on indictment, the certificate 
must include the `substance and effect . . . of the indictment and of the 
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conviction or acquittal' (s. 73(2)(a)). For convictions or acquittals 
following summary proceedings, the certificate must `consist of a copy 
of the conviction or of the dismissal of the information' (s. 73(2)(b)). A 
duly signed document purporting to be a certificate of conviction or 
acquittal is to be considered such a certificate unless the contrary is proved 
(s. 73(2)). 
Section 73(1) does not preclude the proof of convictions by other 
means, however (s. 73(4)). In Moran v. CPS (2000) 164 JP 562 (DC), for 
example, the accused, who was on trial for driving a vehicle on 8 April 
1999 while disqualified, admitted that he had been disqualified by a 
magistrates' court on 3 February 1999 following a conviction. 
Chapter Summary 
.	 As a general rule, a witness is not entitled to give his opinion on any matter in the 
proceedings. There are two exceptions to this rule. 
.	 Any witness is permitted to give his oral evidence in a natural way, even if this 
means that his testimony includes a number of inferences he has drawn from what 
he saw or heard. 
.	 A competent expert witness is entitled to give his (expert) opinion on relevant 
matters outside the general knowledge and experience of the tribunal of fact, for 
example on psychiatric or psychological conditions (as opposed to normal human 
emotions and feelings). As a general rule the tribunal of fact may attach to an 
expert's opinion such weight as it thinks fit. 
.	 Whether an expert is competent to give an opinion depends on whether his field 
of expertise is recognised by the court and he has sufficient expertise in that field. 
He must also be able to give an objective opinion on the matter calling for his 
expertise. An expert is entitled (indeed ought) to place before the court the data 
and information he has relied on in formulating his opinion. 
.	 A subsisting conviction is admissible in civil proceedings under s. 11 of the Civil 
Evidence Act 1968 to prove that the convicted party committed that offence. In 
criminal proceedings the relevant conviction of a person other than the accused is 
admissible under s. 74(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to prove a 
disputed issue, save that the evidence may be excluded under s. 78(1) if its 
admission would unduly prejudice the accused. Acquittals are usually irrelevant 
and inadmissible, but it may exceptionally be permissible for the accused to rely 
on an acquittal in subsequent criminal proceedings if it has sufficient probative 
value. 
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Disclosure and Public 13 
Interest Immunity 
The first part of this chapter is concerned with the law governing pre-trial 
disclosure of admissible evidence and other relevant information, 
reflecting two aspects of the right to a fair hearing: first, that litigants 
should have the means by which to gain access to relevant material in 
advance of the trial so that they can effectively pursue their claim or 
defence; and, second, that litigants should not be `ambushed' during the 
trial by evidence which they are in no position to challenge at short notice. 
The second part of this chapter describes an important countervailing 
consideration of public policy, a rule of secrecy which not only overrides 
the principle of `openness' underlying pre-trial disclosure but may also 
prevent relevant evidence from being admitted during the trial itself. 
13.1 Pre-trial Disclosure 
It is in the public interest that the parties to a dispute ± and for that matter 
third parties ± should reveal all relevant evidence in their possession so 
that justice can be done and be seen to be done. If parties could withhold 
evidence which might assist their opponents, the number of miscarriages 
of justice would increase and this in turn would lead to a decrease in public 
confidence in the legal process. Parties to civil or criminal proceedings are 
therefore under an obligation to make some sort of pre-trial disclosure, 
and even third parties may be compelled to testify or produce relevant 
documentary evidence. 
As a general rule the prosecution in a criminal trial, and the parties to 
civil proceedings, are duty-bound to reveal all relevant evidence in their 
possession, subject to a successful claim to public interest immunity (13.2 
post) or privilege (14.1±3 post). In criminal proceedings, the accused has 
traditionally enjoyed a general right of non-disclosure on account of the 
presumption of innocence, but there has been a significant curtailment of 
this right in recent years. 
13.1.1 Civil Proceedings 
Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 sets out a two-stage process of 
disclosure and inspection, comprising a preliminary exchange of lists 
revealing the existence of relevant documents which are or have been in a 
party's control (the `disclosure' stage), followed by production of those 
documents for inspection and copying (the `inspection' stage). Rule 31.6, 
which applies where an order to give `standard disclosure' has been made, 
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provides that a party's list must include (a) the documents on which he 
relies; (b) the documents which (i) adversely affect his own case, 
(ii) adversely affect another party's case, or (iii) support another party's 
case; and (c) the documents which he is obliged to disclose by a relevant 
practice direction. Each party is under a duty to make a reasonable search 
for documents falling within categories (b) and (c) (r. 31.7(1)). For these 
purposes, a document is `anything in which information of any description 
is recorded' and a copy is `anything onto which information recorded in 
the document has been copied, by whatever means and whether directly or 
indirectly' (r. 31.4). 
Subject to r. 31.3(2) on disproportionate inspection, all documents 
included in a disclosing party's list which are still in his control must be 
made available for the opposing party to inspect and copy (r. 31.15) unless 
the disclosing party `has a right or duty' to withhold inspection 
(r. 31.3(1)). A party has a right not to produce a document if it is 
privileged (14.1±3 post); he has a duty not to produce a document for 
inspection if it is protected by public interest immunity (13.2 post). A 
disclosing party's list will include documents which are privileged, but will 
not include documents protected by public interest immunity if an order 
for non-disclosure on this ground has been made under r. 31.19(1) (13.2.1 
post). A party may also inspect (and copy) a document mentioned in a 
statement of case, a witness statement, a witness summary or an affidavit 
(r. 31.14(1)). If it is believed that a disclosing party has not complied with 
his obligations to disclose and allow inspection, the court may make an 
order for `specific disclosure' or `specific inspection' under r. 31.12(1). 
Under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, parties to civil proceedings must 
also provide one another with copies of their experts' reports and witness 
statements prior to the trial. An expert's report may not be adduced in 
evidence without the leave of the court (r. 35.4(1)), so an order dealing 
with expert evidence and the exchange of reports will be made at any early 
stage in the pre-trial proceedings. A witness statement is a signed, written 
statement setting out the evidence the witness `would be allowed to give 
orally' at the trial (r. 32.4(1)). Rule 32.4(2) provides that the court `will 
order a party to serve on the other parties any witness statement of the 
oral evidence which the party serving the statement intends to rely on . . . 
at the trial'. If a witness statement is not served within the time specified 
by the court, the witness will not be able to give oral evidence at the trial 
unless the judge gives leave (r. 32.10). If a party serves a witness statement, 
but does not call the witness to give evidence at the trial or put the 
statement in as hearsay evidence, any other party may put the statement in 
as hearsay evidence (r. 32.5(5)). Rule 35.13 provides that a party who fails 
to disclose an expert's report may not, without the court's leave, use the 
report at the trial or call the expert to give oral evidence. 
It should also be noted that a claimant (or prospective claimant) may 
exceptionally be granted a `search order' under s. 7(1) of the Civil 
Procedure Act 1997 (and r. 25.1(1)(h) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998) 
entitling his or another solicitor to search for and preserve evidence from 
the (intended) defendant's premises; and that in Norwich Pharmacal v. 
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Customs and Excise Commissioners [1973] 3 WLR 164 (HL) it was held 
that even third parties can be compelled to reveal relevant information in 
certain circumstances. (Note also ss. 33±34 of the Supreme Court Act 
1981, ss. 52±53 of the County Courts Act 1984 and rr. 25.1(1)(i)±(j) and 
31.17 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.) 
13.1.2 Criminal Proceedings 
Given the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial, it goes 
without saying that the accused should have advance disclosure of the 
nature of the allegation against him and the evidence on which the 
prosecution propose to rely. Without such disclosure the accused could be 
severely handicapped in the preparation his defence. Any person charged 
with an offence which is to be tried before a jury in the Crown Court is 
therefore entitled, by the time of committal proceedings, to receive the 
evidential basis of the case against him (ss. 5A±F of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act 1980, in particular s. 5B(2)(c)); and any person charged with 
an indictable offence which is `triable either way' is entitled to pre-trial 
disclosure in the magistrates' court of copies of the prosecution's witness 
statements or a `summary of the facts and matters of which the prosecutor 
proposes to adduce evidence' (r. 4 of the Magistrates' Courts (Advance 
Information) Rules 1985 (SI 1985 No. 601)). Although persons charged 
with a `summary only' offence in a magistrates' court have no statutory or 
common-law entitlement to advance disclosure, in R v. Stratford Justices 
ex parte Imbert [1999] 2 Cr App R 276 the Divisional Court recommended 
that the prosecution should, as a general rule, furnish the accused with the 
evidence on which they propose to rely. Paragraph 43 of the Attorney-
General's Guidelines on Disclosure (www.lslo.gov.uk) now directs that the 
accused be provided with `all evidence upon which the Crown proposes to 
rely in a summary trial' (regardless of the nature of the offence) to `allow 
the accused or their legal advisers sufficient time properly to consider the 
evidence before it is called'. The only caveat is that `statements may be 
withheld for the protection of witnesses or to avoid interference with the 
course of justice'. In certain circumstances a suspect and his solicitor will 
be entitled to know something of the case against him at a much earlier 
stage in the proceedings, even before the suspect has been charged, where 
it is necessary for the solicitor to provide his client with informed legal 
advice on a matter such as whether he should provide answers during the 
course of his police interrogation (9.2.2 ante) or admit his guilt and receive 
a caution (DPP v. Ara [2002] 1 Cr App R 159 (DC)). 
In addition to the evidence on which the prosecution propose to rely at 
the accused's trial, there will also be a body of material acquired by the 
police during the course of their criminal investigation ± much of which 
may be regarded as irrelevant, superfluous or perhaps even damaging to 
their case ± on which the prosecution will not wish to rely. The European 
Court of Human Rights has stated that `according to the principle of 
equality of arms, as one of the features of the wider concept of a fair trial, 
each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case 
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in conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-aÁ-vis his 
opponent' (Foucher v. France (1997) 25 EHRR 234 at p. 247, FR v. 
Switzerland (2001) Application No. 37292/97). Given that the accused and 
his representatives will have neither the time nor the resources to conduct 
their own investigation into the alleged offence, and will in any event lack 
the powers available to the police's investigating officers, it is clearly 
appropriate that the accused should have access to any such `unused' 
material which is (or which might be) relevant to his defence. More 
important, it is no part of the state's functions to secure a conviction at 
any cost. It is right in principle that the accused should have access to 
unused material which might assist him, for non-disclosure of relevant 
information, such as evidence which would undermine the credibility of a 
key prosecution witness, might well cause the jury to be misled and result 
in a wrongful conviction. Fairness under Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention therefore requires `that the prosecution authorities disclose to 
the defence all material evidence for or against the accused' (Edwards v. 
United Kingdom (1992) 15 EHRR 417 (ECtHR) at pp. 431±2, Dowsett v. 
United Kingdom (2003) Application No. 39482/98 (ECtHR)). 
The law governing the disclosure of unused material in criminal 
proceedings is now contained in the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
and Investigations Act 1996, save that for cases which are to be tried on 
indictment pre-committal disclosure is still governed by the common law, 
the test being whether justice and fairness require immediate disclosure in 
the particular circumstances of the case (R v. DPP ex parte Lee [1999] 2 Cr 
App R 304 (DC) at p. 318, para. 34 of the Attorney-General's Guidelines 
on Disclosure). The provisions of the Act are supplemented by the Code of 
Practice on disclosure ± which is admissible in evidence and `shall be taken 
into account' if relevant to any question arising in the proceedings 
(s. 26(3)±(4)) ± and by the Guidelines on Disclosure. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
the Guidelines state that the statutory scheme is designed to ensure that 
there is fair disclosure of unused material, to `assist the accused in the 
timely preparation and presentation of [his] case and assist the court to 
focus on all the relevant issues', while protecting other interests, `including 
those of victims and witnesses who might otherwise be exposed to harm'. 
If the offence is to be tried on indictment the prosecution are obliged to 
comply with `primary disclosure' under s. 3(1) as soon as is reasonably 
practicable after the accused has been committed for trial (s. 13(1)). This 
requires disclosure of any unused `prosecution material . . . which in the 
prosecutor's opinion might undermine the case for the prosecution against 
the accused' (s. 3(1)(a)) or a written statement that there is no such 
material to be disclosed (s. 3(1)(b)), save that material protected by public 
interest immunity (13.2.2 post) must not be disclosed (s. 3(6)). (The 
common law on public interest immunity is preserved by s. 21(2).) Section 
3(2) defines prosecution material as material `which is in the prosecutor's 
possession, and came into his possession in connection with the case for 
the prosecution against the accused' or which, in pursuance of the Code of 
Practice, the prosecutor `has inspected in connection with the case for the 
prosecution against the accused'. If, however, the prosecution are aware of 
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material relating to an unconnected trial which has a material bearing on 
the credibility of a prosecution witness in the instant case against the 
accused, their general duty to act fairly means that this too should be 
disclosed (R v. Cucchiara [2001] EWCA Crim 1529). Paragraph 2.1 of the 
Code of Practice defines material as `material of any kind, including 
information and objects, which is obtained in the course of a criminal 
investigation and which may be relevant to the investigation'; and para. 37 
of the Attorney-General's Guidelines states that the prosecution should 
pay particular attention to material which `has potential to weaken the 
prosecution case or is inconsistent with it', setting out the following six 
examples: (i) any material casting doubt upon the accuracy of any 
prosecution evidence; (ii) any material which may point to another person 
having involvement in the commission of the offence; (iii) any material 
which may cast doubt upon the reliability of a confession; (iv) any 
material which might go to the credibility of a prosecution witness; (v) any 
material which may support a defence which has either been raised or is 
apparent from the prosecution papers; and (vi) any material which may 
have a bearing on the admissibility of any prosecution evidence. This will 
include material such as the accused's exculpatory comments, the 
inconsistent statements or criminal records of prosecution witnesses, and 
any prosecution eye-witness's initial description of the suspect. 
The accused (to be tried on indictment) is then required to give a 
`defence statement' to the court and the prosecution within 14 days of 
primary disclosure having been made (s. 5(5) and reg. 2 of the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (Defence Disclosure Time Limits) 
Regulations 1997 (SI 1997 No. 684)), although it is possible to apply for 
an extension of time before the deadline expires. Section 5(6) provides that 
a defence statement is a written statement setting out in general terms 
(a) the nature of the accused's defence, (b) the matters on which he takes 
issue with the prosecution and (c) the reason why he takes issue with the 
prosecution. If the defence statement discloses an alibi, the accused must 
give particulars of it (s. 5(7); see also para. 27 of the Attorney-General's 
Guidelines on Disclosure). In his Review of the Criminal Courts (October 
2001, pp. 459±60), Lord Justice Auld expressed the view that there is a 
sound need for a defence statement: 
`A criminal trial is not a game under which a guilty defendant should be 
provided with a sporting chance. It is a search for truth in accordance 
with the twin principles that the prosecution must prove its case and 
that a defendant is not obliged to inculpate himself, the object being to 
convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. Requiring a defendant to 
indicate in advance what he disputes about the prosecution case offends 
neither of those principles.' 
Section 11 of the Act provides that if the accused fails to give a defence 
statement, or gives it late, or sets out inconsistent defences, or puts 
forward a defence at his trial which differs from any defence therein, or 
adduces evidence or calls witnesses in support of an alibi without having 
given the necessary particulars, `the court or, with the leave of the court, 
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any other party may make such comment as appears appropriate' 
(s. 11(3)(a)) and `the court or jury may draw such inferences as appear 
proper in deciding whether the accused is guilty of the offence' 
(s. 11(3)(b)). The accused cannot, however, be convicted of an offence 
solely on the basis of any such inference (s. 11(5)). Where the accused's 
defence at trial is inconsistent with his defence statement he may be cross-
examined without the court's leave on the differences, but leave is required 
before the jury can be invited to draw an adverse inference under s. 11(3)(b) 
(see s. 11(4) and R v. Tibbs [2000] 2 Cr App R 309 (CA)). Given the 
powers in s. 11(3) and, in particular, the possibility of an adverse inference 
being drawn from a sufficiently significant difference between the 
accused's defence statement and his defence, it has been suggested that 
the accused should personally sign his defence statement as an acknowl-
edgement of its accuracy (R v. Wheeler [2001] 1 Cr App R 150 (CA)). If it 
has not been signed, the judge is entitled to require the accused to satisfy 
the court that he has actually complied with s. 5(5) of the Act and that the 
document tendered really is his defence statement (R (Sullivan) v. Crown 
Court at Maidstone [2002] 1 WLR 2747 (DC)). 
Once the accused has served his defence statement the prosecution must 
comply with their duty to make `secondary disclosure' in accordance with 
s. 7(2) of the Act as soon as is reasonably practicable (s. 13(7)). The 
prosecution must (a) disclose to the accused any material which has not 
previously been disclosed and `which might reasonably be expected to 
assist the accused's defence as disclosed by the defence statement' or (b) 
give to the accused a written statement that there is no such material. 
Again, material protected by public interest immunity must not be 
disclosed (s. 7(5)). Paragraph 40 of the Attorney-General's Guidelines on 
Disclosure sets out some of the types of material which might reasonably 
be expected to be disclosed where it relates to the defence being put 
forward: (i) recorded scientific or scene-of-crime findings; (ii) previous 
descriptions of suspects (where identification may be in issue) together 
with all records of identification procedures; (iii) information that any 
prosecution witness has requested, been promised or received any 
payment or reward in connection with the case; (iv) plans of crime scenes 
or video recordings made by investigators of crime scenes; (v) names of 
individuals who may have relevant information but who will not be 
interviewed; and (vi) records of information provided by any individual. 
In R v. Cairns [2003] 1 Cr App R 662 (CA) it was held that the prosecution 
should have disclosed to the accused the defence statements provided by 
her co-accused because, in the light of her own defence statement, those 
statements might reasonably have been expected to assist her defence. 
If the offence is to be tried summarily, the prosecution must comply 
with primary disclosure under s. 3(1) as soon as is reasonably practicable 
after the accused has entered a not guilty plea (s. 13(1)). Once primary 
disclosure has been effected, the accused is entitled to give a defence 
statement but need not do so (s. 6(2)). If the accused decides to serve a 
defence statement the position in the magistrates' court is identical to that 
which applies to trials on indictment. If he decides not to submit a defence 
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statement he will suffer no adverse consequences; but nor will he be 
entitled to secondary disclosure by the prosecution. 
In any case where a defence statement has been served and the 
prosecution have purported to comply with secondary disclosure under 
s. 7, the accused may apply to the court for an order requiring the 
prosecution to disclose additional material if he has reasonable cause to 
believe undisclosed material exists which might reasonably be expected to 
assist his defence as disclosed in his defence statement (s. 8(2)). Section 
8(2) does not apply to material which is subject to public interest immunity 
(s. 8(5)). 
The Attorney General's Guidelines on Disclosure also set out a number 
of `general principles' relating to disclosure by police officers and the 
prosecution. The guidelines for police officers are particularly important, 
given that they may have their own firm views on the guilt of the accused 
and be reluctant to disclose material which might render a conviction less 
likely (see, for example, R v. Taylor (1993) 98 Cr App R 361 (CA)). 
Accordingly, para. 5 expressly provides that investigators and disclosure 
officers must be `fair and objective' and must work together with 
prosecutors to ensure that the disclosure obligations are met. Similarly, 
para. 13 directs prosecutors to do all that they can to facilitate proper 
disclosure in the interests of justice, as part of `their general and personal 
professional responsibility to act fairly and impartially'. Moreover, 
disclosure officers must specifically draw material to the attention of the 
prosecutors for consideration where they have any doubt as to whether it 
might undermine the prosecution case or might reasonably be expected to 
assist the defence disclosed by the accused (para. 11); and, in deciding 
what material should be disclosed, prosecutors are directed by para. 20 to 
resolve any doubt they may have in favour of disclosure (unless the 
material is to be the subject of a public interest immunity application). 
The statutory scheme was recently considered by Lord Justice Auld as 
part of his Review of the Criminal Courts (October 2001), and a number of 
recommendations for reform are set out at pp. 472±3 on the basis that the 
`1996 Act has not worked well'. The main concerns about the disclosure 
provisions of the 1996 Act are summarised at pp. 464±5: 
`a lack of common understanding within the Crown Prosecution Service 
and among police forces of the extent of disclosure required, 
particularly at the primary stage; the conflict between the need for a 
disclosure officer sufficiently familiar with the case to make a proper 
evaluation of what is or may be disclosable and one sufficiently 
independent of the investigation to make an objective judgment about 
it; the consignment of the responsibility to relatively junior officers who 
are poorly trained for the task; general lack of staffing and training for 
the task in the police or the Crown Prosecution Service for what is an 
increasingly onerous and sophisticated exercise; in consequence, 
frequent inadequate and late provision by the prosecution of primary 
disclosure; failure by defendants and their legal representatives to 
comply with the Act's requirements for giving the court and the 
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prosecutor adequate and/or timely defence statements and lack of 
effective means of enforcement of those requirements; seemingly and 
confusingly different tests for primary and secondary disclosure; and 
the whole scheme, whether operated efficiently or otherwise, is time 
consuming and otherwise expensive for all involved.' 
Under the Crown Court (Advance Notice of Expert Evidence) Rules 
1987 (SI 1987 No. 716) and the Magistrates' Courts (Advance Notice of 
Expert Evidence) Rules 1997 (SI 1997 No. 705), both the accused and the 
prosecution must disclose in advance of the trial any expert evidence on 
which they propose to rely. Furthermore, where material evidence is in the 
control of a third party who refuses to allow access to it, an application 
may be made under ss. 2±2A of the Criminal Procedure (Attendance of 
Witnesses) Act 1965 or s. 97 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 for a 
witness summons compelling him to produce it. 
13.2 Public Interest Immunity 
The public interest in the administration of justice, which requires, in 
accordance with the principle of free proof, the disclosure of all relevant 
evidence so that trials can be conducted fairly, may on occasion need to be 
overridden by the public interest in preserving the secrecy of certain 
sensitive information, the disclosure of which might adversely affect the 
interests of the state or the administration of justice in a wider sense. 
Where the public interest favouring non-disclosure prevails, any doc-
umentary or oral evidence of the information must be withheld on the 
ground of public interest immunity (`PII'). 
13.2.1 Civil Proceedings 
To understand the modern law on PII it is useful to know something of its 
historical development. In Duncan v. Cammell Laird [1942] AC 624 the 
House of Lords held that there were two possible claims to what was then 
known as `Crown privilege': class claims and contents claims. A contents 
claim was one based on the sensitive nature of the information itself, such 
as military secrets. A class claim was one based on the category of 
correspondence involved, such as the communications between Cabinet 
ministers, regardless of the content of the document in question. Class 
claims were thought necessary so that ministers and civil servants would 
feel able to communicate candidly with one another (the so-called 
`candour' justification). It was open to the executive to claim Crown 
privilege for either reason, and once a claim had been made in the proper 
form the courts were obliged to give effect to it and order that the 
information be withheld from production. Government ministers were 
thus recognised as the final arbiters of what ought or ought not to be 
produced, even though they might be motivated by little more than 
political expediency. 
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In Conway v. Rimmer [1968] 2 WLR 998, which concerned an action for 
malicious prosecution by a former probationary police officer against his 
erstwhile superintendent, the House of Lords took the opportunity to 
reconsider the question of Crown privilege. During the course of pre-trial 
discovery the defendant disclosed a list of documents which included four 
reports made by him about the plaintiff as a probationary officer and a 
further report he had made to the Chief Constable relating to a theft the 
plaintiff was alleged to have committed and which, following his acquittal, 
had given rise to the instant civil proceedings. The Home Secretary 
objected to disclosure, claiming that none of the five documents could be 
produced as they each fell within one or other of two privileged classes, 
namely confidential reports by police officers relating to the fitness for 
employment of officers under their command and reports by police 
officers concerning criminal investigations. 
Overruling Duncan v. Cammell Laird [1942] AC 624 (HL), the House of 
Lords held that whether the Crown could withhold information on the 
ground of public interest was ultimately a question of law to be 
determined by the courts and not by government ministers, though it 
was also recognised that certain types of document should never be 
disclosed. While a claim for non-disclosure could be made on the basis of 
the contents of a particular document or on the ground that the document 
belonged to a particular class, class claims were of two different types. The 
first type covered documents requiring absolute protection regardless of 
their content. However, the justification for this class was not the old 
argument based on candour, but rather the risk that disclosure `would 
create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political criticism' (per 
Lord Reid at p. 1015) and that it would be `entirely inimical to the proper 
functioning of the public service if the public were to learn of these high 
level communications' (per Lord Upjohn at p. 1050). Documents falling 
within this class included Cabinet minutes and correspondence, docu-
ments concerned with policy making within government departments, 
high-level inter-departmental minutes and communications, dispatches 
from ambassadors abroad, correspondence and documents pertaining to 
the administration of the armed forces or the security of the state, and 
correspondence and reports concerning the promotion or transfer of 
reasonably high-level personnel in the service of the Crown. Such 
documents `ought not to be disclosed whatever their contents may be' 
(per Lord Reid at p. 1015); they required `absolute protection' (per Lord 
Hodson at p. 1033), and their `production would never be ordered' (per 
Lord Pearce at p. 1044). The second type of class claim was based, as it 
was in the instant case, on a vague assertion by a minister that the 
documents fell within a class which ought to be withheld in the public 
interest. Documents falling within a low-level class were of a more routine 
or trivial nature and were therefore not to be afforded the same sort of 
protection. Such documents were to be produced if the trial judge 
determined, having inspected them, that the public interest favouring 
concealment was outweighed by the public interest favouring the 
disclosure of all relevant information to the litigants. Non-disclosure 
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would be justified only if it was `really necessary for the proper functioning 
of the public service' (per Lord Reid p. 1015). It was stressed, however, 
that full weight would be given to the minister's view in every case, and if 
the reasons given were of a character which judicial experience was not 
competent to weigh then the minister's view would have to prevail. This 
was not the case with regard to the superintendent's reports and, once 
Lord Reid had inspected them, the House of Lords ordered that they be 
made available to the plaintiff. With regard to contents claims, it was felt 
that while it would rarely be proper to question the view of a minister that 
it would be contrary to the public interest to make public the contents of a 
particular document, as a matter of law the judge would be entitled to 
inspect the documents and balance the public interests in the same way as 
for low-level class claims. 
Non-disclosure in the public interest is not a privilege for the Crown to 
claim or waive but ultimately a question of law for the judiciary to 
determine (see 13.2.3 post). This is one reason why the term `Crown 
privilege' is no longer used. Another reason is that, while a minister will 
often be the most appropriate person to raise the question of non-
disclosure in the public interest, this is not a necessary requirement. The 
question may be raised by any person, including the judge (R v. Lewes 
Justices ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department [1972] 3 
WLR 279 (HL)). It is not even necessary that the relevant document 
should have emanated from a government department. For example, in D 
v. NSPCC [1977] 2 WLR 201 the House of Lords held that it was not in 
the public interest for certain confidential information possessed by a 
charity to be revealed; in Gaskin v. Liverpool City Council [1980] 1 WLR 
1549 the Court of Appeal upheld a local authority's PII claim in respect of 
documents in the possession of its child care service; in Buckley v. Law 
Society (No. 2) [1984] 1 WLR 1101 (ChD) it was held that PII attached to 
documents in the possession of the Law Society; and in Roylance v. 
General Medical Council (1999) The Times 27.1.99 the Privy Council held 
that PII attached to the in camera deliberations of the GMC's professional 
conduct committee. There is, however, no general duty to weigh in the 
balance any public interest favouring non-disclosure against the compet-
ing public interest that the administration of justice should not be 
frustrated. In D v. NSPCC [1977] 2 WLR 201 (HL) it was felt that the law 
could develop only by analogy with heads of public interest which had 
already been recognised, a view subsequently endorsed by the House of 
Lords in Leyland Cars v. Vyas [1979] 3 WLR 762 where it was held that 
PII could not be raised to prevent the disclosure of confidential records on 
persons who had been interviewed for a job in an industrial concern. 
If a legitimate question of PII does arise in civil proceedings, the public 
interest favouring disclosure requires the judge to consider the private 
interests of the litigants themselves, bearing in mind Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the general public interest that 
justice should be seen to be done, and the importance of the particular 
litigation to the public at large. Decided cases identify the heads of public 
interest which have justified the non-disclosure of evidence in the past, but 
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ultimately the conclusion the judge reaches will depend on all the 
circumstances of the case before him. Indeed, notwithstanding the dicta in 
Conway v. Rimmer [1968] 2 WLR 998 (HL) suggesting that high-level class 
claims to PII can never be challenged, it is now clear that there is no 
absolute immunity for all documents falling within such classes. The judge 
is entitled to inspect even high-level documents in respect of which a class 
claim to PII has been made, and thereafter determine whether the balance 
of public interest lies in their production or concealment. In Burmah Oil v. 
Bank of England [1979] 3 WLR 722 the House of Lords ordered that 
documents relating to the formulation of government policy should be 
made available to their Lordships for inspection. Lord Keith said (at 
pp. 749±50): 
`[T]he nature of the litigation and the apparent importance to it of the 
documents in question may in extreme cases demand production even 
of the most sensitive communications at the highest level . . . The courts 
are . . . concerned with the consideration that it is in the public interest 
that justice should be done and should be publicly recognised as having 
been done. This may demand, though no doubt only in a very limited 
number of cases, that the inner workings of government should be 
exposed to public gaze, and there may be some who would regard this 
as likely to lead, not to captious or ill-informed criticism, but to 
criticism calculated to improve the nature of that working as affecting 
the individual citizen.' 
Thus, in Williams v. Home Office [1981] 1 All ER 1151 (QBD) McNeill J 
ordered the production of documents relating to the formulation of 
government policy on an experimental prison `control unit' even though 
the documents contained communications between ministers and senior 
civil servants; and in Air Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 
WLR 494 (HL) Lord Fraser expressed the view (at p. 523) that even 
Cabinet minutes were not completely immune from disclosure, though his 
Lordship added that such documents were entitled to a high degree of 
protection. Where, however, the claim to PII is made in relation to 
documents affecting national security or diplomatic relations, matters on 
which the executive have far greater knowledge and experience, the 
minister's objection to disclosure will almost certainly prevail (R v. Lewes 
Justices ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department [1972] 3 
WLR 279 (HL) at p. 294; see also Balfour v. Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office [1994] 2 All ER 588 (CA) at p. 596). 
The same cannot be said for other interests, however. Prior to the 
coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, the courts demonstrated 
a willingness to dispense with the balancing exercise and grant blanket 
immunity to certain classes of information in order to facilitate the fight 
against crime and other social evils, regardless of the adverse effect this 
would have on the party seeking disclosure. In Marks v. Beyfus (1890) 25 
QBD 494 the Court of Appeal held there was a rule of law that the names 
of police informants should never be revealed in civil proceedings, the 
reasons being, first, that informants should be protected from possible 
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reprisals and, second, that other persons should not be discouraged from 
providing information. This class of PII was extended in D v. NSPCC 
[1977] 2 WLR 201 (HL) to cover the identity of informants who provide 
confidential information on child abuse to the National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children. Similarly, in R v. Lewes Justices ex 
parte Secretary of State for the Home Department [1972] 3 WLR 279 (HL) 
it was held that any information provided to the Gaming Board in 
confidence should not be produced, for otherwise prospective informants 
might withhold the sort of information which was necessary for the Board 
to perform its statutory duty to identify and prevent undesirable persons 
from obtaining gaming licences. The balancing exercise was also dispensed 
with in Gaskin v. Liverpool City Council [1980] 1 WLR 1549 (CA), a case 
where a local authority had claimed PII in respect of documents relating to 
the treatment of children in its care on the ground that if such documents 
could be produced social workers and doctors would be inhibited from 
freely expressing their views on such children. However, now that the 
European Convention on Human Rights must be taken into consideration, 
a more `case-specific' approach has been adopted, in line with the position 
in criminal proceedings (13.2.2 post). In Chief Constable of Greater 
Manchester Police v. McNally [2002] 2 Cr App R 617, a claim for malicious 
prosecution and false imprisonment, the Court of Appeal held that the 
claimant's Article 6(1) right to a fair hearing could override a police 
informer's own rights under Article 2 and Article 8 of the Convention. In 
other words, as `part of a wider jurisprudential move away from near 
absolute protection of various categories of public interest in non-
disclosure' there is no longer an absolute prohibition on disclosing an 
informer's identity in civil proceedings. If the informer's identity is relevant 
to the claimant's claim, the public interest in protecting his identity will be 
balanced against the public interest in ensuring that justice is done in the 
particular case. In appropriate cases disclosure may be justified. 
This wider jurisprudential move away from blanket immunity is also 
exemplified by the approach adopted in R v. Chief Constable of the West 
Midlands Police ex parte Wiley [1994] 3 WLR 433 where the House of 
Lords felt there would need to be `clear and compelling evidence' before 
any new class-based claim to PII is recognised by the courts, and held that 
there was no general class of immunity covering all documents created in 
the course of an investigation into alleged police misconduct. (Reports 
made by the investigating officers are covered by PII as a class, however, 
because of the need for candour: Taylor v. Anderton [1995] 1 WLR 447 
(CA).) Further, where a claim to PII is successful there would now seem to 
be an obligation on the part of the protected litigant to mitigate the 
adverse effect of the ruling on the opposing party's ability to put his case. 
As Lord Woolf noted in ex parte Wiley (at p. 460), it might be possible for 
some information to be provided without producing the actual 
documents, or to disclose a part of the document or a document on a 
restricted basis: `There is usually a spectrum of action which can be taken 
if the parties are sensible which will mean that any prejudice due to non-
disclosure of the documents is reduced to a minimum.' 
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A claim to PII in civil proceedings is made under r. 31.19 of the Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998. Unlike a claim to privilege, where the party is 
obliged to reveal (`disclose') the existence of the relevant documents but is 
entitled to withhold the documents from inspection, the party or other 
individual claiming PII may apply under r. 31.19(1), without notice, for a 
court order permitting him to withhold disclosure. The opposing party 
will not know that the application is being made and, if the application is 
successful, will often have no knowledge that the applicant has the 
documents: r. 31.19(2) provides that, unless the court orders otherwise, the 
order must not be served on any other person. There is also provision 
under r. 31.19(3)±(4) to claim a `duty to withhold inspection' of a 
document in the list in which the document is disclosed, in which case a 
party may apply to the court to determine whether the claim should be 
upheld. Where an application is made under r. 31.19 the court may require 
the person claiming PII to produce the document to the court; and the 
court may invite any person, whether or not a party, to make 
representations (r. 31.19(6)). It is important to note, however, that the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights suggests that, if the 
affected party is denied the opportunity to make representations in respect 
of a PII claim, and a judge other than the trial judge determines the 
question, that party may be denied the fair hearing to which he is entitled 
under Article 6(1) of the European Convention (13.2.2 post). 
13.2.2 Criminal Proceedings 
In R v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Osman (1990) 93 Cr App R 202 
(DC) Mann LJ said (at p. 208): 
`The seminal cases in regard to public interest immunity do not refer to 
criminal proceedings at all. The principles are expressed in quite general 
terms. Asking myself why those general expositions should not apply to 
criminal proceedings, I can see no reason but that they do. It seems 
correct in principle that they should apply. The reasons for the 
development of the doctrine seem equally applicable to criminal as to 
civil proceedings.' 
Although the law on PII in the context of civil proceedings may, at one 
level, be said to apply equally to criminal proceedings, there is an 
important difference. The public interest in ensuring that the innocent 
should not be convicted is of such importance that it will invariably 
outweigh the public interest justifying non-disclosure. Thus, although 
there may be a balancing exercise in theory, in practice a PII application 
will fail if disclosure might help the accused to secure an acquittal. In other 
words: `If . . . there is material which might assist the defence, then the 
necessity for the defendant to have a fair trial outweighs the other interests 
in the case and the prosecution must either produce the undisclosed 
material or discontinue the prosecution' (R v. Dervish [2002] 2 Cr App R 
105 (CA) at p. 111). Accordingly, the relevant documents should be 
inspected by the judge as a matter of course following the prosecution's 
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application (R v. K (1992) 97 Cr App R 342 (CA), R v. Keane [1994] 1 
WLR 746 (CA)). If the prosecution are successful, no evidence may be 
adduced and no questions may be asked which might reveal the withheld 
information. (It may be possible, however, to provide the defence with 
other material in the document containing the withheld information by 
serving the document in an edited form or producing a separate 
summary.) 
Many PII claims in criminal proceedings concern the identity of police 
informers and surveillance techniques, or, where the allegation is one of 
child abuse, records held by social services or the local authority relating 
to the child in question (but see also para. 6.12 of the Code of Practice 
issued under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, which 
lists other examples of sensitive material for which a claim might be 
thought necessary). In R v. Hallett [1986] Crim LR 462 (CA) Lord Lane CJ 
explained the application of the exclusionary presumption in Marks v. 
Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494 (CA) (13.2.1 ante) to criminal proceedings: 
`[I]t is a rule which excludes evidence as to the identity of informants, 
unless the judge comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to override 
the rule and to admit the evidence in order to prevent a miscarriage of 
justice, and in order to prevent the possibility that a man may, by 
reason of the exclusion, be deprived of the opportunity of casting doubt 
upon the case against him . . . The result is, on [counsel's] submission, 
that if the judge does come to the conclusion that the lack of 
information as to the identity of the informer is going to cause a 
miscarriage of justice, then he is under a duty to admit the evidence. We 
would respectfully agree with that view.' 
In R v. Keane [1994] 1 WLR 746 (CA) Lord Taylor CJ, referring to 
evidence of this type, said that if `the disputed material may prove [sic] the 
defendant's innocence or avoid a miscarriage of justice, then the balance 
comes down resoundingly in favour of disclosing it'. In other words, the 
accused's right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights is of such importance that it will invariably override the 
informer's own Article 8 right to have his privacy respected and even his 
Article 2 right to life, an outcome explicitly recognised by the Court of 
Appeal (Civil Division) in Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v. 
McNally [2002] 2 Cr App R 617 (13.2.1 ante). So long as the accused has a 
tenable defence which might realistically be assisted by knowledge of the 
informer's identity he will be entitled to that information. It will also be 
necessary to disclose the fact that a prosecution witness was an informer 
and participant in the matter with which the trial is concerned if non-
disclosure might cause the jury to be misled by his testimony (R v. Patel 
[2002] Crim LR 304 (CA)). If, however, the accused's defence is 
`manifestly frivolous and doomed to failure' the judge will be entitled to 
refuse disclosure (R v. Agar (1989) 90 Cr App R 318 (CA)). It goes without 
saying that a claim for PII will be upheld if the accused's defence is tenable 
but the information would provide him with no assistance. This was the 
position in R v. Slowcombe [1991] Crim LR 198 (CA) where the identity of 
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an informer who had tipped off the police about a planned robbery could 
not have assisted the accused's defence that he had merely been involved in 
a conspiracy to steal (see also R v. Menga [1998] Crim LR 58 (CA) and R 
v. Dervish [2002] 2 Cr App R 105 (CA)). 
The procedures governing PII applications were laid down by the Court 
of Appeal in R v. Davis [1993] 1 WLR 613 (at p. 617), and are now to be 
found in the Crown Court (Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996) (Disclosure) Rules 1997 (SI 1997 No. 698) (and the Magistrates' 
Courts (Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996) (Disclosure) 
Rules 1997 (SI 1997 No. 703)). The prosecution will make their 
application to the court under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations 
Act 1996 (ss. 3(6), 7(5), 8(5) or 9(8)) and, as a general rule, will notify the 
defence, specifying the `nature of the material' they wish to withhold. The 
application will then be made in the presence of the defence and both 
parties will be permitted to make representations to the judge. Where, 
however, the prosecution have reason to believe that to disclose the nature 
of the material would have the effect of revealing the information which 
they contend should not be disclosed, the application will be made in the 
absence of the defence (the ex parte procedure) and the defence will be told 
only that an application is to be made. (The judge will, however, be aware 
of the defence case from the accused's defence statement, or any other 
details provided by his representatives, so that an informed decision can be 
made on the relevance and value of the withheld information.) Given the 
absence of the defence, the prosecution are under a duty to be 
`scrupulously accurate' in the information they provide during their 
application (R v. Jackson [2000] Crim LR 377 (CA); see also para. 42 of 
the Attorney-General's Guidelines on Disclosure). Exceptionally, where the 
prosecution have reason to believe that the mere knowledge that an ex 
parte PII application is to be made would have the effect of revealing the 
information which they contend should not be disclosed, the application 
may be made without notifying the defence (the `exceptional' ex parte 
procedure). 
The role of the judge is twofold. First of all he must assess the credibility 
of the accused's defence. Then, having inspected the withheld information 
for himself, and taken any other relevant material into account ± which 
need not be admissible evidence (R v. Law (1996) The Times 15.8.96 (CA)) 
± he must determine whether the information might further that defence. 
In R v. Turner [1995] 1 WLR 265 the Court of Appeal expressed concern 
about defences being fabricated to obtain the identity of an informer, and 
stated that applications for disclosure should be scrutinised with `very 
great care'. It follows that the accused is in effect obliged to give full and 
specific details of his defence and the issues likely to be raised during the 
trial for otherwise the judge will be unable to determine the value of the 
withheld information to his case (see R v. Keane [1994] 1 WLR 746 (CA) 
at p. 752). If the judge rules in favour of non-disclosure he must 
nevertheless continue to monitor the issue during the trial as new issues 
emerge, and may subsequently need to review his original decision (see 
s. 15(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and, at 
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common law, R v. Davis [1993] 1 WLR 613 (CA) at p. 618). By virtue of 
ss. 14(2) and 15(4) of the Act, the defence may apply for a review before 
the end of the summary or Crown Court trial. 
The ex parte PII procedure was considered by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Jasper v. United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 441 and Fitt 
v. United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 480. In each case a bare majority of 
the Court held that there had been no violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention. Although Article 6 requires that the prosecution should 
disclose to the defence all material evidence in their possession, this is not 
an absolute right. Competing interests such as national security and the 
need to protect witnesses (and preserve their human rights) must be 
weighed against the rights of the accused. In some cases, therefore, it is 
permissible to withhold certain evidence from the accused, so long as the 
measures restricting the accused's rights are strictly necessary and any 
difficulties caused to the defence are sufficiently counterbalanced by 
procedures designed to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial. In each 
case before the Court the applicant had received a fair trial, notwith-
standing the non-disclosure of certain material (which had not formed 
part of the prosecution case). Important considerations were the fact that 
the defence had been able to make representations to the trial judge 
outlining the nature of their case, the test adopted by the judge following 
the ex parte application and the further safeguard provided by the judge's 
having monitored the need for disclosure during the course of the trial. In 
the light of these judgments, the Court of Appeal has expressed its view 
that the ex parte PII procedure is not `by definition or in principle' a 
procedure which violates the accused's right to a fair trial under Article 6 
(R v. Lawrence [2001] EWCA Crim 1829). Indeed, the approach adopted 
by the majority in Jasper v. United Kingdom and Fitt v. United Kingdom 
was unanimously approved by the European Court of Human Rights in 
PG v. United Kingdom (2001) Application No. 44787/98. It is to be noted, 
however, that the `exceptional' ex parte procedure, where the accused 
receives no notice of the prosecution's application, has not been 
considered; and, in the light of the foregoing, it is doubtful whether this 
procedure would be regarded as compatible with the accused's right to a 
fair trial. A scheme which would allow a `special independent counsel' to 
be instructed by the court to represent the accused's interests would 
overcome this problem (see Lord Justice Auld's Review of the Criminal 
Courts (October 2001) at pp. 476±8). 
The public interest justifying the anonymity of police informers applies 
with equal force to any business premises or private accommodation used 
by the police for surveillance operations; but, as with the identity of 
informers, the judge must order disclosure if the information might help 
the accused to secure an acquittal (R v. Rankine [1986] 2 WLR 1075 (CA)). 
If, for instance, the accused claims in his defence that he has been 
mistakenly identified from the observation post, and this is indeed a 
realistic possibility, the judge ought to disclose the location of the premises 
so that the identification evidence can be properly tested in cross-
examination. If, however, there is no real risk of a mistaken identification, 
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the judge will rule in favour of non-disclosure even though the accused's 
ability to cross-examine the observing officers will to some extent be 
hampered as a result. In R v. Johnson [1988] 1 WLR 1377 the accused 
faced several counts of supplying cannabis and cocaine on a street in 
London. His defence was that he had been buying rather than selling 
drugs and requested the identity of the addresses from which the police 
officers had made their observations in order to ascertain whether there 
had been any obstacles which would have obstructed their view. The judge 
ruled that the prosecution should disclose no more than the maximum 
distance involved and the accused was convicted. The Court of Appeal 
dismissed his appeal on the ground that, although there had been some 
restraints placed upon the conduct of the defence by the judge's ruling, the 
jury had been made aware of those restraints and the judge had given 
safeguarding directions during his summing-up. However, the Court went 
on to hold that PII applications in such cases would need to be supported 
by evidence from the sergeant in charge of the surveillance operation to 
the effect that he had spoken to the occupants prior to the operation and 
ascertained their attitude to the use of the premises and the possible 
disclosure thereafter of facts which could lead to the identification of the 
premises, and, further, by evidence from a senior officer (that is, a chief 
inspector or above) to the effect that he had spoken to the occupants just 
prior to the trial to ascertain their attitude to disclosure. If the judge rules 
in favour of non-disclosure he must also explain the effect of his ruling to 
the jury. In R v. Brown (1987) 87 Cr App R 52 (CA) it was held that the 
public interest which justifies the non-disclosure of information identifying 
static observation posts cannot apply to mobile posts such as unmarked 
police cars as they have no occupant in need of protection. It was felt, 
however, that there might be an additional ground for claiming PII based 
on the need to ensure that the methods used by the police to combat crime 
should not be revealed. 
PII claims are also often made in respect of confidential records held by 
social services or a local authority relating to the child the accused has 
allegedly abused. In such cases the judge must conduct a balancing 
exercise to determine `whether the public interest in maintaining the 
confidentiality of those documents and the public interest in seeing that 
justice is done, particularly in a criminal case involving the liberty of the 
subject, requires either that the documents be withheld or . . . disclosed' (R 
v. Higgins [1996] 1 FLR 137 (CA) at p. 140, followed in R v. Brushett 
[2001] Crim LR 471 (CA)). Where the material might assist the accused in 
securing an acquittal, on the basis that it undermines the reliability of the 
child's evidence, the prosecution will be ordered to disclose it. 
13.2.3 Duty, Waiver and Secondary Evidence 
Echoing the view of Lord Simon in R v. Lewes Justices ex parte Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [1972] 3 WLR 279 (HL) (at p. 289), in 
Air Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 WLR 494 (HL) Lord 
Fraser said (at p. 526): `Public interest immunity is not a privilege which 
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may be waived by the Crown or by any party.' A similar point was made 
by Bingham LJ in Makanjuola v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
[1992] 3 All ER 617 (CA) (at p. 623): 
`Where a litigant asserts that documents are immune from production 
or disclosure on public interest grounds he is not (if the claim is well 
founded) claiming a right but observing a duty. Public interest 
immunity is not a trump card vouchsafed to certain privileged players 
to play when and as they wish. It is an exclusionary rule, imposed on 
parties in certain circumstances, even where it is to their disadvantage in 
the litigation.' 
As to whether a party is under a duty to claim PII, in R v. Chief 
Constable of the West Midlands Police ex parte Wiley [1994] 3 WLR 433 
the House of Lords recognised that the relevant Secretary of State (as 
opposed to an ordinary litigant) is competent to conduct the PII balancing 
exercise and should voluntarily disclose the relevant documents once he 
has concluded, after due consideration, that the public interest in 
disclosing them for the purposes of the litigation outweighs the public 
interest favouring non-disclosure. In other words, documents which might 
be the subject of a contents claim ± it will be seen below that the present 
Labour Government is not making class claims ± may be assessed by the 
relevant minister with a view to determining whether a PII application 
should be made. If the minister comes to the conclusion that the public 
interest is best served by revealing the information, there will be no 
application. (The question is not, therefore, whether PII is being `waived' 
but whether there are actually grounds for making a valid claim in the first 
place.) By contrast, a minister who concludes that the balance of public 
interest comes down in favour of non-disclosure is under a duty to claim 
PII (R v. Lewes Justices ex parte Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [1972] 3 WLR 279 (HL) at p. 294). Similarly, in criminal 
proceedings the prosecution should voluntarily disclose documents in 
respect of which a claim to PII might be made if the Treasury Solicitor is 
satisfied that the balance of public interest falls clearly in favour of 
disclosure (R v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court ex parte Bennett 
(No.2) (1993) 99 Cr App R 123 (DC)); but if the balance falls the other 
way the prosecution must make an application to withhold the evidence. 
In Savage v. Chief Constable of Hampshire [1997] 1 WLR 1061 (CA) it 
was held that a police informer's willingness to waive anonymity was not 
determinative of the issue whether a PII claim should be upheld ± it was 
for the judge to determine whether there was still a significant public 
interest, extraneous to the informer and his own personal safety, which 
would be damaged if the informer were allowed to reveal his identity and 
role. The informer does not have a personal privilege which he is entitled 
to claim or waive as he thinks fit. Where, however, a class-claim to PII has 
been recognised for the purpose of protecting a particular body of 
individuals, such as informers or the occupants of premises used for a 
surveillance operation, the willingness of the protected individual to waive 
his anonymity is clearly a relevant factor for the judge to take into 
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consideration when undertaking the balancing exercise, simply because the 
primary justification for the PII claim has now disappeared (Savage v. 
Chief Constable of Hampshire at p. 1067; see also R v. Johnson [1988] 1 
WLR 1377 (CA), 13.2.2 ante, and R v. Chief Constable of the West 
Midlands Police ex parte Wiley [1994] 3 WLR 433 (HL) at p. 453). 
As noted above, the present Government has accepted that it should no 
longer make class claims to PII. In a written answer to the House of 
Commons on 11 July 1997 (Hansard (HC), vol. 297, cols. 616±17) the 
Attorney-General said: 
`[P]ublic interest immunity will not be asserted by the Government 
unless the relevant Minister believes that disclosure of a document or 
piece of information will cause real damage to the public interest. The 
test will be applied rigorously. Where public interest immunity applies, 
Ministers will nevertheless make voluntary disclosure if they consider 
that the interests of justice outweigh the public interest in withholding 
the document or information in question. In all cases, a Minister's claim 
for public interest immunity is subject to the Court's power to order 
disclosure. The approach will be followed in both criminal and civil 
cases.' 
This statement of policy does not prevent local authorities or other 
organisations such as the police from asserting a class-based claim to PII. 
Indeed, it would seem that where information in the possession of a non-
governmental body falls within a protected class a PII claim must be made 
so that the question can be determined by the judge. That a local authority 
is under a duty to claim PII was explicitly recognised by the Court of 
Appeal in R v. Higgins [1996] 1 FLR 137; and in R v. Chief Constable of 
the West Midlands Police ex parte Wiley Lord Woolf expressed the view 
(at pp. 451±2) that litigants other than government departments should 
make a class-claim so that the cases where disclosure occurs can be 
restricted by the courts to situations where it is necessary. 
Finally, where a document is protected by PII, it is not permissible to 
rely on secondary evidence (such as a copy of the document) to prove the 
protected information (Hennessy v. Wright (1888) 21 QBD 509 (DC), 
Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India [1895] 2 QB 189 (CA), R v. Lewes 
Justices ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department [1972] 3 
WLR 279 (HL)). 
Chapter Summary 
.	 As a general rule the parties to a civil dispute, and the prosecution in criminal 
proceedings, are under a legal duty to disclose and produce the evidence upon 
which they intend to rely at the trial along with the (possibly) relevant evidence 
which they do not intend to rely upon. The accused is under a limited duty of pre-
trial disclosure. He must provide the prosecution with the expert evidence upon 
which he intends to rely and (if he is to be tried on indictment) he must provide 
the court and prosecution with a `defence statement' setting out his defence and 
the matters on which he takes issue with the prosecution. 
51 
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.	 If a party to civil proceedings has evidence in respect of which a valid claim to 
public interest immunity might be made then, as a general rule, the claim must be 
made so that the court can determine whether the evidence ought to be withheld 
or disclosed. To determine the issue the court will balance the public interest 
favouring disclosure against the public interest favouring non-disclosure, bearing 
in mind the rights of the parties and other affected individuals under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The relevant Secretary of State is competent to 
conduct the balancing exercise and should make an application to the court on 
public interest immunity grounds only if he concludes that (or is unsure whether) 
the public interest is best served by non-disclosure. 
.	 If the Treasury Solicitor is satisfied that evidence which might justify a public 
interest immunity claim should be disclosed in criminal proceedings then the 
prosecution may voluntarily disclose that evidence, otherwise a public interest 
immunity application must be made to the court. If the court concludes that the 
evidence might assist the accused's defence then the prosecution must either 
disclose it to the accused or discontinue their prosecution. 
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Privilege14

In the previous chapter it was seen that the principle of free proof in 
respect of some evidence may have to give way to a policy consideration 
favouring non-disclosure, not because the evidence is unreliable or likely 
to prejudice the tribunal of fact against a party, but because the public 
interest militating against disclosure outweighs the public interest in the 
due administration of justice. Highly probative and reliable evidence may 
also be withheld on the ground of `privilege'. There are, however, two 
important differences between the exercise of a privilege and the operation 
of public interest immunity. First, if evidence falls within the scope of a 
recognised privilege the party in whose favour it operates is entitled to 
claim it but is under no obligation to do so. Privilege is no more than a 
personal right which a party may claim or waive as he thinks fit, allowing 
him to refuse to produce certain documents for inspection and to refuse to 
answer certain questions in the witness box (even if he has been compelled 
to testify). He will suffer no sanction as a result of his exercising that right; 
nor can any adverse inference be drawn from his silence or refusal to 
produce evidence. Second, unlike public interest immunity, privilege 
entitles the person in whom it is vested not to reveal certain information, 
but it does not prevent that information from being adduced by an 
opponent if he has secondary evidence of it, for example because he has 
managed to obtain a copy of a privileged document or has overheard a 
privileged conversation. 
14.1 The Privilege Against Self-incrimination 
The common-law privilege against self-incrimination is the personal right 
of any person not to answer any question or produce any evidence which 
would tend to expose him `to any criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture [of 
property]' (Blunt v. Park Lane Hotel [1942] 2 KB 253 (CA)), save that it 
cannot be relied on if the charge, penalty or forfeiture arises under foreign 
law (Brannigan v. Davison [1996] 3 WLR 859 (PC), Attorney-General for 
Gibralter v. May [1999] 1 WLR 998 (CA)). The position in civil 
proceedings is now governed by statute. By virtue of ss. 14(1) and 
16(1)(a) of the Civil Evidence Act 1968, the privilege may be relied on by a 
person in respect of possible proceedings for an offence or penalty under 
UK law, entitling him `to refuse to answer any question or produce any 
document or thing' which would tend to expose him (or his spouse) to 
such proceedings, including proceedings for civil contempt (Memory 
Corporation v. Sidhu [2000] 2 WLR 1106 (ChD)). If a party to litigation 
successfully invokes the privilege he cannot be punished or made the 
subject of a court order to do the act which he has objected to (Versailles 
Trade Finance v. Clough (2001) The Times 1.11.01 (CA)). 
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The privilege against self-incrimination may be seen as one of the 
`disparate group of immunities' collectively known as the `right of silence' 
(R v. Director of Serious Fraud Office ex parte Smith [1992] 3 WLR 66 
(HL) at p. 74). In a broad sense the suspect's right to remain silent in the 
face of police questioning and the accused's right not to testify in his own 
defence may be regarded as two facets of a single privilege against self-
incrimination. In a narrow sense the privilege has been seen to exist 
independently of, but in association with, these common-law rights of 
silence. In Saunders v. United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313 (at p. 337) the 
privilege, in both senses, was described by the European Court of Human 
Rights as a generally recognised international standard lying at the heart 
of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It was also noted that the right not to 
incriminate oneself: 
`presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their 
case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through 
methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. 
In this sense the right is closely linked to the presumption of innocence 
contained in Article 6(2) of the Convention.' 
The traditional view is that the privilege against self-incrimination ± the 
`nemo tenetur principle' (10.1 ante) ± came to be recognised as part of the 
common law in the seventeenth century in response to the horrors of the 
Star Chamber (see, for example, Bishopsgate Investment Management v. 
Maxwell [1992] 2 WLR 991 (CA) at p. 1001). However, recent research 
suggests that it evolved during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries as the criminal trial process changed from an inquisitorial 
approach to adversarial proceedings, and that it did not become firmly 
established until the middle of the nineteenth century (see Azzopardi v. R 
(2001) 179 ALR 349 (HCA) at pp. 378±88). The privilege is usually 
justified on the ground that it discourages the ill-treatment of suspects and 
the production of dubious confessions (AT & T Istel v. Tully [1992] 3 
WLR 344 (HL) at p. 350; R v. Hertfordshire County Council ex parte 
Green Environmental Industries [2000] 2 WLR 373 (HL) at pp. 377±8). 
Perhaps a more valid justification for the twenty-first century is that it 
encourages witnesses to provide relevant evidence and discourages 
perjury. If a witness could be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence 
he would be far less willing to come forward to reveal what he knows; and 
the apprehension he would suffer in the witness box might affect the way 
he gives his evidence, undermining his apparent credibility and inhibiting 
his willingness to reveal his knowledge about the facts in issue. 
Furthermore, if he were to be asked a specific question requiring a self-
incriminating answer he would have three choices, each resulting in a 
possible adverse consequence. He could lie and commit perjury; he could 
tell the truth and incriminate himself; or he could remain silent and be 
punished for contempt of court. It would be unfair to put a witness in that 
position. 
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Notwithstanding the importance attached to the principle at common 
law, the privilege against self-incrimination has been overridden by a 
number of statutory provisions designed to compel unresponsive 
individuals to reveal information required by the state. The compulsion 
may be direct in that there will be a sanction for non-compliance, or 
indirect in that an adverse inference may be drawn from the non-
compliance at a subsequent criminal trial. Furthermore, until relatively 
recently a considerable number of statutory provisions imposed an 
obligation to respond to questions and permitted a self-incriminating 
answer to be used by the prosecution as an admission in subsequent 
criminal proceedings. Provisions of this sort ± namely, ss. 434 and 436 of 
the Companies Act 1985 ± were considered by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Saunders v. United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313. 
Section 434(1) and (2) provided that questions put by Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) inspectors investigating corporate fraud had to 
be answered by any officer or agent of the company under investigation. A 
refusal to co-operate could be punished as contempt of court (s. 436(3)). 
Section 434(5) provided that answers could be used in subsequent criminal 
proceedings. S was convicted of a number of offences relating to his 
conduct in an unlawful share support operation during a corporate take-
over bid in 1986 on the basis of, inter alia, self-incriminating answers he 
had given to the DTI inspectors during the course of seven lengthy 
interviews. The trial judge had ruled that the transcripts containing S's 
answers should not be excluded under s. 78(1) of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, a decision which was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 
However, the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
prosecution's use of incriminating answers which S had been legally 
compelled to provide, and which formed `a significant part' of the case 
against him, had violated his right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention, even though some of his answers, if true, would 
have been exculpatory. According to the Court (at pp. 337±40): 
`The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned . . . with 
respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent. As commonly 
understood in the legal systems of the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention and elsewhere, it does not extend to the use in criminal 
proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused 
through the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence 
independent of the will of the suspect such as, inter alia, documents 
acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and 
bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA testing . . . [S]ome of the 
applicant's answers were . . . of an incriminating nature in the sense that 
they contained admissions to knowledge of information which tended 
to incriminate him. In any event, bearing in mind the concept of fairness 
in Article 6, the right not to incriminate oneself cannot reasonably be 
confined to statements of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks which 
are directly incriminating. Testimony obtained under compulsion which 
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appears on its face to be of a non-incriminating nature . . . may later be 
deployed in criminal proceedings in support of the prosecution case, for 
example to contradict or cast doubt upon other statements of the 
accused or evidence given by him during the trial or to otherwise 
undermine his credibility . . . [T]he general requirements of fairness 
contained in Article 6, including the right not to incriminate oneself, 
apply to criminal proceedings in respect of all types of criminal offences 
without distinction, from the most simple to the most complex. The 
public interest cannot be invoked to justify the use of answers 
compulsorily obtained in a non-judicial investigation to incriminate 
the accused during the trial proceedings.' 
As an interim measure following this judgment, the Attorney-General 
instructed prosecutors to avoid using answers obtained in consequence of 
any compulsory powers during the accused's trial, whether as part of their 
case against the accused or during cross-examination (General Note for 
Prosecutors (1998) 148 NLJ 208). Since then, s. 59 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and Schedule 3 thereto have amended a 
number of provisions (including s. 434 of the Companies Act 1985) to 
prohibit the use in a criminal trial of answers provided by the accused 
under legal compulsion during a preceding non-judicial investigation. 
(Some provisions, such as s. 31 of the Theft Act 1968, s. 9 of the Criminal 
Damage Act 1971, s. 72 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and s. 98 of the 
Children Act 1989, already provided for the inadmissibility in criminal 
proceedings of answers given under legal compulsion.) 
However, not all statutory provisions which affect the privilege against 
self-incrimination have been, or need to be, amended. First, the 
Strasbourg Court was concerned solely with the use of the accused's 
statements (obtained under legal compulsion) as evidence against him at 
his criminal trial. The Court did not address the propriety of provisions 
which compel a response from someone who is being investigated, even if 
he faces a criminal sanction for refusing to co-operate. Indeed it is now 
clear that the privilege `does not per se prohibit the use of compulsory 
powers to require persons to provide information about their financial 
or company affairs' (Allen v. United Kingdom (2002) Application 
No. 76574/01 (ECtHR)). Second, it is implicit in the Court's use of the 
expression `unjustifiable infringement of the right' (at p. 338) that some 
infringements may be permissible; in other words the privilege against self-
incrimination is not absolute (see, for example, Heaney v. Ireland (2000) 33 
EHRR 264 at p. 280). Accordingly, where there is no statutory bar the 
prosecution may still adduce self-incriminating answers obtained under 
legal compulsion without violating Article 6(1) of the Convention, so long 
as the infringing provision was enacted to achieve a legitimate objective 
and is a proportionate response to the problem it was intended to address. 
Third, it is clear from the Court's judgment that there is no prohibition on 
the use, even in a criminal trial, of `material which may be obtained from 
the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which has an 
existence independent of the will of the suspect' (see also Heaney v. Ireland 
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(2000) 33 EHRR 264 (ECtHR) at p. 278 and L v. United Kingdom [2000] 2 
FLR 322 (ECtHR) at p. 331). 
One provision which may have the effect of infringing the privilege 
against self-incrimination, and provide the prosecution with a self-
incriminating response to use as evidence against the accused at his 
criminal trial, is s. 172(2)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which provides 
that, where the driver of a vehicle is alleged to be guilty of an offence to 
which the section applies, such as driving under the influence of alcohol, 
the keeper of the vehicle `shall give such information as to the identity of 
the driver as he may be required to give'. A keeper who fails to comply 
with this requirement is guilty of an offence (s. 172(3)) and liable to a 
maximum fine of £1000 and possible disqualification. In Brown v. Stott 
[2001] 2 WLR 817 the accused was confronted by the police in an 
apparently intoxicated state at a 24-hour superstore in Dunfermline, 
Scotland. Asked how she had come to the store, she replied that she had 
travelled by car and pointed to a vehicle in the car park which she said was 
hers. At the police station the keys to the car were found in the accused's 
handbag and, pursuant to s. 172(2)(a), the police required her (as the 
keeper of the vehicle) to say who had been driving the car at the time when 
she would have been travelling in it to the store. She replied, `It was me' 
and subsequently provided a specimen of breath which proved that she 
had been under the influence of alcohol at that time. On appeal from the 
Scottish High Court of Justiciary, the question for the Privy Council was 
whether the prosecution would be able to rely at her trial on the admission 
which she had been compelled to make. Concluding that the right not to 
incriminate oneself is an implied right within Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention, but not an absolute right, the Privy Council held that the 
provision, as a limited infringement reasonably directed towards a clear 
and proper public objective, was acceptable and that the accused's 
admission, if admitted, would not prevent her from receiving a fair trial. 
It was not in dispute that the high incidence of death and injury on the 
roads caused by the misuse of motor vehicles is a serious social problem 
which needs to be addressed. That is to say, there is a clear public interest 
in subjecting the use of motor vehicles to a regime of regulatory rules and 
in being able to enforce the relevant legislation. The question for the Privy 
Council was whether s. 172(2)(a), properly applied, was a necessary and 
proportionate response to this problem, bearing in mind the need to 
balance the general interests of the individual (and her Convention rights) 
against the interests of the community (and their Convention rights). This 
question was answered in the affirmative for a number of reasons. First, 
the provision allows one simple question to be put by the police, and the 
answer given will not necessarily incriminate the keeper as it is not an 
offence to drive a car (so long as the driver holds a valid licence). Second, 
insofar as the privilege against self-incrimination is infringed, it is a 
relatively narrow interference, allowing the police to go no further than 
demand the name of the driver at a particular time. Third, the police are 
not entitled to use any overbearing methods to elicit a response. Fourth, 
the penalty for refusing to answer is moderate and non-custodial. Fifth, 
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people who own and drive cars know that they are subjecting themselves 
to a regulatory regime of which s. 172(2)(a) is a part ± the keeper of a car 
must be taken to have accepted responsibility for its use and the 
corresponding obligation to provide information when required to do so. 
Finally it was noted that, under Scottish law, it is necessary for a 
confession to be corroborated. 
The decision in Brown v. Stott was approved in DPP v. Wilson (2001) 
165 JP 715 (DC) and applied to the similar provision (for non-keepers) in 
s. 172(2)(b) of the Act in relation to the offence of speeding. Moreover, 
according to the Court no caution is necessary if s. 172(2) is being relied on 
to elicit self-incriminating information from a suspect, notwithstanding 
para. C-10.1 of the PACE Code of Practice (7.1.3.3 ante). The existence of 
the offence under s. 172(3) of the Act means that a caution `would, at best, 
cause confusion . . . and, at worst, undermine the clear statutory purpose' 
underlying the section. Furthermore, although confessions do not need to 
be corroborated in England and Wales, a sufficient safeguard is provided 
in this jurisdiction by the fact that a confession is inadmissible if the 
prosecution are unable to discharge their burden of proof under s. 76(2) of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. (The exclusionary discretions 
under ss. 78(1) of the 1984 Act and 12(1) of the Road Traffic Offenders 
Act 1988 Act provide an additional safeguard for the accused.) It has also 
been held that the use of s. 172(2) for the offence of going through a red 
light is a proportionate response to the problem of maintaining road 
safety (Charlebois v. DPP [2003] EWHC 54 Admin (QBD)). 
The question whether a provision which compels a person under pain of 
penalty to provide information infringes his right to a fair trial, should he 
fail to comply with the demand and be tried for the offence thereby 
committed, was considered by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Heaney v. Ireland (2000) 33 EHRR 264 and JB v. Switzerland (2001) 
Application No. 31827/96. In Heaney v. Ireland the applicant had been 
arrested and interrogated by the police about his suspected involvement in 
a recent terrorist attack and asked to account for his movements at the 
relevant time, a failure to provide such an account being an offence under 
s. 52 of Ireland's Offences Against the State Act 1939. The applicant 
refused to provide the requested information and he was tried and 
convicted of the s. 52 offence. The Strasbourg Court held that the 
applicant's privilege against self-incrimination and pre-trial right of silence 
had in effect been extinguished by the degree of compulsion used and that 
there had therefore been a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention. A 
relevant consideration was that an account of the applicant's movements, 
if provided in response to the s. 52 request, could have been used in 
evidence against him in criminal proceedings for the terrorist offence. The 
Court recognised that the privilege against self-incrimination is not an 
absolute right, but concluded that s. 52 could not be regarded as a 
proportionate response to the threat of terrorism. In JB v. Switzerland the 
Court held that there had been a breach of Article 6(1) in relation to 
proceedings in which the applicant had been fined for refusing to provide 
the Swiss tax authorities with documents relating to his investments. The 
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factor which led the Court to conclude that there had been a violation of 
the applicant's privilege against self-incrimination was that proceedings 
had already been commenced against him for the offence of tax evasion 
and the authorities had been trying to compel him to provide evidence 
which could have been used against him in those separate proceedings. 
A provision which compels a person under pain of penalty to provide 
information was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in R v. 
Kearns [2003] 1 Cr App R 111. In that case, K, a bankrupt, was charged 
with having committed an offence contrary to s. 354(3)(a) of  the  
Insolvency Act 1986, carrying a maximum sentence of two years' 
imprisonment, in that he had failed without reasonable excuse to account 
for the loss of part of his property having been required to do so by the 
Official Receiver. If K had provided the information it could not have 
been used against him in a subsequent trial for some other offence because 
of amendments to s. 433 of the 1986 Act introduced by s. 59 of the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and Schedule 3 thereto. 
Nevertheless, K submitted that s. 354(3)(a) of the 1986 Act violated his 
privilege against self-incrimination and therefore his right to a fair trial 
under Article 6(1) of the European Convention. The argument was 
rejected by the Court of Appeal. The demand for information under 
s. 354(3)(a) was made in the course of an extra-judicial procedure to 
investigate his estate rather than to obtain evidence to prove a case against 
him in subsequent criminal proceedings. He was not charged with any 
other offence when the demand was made, and there was no possibility 
that any information obtained as a result of the statutory demand could be 
used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings. The judgments in 
Heaney v. Ireland (2000) 33 EHRR 264 and JB v. Switzerland (2001) 
Application No. 31827/96 offered no support for K's submission, for in 
those cases the purpose in obtaining information from the applicants had 
been to provide evidence for other charges. Further, even if it could be said 
that s. 354(3)(a) had infringed K's privilege against self-incrimination, 
there had been no violation of Article 6(1). The privilege against self-
incrimination is not absolute and, according to the Court of Appeal, the 
provision was a proportionate legislative response to the problem of 
administering and investigating bankrupt estates. 
In Allen v. United Kingdom (2002) Application No. 76574/01 the 
European Court of Human Rights held that the requirement to make a 
declaration of assets to the Inland Revenue raises no issue under Article 
6(1), even though a penalty is attached to non-compliance with the 
Revenue's request for information. In that case, D had been served with a 
notice under s. 20(1) of the Taxes Management Act 1970 to provide the 
Inland Revenue with a statement of his assets and liabilities. Following his 
failure to comply, and the presentation to him of a `Hansard warning' to 
the effect that his co-operation would be a relevant factor when deciding 
whether he should be prosecuted for fraud, D delivered a false schedule of 
assets. He was subsequently charged with and convicted of cheating the 
Inland Revenue and, following an unsuccessful appeal to the House of 
Lords (R v. Allen [2001] 3 WLR 843) applied to Strasbourg on the basis 
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that he had been compelled to provide a schedule which was used in 
evidence against him at his trial. The Court gave D's argument short 
shrift. The obligation to make disclosure of income and capital for the 
purposes of assessing tax was said to be a common feature of the taxation 
systems of contracting states and, in any event, he had been charged with 
and convicted of the offence of making a false declaration. He had not 
been placed under compulsion to incriminate himself in relation to an 
offence which he had already committed. 
It will be remembered that in Saunders v. United Kingdom (1996) 23 
EHRR 313 (ECtHR) it was said that the privilege against self-
incrimination cannot be relied on in respect of `material which may be 
obtained from the accused through the use of compulsory powers but 
which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect'. Thus, in PG 
v. United Kingdom (2001) Application No. 44787/98 (ECtHR) it was held 
that the underhand way in which the police had obtained samples of the 
accused's voice had not infringed his privilege against self-incrimination as 
`the voice samples, which did not include any incriminating statements, 
may be regarded as akin to blood, hair or other physical or objective 
specimens used in forensic analysis and to which the privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply'. Provisions which entitle the police to take 
samples from a suspect cannot therefore be challenged in Strasbourg on 
the ground that their use by the prosecution at his subsequent trial 
violated Article 6(1), even though the accused may have been compelled to 
reveal what was not already in existence. (As Lord Bingham pointed out in 
Brown v. Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817 (PC) (at p. 837) the whole purpose of 
requiring a driver to blow into a breathalyser, on pain of a criminal 
penalty if he refuses, is to obtain evidence which is not yet available and 
which could be enough to convict him of an offence.) In the present 
context it is to be noted that ss. 6(4) and 7(6) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 
provide that it is an offence (in certain circumstances) to refuse without 
reasonable excuse to provide a specimen of breath, blood or urine; and 
that fingerprints and non-intimate body samples may be taken from a 
suspect without his consent under ss. 61 and 63 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (in accordance with Code D-4 and D-6 of the PACE 
Codes of Practice). Samples or specimens obtained from a suspect during 
an investigation into an offence may be used in evidence against him at 
his trial. 
In Attorney-General's Reference (No. 7 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 1879 the 
accused, a bankrupt, was legally obliged to deliver up to the official 
receiver his books, papers and other records relating to his estate and 
affairs by virtue of s. 291(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (supported by a 
contempt sanction in s. 291(6)). He was charged with having committed an 
offence under s. 362(1)(a) of the Act (of having materially contributed to, 
or increased the extent of, his insolvency by gambling) and, following a 
defence application in the Crown Court, the judge ruled that the 
admission of documentary evidence (including a betting file, bank 
statements, cheque stubs and gambling statements) would violate the 
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accused's right to a fair trial and directed the jury to acquit. The Court of 
Appeal held that the trial judge had erred. Approving the analysis of La 
Forest J in Thomson Newspapers v. Director of Investigation and Research 
[1990] 1 SCR 425 (SCC), it was held that the distinction drawn in Saunders 
v. United Kingdom between statements made by the accused and other pre-
existing material was `jurisprudentially sound' and, accordingly, that the 
documents had been admissible, subject to the judge's discretion to 
exclude them under s. 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
This approach accords, in the context of civil proceedings, with the view of 
Lord Templeman in AT & T Istel v. Tully [1992] 3 WLR 344 (HL) (at 
p. 350) that it was `difficult to see any reason why . . . the privilege against 
self-incrimination should be exercisable so as to enable a litigant to refuse 
relevant and even vital documents which are in his possession or power 
and which speak for themselves'. That said, the European Court of 
Human Rights has held that there can be a violation of the accused's 
privilege against self-incrimination in respect of his pre-existing documents 
if the authorities tried to obtain them from him `by means of coercion and 
in defiance of the will' with a view to their being used as evidence against 
him in separate criminal proceedings (JB v. Switzerland (2001) Applica-
tion No. 31827/96; see also Funke v. France (1993) 16 EHRR 297 
(ECtHR) at p. 326). 
Some provisions impose no liability for an offence should a person 
refuse to comply with a request, but provide that non-compliance will 
allow an adverse inference to be drawn at that person's subsequent trial. 
In particular, s. 11(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996 provides that the accused's failure to give notice of his defence to the 
prosecution and court prior to his trial on indictment allows the jury to 
`draw such inferences as appear proper in deciding whether the accused is 
guilty of the offence concerned'; ss. 34, 36 and 37 of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 allow adverse inferences to be drawn (in 
certain circumstances) from the accused's failure to respond to police 
questions; and s. 62(10)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
permits an adverse inference to be drawn from the accused's failure 
without good cause to allow an intimate body sample to be taken 
from him. 
In the absence of a statutory exception, a witness may claim the 
privilege against self-incrimination in relation to any evidence on which a 
prosecuting authority might wish to rely in establishing guilt or in deciding 
whether or not to prosecute (Den Norske Bank v. Antonatos [1998] 3 WLR 
711 (CA) at p. 727). Whether a witness will be permitted to refrain from 
answering a question on the ground of self-incrimination depends, first, on 
whether his response would incriminate him and, second, on the likelihood 
that he would be prosecuted for the offence in question. These are 
questions for the judge to answer, but he is under no legal obligation to 
explain the existence of the privilege to the witness for every person is 
presumed to be aware of it (R v. Coote (1873) LR 4 PC 599 (PC)). The first 
question will occasionally give rise to a dilemma for the witness because he 
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may have to disclose his self-incriminating answer to the judge (perhaps in 
camera) so that it can be decided whether he should have to repeat it in the 
trial. With regard to the second question, the privilege may be claimed 
only if the trial judge is of the opinion that a criminal charge is `reasonably 
likely' to be preferred against him (Blunt v. Park Lane Hotel [1942] 2 KB 
253 (CA)) or, at least, that it is a realistic possibility (Khan v. Khan [1982] 1 
WLR 513 (CA), Renworth v. Stephansen [1996] 3 All ER 244 (CA)). This 
will depend on a number of factors, including the gravity of the offence in 
question, how long ago it was committed and any undertakings given by 
the prosecuting authority. If the CPS undertake not to use the 
incriminating material or to prosecute there will be no justification for 
allowing the witness to rely on the privilege (see AT & T Istel v. Tully 
[1992] 3 WLR 344 (HL)). 
If a witness validly asserts the privilege and refuses to answer a 
question, no inference of guilt may be drawn from his silence `or the 
privilege would be at once destroyed' (Wentworth v. Lloyd (1864) 10 HLC 
589 (HL) at p. 590). At common law if a witness was entitled to claim the 
privilege, but was wrongly compelled to answer, the compulsion rendered 
his admission involuntary and therefore inadmissible at his subsequent 
trial for the offence (R v. Garbett (1847) 1 Den 236 (CCCR)). Should the 
same situation occur today the admission would presumably have to be 
ruled inadmissible under s. 76(2)(a) of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 on the ground of `oppression' (or excluded by the mandatory 
application of s. 78(1) of the Act). 
If the accused testifies, then, subject to s. 1(3) of the Criminal Evidence 
Act 1898, he may be asked `any question in cross-examination 
notwithstanding that it would tend to criminate him as to any offence 
with which he is charged in the proceedings' (s. 1(2)). The accused has no 
privilege against self-incrimination in respect of an offence he is on trial 
for and must answer any such question (Maxwell v. DPP [1935] AC 309 
(HL) at p. 318). If the accused has retained his s. 1(3) `shield' against 
cross-examination on his bad character he `shall not be asked, and if asked 
shall not be required to answer' any question relating to his possible 
involvement in any other offence. No adverse inference may be drawn 
from his silence in the face of any such impermissible question (s. 35(5)(a) 
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994). However, if an 
exception to the s. 1(3) shield applies, the accused may be asked, and 
required to answer, questions relating to other offences he has committed 
even if he has not yet been convicted of them. 
14.2 Legal Professional Privilege 
The public interest in the due administration of justice outweighs the 
desirability of upholding most guarantees of confidentiality; so, as a 
general rule, it is not possible to claim that privilege attaches to 
information merely because it has been communicated in confidence. 
However, an important exception to this rule has been recognised for 
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confidential legal advice (`advice privilege') and certain confidential 
communications made in contemplation of legal proceedings (`litigation 
privilege'). Advice privilege and litigation privilege are two aspects of 
`legal professional privilege', but this term is misleading. The privilege is 
the personal right of the client (or litigant) and his to claim or waive 
regardless of the wishes of his lawyer or anyone else. A lawyer is bound by 
his client's wishes and may not disclose privileged information unless 
authorised to do so. 
14.2.1 The Scope of the Privilege 
Regardless of whether legal proceedings are contemplated, advice privilege 
attaches to confidential communications passing between a professional 
legal adviser and his client (or his client's agent) where the dominant 
purpose is to seek and receive legal advice. Legal advice means advice on 
what the law is and `advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be 
done in the relevant legal context' (Balabel v. Air India [1988] 2 WLR 1036 
(CA)). The privilege would also seem to cover confidential documents the 
client intended to send to his legal adviser, but which were never received 
(because, for example, they were lost or the client died before they could 
be posted); but it does not attach to confidential documents prepared by 
other individuals as raw material in respect of which the client would 
subsequently seek advice, even if those preparatory documents were sent 
to the legal adviser (Three Rivers District Council v. Governor & Company 
of the Bank of England (No. 5) [2003] 3 WLR 667 (CA)). Nor does the 
privilege protect information or communications such as the record of a 
client's attendance contained in his solicitor's appointments diary (R v. 
Manchester Crown Court ex parte Rogers [1999] 1 WLR 832 (DC)) or a 
client's address and contact details (R (on the application of Miller Gardner 
Solicitors) v. Minshull Street Crown Court [2002] EWHC 3077 Admin 
(DC)) or a solicitor's response to a request for a quote regarding possible 
conveyancing work (C v. C [2001] 3 WLR 446 (CA)). 
Litigation privilege attaches to confidential communications between 
(i) the professional legal adviser and the client (or his agent), (ii) the 
professional legal adviser and a third party and (iii) the client (or his agent) 
and a third party, so long as the communications are made for the purpose 
of pending or contemplated legal proceedings (Wheeler v. Le Marchant 
(1881) 17 ChD 675 (CA)). In practice the third party will often be an 
expert witness. Litigation privilege is also governed by a `dominant 
purpose' test. In Waugh v. British Railways Board [1979] 3 WLR 150 a 
train driver had been fatally crushed in a collision at work and his wife 
sought compensation from the defendant, alleging that the collision had 
been caused by their negligence. She wished to inspect reports prepared for 
the defendant soon after the accident, but the defendant withheld them on 
the ground that they had been prepared not only for the purpose of 
assessing how to avoid future accidents but also for their lawyers to use in 
any litigation arising out of the collision. The House of Lords ordered the 
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production of the reports for inspection. Litigation privilege did not attach 
to the reports because the `dominant purpose' for which they had been 
brought into existence was not that they should be used in litigation; the 
need to prevent the recurrence of similar accidents had been an equally 
important reason for their creation. 
Section 10(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which 
restates the position at common law, sets out the meaning of `items subject 
to legal privilege' for the purposes of the entry, search and seizure 
provisions of the Act. Advice privilege covers `communications between a 
professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his 
client made in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client' 
(s. 10(1)(a)). Litigation privilege covers `communications between a 
professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his 
client or between such an adviser or his client or any such representative 
and any other person made in connection with or in contemplation of 
legal proceedings and for the purposes of such proceedings' (s. 10(1)(b)). 
Legal professional privilege also attaches to items enclosed with or 
referred to in privileged communications, if the items are in the possession 
of a person who is entitled to possession, so long as the items were brought 
into existence in connection with the giving of legal advice or in 
connection with (or in contemplation of) legal proceedings and for the 
purposes of such proceedings (see s. 10(1)(c) of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984). Examples include a sample of blood taken from the 
accused pursuant to a request by his solicitor and the subsequent report 
prepared by an expert following his analysis of that sample (R v. R [1995] 
1 Cr App R 183 (CA)). Moreover, where in criminal proceedings an expert 
has based his opinion on privileged information or items, the expert's 
opinion, as well as his written report, is privileged (R v. Davies (2002) 166 
JP 243 (CA)). However, no privilege attaches to any pre-existing items the 
client has sent his legal adviser, so in R v. King [1983] 1 WLR 411 (CA) 
pre-existing documents which the accused's solicitor had sent to a 
handwriting expert for analysis were not protected. 
A professional legal adviser need not be in private practice for legal 
professional privilege to arise. Communications between in-house lawyers 
and their employers are also privileged (Alfred Crompton Amusement 
Machines v. Customs and Excise Commissioners (No. 2) [1972] 2 WLR 835 
(CA)) as are communications with foreign advisers (Re Duncan [1968] 2 
WLR 1479 (PD)). A communication with a solicitor's clerk, acting on the 
solicitor's behalf, is also privileged (Taylor v. Forster (1825) 2 C & P 195 
(CCP), Wheeler v. Le Marchant (1881) 17 ChD 675 (CA)). In R (Bozkurt) 
v. Thames Magistrates' Court [2002] RTR 246 the Divisional Court held 
(following Du BarreÂ v. Livette (1791) Peake 108 (KB)) that the interpreter 
who was present during a solicitor's interview with his client was bound by 
the client's privilege to the same extent as the solicitor. Furthermore, a 
number of statutory provisions have now extended the scope of the 
privilege to communications with individuals such as licensed conveyan-
cers, trade mark agents and persons providing advocacy or litigation 
services. 
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14.2.2 The Justification for the Privilege 
It is for reasons of public policy that communications between a 
professional legal adviser and his client may be withheld at the behest of 
the client, notwithstanding the public interest in the due administration of 
justice. In R v. Derby Magistrates' Court ex parte B [1995] 3 WLR 681 
(HL) Lord Taylor CJ justified the privilege in the following terms (at 
p. 695): 
`[A] man must be able to consult his lawyer in confidence, since 
otherwise he might hold back half the truth. The client must be sure that 
what he tells his lawyer in confidence will never be revealed without his 
consent. Legal professional privilege is thus much more than an 
ordinary rule of evidence, limited in its application to the facts of a 
particular case. It is a fundamental condition on which the adminis-
tration of justice as a whole rests.' 
The necessity of advice privilege has been recognised since the sixteenth 
century to ensure that a client will speak candidly with his legal adviser 
and thereby obtain the most appropriate advice and representation. 
Litigation privilege is a more recent development. It has its roots in the 
adversarial system as it was practised in the nineteenth century ± just as 
each party was entitled to conceal his case until the trial, so he was entitled 
to conceal all the evidence upon which his case was based. However, this 
justification is hardly a valid reason in the twenty-first century for 
withholding evidence. Civil litigants are now required to disclose their 
evidence in advance of the trial, and even in criminal proceedings the 
accused is under a pre-trial obligation to disclose the nature of his defence 
and any expert evidence he wishes to rely on. That said, it is clearly 
important that the litigant, his lawyer and third parties such as expert 
witnesses should be able to speak candidly with one another while 
preparing for the trial; so while the historical justification for litigation 
privilege has disappeared, the justification for advice privilege provides a 
valid reason for its continued existence. 
The justification for either privilege disappears, however, once the 
relevant evidence has come into the opponent's possession. If this has 
happened the public interest favouring the adduction of all relevant 
evidence stands uncontradicted and, in the absence of any further policy 
consideration justifying its exclusion, the evidence will be admissible. As a 
matter of law the same is true whether the information has come into the 
opponent's possession innocently or been obtained through theft or 
trickery; so, subject to the judge's exclusionary discretion under r. 32.1 of 
the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, privileged documents or copies of such 
documents which have been obtained by the opposing party may be 
adduced in civil proceedings even if the originals or copies were stolen 
(Calcraft v. Guest [1898] 1 QB 759 (CA), Waugh v. British Railways Board 
[1979] 3 WLR 150 (HL) at p. 159). In criminal proceedings prosecution 
evidence which has been stolen or obtained by trickery from the accused 
may be excluded by the application of s. 78(1) of the Police and Criminal 
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Evidence Act 1984 (or the prosecution itself may be halted as an abuse of 
process) but if the evidence has come into the hands of the prosecution 
innocently there is no rule of law to prevent their using it. In R v. 
Tompkins (1977) 67 Cr App R 181 a privileged note the accused had 
written and given to his barrister during the trial was found on the floor of 
the court-room and handed to the prosecuting barrister. The Court of 
Appeal held that the prosecution had been entitled to cross-examine the 
accused on its content. 
In civil proceedings it may be possible for a person who has had his 
privileged information taken by some improper means to obtain an 
injunction to prevent any use being made of it (Lord Ashburton v. Pape 
[1913] 2 Ch 469 (CA), Goddard v. Nationwide Building Society [1986] 3 
WLR 734 (CA)). (This equitable remedy is not available to prevent the 
Crown from relying on admissible evidence in criminal proceedings: Butler 
v. Board of Trade [1970] 3 WLR 822 (ChD).) Subject to the judge's power 
under r. 32.1 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, the question of 
admissibility in a civil trial turns on relevance; but if an equitable remedy 
is sought before the question of admissibility arises, the way in which the 
information was obtained is itself relevant to whether the remedy ought to 
be granted. In Guinness Peat Properties v. Fitzroy Robinson Partnership 
[1987] 1 WLR 1027 (CA) it was accepted that an injunction could be 
granted even if the privileged information had been obtained as a result of 
an obvious but honest mistake. 
Rule 31.20 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 now provides that a 
privileged document which has been `inadvertently' produced for 
inspection may not be relied on by the opposing party unless the judge 
permits it, but the Court of Appeal has held that the pre-CPR principles 
have not been affected. In other words, the inspecting party is entitled to 
assume that privilege has been waived, but injunctive relief may be granted 
to prevent him from using the evidence if there has been fraud or an 
obvious mistake (Breeze v. John Stacey (1999) The Times 8.7.99 (CA), Al 
Fayed v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2002] EWCA Civ 780). 
In R v. Derby Magistrates' Court ex parte B [1995] 3 WLR 681 the 
majority of the House of Lords came down firmly in favour of the view 
that advice privilege is absolute in nature regardless of any unfairness this 
approach might cause in individual cases. In 1978 a 16-year-old girl was 
murdered and B, having confessed to the murder, was charged with the 
offence. Before his trial B changed his story and alleged instead that his 
stepfather had been responsible, and in reliance on this second version of 
events he managed to secure an acquittal. His stepfather was subsequently 
charged with the girl's murder and at his committal proceedings B was 
called as a prosecution witness. Not surprisingly, the accused wished to 
obtain the documentary record of B's instructions to his solicitor before 
the date when he had changed his story. It could be assumed that B's first 
version of events would be inconsistent with the evidence he would give at 
the accused's trial, and if the defence was equipped with that information 
B could be cross-examined on it for the purpose of undermining the value 
of his evidence (see 16.5.3 post). The House of Lords held that there could 
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never be the sort of balancing exercise which was permissible in cases 
where a claim to public interest immunity was asserted and that the 
accused was not entitled to the requested material unless B was willing to 
waive his privilege. Lord Taylor CJ, in a speech with which Lords Keith, 
Mustill and Lloyd agreed, said (at pp. 696±7): 
`[O]nce any exception to the general rule is allowed, the client's 
confidence is necessarily lost. The solicitor, instead of being able to tell 
his client that anything which the client might say would never in any 
circumstances be revealed without his consent, would have to qualify 
his assurance . . . But it is not for the sake of the applicant alone that the 
privilege must be upheld. It is in the wider interests of all those hereafter 
who might otherwise be deterred from telling the whole truth to their 
solicitors. For this reason I am of the opinion that no exception should 
be allowed to the absolute nature of legal professional privilege, once 
established.' 
Lord Lloyd added (at p. 697): 
`There may be cases where the principle will work hardship on a third 
party seeking to assert his innocence. But in the overall interests of the 
administration of justice it is better that the principle should be 
preserved intact.' 
The same utilitarian approach was adopted by the majority of the High 
Court of Australia in Carter v. Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 
CLR 121; and in General Mediterranean Holdings v. Patel [2000] 1 WLR 
272 (QBD) Toulson J opined (at p. 296) that the accused who was denied 
access to another person's privileged material would still receive a fair trial 
within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. However, it is difficult to see how this view, as a general 
proposition, can be sustained. Although a balancing exercise is permitted 
when determining what is meant by a `fair trial' (2.9 ante), there can be 
little doubt that to deny the accused access to cogent (and otherwise 
admissible) evidence of his innocence on the ground that it is privileged 
material will on occasion result in a violation of Article 6(1). It is true that 
the importance of lawyer-client confidentiality as an aspect of the Article 
8(1) right to have one's private life respected has been recognised by the 
European Court of Human Rights (Campbell v. United Kingdom (1992) 15 
EHRR 137, Foxley v. United Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 637), but there is 
nothing in the Strasbourg jurisprudence to suggest that the privilege can 
be allowed to override all other considerations whatever the circum-
stances. Where privileged material would demonstrate the accused's 
innocence (or give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his innocence) the 
privilege must give way to the requirements of Article 6(1). This was 
recently recognised by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. McClure 
[2001] 1 SCR 445, where it was accepted that, while lawyer-client privilege 
`must be as close to absolute as possible' it would have to yield if reliance 
on it would prevent the accused from establishing his innocence. A two-
stage `innocence at stake' exception to the privilege was set out to be 
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applied in cases where the accused cannot raise a reasonable doubt as to 
his guilt in any other way and the privileged information is not available 
from any other source: 
The first stage . . . requires production of the material to the trial judge 
for review . . . The trial judge must ask: `Is there some evidentiary basis 
for the claim that a solicitor-client communication exists that could raise a 
reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused?' . . . The evidence sought 
should be considered in conjunction with other available evidence in 
order to determine its importance . . . Once the first stage . . . has been 
met, the trial judge must examine the record . . . The trial judge must ask 
herself the following question: `Is there something in the solicitor-client 
communication that is likely to raise a reasonable doubt about the 
accused's guilt? ' 
Subject to any intervention by Parliament or relevant decision in 
Strasbourg, it would appear that advice privilege is to maintain its status 
in England and Wales as an absolute common-law right, notwithstanding 
the changes introduced by the Human Rights Act 1998 (see R (Morgan 
Grenfell) v. Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2002] 2 WLR 1299 (HL) 
at pp. 1304 and 1310). Accordingly, if there is a case where non-disclosure 
of privileged evidence would prevent the accused from receiving the fair 
trial to which he is entitled under Article 6, it will be necessary to argue 
that the proceedings should be stayed as an abuse of the court's process 
(10.4 ante). This approach to the problem, if adopted, might be addressed 
by a two-stage test similar to that established in JC v. R (2001) 195 DLR 
(4th) 513, although the outcome would of course be quite different. (There 
is authority for the view that a person's advice privilege would not be 
infringed by disclosure to the judge for such a limited purpose: Parry-
Jones v. Law Society [1968] 2 WLR 397 (CA), R (Morgan Grenfell) v. 
Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2002] 2 WLR 1299 (HL) at p. 1307.) 
It is to be noted, however, that the stepfather in R v. Derby Magistrates' 
Court ex parte B [1995] 3 WLR 681 submitted at his trial for murder that 
the proceedings should be stayed or, alternatively, that the evidence of his 
stepson, the principal prosecution witness, should be excluded in its 
entirety under s. 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 by 
virtue of his refusal to waive advice privilege. These submissions were 
rejected by the trial judge on the basis that the stepfather's position was 
adequately protected by his counsel's freedom to comment on the 
information which was probably in the privileged documents and explore 
the stepson's reasons for asserting his privilege. The judge's rulings were 
upheld on appeal following the stepfather's conviction (R v. Brookes 
(1998) unreported (96/5986/X2) (CA)). 
The present nature of advice privilege means that it may be removed 
only by legislation, where the statute expressly overrides the right of 
confidentiality or overrides it by necessary implication. An example of the 
latter type of provision is s. 33(3)(f) of the Limitation Act 1980, which 
directs the court to have regard to the nature of the legal advice received 
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by the claimant when deciding whether to grant him leave to bring an 
action out of time (see Jones v. G D Searle [1979] 1 WLR 101 (CA)). 
Litigation privilege is not absolute, however. In Re L (a Minor) [1996] 2 
WLR 395 the majority of the House of Lords held that litigation privilege 
does not apply to proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989 
which are non-adversarial in nature and place the welfare of the child as 
the primary consideration. 
14.2.3 Duration and Waiver 
Once legal professional privilege has arisen it can be lost only if the client 
waives that right. Subject to waiver, a privileged communication is 
privileged for all time and in all circumstances ± `once privileged always 
privileged' (Calcraft v. Guest [1898] 1 QB 759 (CA) at p. 761). Indeed both 
the privilege and the right to waive it survive the death of the client in 
favour of his personal representative or successors-in-title (R v. Molloy 
[1997] 2 Cr App R 283 (CA)). As with the privilege against self-
incrimination, no adverse inference may be drawn if a person refuses to 
waive his legal professional privilege (Wentworth v. Lloyd (1864) 10 HLC 
589 (HL), Sayers v. Clarke Walker [2002] EWCA Civ 910). 
Although the right of waiver, like the privilege itself, is that of the client, 
the legal adviser is deemed to act with his client's authority in the conduct 
of the litigation and may therefore waive the privilege on his client's 
behalf, even if he (the legal adviser) has acted inadvertently and contrary 
to his client's interests. This is apparent from the Court of Appeal's 
decision in Great Atlantic Insurance v. Home Insurance [1981] 1 WLR 529, 
where it was held that waiver in respect of part of the information in a 
privileged document amounts to waiver in respect of all the privileged 
information therein, unless the nature of the subject-matter is sufficiently 
dissimilar to justify severance. (It is possible, however, to withhold ± by 
blanking out ± the privileged parts of a document containing privileged 
and non-privileged material; see The Sagheera [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 160 
(QBD) at p. 170.) According to the Court of Appeal in Al Fayed v. 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2002] EWCA Civ 780, where a 
party or his solicitor has inadvertently permitted another party to inspect 
documents, the inspecting party `is in general entitled to assume' that any 
privilege which might have been claimed for the documents has been 
waived. As a general rule it will be too late for the privilege to be claimed 
by obtaining injunctive relief, although, as explained above, such relief 
may be granted if the documents were procured for inspection by fraud or 
made available for inspection as a result of an obvious mistake. If, 
however, a lawyer intentionally reveals privileged information to the other 
side it will not be possible to argue subsequently that privilege was not 
waived. In R v. Cottrill [1997] Crim LR 56 (CA) the accused's written 
statement was sent to the CPS, without his knowledge or consent, in an 
attempt by his solicitor to persuade the CPS to drop the case. The 
prosecution were therefore entitled to cross-examine the accused on the 
inconsistencies between his testimony and his written statement. 
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A former client who sues his solicitor impliedly waives his privilege in 
respect of any relevant communications between them (Paragon Finance v. 
Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183 (CA)). 
14.2.4 Iniquity 
Communications between a client and his legal adviser which were 
intended by the client or the adviser, or indeed both of them, to facilitate a 
crime or fraud are not covered by legal professional privilege (R v. Cox 
(1884) 14 QBD 153 (CCCR)). Communications which are `criminal in 
themselves' also fall outside the scope of the privilege, for example where a 
client threatens to commit murder or makes an obscene telephone call (C v. 
C [2001] 3 WLR 446 (CA)). The iniquity rule does not apply, however, if 
the legal adviser simply volunteered advice to his client warning him that if 
he persisted in a particular course of conduct he could be prosecuted 
(Butler v. Board of Trade [1970] 3 WLR 822 (ChD)). 
Fraud has a broad meaning in this context and includes `all forms of 
fraud and dishonesty such as fraudulent breach of trust, fraudulent 
conspiracy, trickery and sham contrivances' (Crescent Farm (Sidcup) 
Sports v. Sterling Offices [1972] 2 WLR 91 (ChD) at p. 100). Indeed, it 
now seems that any sufficiently iniquitous purpose will prevent the 
privilege from attaching, the test being objective. In Barclays Bank v. 
Eustice [1995] 1 WLR 1238 the Court of Appeal held that entering into 
transactions at an undervalue for the purpose of prejudicing the interests 
of a creditor was `sufficiently iniquitous' for the communications between 
the transferor and his solicitor relating to those transactions not to be 
privileged, and that it did not matter whether the client or the solicitor 
shared that view. In Dubai Aluminium v. Al Alawi [1999] 1 All ER 703 
(QBD) private investigators employed by the plaintiff's solicitors had 
obtained information about the defendant's finances and assets by means 
of false representation and impersonation amounting to a criminal offence 
under what was then s. 5(6) of the Data Protection Act 1984. This conduct 
was held to fall within the scope of the `crime, fraud or iniquity' doctrine 
thereby preventing litigation privilege from attaching to the reports and 
documents relating to the investigation. 
The rule in R v. Cox (1884) 14 QBD 153 is not an exception to the 
absolute nature of advice privilege. Rather it is a situation where, for 
reasons of public policy, the privilege does not attach. This limitation can 
be justified on two grounds. First, a person with fraudulent intentions 
cannot legitimately expect the communications between himself and his 
legal adviser to be privileged. Second, the innocent legal adviser should be 
free to explain what transpired so that he can disassociate himself from his 
client's criminal or fraudulent conduct. If a party wishes to displace 
another party's claim to privilege under this rule, a prima facie case of 
iniquity must be established (O'Rourke v. Darbishire [1920] AC 581 (HL)). 
Section 10(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides 
that items held with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not 
subject to legal professional privilege. In R v. Central Criminal Court ex 
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parte Francis [1988] 3 WLR 989 the majority of the House of Lords held 
that the intention in question need not be that of the person holding the 
items (in most cases the legal adviser) but could be the intention of any 
person. 
14.3 `Without Prejudice' Communications 
Written or oral communications made by parties to litigation in the course 
of a genuine attempt to settle their dispute are privileged. If the parties fail 
to reach a compromise their various offers, counter-offers and concessions 
may not be disclosed at the trial as evidence of the strength or weakness of 
their respective cases. Generally such correspondence is expressly asserted 
to be on a `without prejudice' basis, but these words are not strictly 
necessary for the privilege to attach so long as the communication is 
genuinely aimed at reaching a settlement (Rush & Tompkins v. Greater 
London Council [1988] 3 WLR 939 (HL)). Conversely, the mere addition of 
the words `without prejudice' to other types of correspondence will not 
give rise to the privilege (Buckinghamshire County Council v. Moran [1989] 
3 WLR 152 (CA)). 
Two justifications have been given for the `without prejudice' rule. 
First, and most important, it is in the public interest that parties to 
litigation should not proceed to trial. In other words, public policy dictates 
that parties should be encouraged to reach a settlement (Rush & Tompkins 
v. Greater London Council [1988] 3 WLR 939 (HL) at p. 942). The 
exclusionary rule performs this function by allowing parties to negotiate 
without running the risk that their communications, usually express or 
implied admissions, will be used against them. Indeed, the strength of the 
public interest underlying the rule is such that it will not be displaced for 
the benefit of one party merely because the other party, who wishes to rely 
on it, is putting forward an implausible or inconsistent case (WH Smith v. 
Colman [2001] FSR 91 (CA)). The second justification is that the parties 
may be said to have agreed that their `without prejudice' communications 
should not be used as evidence against them should their dispute proceed 
to trial (South Shropshire District Council v. Amos [1986] 1 WLR 1271 
(CA) at p. 1277, Unilever v. Procter & Gamble [2000] 1 WLR 2436 (CA) at 
p. 2442). 
The exclusionary rule is not absolute, however, for `the veil imposed by 
public policy may have to be pulled aside, even so as to disclose 
admissions, in cases where the protection afforded by the rule has been 
unequivocally abused' (Unilever v. Procter & Gamble [2000] 1 WLR 2436 
(CA) at p. 2449). In that case, eight exceptions to the rule were 
enumerated, each of which permits communications to be adduced in 
civil proceedings regardless of the fact that they were made during the 
course of `without prejudice' negotiations. Furthermore, in Prudential 
Assurance Co v. Prudential Insurance Co of America [2002] EWHC 2809 
(ChD) it was held that the `without prejudice' rule does not apply in 
respect of communications during negotiations aimed at preventing a 
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dispute from arising, the reason being that the rule should be applied with 
restraint, in accordance with the public interest considerations which 
underlie it, to ensure that relevant evidence is not excluded without good 
reason. However, the privilege does attach to communications which were 
aimed at resolving an existing dispute, even though legal proceedings had 
not been commenced at the time the negotiations took place (Rabin v. 
Mendoza [1954] 1 WLR 271 (CA)). 
In Rush & Tompkins v. Greater London Council [1988] 3 WLR 939 (HL) 
it was held that the public policy which applies to protect genuine 
negotiations from being admissible in evidence should extend to protect 
those negotiations from being discoverable to third parties. As the 
privilege belongs to both parties it may be waived only if they both 
consent. 
14.4 Other Confidential Communications 
Generally speaking, the mere fact that a communication was made as a 
result of an assurance of confidentiality will not protect it from being 
revealed in court (or during pre-trial discovery). If a witness has been told 
something in confidence he can be compelled to reveal that information 
and will be in contempt of court if he refuses to comply. To this there are 
some well-established exceptions, but they are few in number and 
confidentiality is not a separate head of privilege or public interest 
immunity. If it were, `the law would operate erratically and capriciously 
according to whether or not a particular communication was made 
confidentially' (D v. NSPCC [1977] 2 WLR 201 (HL) at p. 226). In 
Attorney-General v. Mulholland [1963] 2 WLR 658 (CA) Lord Denning MR 
said (at p. 665): 
`The only profession that I know which is given a privilege from 
disclosing information to a court of law is the legal profession, and then 
it is not the privilege of the lawyer but of his client. Take the clergyman, 
the banker or the medical man. None of these is entitled to refuse to 
answer when directed to by a judge.' 
Confidential communications to priests are not protected (Wheeler v. 
Le Marchant (1881) 17 ChD 675 (CA) at p. 681, Du BarreÂ v. Livette (1791) 
Peake 108 (KB) at pp. 109±10). Medical doctors too may be compelled to 
reveal what their patients have told them in confidence (Hunter v. Mann 
[1974] 2 WLR 742 (DC)); and bankers may be compelled to disclose the 
details of their books (if an order has been made under s. 7 of the Bankers' 
Books Evidence Act 1879). Close friends and family members are also 
obliged to reveal what they have been told in confidence (Wheeler v. Le 
Marchant (1881) 17 ChD 675 (CA) at p. 681); and, although spouses are 
compellable to testify only in certain situations (16.3.2 post), once they 
have taken the oath they must answer any question like any other witness 
(R v. Pitt [1982] 3 WLR 359 (CA)). However, because of the importance 
attached in democratic societies to the freedom of the press, and the 
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concomitant need to ensure that journalists' sources are not deterred from 
disclosing information which ought to be in the public domain, journalists 
are obliged to reveal their sources only if it is necessary in the interests of 
justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime (see 
s. 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights). In other words, a disclosure order should 
be made only if it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public 
interest (Goodwin v. United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123 (ECtHR), 
Ashworth Hospital Authority v. MGN [2002] 1 WLR 2033 (HL)). 
There are dicta, however, to the effect that trial judges possess a 
discretion as to whether a witness should be compelled to reveal a 
confidential communication. For example, in British Steel v. Granada 
Television [1980] 3 WLR 774 (HL) Lord Wilberforce said (at p. 821): 
`[A]s to information obtained in confidence, and the legal duty, which 
may arise, to disclose it to a court of justice, the position is clear. Courts 
have an inherent wish to respect this confidence, whether it arises 
between doctor and patient, priest and penitent, banker and customer, 
between persons giving testimonials to employees, or in other relation-
ships . . . But in all these cases the court may have to decide, in 
particular circumstances, that the interest in preserving this confidence 
is outweighed by other interests to which the law attaches importance.' 
Similarly, in D v. NSPCC [1977] 2 WLR 201 (HL) (at p. 232) Lord 
Edmund-Davies recognised a discretion in civil proceedings to uphold a 
refusal to disclose relevant evidence if `disclosure would be in breach of 
some ethical or social value' and `on balance the public interest would be 
better served by excluding such evidence'. Whether a witness should be 
compelled to breach a confidence will depend `largely on the importance 
of the potential answer to the issues being tried' (Hunter v. Mann [1974] 2 
WLR 742 (DC) at p. 748). In other words, the question is governed by the 
judge's discretion to exclude logically relevant evidence on the basis that 
countervailing considerations ± in this case confidentiality ± outweigh the 
importance of the evidence to the resolution of one or more issues in the 
trial (Vernon v. Bosley [1994] PIQR 337 (CA) at p. 340; see generally 3.1.3 
ante). This might explain the decision in R v. Griffin (1853) 6 Cox CC 219 
(CCC) where it was considered inappropriate to allow a chaplain to reveal 
what the accused had told him in confidence. 
Chapter Summary 
.	 The privilege against self-incrimination is the personal right of any person not to 
answer any question or produce any evidence which would, inter alia, tend to 
expose him to a criminal charge. It is, however, subject to a number of infringing 
statutory provisions which place unresponsive individuals under a degree of legal 
compulsion to provide information. A failure to respond may result in a penalty or 
an adverse inference being drawn from the individual's silence. A provision may 
even allow the prosecution to rely on a self-incriminating answer provided under 
legal compulsion as evidence against the individual at his trial for an offence 
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which has already been committed, but only if the provision in question was 
enacted to achieve a legitimate objective and is a proportionate response to the 
problem it was intended to address. 
.	 There are two types of legal professional privilege. Advice privilege is the personal 
right of a legal adviser's client to withhold the confidential communications 
between them, so long as the (dominant) purpose of the communications was to 
seek and receive legal advice. It is an absolute right at common law Litigation 
privilege, which is not absolute at common law, is the personal right of the client 
to withhold communications between him and his legal adviser (and any third 
party) if their communications were made for the (dominant) purpose of pending 
or contemplated legal proceedings. Privilege also attaches to items enclosed with 
or referred to in privileged communications if they were brought into existence in 
connection with the provision of legal advice or in connection with (and for the 
purpose of) legal proceedings. Legal professional privilege does not extend to 
communications which were intended to facilitate a crime, fraud or some other 
sufficiently iniquitous conduct. 
.	 As a general rule, `without prejudice' communications between parties to 
litigation in the course of a genuine attempt to settle their dispute are privileged. 
.	 Other confidential communications are not protected by privilege (or public 
interest immunity), but the judge has a discretion to prevent the disclosure of 
confidential information if, in the circumstances of the particular case, counter-
vailing considerations of policy outweigh the principle of free proof. 
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The purpose of the trial is to resolve disputed issues of fact to the 
satisfaction of the court by the adduction of admissible evidence. The law 
of evidence sets out the principles and rules which determine whether 
evidence is admissible and, if so, whether it ought to be admitted, but it is 
also concerned with the process of proof. For a trial to function effectively 
it is necessary to understand: which party has to prove any disputed issue 
of fact (`discharge the burden of proof'); what is meant by `proof' in this 
context; what happens when there is no evidence in support of or against a 
particular factual proposition; and to what extent the tribunal of fact may 
rely on its own knowledge. 
15.1 The Burden and Standard of Proof 
The legal burden of proof (sometimes known as the `persuasive' or 
`probative' burden) is the obligation the law imposes on a party to prove a 
fact in issue. In effect it is no more than a risk-allocation mechanism: the 
party who bears the legal burden on an issue carries the risk of losing on 
that issue if the evidence relevant to it is evenly balanced or non-existent. 
It is for that party to adduce sufficient evidence to persuade the tribunal of 
fact that his version of events is correct. In Rhesa Shipping v. Edmunds 
[1985] 1 WLR 948 (HL) (at pp. 955±6) Lord Brandon said of the tribunal 
of fact in civil proceedings: 
`The . . . judge is not bound always to make a finding one way or the 
other with regard to the facts averred by the parties. He has open to him 
the third alternative of saying that the party on whom the burden of 
proof lies in relation to any averment made by him has failed to 
discharge that burden. No judge likes to decide cases on burden of 
proof if he can legitimately avoid having to do so. There are cases, 
however, in which, owing to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence or 
otherwise, deciding on the burden of proof is the only just course for 
him to take.' 
The claimant who alleges negligence must prove that the defendant's 
conduct amounted to a breach of duty and that he suffered a 
consequential loss; if the evidence is evenly balanced on either issue the 
claimant's claim will fail. In Wakelin v. London & South Western Railway 
(1886) 12 App Cas 41 (HL) it was alleged that the defendant railway 
company's negligence had caused the death of the plaintiff's husband. The 
deceased had been found on a railway crossing following a collision 
between him and one of the defendant's trains, but there were no witnesses 
to what had happened. There was nothing to show whether it was the 
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defendant or the deceased who had been negligent; and even if it was 
assumed that the defendant had been negligent there was no evidence to 
suggest that it had caused the deceased's death. The legal burden lay with 
the plaintiff to prove both facts in issue and as she had been unable to do 
this her claim could not succeed. The `third alternative' is not always an 
available option for the tribunal of fact, however, for it has been held that 
it may not be relied on where there is a clash of medical opinion (Sewell v. 
Electrolux (1997) The Times 7.11.97 (CA)). 
If the claimant is unable to discharge the legal burden he bears on any 
fact in issue in relation to his case, the whole of that case will collapse. For 
this reason it is sometimes said that he bears a specific legal burden on 
each of the facts in issue he is obliged to prove and an `ultimate burden' to 
prove his case as a whole. By contrast, if the defendant bears the legal 
burden on an issue, for example because he has responded to the 
claimant's allegation of negligence with his own counter-allegation of 
contributory negligence, his failure to discharge that burden will not 
necessarily mean he will lose his case. He may fail to prove contributory 
negligence, but if the claimant fails to prove any of the facts in issue which 
comprise his allegation of negligence it is the claimant who will ultimately 
lose, for the defendant will not be found liable to any extent. 
Generally the party who makes an assertion of fact must prove it (`he 
who asserts must prove'), although this principle occasionally has to give 
way to a weightier principle such as the accused's right not to be convicted 
of a crime he has not committed. Thus, in criminal proceedings the 
prosecution generally have to prove each of the elements of the offence 
charged (that is, that the accused committed the actus reus of the offence 
with the requisite mens rea) and also disprove any affirmative defence 
raised by the accused. If the accused is charged with murder and testifies 
that he acted in self-defence the prosecution must prove that he killed the 
deceased with malice aforethought and that he did not act in self-defence. 
If the prosecution fail to prove any of these specific facts in issue the 
accused must be acquitted. This is the general position, but it is subject to 
a number of exceptions where policy has dictated that the accused should 
bear the legal burden of proving his defence (and therefore his innocence) 
in certain situations. 
The legal burden of proof has to be distinguished from the `evidential 
burden'. The evidential burden is not a burden of proof as such but rather 
an obligation to demonstrate that sufficient evidence has been adduced or 
elicited in support of an assertion of fact so that it can become a live issue. 
Whether the legal burden has been discharged, in respect of any fact in 
issue, is determined by the tribunal of fact at the end of the trial in the light 
of all the evidence adduced by both parties. However, the tribunal of fact 
is entitled to adjudicate on any such issue only if the tribunal of law has 
decided that there is sufficient evidence in support of that assertion of fact. 
For example, it is for the judge to say whether fault can legitimately be 
inferred, but for the jury to determine whether it ought to be inferred 
(Metropolitan Railway v. Jackson (1877) 3 App Cas 193 (HL) at p. 200). 
For this reason the evidential burden is sometimes known as `the duty of 
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passing the judge'. If the party bearing an evidential burden fails to 
discharge it the issue is withheld or withdrawn from the tribunal of fact 
and that party will therefore lose on that issue (see, for example, Alexander 
v. Arts Council of Wales [2001] 1 WLR 1840 (CA)). 
As a general rule, the party bearing the legal burden of proof on a fact 
in issue also bears the evidential burden to make it a live issue. If 
insufficient evidence has been adduced by the close of P's case to support 
an assertion of fact made against D the tribunal of law will hold that the 
asserted fact is not to be considered by the tribunal of fact. The 
consequence is that P will lose on that issue and the case against D will 
fail. The tribunal of law may come to such a ruling of its own volition, but 
in practice it will usually follow a submission by D that there is `no case to 
answer' (16.7 post). If the evidential burden in respect of each element of 
an allegation has been discharged there is said to be a prima facie case 
against the opposing party. In criminal proceedings it will be a case 
against the accused. In civil proceedings the claimant will have a claim 
against the defendant, but it is also possible for the defendant to bring a 
counterclaim against the claimant. (For example, where there has been a 
road accident involving a collision between two motorists it is not 
uncommon for each motorist to allege negligence against the other by way 
of a claim and counterclaim.) Thus, if the claimant alleges negligence and 
adduces insufficient evidence by the end of his case for a reasonable 
tribunal of fact to be able to conclude at the end of the trial, taking the 
evidence at its highest, that the defendant was in breach of his duty of care 
to the claimant, the defendant will succeed on a submission of no case to 
answer and the claimant's case will collapse. Likewise, if the prosecution 
allege murder and are unable to adduce sufficient evidence by the end of 
their case that the accused killed the deceased, the case against the accused 
will be dismissed for want of evidence. 
In criminal proceedings there is an exception to the general rule that the 
party with the legal burden of proof on an issue also carries the evidential 
burden. If the accused raises a defence which the prosecution are obliged 
to disprove, there must be sufficient evidence to support that defence by 
the end of the trial or the tribunal of law will withdraw the issue from the 
tribunal of fact. Thus, if the prosecution have discharged their evidential 
burden in respect of all the elements of murder ± that is, they have 
adduced sufficient evidence which if believed, and in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, would enable a reasonable and properly directed 
jury to find the accused guilty of murder ± and the accused raises self-
defence, the accused will have to show there is some admissible evidence in 
support of his defence or the judge will not allow the jury to consider it. 
This will usually mean the accused will have to adduce evidence of his 
own, for example by testifying or calling witnesses on his behalf. However, 
if evidence of self-defence has come out during the prosecution case, for 
example because a prosecution witness has revealed something to that 
effect while being cross-examined, the judge will allow the jury to consider 
the defence even if the accused has adduced no evidence of his own (R v. 
Gill [1963] 1 WLR 841 (CCA), Bullard v. R [1957] 3 WLR 656 (PC)). 
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Whether the evidential burden has been discharged is a question of law for 
the judge, and neither the question itself nor the judge's ruling on it should 
be mentioned to the jury. The judge must, however, direct the jury on the 
incidence of the legal burden of proof, and on the standard of proof 
required, so that they can determine whether that burden has been 
discharged (R v. Gibson (1983) 77 Cr App R 151 (CA)). 
If the party bearing an evidential burden on an issue manages to 
discharge it this is said to place on his opponent a `tactical' or `provisional' 
burden to adduce evidence in rebuttal. The tribunal of law's ruling means 
that sufficient evidence has been adduced on the issue for the tribunal of 
fact to find, at the end of the trial, that it has been proved. If the opponent 
fails to adduce evidence to show the contrary it is quite possible that the 
issue will be proved against him. It would therefore be to the opponent's 
advantage to adduce evidence in rebuttal rather than simply hope the 
tribunal of fact does not find in the proponent's favour: he is obliged, in a 
tactical sense, to adduce evidence of his own. If the prosecution have 
established a prima facie case against the accused it is not incumbent on 
him to adduce evidence of his own, for the jury may decide in his favour 
anyway. However, that might be a very risky approach to take, 
particularly as the jury are entitled to draw an adverse inference from 
the accused's refusal to testify (9.3.2 ante). 
For the tribunal of fact to be able to determine whether the legal burden 
of proof has been discharged by the party bearing it there must be a 
standard (a degree of probability) against which the likelihood of his 
version being true can be compared. This is known as the `standard of 
proof'. Common sense dictates that very little, if anything, can be known 
with certainty, particularly in the adversarial context of criminal and civil 
proceedings where there is so much scope for falsehood and error, so the 
standard must be lower than 100 per cent. It is also meaningless to talk of 
an issue being `proved' (at least in the conventional sense of the word) if an 
alternative explanation is equally or more likely, so the standard of proof 
must be greater than a probability of 50 per cent. Where the standard is set 
between these limits in civil and criminal proceedings is governed by 
considerations of policy. This is subject to the power of the judiciary, or 
indeed Parliament, to attribute to the word `proof' a meaning which does 
not accord with conventional usage, and set a standard which is lower 
than 50 per cent, obliging the party bearing the legal burden to establish a 
possibility (or a reasonable possibility) rather than a likelihood. Thus, if a 
claim for asylum has been rejected by the Home Office, at the subsequent 
appeal hearing (the trial process) the claimant need only establish that 
there is a `reasonable degree of likelihood' that he has a `well-founded fear 
of persecution' because of the serious consequences which might befall 
him should a legitimate claim be rejected (R v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department ex parte Sivakumaran [1988] 2 WLR 92 (HL) at 
pp. 98±9). Furthermore, in the context of criminal proceedings, it is now 
clear that the word `prove' will be interpreted to mean no more than an 
obligation to discharge an evidential burden if its conventional meaning 
would amount to a disproportionate interference with the presumption of 
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innocence guaranteed by Article 6(2) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (see 15.2.2.1 post). 
It would appear that neither the defence nor the prosecution bear an 
evidential burden or the legal burden of proof in relation to whether the 
trial judge (or magistrates) should exercise their power under s. 78(1) of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to exclude prosecution 
evidence, and that no particular standard of proof applies in respect of the 
facts relevant to the exercise of this power (R (Saifi) v. Governor of 
Brixton Prison [2001] 1 WLR 1134 (DC)). 
Finally it should be noted that when determining whether a party has 
discharged the burden of proof to the requisite standard of probability the 
tribunal of fact will not apply a theoretical or statistical approach, 
particularly if a jury is evaluating the evidence. The question must be 
determined `not by means of a formula, mathematical or otherwise, but by 
the joint application of [the jury's] individual common sense and 
knowledge of the world to the evidence before them' (R v. Adams [1996] 
2 Cr App R 467 (CA) at p. 481). That said, the cogency of certain types of 
circumstantial evidence, such as DNA and fingerprint evidence, can only 
properly be evaluated at a statistical level (see 11.4±5 ante). 
15.2 The Burden of Proof in Criminal Proceedings 
15.2.1 The `Golden Thread' 
The starting point for any discussion on the incidence of the legal burden 
of proof in criminal proceedings is the landmark case of Woolmington v. 
DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL). Reginald Woolmington's wife, Violet, left him 
to live with her mother just a couple of months after their marriage and on 
10 December 1934 he cycled round to their house in an attempt to induce 
her to return to him. The next-door neighbour, a Mrs Smith, heard the 
sound of a gun at about 9.30 a.m. and, upon looking out of her front 
window, saw Woolmington mount his bicycle and ride away. Mrs Smith 
entered her neighbour's home to find Violet lying on the floor. She had 
been shot through the heart and was dead. A note was later found in 
Woolmington's coat pocket which suggested that he had intended to kill 
his wife and then himself. At his trial for murder, Woolmington admitted 
that he had cycled round to Violet's house armed with a loaded sawn-off 
shotgun but said that he had merely intended to frighten her into returning 
with him by threatening suicide and that the gun had gone off 
accidentally. The trial judge directed the jury, in accordance with the 
law as it was generally understood to be, that once it had been proved by 
the prosecution that Woolmington had killed his wife a presumption of 
murder arose and it was for him to prove that he had not intended to kill 
her. Woolmington was convicted of murder and appealed unsuccessfully 
to the Court of Criminal Appeal, and then finally to the House of Lords. 
The House of Lords quashed his conviction, and in a speech with which all 
their Lordships concurred Viscount Sankey LC said (at pp. 481±2): 
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`Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is 
always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the 
prisoner's guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of 
insanity and subject also to any statutory exception . . . No matter what 
the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must 
prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England 
and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.' 
The consequence is that, as a general rule, the prosecution are obliged (i) to 
prove that the accused committed the actus reus of the offence with the 
requisite mens rea and (ii) to disprove any defence (in respect of which the 
accused has discharged a mere evidential burden). Viscount Sankey 
referred to the common-law defence of insanity and certain statutory 
exceptions, demonstrating that while the presumption of innocence is 
fundamental it is not an absolute right immune from derogation; but such 
exceptions aside, the burden rests with the prosecution to disprove any 
defence which the judge has allowed the jury to consider, and the judge 
must make this clear in his summing-up. As Lord Bingham CJ stated in 
R v. Bentley (Deceased) [2001] 1 Cr App R 307 (CA) (at p. 326): 
`The jury must be clearly and unambiguously instructed that the burden 
of proving the guilt of the accused lies and lies only on the Crown, that 
(subject to exceptions not here relevant) there is no burden on the 
accused to prove anything and that if, on reviewing all the evidence, the 
jury are unsure of or are left in any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of 
the accused that doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused.' 
Even though the presumption of innocence is regarded as a 
fundamental part of the law of criminal evidence, it is a surprisingly 
recent development. The judge presiding over Woolmington's trial applied 
the law as it was understood to be in 1935 and the Court of Criminal 
Appeal agreed (R v. Woolmington (1935) 25 Cr App R 72 at pp. 75±9). So, 
although Viscount Sankey spoke of the presumption of innocence being 
`part of the common law', it was actually a departure from the historical 
position which had required the alleged murderer to prove his killing was 
not murder (see Jayasena v. R [1970] 2 WLR 448 (PC) at p. 453). 
The principle which underlies the `golden thread' is the self-evident 
truth that people have a right not to be convicted of offences they have not 
committed. This is reflected in Article 6(2) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which provides that everyone charged with a criminal 
offence `shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law'. 
The importance attached to this principle is reinforced by the very high 
standard of proof the prosecution must attain to secure a conviction 
(15.4.1 post), but the desirability of acquitting the innocent is not the only 
justification for the presumption of innocence. Other considerations, such 
as the dignity of the individual, and the individual's right to privacy and 
liberty, which may be violated as a result of any decision to prosecute, 
demand that prosecutions should be commenced and continued only when 
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there is cogent evidence to justify such course of action. The point was 
eloquently made in the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Oakes [1986] 1 
SCR 103 (at pp. 119±20): 
`The presumption of innocence is a hallowed principle lying at the very 
heart of criminal law. . . . [It] protects the fundamental liberty and 
human dignity of any and every person accused by the State of criminal 
conduct. An individual charged with a criminal offence faces grave 
social and personal consequences, including potential loss of physical 
liberty, subjection to social stigma and ostracism from the community, 
as well as other social, psychological and economic harms. In light of 
the gravity of these consequences, the presumption of innocence is 
crucial. It ensures that until the State proves an accused's guilt beyond 
all reasonable doubt he or she is innocent. This is essential in a society 
committed to fairness and social justice.' 
The presumption of innocence and the concomitant high standard of 
proof which the prosecution must satisfy act as a bulwark against 
unwarranted intrusions into the private life of the individual and minimise 
the possibility that innocent persons will be convicted. A corollary of this 
is that the presumption serves `to maintain public confidence in the 
enduring integrity and security of the legal system' (State v. Coetzee (1997) 
(4) BCLR 437 (SACC) at p. 522). 
The prosecution therefore have to disprove the defences of provocation 
(Mancini v. DPP [1942] AC 1 (HL)), self-defence (R v. Lobell [1957] 2 
WLR 524 (CCA)), mechanical defect (R v. Spurge [1961] 3 WLR 23 
(CCA)), duress (R v. Gill [1963] 1 WLR 841 (CCA)) and non-insane 
automatism (Bratty v. Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1961] 3 
WLR 965 (HL)) to list but some of the principal examples. However, it 
would be intolerable if the prosecution had to anticipate and then disprove 
any such defence in the absence of evidence to suggest the possibility of its 
being true. The accused therefore bears an evidential burden in respect of 
these defences, and this must be discharged for the defence to be left to the 
tribunal of fact as a live issue. The standard of disproof for the 
prosecution is `beyond reasonable doubt' (15.4.1 post) so in a trial on 
indictment the accused's evidential burden will be discharged if the judge is 
of the view that there is enough evidence for the jury to be able to accept 
the truth of his defence as a reasonable possibility. If the judge accepts that 
the evidential burden has been discharged the jury will be directed to 
consider the defence and told that it is for the prosecution to disprove it 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
It is interesting to note that the accused bears an evidential burden 
whether his defence is one which operates by trumping his proven actus 
reus and mens rea, for example the defence of duress, or is simply a denial 
of his having committed the actus reus with the requisite mens rea, for 
example the defences of self-defence and non-insane automatism. 
Although in principle the accused should not have to bear an evidential 
burden in respect of the absence of an element of the offence charged, this 
426 Evidence 
is overridden by the need to ensure that the prosecution are not unduly 
disadvantaged by having to prove what in essence (if not in theory) 
amounts to an affirmative defence when there is no evidence to support it. 
For this reason it would seem that the accused bears an evidential burden 
if his defence is one of accident (Bratty v. Attorney-General for Northern 
Ireland [1961] 3 WLR 965 (HL) at p. 975 (obiter)) or alibi (R v. Johnson 
[1961] 1 WLR 1478 (CCA) at p. 1479 (obiter)), although this would be 
more acceptable in relation to the latter defence than the former as an 
averment of alibi entails something more than a mere denial of presence. 
In any event the prosecution are obliged to prove the falsity of the 
defences of alibi (R v. Helliwell [1995] Crim LR 79 (CA)) and accident 
(Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL)). Similarly, while the accused 
bears an evidential burden on the defence of consent to a charge of 
indecent assault, it is for the prosecution to disprove the defence (R v. May 
[1912] 3 KB 572 (CCA), R v. Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 (CCA)). 
The absence of consent forms part of the statutory definition of the 
actus reus of rape (s. 1(2)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956) and, 
according to the majority of the House of Lords in DPP v. Morgan [1975] 
2 WLR 913, the prosecution bear both the evidential burden and the legal 
burden of proof on that issue. It is also implicit in their Lordships' 
speeches that the accused bears no more than a tactical burden in relation 
to the `defence' that he mistakenly believed the complainant was 
consenting. However, this is subject to the principle that the jury should 
not be subjected to unnecessary and irrelevant directions, so if there is no 
evidence to suggest the possibility that the accused was mistaken there is 
no requirement that the judge should direct the jury to consider the 
question (R v. Adkins [2000] 2 All ER 185 (CA)). In effect, then, the 
accused bears an evidential burden to make the question of mistaken belief 
a live issue for the jury to consider. Similarly, if the offence charged is one 
which requires proof that the accused intended a particular consequence, 
and his defence is that he was so drunk that he did not have that specific 
intent, he will have to discharge an evidential burden in relation to that 
issue (R v. McKnight (2000) The Times 5.5.00 (CA)). 
15.2.2 Proving Innocence ± Insanity and Reverse Onus Provisions 
In Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL) Viscount Sankey recognised 
that while the legal burden of proof generally lies with the prosecution 
there was the one common-law exception of insanity and a number of 
statutory exceptions to this rule. In all cases where the accused bears the 
legal burden of proof on an issue the standard which has to be met is proof 
on the `balance of probabilities' (15.4.1 post). An obligation to prove a 
defence also entails an obligation to discharge an evidential burden in 
relation to it (R v. Windle [1952] 2 QB 826 (CCA) at p. 831). For an 
evidential burden of this sort to be discharged, the judge must be of the 
view that there is enough evidence in support of the defence for a properly 
directed jury to be able to conclude (at the end of the trial) that the issue 
has been proved to the requisite standard. 
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15.2.2.1 Article 6(2) of the European Convention 
By imposing a burden of proof on the accused in respect of a defence he 
wishes to rely on, and obliging him to prove that defence on the balance of 
probabilities, the jury may convict him even though they feel there is a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. That is, the jury may accept that it is 
reasonably possible (but not probable) that his defence is true and that he 
is not guilty. Moreover, as there is no logical distinction between the 
definitional elements of a statutory offence and any linked statutory 
defence the so-called defence may in fact oblige the accused to disprove his 
presumed moral culpability, the `gravamen' of the offence. As Lord Steyn 
recently noted: `there are . . . cases where the defence is so closely linked 
with mens rea and moral blameworthiness that it would derogate from the 
presumption [of innocence] to transfer the legal burden to the accused' (R 
v. Lambert [2001] 3 WLR 206 (HL) at p. 220). 
Consider, for instance, ss. 5(3) and 28(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971. Section 5(3) provides that, subject to s. 28, it is an offence for a 
person to have a controlled drug in his possession with the intent to supply 
it to another. Section 28(3) provides a defence if the accused `proves that 
he neither believed nor suspected nor had reason to suspect that the 
substance or product in question was a controlled drug' (see s. 28(3)(b)(i)). 
The traditional interpretation of these provisions was that the prosecution 
had only to prove that the accused had possession of an item, in the sense 
that he had control over it and knew of its existence, and that that item 
was in fact a controlled drug. There was no obligation on the prosecution 
to prove that the accused knew the item was a controlled drug, for s. 28(3) 
raised a rebuttable presumption of knowledge ± once the prosecution had 
proved those two facts beyond reasonable doubt it was for the accused to 
prove on the balance of probabilities that he neither believed nor 
suspected nor had reason to suspect that the item was a controlled drug (R 
v. McNamara (1988) 87 Cr App R 246 (CA)). The effect of the provisions 
was to give rise to a presumption that the accused had the requisite 
culpable state of mind and oblige him to rebut that presumption ± in effect 
to place on the accused an obligation to prove the absence of mens rea, 
albeit framed as a defence. Thus, if the accused picked up a bag from one 
acquaintance to be delivered to another, and the bag contained an item 
which the accused believed to be pornography, and the police searched the 
bag and found that the item was a controlled drug, it would be for the 
accused to prove (on the balance of probabilities) that he had no reason to 
suspect that the item was a controlled drug; and if the jury accepted that it 
was reasonably possible that this was the case (that is, they accepted there 
was a reasonable doubt as to whether he had the requisite culpable state of 
mind), but were not satisfied that his defence was more likely than not to 
be true, he would be convicted of the very serious s. 5(3) offence. A 
separate provision in s. 28 raises a similar rebuttable presumption of 
knowledge by providing that `it shall be a defence for the accused to prove 
that he neither knew of nor suspected nor had reason to suspect the 
existence of some fact alleged by the prosecution which it is necessary for 
the prosecution to prove if he is to be convicted' (s. 28(2)), and the 
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traditional view has been that this too places a legal burden on the accused 
(see R v. Champ (1981) 73 Cr App R 367 (CA)). This would provide the 
accused with a defence in the sort of situation where he is found to have a 
controlled drug in the bag in his possession, raising the presumption that 
the accused was (knowingly) in possession of its contents, his defence 
being that he neither knew nor suspected nor had reason to suspect that 
that item was in his bag. (In Salmon v. HM Advocate (1999) JC 67 (HCJ) 
(at pp. 73±4) it is suggested that s. 28(3) applies only to the situation where 
the accused knows he has a substance such as powder or pills in his 
possession and his defence is that he was ignorant of the nature of that 
substance as a controlled drug.) 
A factual scenario of this type, albeit one in which the accused asserted 
that he believed his bag contained `scrap jewellery', arose in the case of R 
v. Lambert [2001] 3 WLR 206 (HL) where the accused was convicted of 
possessing two kilograms of cocaine with intent to supply, for which he 
received a sentence of seven years' imprisonment. He appealed to the 
Court of Appeal (R v. Lambert [2001] 2 WLR 211) and then to the House 
of Lords on the ground that the onus he bore to prove his non-culpable 
state of mind on the balance of probabilities for the purposes of 
s. 28(2)±(3) conflicted with the presumption of innocence. The appeal was 
dismissed by the House of Lords because his trial had taken place before 
the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, and the Act did not apply 
retrospectively. Nevertheless, their Lordships took the opportunity to 
express their (obiter) views on his ground of appeal. 
The question for the House of Lords was whether the defences in 
s. 28(2)±(3) of the 1971 Act, given their ordinary meaning (that is, without 
recourse to s. 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998) were compatible with 
Article 6(2), given that the right protected is not absolute and not every 
reverse onus provision will be incompatible with the Convention. The 
European Court of Human Rights has accepted that reverse onus 
provisions (and for that matter strict liability offences) can be reconciled 
with Article 6(2) so long as they are confined `within reasonable limits 
which take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain 
the rights of the defence' (Salabiaku v. France (1988) 13 EHRR 379 at 
p. 388, Hoang v. France (1992) 16 EHRR 53 at p. 78). Accordingly, 
whether a reverse onus provision breaches the Convention depends on 
whether the modification or limitation of the right protected by Article 
6(2) pursues a legitimate aim and satisfies the principle of proportionality. 
As Lord Hope said (at p. 237): 
`It is now well settled that the principle which is to be applied requires a 
balance to be struck between the general interest of the community and 
the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual. This will not 
be achieved if the reverse onus provision goes beyond what is necessary 
to accomplish the objective of the statute.' 
Thus, the mere fact that a provision places the legal burden of proof on 
the accused in respect of a particular issue, and may therefore result in his 
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being convicted where there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, does not 
of itself determine the question of compatibility. It is first necessary to 
determine whether the interference with the presumption of innocence is 
directed towards a legitimate public objective: `What is the nature of the 
threat faced by society which the provision is designed to combat?' (R v. 
DPP ex parte Kebilene [1999] 3 WLR 972 (HL) at pp. 998±9). Further, a 
degree of deference will be paid to the view of Parliament as to what is in 
the interest of the public generally; as Lord Hope explained in R v. DPP 
ex parte Kebilene (at p. 994): `[i]n some circumstances it will be 
appropriate for the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgment 
within which the judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, to the 
considered opinion of the elected body'. If the reverse onus provision is 
directed at a legitimate objective, it is then necessary to consider the issue 
of proportionality, that is, whether the provision is a reasonable measure 
to take to achieve that legitimate objective, a measure which does not go 
beyond what is strictly necessary to accomplish it. Relevant factors 
include, first, what it is that the prosecution have to prove for the 
presumption to arise and, second, the nature of the burden on the accused: 
`does it relate to something which is likely to be difficult for him to prove, 
or does it relate to something which is likely to be within his knowledge or 
. . . to which he readily has access?' (R v. DPP ex parte Kebilene at p. 998). 
However, in the absence of exceptional circumstances it is doubtful that 
much weight will be attached to the `within his knowledge' criterion where 
the offence is serious, as it would justify placing an obligation on the 
accused to prove anything which only he could be aware of (such as 
whether or not he had the requisite mens rea for murder). A third factor is 
whether the legitimate objective could just as effectively be achieved by 
placing on the accused nothing more than an evidential burden (which 
would be far less likely to lead to a contravention of Article 6(2)). If, for 
instance, the legal burden has been placed on the accused to prevent an 
unmeritorious defence being raised frivolously, and an evidential burden 
would serve just as well, the imposition of the legal burden would go 
beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate objective. 
This approach to the question of compatibility is evident in the way the 
Privy Council determined whether two reverse onus provisions were 
compatible with the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 11(1) 
of Hong Kong's Bill of Rights in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Lee 
Kwong-Kut [1993] 3 WLR 329. Lord Woolf said (at p. 341): 
`This implicit flexibility allows a balance to be drawn between the 
interest of the person charged and the state. There are situations where 
it is clearly sensible and reasonable that deviations should be allowed 
from the strict applications of the principle that the prosecution must 
prove the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt . . . Some 
exceptions will be justifiable, others will not. Whether they are 
justifiable will in the end depend upon whether it remains primarily 
the responsibility of the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused to 
the required standard and whether the exception is reasonably imposed 
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. . . If the prosecution retains responsibility for proving the essential 
ingredients of the offence, the less likely it is that an exception will be 
regarded as unacceptable. In deciding what are the essential ingredients, 
the language of the relevant statutory provision will be important. 
However, what will be decisive will be the substance and reality of the 
language creating the offence rather than its form.' 
Applying this test, the Privy Council held that a provision obliging the 
accused to prove that money found in his possession had not been stolen 
or obtained unlawfully was inconsistent with the presumption of 
innocence, as the accused bore the legal burden of proof in respect of 
the most significant element in the definition of the offence, the onus on 
the prosecution being limited to the `formality' of proving possession and 
certain facts from which a reasonable suspicion could be inferred that the 
property had been unlawfully obtained. The second provision was upheld, 
however. The prosecution had to prove, first, that the accused was 
involved in a transaction involving another person's proceeds of drug 
trafficking and, second, that the accused knew or had reasonable grounds 
to believe that the other person carried on or had carried on (or had 
benefited from) drug trafficking. Only then was the accused obliged to 
prove that he had not known or suspected that the involvement in 
question related to any person's proceeds of drug trafficking, a `manifestly 
reasonable' provision in the view of the Privy Council given the context of 
the war against drug trafficking and the difficulty the prosecution would 
face if they had to prove the accused had taken steps necessary to ensure 
that he did not have the relevant knowledge or suspicion. 
Two aspects of the approach adopted in Attorney-General of Hong 
Kong v. Lee Kwong-Kut require further consideration. First, the Privy 
Council referred to `the substance and reality of the language creating the 
offence rather than its form', making the important point that a reverse 
onus provision may be the gravamen of the offence, the very issue which 
determines moral blameworthiness. Lord Steyn made the same point in R 
v. Lambert [2001] 3 WLR 206 (HL) (at pp. 219±20) when he said that the 
`distinction between constituent elements of the crime and defensive issues 
will sometimes be unprincipled and arbitrary' and that it was `sometimes 
simply a matter of which drafting technique is adopted: a true constituent 
element can be removed from the definition of the crime and cast as a 
defensive issue'. The second point is that the Privy Council accepted that 
the `war against drug trafficking' was a legitimate public objective, which 
might suggest that the serious nature of the criminal activity is a relevant 
consideration when determining where the balance is to be drawn (see also 
R v. Lambert [2001] 2 WLR 211 (CA) at p. 221). However, as noted by 
Lord Steyn in R v. Lambert (HL) (at p. 218), repeating the dictum of 
Sachs J in State v. Coetzee (1997) (4) BCLR 437 (SACC) (at p. 522): `the 
more serious the crime and the greater the public interest in securing 
convictions of the guilty, the more important do constitutional protections 
of the accused become'. The general interest of the community in 
suppressing crime is relevant, but it `will not justify a state in riding 
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roughshod over the rights of a criminal defendant' (McIntosh v. Lord 
Advocate [2001] 3 WLR 107 (PC) at p. 119). 
The House of Lords in R v. Lambert recognised that it was clearly in the 
public interest to discourage the `grave social evil' of trafficking in drugs 
and that there were sound practical reasons for the reverse onus provisions 
in s. 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. However, the majority view was 
that the imposition of the legal burden of proof on the accused by those 
provisions could not be justified as a proportionate measure given the 
gravity of the consequences which would follow a conviction (with a 
sentence of life imprisonment in the most serious cases), the rights of the 
accused and the express recognition in the 1971 Act that it was wrong to 
penalise an individual who neither believed nor suspected nor had reason 
to suspect that the item in his possession was a controlled drug (s. 28(3)) 
or who neither knew of nor suspected nor had reason to suspect the 
existence of some essential fact alleged by the prosecution (s. 28(2)). The 
reverse onus could therefore result in a lengthy custodial sentence when 
there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had the specified 
culpable state of mind, and `if any error is to be made in the weighing of 
the scales of justice it should be to the effect that the guilty should go free 
rather than that an innocent person should be wrongly convicted' (per 
Lord Clyde at p. 258). According to Lords Slynn, Steyn, Hope and Clyde, 
the words `if he proves' in s. 28(3)(b)(i), and the words `for the accused to 
prove' in the defence provided by s. 28(2), in effect obliging the accused to 
prove absence of mens rea, would be incompatible with Article 6(2) unless 
`read down' by virtue of s. 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to impose 
on the accused no more than an evidential burden, with the prosecution 
being obliged to prove the accused's culpable state of mind beyond 
reasonable doubt. Only Lord Hutton felt that the reverse onus provisions 
in question were a proportionate measure striking a fair balance between 
the general interest of the community and the personal rights of the 
individual, the threat to society being sufficiently grave and the difficulty 
of proving the accused's state of mind sufficiently great to justify a 
rebuttable presumption of mens rea for persons found to be in possession 
of drugs. His Lordship suggested that the imposition of a mere evidential 
burden would not be adequate to deal with the problem with which the 
reverse onus provisions were intended to deal, such as where it is proved 
that the accused was in possession of a bag containing a controlled drug 
and he says that he thought the bag contained a video, as it would be very 
difficult for the prosecution to disprove a defence of this sort beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Any express (or implied) reverse onus provision may now be challenged 
on the ground that it is incompatible with the European Convention. This 
does not mean that every such provision will be held to be incompatible 
with Article 6(2), of course, for there can be little doubt that exceptions 
which impose an obligation in relation to regulatory offences of a 
relatively trivial or quasi-criminal nature, where the accused may be 
obliged to do nothing more than present evidence that he is licensed to do 
a particular activity, will be considered reasonable infringements of the 
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presumption of innocence. But there are many reverse onus provisions 
which are not so trivial, which in effect place on the accused the burden of 
proving that he was not morally culpable at the time the offence was 
allegedly committed. These are all now open to challenge, and there will be 
a considerable degree of uncertainty in the law until each and every such 
provision has been adjudicated upon. It is also quite clear that different 
judges will have very different opinions on how the balance between the 
interests of the community and the protection of the rights of the 
individual should be struck, as starkly demonstrated by the differences of 
opinion in the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in R v. Lambert. 
Indeed, in Sheldrake v. DPP [2003] 2 WLR 1629 the original two-judge 
Divisional Court could not agree on the approach to be taken with s. 5(2) 
of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the matter had to be reheard by a 
differently constituted three-judge Court, which was also divided. 
Needless to say, it has since been held by the Court of Appeal that the 
defences in s. 28(2)±(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 place only an 
evidential burden on the accused (R v. Lang [2002] EWCA Crim 298, R v. 
Carrera [2002] EWCA Crim 2527). The same conclusion was reached in R 
v. Carass [2002] 2 Cr App R 77 (CA) in respect of s. 206(4) of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, which provides a defence to a charge under 
s. 206(1)(a) if the accused can `prove that he had no intent to defraud', the 
Court of Appeal being of the view that there was insufficient justification 
in the ease-of-proof argument for imposing the legal burden on the 
accused in relation to what was clearly `an important element of the 
offence' (see also R v. Daniel [2003] 1 Cr App R 99 (CA)). Similarly, in 
Sheldrake v. DPP [2003] 2 WLR 1629 the Divisional Court held that s. 5(2) 
of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which had hitherto placed the legal burden 
on the accused to prove `no likelihood of his driving' if the accused had 
been found drunk in charge of a motor vehicle (for the purposes of the 
s. 5(1)(b) offence) should be read down to impose no more than an 
evidential burden. 
However, in L v. DPP [2002] 3 WLR 863 the Divisional Court upheld 
the reverse onus in s. 139(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which 
obliges the accused `to prove that he had a good reason or lawful 
authority' as a defence to a charge of having a bladed article in his 
possession in a public place, contrary to s. 139(1) of the Act. In reaching 
its conclusion, and distinguishing the provisions considered by the House 
of Lords in R v. Lambert, it was noted that the prosecution had to prove 
possession, including knowledge on the part of the accused that he had the 
relevant article; that there was a strong public interest in bladed articles 
not being carried in public without good reason; that the accused was 
obliged to prove something within his own knowledge; and that respect 
should be given to the way in which Parliament had sought to strike the 
right balance between the demands of the community and the protection 
of the rights of the individual. L v. DPP was followed in R v. Matthews 
[2003] 3 WLR 693, in respect of s. 139(4) and (5) of the 1988 Act, where 
the Court of Appeal opined that the two subsections `strike a fair balance 
between the general interest of the community in the realisation of a 
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legitimate legislative aim and the protection of the fundamental rights of 
the individual and go no further than is necessary to accomplish 
Parliament's objective in protecting the public from the menace posed 
by persons having bladed articles in public places without good reason'. In 
R v. Ali, R v. Jordan [2001] 2 WLR 211 (CA) it was held that s. 2(2) of the 
Homicide Act 1957 continues to place the legal burden on the accused to 
prove diminished responsibility on the ground that it is a defence 
unconnected to the elements of murder which is of benefit to those who 
are in a position to take advantage of it, and which would be difficult for 
the prosecution to disprove if the accused was unwilling to be examined by 
a doctor. Furthermore, the reverse onus in s. 15(3) of the Road Traffic Act 
1988 (the so-called `hip-flask defence' to drink-driving) was upheld in R v. 
Drummond [2002] 2 Cr App R 352 (CA); the reverse onus in s. 92(5) of the 
Trade Marks Act 1994 (reasonable grounds for believing there was no 
trade mark infringement) was upheld in R v. S [2003] 1 Cr App R 602 
(CA) and R v. Johnstone [2003] 1 WLR 1736 (HL); the reverse onus in 
s. 40 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 was upheld in R v. Davies 
[2002] EWCA Crim 2949; and the reverse onus in s. 11(2) of the Terrorism 
Act 2000 (a defence to the s. 11(1) offence of belonging to a proscribed 
organisation) was upheld in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 4 of 2002) 
[2003] 2 Cr App R 346 (CA). 
Now that the Human Rights Act 1998 is in force, Parliament has begun 
to introduce statutory defences which, though framed in terms which 
suggest that the accused bears the legal burden of proof, must, by virtue of 
an express provision, be interpreted to place on the accused no more than 
an evidential burden. The Terrorism Act 2000 contains a number of 
express defences which the accused is obliged to `prove', but by virtue of 
s. 118(1)±(2) the accused has to discharge no more than an evidential 
burden if the defence is included in s. 118(5). There are, however, other 
defences in the Act, such as s. 11(2) (above), which do not benefit from 
s. 118, and which the accused is obliged to prove on the balance of 
probabilities, subject of course to any contrary view the courts may have 
on the matter. 
Section 57(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 deserves special mention 
because its predecessor, a reverse onus provision in s. 16A(3) of the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (now repealed), 
was the subject of some scrutiny in the Divisional Court and House of 
Lords just before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force (R v. DPP 
ex parte Kebilene [1999] 3 WLR 175 (DC), [1999] 3 WLR 972 (HL)). The 
Divisional Court was of the view that, by placing the legal burden of proof 
on the accused, ss. 16A(3) and 16B(1) undermined the presumption of 
innocence `in a blatant and obvious way'. The House of Lords, though 
reversing the decision of the Divisional Court on an unrelated issue, 
expressed its own opinions on s. 16A(3). Lords Slynn, Steyn, Hobhouse 
and Hope each felt that the issue of incompatibility remained arguable, 
Lords Hope and Hobhouse making the point that the Divisional Court 
had considered only prima facie incompatibility and not gone on to 
address the necessary balancing exercise. Lord Cooke was minded to agree 
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with the Divisional Court's view, but felt that it might be permissible to 
infringe Article 6(2) in the particular context of the threat posed to society 
by terrorism, a view which Lord Hope seemed to support when pointing 
out that in Murray v. United Kingdom (1994) 19 EHRR 193 (at p. 222) the 
European Court of Human Rights expressly recognised that `due account 
will be taken of the special nature of terrorist crime, the threat which it 
poses to democratic society and the exigencies of dealing with it'. Clearly 
concerned by the possibility of a successful argument on incompatibility, 
Parliament decided to include s. 57(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 within 
s. 118(5) and, accordingly, the accused now bears only an evidential 
burden in relation to that defence. 
Whether terrorism is to be regarded as an exceptional category of crime 
remains to be seen but, if so, it might be justified on the ground that crimes 
of this sort threaten the very fabric of the free and democratic societies in 
which human rights are valued and upheld. The argument would be that a 
certain reduction in these freedoms is necessary to save liberties and 
democracy at a more general level. 
15.2.2.2 Insanity 
As the law stands, if the accused wishes to rely on the common-law 
defence of insanity he bears the legal burden of proving it (R v. Smith 
(1910) 6 Cr App R 19 (CCA)) and, of course, the evidential burden too (R 
v. Windle [1952] 2 QB 826 (CCA) at p. 831). By virtue of ss. 1(1) and 6(1) 
of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, for 
the evidential (and legal) burden to be discharged there must be expert 
opinion evidence in support of the defence from two or more registered 
medical practitioners (at least one of whom must be `duly approved' as 
having special experience in the diagnosis or treatment of mental 
disorder). 
The incidence of the burden of proof for insanity dates back to the 
M'Naghten Rules of 1843 (M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Cl & F 200 at 
p. 210) and was so clearly established as part of the common law that the 
House of Lords in Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 462 was clearly not 
prepared to overturn it. Although there is no generally accepted rationale 
for this reverse burden it would appear to be a policy-driven decision 
predicated on the desirability of convicting persons who have committed 
serious offences. No doubt an apprehension that the defence might easily 
be faked (and be difficult for the prosecution to disprove), a distrust of 
psychiatric evidence (or the jury's ability to assess it), and an awareness 
that the vast majority of individuals who stand trial are sane, have to some 
extent contributed to the retention of this rebuttable `presumption of 
sanity'. The consequence is of course that, contrary to principle, `a verdict 
of guilty [can] be properly returned if the jury entertain a reasonable doubt 
as to the existence of a fact which is essential to guilt, namely, the capacity 
in law of the accused to commit that crime' (Davis v. United States (1895) 
160 US 469 (USSC) at p. 488). 
The insanity exception was recently considered by the Supreme Court of 
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Canada in R v. Chaulk [1990] 3 SCR 1303. (The Canadian two-stage test 
means that the question of proportionality is considered only after an 
infringement of the presumption of innocence has been identified, a strict 
approach being adopted in relation to the preliminary issue.) The majority 
view was that the reverse onus insanity provision in the Criminal Code 
violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (as it permitted a conviction 
notwithstanding a reasonable doubt in the mind of the tribunal of fact as 
to the accused's guilt) but that it was nonetheless a reasonable and 
proportionate limitation given the desirability of convicting sane offenders 
and the `impossibly onerous burden' which the prosecution would bear if 
sanity had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt once the accused had 
discharged a mere evidential burden. An alternative view was adopted by 
Wilson J who, having agreed with the majority that the reverse onus 
provision violated the presumption of innocence, felt that the requirement 
of proving insanity on the balance of probabilities could not be justified ± 
an evidential burden would suffice, in line with the position adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States (1895) 160 US 469, 
on the ground that the prosecution would have to do no more than 
address the doubt engendered by the accused's evidence, and there was 
nothing to suggest that this had placed an unduly onerous burden on the 
prosecution in the US federal courts and the State jurisdictions which had 
adopted this approach. A third view was that the reverse onus provision 
did not contravene the presumption of innocence at all. Insanity could not 
properly be regarded as a `true' defence as it resulted in no more than a 
formal acquittal, followed by the imposition of alternative coercive 
measures (namely, detention and treatment). In other words, the 
prosecution were still obliged to prove all the elements of the offence 
and disprove any `true' defence raised on the evidence, so there was no 
violation of s. 11(d) of the Charter. 
In Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Lee Kwong-Kut [1993] 3 WLR 329 
(at p. 341) the Privy Council, comprising five Law Lords, inclined towards 
the majority view in Chaulk v. R as `common sense'. The European 
Commission of Human Rights considered the question in H v. United 
Kingdom (1990) Application 15023/89, and in dismissing the applicant's 
submission that the insanity exception contravened Article 6(2) as 
manifestly ill-founded, formed the view that the rule did `not concern 
the presumption of innocence, as such, but the presumption of sanity' and 
that it could not be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary. Lord Hope 
would appear to have been reflecting this view when suggesting that the 
presumption was `one of sanity, not responsibility' and that it was for the 
prosecution to prove mens rea (R v. DPP ex parte Kebilene [1999] 3 WLR 
972 (HL) at p. 991). However, as Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law (10th edn, 
2002, pp. 226±7) points out, if the accused relies on the first limb of the 
test in the M'Naghten Rules (that is, that he did not know the nature and 
quality of his act) he is in effect obliged to prove absence of mens rea, and 
if he is to bear the legal burden of proof on that issue a different rationale 
must be found. 
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If the accused raises the defence of diminished responsibility to a charge 
of murder, the prosecution may counter by alleging that he was insane, in 
which case the burden of proving insanity rests with them (see s. 6 of the 
Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964). 
15.2.2.3 Express Statutory Exceptions 
It has been seen that statutory offences may expressly provide the accused 
with an exception which he must prove on the balance of probabilities, 
subject of course to any such provision being read down under s. 3(1) of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 so as to place no more than an evidential 
burden on him. The following examples illustrate the different types of 
formula used by Parliament. `Any person who without lawful authority or 
reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any 
public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence' (s. 1(1) of 
the Prevention of Crime Act 1953; see also s. 139(4) of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988). `In any proceedings for an offence under this Act it shall . . . be 
a defence for the person charged to prove . . .' (s. 24(1) of the Trade 
Descriptions Act 1968). `On a charge of murder, it shall be for the defence 
to prove that the person charged is by virtue of this section not liable to be 
convicted of murder' (s. 2(2) of the Homicide Act 1957: diminished 
responsibility). `Where in any of the foregoing sections the description of 
an offence is expressed to be subject to exceptions mentioned in the 
section, proof of the exception is to lie on the person relying on it' (s. 47 of 
the Sexual Offences Act 1956). `Where in any proceedings against a person 
for an offence . . . it is proved that any money, gift or other consideration 
has been paid or given to or received by a person in the employment of His 
Majesty or any Government Department or a public body by or from a 
person, or agent of a person, holding or seeking to obtain a contract . . . 
the money, gift or consideration shall be deemed to have been paid or 
given and received corruptly . . . unless the contrary is proved' (s. 2 of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1916). 
Until the Human Rights Act 1998 was passed, the courts consistently 
held that exceptions to statutory offences which expressly impose a 
requirement of proof on the accused place a legal burden upon him. Thus, 
in R v. Hunt [1986] 3 WLR 1115 (HL) Lord Ackner said (at p. 1137): `It is 
accepted that when Parliament by express words provides that the proof 
of the excuse shall lie upon the accused, the legal burden of proof . . . is 
placed upon the defendant, and that is discharged on the balance of 
probabilities'. This is now true only of such provisions which (i) are not 
subject to an express interpretation clause placing a mere evidential 
burden on the accused (such as s. 118(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000) and 
(ii) have been (or will be) upheld by the courts. 
As the law stands, the accused bears the legal burden of proof in respect 
of, inter alia, diminished responsibility (R v. Dunbar [1957] 3 WLR 330 
(CCA), R v. Ali, R v. Jordan [2001] 2 WLR 211 (CA)); lawful authority or 
reasonable excuse for s. 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 (R v. 
Brown (1971) 55 Cr App R 478 (CA)); that money (etc.) was not paid or 
given and received corruptly for s. 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 
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1916 (R v. Braithwaite [1983] 1 WLR 385 (CA)); good reason or lawful 
authority for s. 139(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (L v. DPP [2002] 3 
WLR 863 (DC)); the `hip-flask defence' in s. 15(3) of the Road Traffic Act 
1988 (R v. Drummond [2002] 2 Cr App R 352 (CA)); the defence to trade 
mark infringement in s. 92(5) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (R v. S [2003] 1 
Cr App R 602 (CA)); the defence of `not reasonably practicable' in s. 40 of 
the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (R v. Davies [2002] EWCA Crim 
2949); and the defence of marital coercion in s. 47 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1925 (R v. Cairns [2003] 1 Cr App R 662 (CA)). 
15.2.2.4 Implied Statutory Exceptions 
Since 1848 there has been a provision which, while not expressly placing 
any specific legal burden on the accused, provides that where the accused 
in summary proceedings wishes to rely on an exception to a statutory 
offence he bears the burden of proving it. The present incarnation of this 
provision is now found in s. 101 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980: 
Where the defendant to an information or complaint relies for his 
defence on any exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification, 
whether or not it accompanies the description of the offence or matter 
of complaint in the enactment creating the offence or on which the 
complaint is founded, the burden of proving the exception, exemption, 
proviso, excuse or qualification shall be on him . . . 
This provision was originally enacted as s. 14 of the Summary 
Jurisdiction Act 1848. It was subsequently amended and re-enacted as 
s. 39(2) of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, and then as s. 81 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1952. Viscount Sankey therefore almost certainly 
had the provision in mind when referring to `any statutory exception' in 
Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL) (15.2.1 ante). Thus, subject to 
any ruling on incompatibility with Article 6(2) of the European 
Convention, s. 101 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 places the legal 
burden on the accused to prove any `exception' to the statutory offence he 
has been charged with in a magistrates' court. This was the view taken in 
Gatland v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2 WLR 1263 where 
the accused faced a charge under s. 140(1) of the Highways Act 1959 
arising out of his having deposited a builders' skip on a road in Croydon. 
Section 140(1) provided that it was an offence if a person `without lawful 
authority or excuse, deposits any thing whatsoever on a highway'. The 
Divisional Court, applying s. 81 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952, held 
that it was for the accused to prove `lawful authority or excuse' (see also 
Baker v. Sweet [1966] Crim LR 51 (DC) and Guyll v. Bright (1986) 84 Cr 
App R 260 (DC)). 
If s. 101 were uniformly applied, so as to place the legal burden of proof 
on the accused in respect of any expressly stated exception to a summary 
offence, it could be justified, albeit with reservations. Statutory 
summary offences which are qualified by an express proviso or exception 
tend to be relatively minor and regulatory rather than truly criminal. 
Indeed, given the large number of summary offences of strict liability, 
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statutory offences qualified by an exception, which at least give the 
accused a chance of avoiding criminal liability, could be seen as something 
of a concession to the defence. The problem with s. 101 is that it has not 
been applied consistently by the courts, resulting in considerable 
uncertainty in the law, and its scope has (in effect) been extended to 
cover offences which are triable on indictment (although this latter 
problem may be of no more than historical interest now that the Human 
Rights Act 1998 is in force). 
The first comment to make about s. 101, then, is not so much a criticism 
of the provision itself but of the way in which it has, or has not, been 
applied. There has been little consistency in the approach adopted by the 
Divisional Court, with the legal burden being placed on the accused in 
respect of some excuses and on the prosecution in respect of others. Thus, 
unless a particular provision has already been interpreted by the 
Divisional Court the accused will not know in advance of his trial 
whether or not he will be obliged to prove his defence. Take, for instance, 
the case of Nagy v. Weston [1965] 1 All ER 78. The accused faced a charge 
under s. 121(1) of the Highways Act 1959 which provided that it was an 
offence if a person `without lawful authority or excuse, in any way wilfully 
obstructs the free passage along a highway'. The offence was qualified 
with an exception, and its similarities with s. 140(1) are obvious, yet the 
Divisional Court failed to mention s. 81 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 
1952 and held that it was for the prosecution to prove that there was no 
lawful authority and that the accused's use of the highway was 
unreasonable (that is, that he had no excuse). Even if this was an 
oversight on the part of the Divisional Court, the decision was applied in 
Hirst v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1986) 85 Cr App R 143 (DC) 
to the identical provision now found in s. 137(1) of the Highways Act 
1980. In this latter case, which concerned the reasonableness of a protest 
by animal rights supporters outside a furrier's shop, Otton J recognised the 
constitutional importance of the right to protest on issues of public 
concern. However, as s. 101 of the Magistrates' Courts Act was not 
mentioned in the judgment it is unclear whether it was deliberately 
ignored, because of the importance attached to freedom of speech, or 
simply overlooked. In any event, whatever the justification for the 
interpretation of what is now s. 137(1) of the Highways Act 1980, s. 101 
has also been ignored or overlooked in a variety of other contexts. It is an 
offence under s. 7(6) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to fail `without 
reasonable excuse' to provide a specimen of breath, blood or urine for 
analysis; yet it has been held that once the accused has discharged a mere 
evidential burden the prosecution must disprove the defence (DPP v. 
Ambrose [1992] RTR 285 (DC)). Similarly, an offence under s. 1(1) of the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971 is not committed if the accused acted with 
`lawful excuse', two examples of which are set out in s. 5(2); however, in 
Jaggard v. Dickinson [1981] 2 WLR 118 the Divisional Court held that it 
was for the prosecution to disprove a statutory lawful excuse. 
Section 101 applies only to offences tried in magistrates' courts, with the 
common-law position governing trials on indictment. This means that if 
The Mechanics of Proof 439 
the accused is charged with an offence which is triable either way, and 
there is an exception he may be able to rely on, he will bear the legal 
burden of proof on that issue in the magistrates' court (subject to the 
provision actually being applied) but will bear only an evidential burden in 
the Crown Court unless there is an equivalent common-law exception. 
Until 1974 there was considerable authority, dating back to the case of R v. 
Turner (1816) 5 M & S 206 (KBD), for the view that statutory provisions 
were to be interpreted so as to place the legal burden of proof on the 
accused where he sought to rely on facts peculiarly within his own 
knowledge in cases where the prosecution alleged that the accused was not 
qualified to do (or possess) what he had done (or had in his possession). 
So, for example, in R v. Scott (1921) 86 JP 69 it was held by Swift J at first 
instance that the accused had to prove he was licensed to supply cocaine; 
in R v. Oliver [1944] 1 KB 68 (CCA) the accused had to prove that he had 
the requisite war-time licence to supply sugar; and in R v. Ewens [1966] 2 
WLR 1372 (CCA) the accused had to prove he had been issued a valid 
prescription for the drinnamyl tablets found in his possession. The same 
approach to the interpretation of statutory offences was also adopted in 
summary proceedings: in John v. Humphreys [1955] 1 WLR 325 (DC) the 
accused charged with driving without a licence had to prove he had a 
current driving licence, and in Philcox v. Carberry [1960] Crim LR 563 
(DC) the accused charged with driving without insurance had to prove he 
was covered by an appropriate policy. In neither case was s. 81 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 applied. 
In R v. Edwards [1974] 3 WLR 285 the accused faced a charge of selling 
intoxicating liquor without a justices' licence contrary to s. 160(1)(a) of the 
Licensing Act 1964. At his trial (on indictment) he failed to show he had a 
licence and was convicted. He appealed on the ground that it had been for 
the prosecution to prove he did not have a licence as the prosecution's 
access to the register of licences meant it was not a fact peculiarly within 
his own knowledge. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal and held 
that as the provision first enacted as s. 14 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 
1848 had then reflected the common law, so s. 81 of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act 1952 represented the common law as it stood in 1974. Giving 
the judgment of the Court, Lawton LJ said (at pp. 295±6): 
`In our judgment . . . the common law, as a result of experience and the 
need to ensure that justice is done both to the community and to 
defendants, has evolved an exception to the fundamental rule of our 
criminal law that the prosecution must prove every element of the 
offence charged . . . It is limited to offences arising under enactments 
which prohibit the doing of an act save in specified circumstances or by 
persons of specified classes or with specified qualifications or with the 
licence or permission of specified authorities. Whenever the prosecution 
seeks to rely on this exception, the court must construe the enactment 
under which the charge is laid. If the true construction is that the 
enactment prohibits the doing of acts, subject to provisos, exemptions 
and the like, then the prosecution can rely upon the exception. In our 
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judgment its application does not depend upon either the fact, or the 
presumption, that the defendant has peculiar knowledge enabling him 
to prove the positive of any negative averment . . . 
Two consequences follow from the view we have taken as to the 
evolution and nature of this exception. First, as it comes into operation 
upon an enactment being construed in a particular way, there is no need 
for the prosecution to prove a prima facie case of lack of excuse, 
qualification or the like; and secondly, what shifts is the onus: it is for 
the defendant to prove that he was entitled to do the prohibited act. 
What rests on him is the legal or, as it is sometimes called, the 
persuasive burden of proof. It is not the evidential burden.' 
While it makes sense that the incidence of the legal burden of proof 
should not be determined by the venue of the accused's trial, the decision 
in R v. Edwards gives rise to a number of problems. In Woolmington v. 
DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL) the obligation on the prosecution to prove the 
accused's guilt was held to be subject to only one common-law exception, 
the defence of insanity. If this is correct, the enactment of 1848 had not put 
the common law on a statutory footing but had created a new exception 
applicable only to summary proceedings. Even if this is not accepted, s. 101 
does not even reflect what was originally in the 1848 Act as the relevant 
provision in that Act was re-enacted in an amended form in 1879. To say 
that what is now s. 101 of the 1980 Act reflects the common law applicable 
to trials on indictment would also seem to conflict with the decision in R v. 
Curgerwen (1865) LR 1 CCR 1 (CCCR), where it was held that a statutory 
proviso to the offence of bigamy in s. 57 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 (that is, that the first spouse had been absent for seven 
years and was not known by the accused to be alive during that period) 
had to be disproved by the prosecution. Further, if the common-law 
position is and always has been as set out in s. 101 it is difficult to 
understand why Parliament has enacted so many provisions which 
expressly place the legal burden of proof on the accused. In effect the 
Court of Appeal in R v. Edwards created a new exception to the 
`fundamental rule' in Woolmington v. DPP. So long as the `true 
construction' of the provision in question was that it prohibited the doing 
of an act, subject to a `proviso' or `exception' (and the like), then the 
accused was obliged to prove that the proviso or exception covered his 
situation. That said, the Court of Appeal has on occasion adopted the 
approach of the Divisional Court and either ignored this common-law rule 
or shown itself to be entirely ignorant of its existence. In R v. Burke (1978) 
67 Cr App R 220 (CA) it was held that the prosecution had to disprove the 
`antique firearm' exemption in s. 58(2) of the Firearms Act 1968 to an 
offence under s. 1(1); and in R v. Cousins [1982] 2 WLR 621 (CA) it was 
held that the prosecution had to disprove `lawful excuse' in s. 16 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861. In neither case was R v. Edwards 
referred to. 
The issue came before the House of Lords in R v. Hunt [1986] 3 WLR 
1115. A number of police officers had raided H's home in 1984 and found 
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a paper fold containing white powder which was subsequently analysed 
and found to contain morphine. H was charged under s. 5(2) of the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1971 with unlawful possession of a controlled drug in 
contravention of s. 5(1) of the Act, and at his trial the analyst's report was 
adduced in evidence by the prosecution. This report listed the ingredients 
of the white powder (`morphine mixed with caffeine and atropine') but 
failed to specify the actual proportion of morphine. Possession of a 
preparation `containing . . . not more than 0.2 per cent of morphine' was 
not unlawful for the purposes of s. 5(1) of the 1971 Act (by virtue of 
reg. 4(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1973 and para. 3 of 
Schedule 1 thereto) and at the trial a submission of no case to answer was 
made on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that the white 
powder contained more than 0.2 per cent morphine. Following the judge's 
ruling against that submission H pleaded guilty and appealed, at first 
unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal and then to the House of Lords. 
The questions which had to be answered were, first, whether the Court of 
Appeal had been correct in R v. Edwards [1974] 3 WLR 285; and, if so, 
whether the proportion of morphine in a preparation was to be regarded 
as an element of the definition of the offence, which had to be proved by 
the prosecution, or whether there was an `exception' to a charge of 
possessing morphine where the preparation contained no more than 
0.2 per cent of the drug, which the accused was obliged to prove. Lord 
Griffiths, in a speech with which Lords Keith and Mackay agreed, 
expressed the view that as the decision in Woolmington v. DPP (15.2.1 
ante) had been solely concerned with the defence of accident to a charge of 
murder (that is, everything else said by Viscount Sankey in that case had 
been obiter) and had cast no doubt on cases decided before 1935, Viscount 
Sankey's reference to `any statutory exception' could not be interpreted to 
exclude implied statutory exceptions. Lord Griffiths summarised the 
position (at pp. 1127±8): 
`Woolmington . . . did not lay down a rule that the burden of proving a 
statutory defence only lay upon the defendant if the statute specifically 
so provided: that a statute can, on its true construction, place a burden 
of proof on the defendant although it does not do so expressly: that if a 
burden of proof is placed on the defendant it is the same burden 
whether the case be tried summarily or on indictment, namely, a burden 
that has to be discharged on the balance of probabilities. The real 
difficulty in these cases lies in determining upon whom Parliament 
intended to place the burden of proof when the statute has not expressly 
so provided. It presents particularly difficult problems of construction 
when what might be regarded as a matter of defence appears in a clause 
creating the offence rather than in some subsequent proviso from which 
it may more readily be inferred that it was intended to provide for a 
separate defence which a defendant must set up and prove if he wishes 
to avail himself of it . . . 
However [in Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan & Sons [1967] 3 WLR 1169 
(HL)] their Lordships were in agreement that if the linguistic 
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construction of the statute did not clearly indicate upon whom the 
burden should lie the court should look to other considerations to 
determine the intention of Parliament such as the mischief at which the 
Act was aimed and practical considerations affecting the burden of 
proof and, in particular, the ease or difficulty that the respective parties 
would encounter in discharging the burden. I regard this last 
consideration as one of great importance for surely Parliament can 
never lightly be taken to have intended to impose an onerous duty on a 
defendant to prove his innocence in a criminal case, and a court should 
be very slow to draw any such inference from the language of a statute. 
When all the cases are analysed, those in which the courts have held that 
the burden lies on the defendant are cases in which the burden can be 
easily discharged.' 
Accordingly, R v. Edwards [1974] 3 WLR 285 (CA) was held to have 
been correctly decided, save that Lawton LJ's definition of the scope of this 
exception to the rule in Woolmington v. DPP was considered to be no more 
than a guide to construction: `In the final analysis each case must turn 
upon the construction of the particular legislation to determine whether 
the defence is an exception within the meaning of section 101 of the Act of 
1980 which the Court of Appeal rightly decided reflects the rule for trials 
on indictment' (per Lord Griffiths at p. 1129). Lord Ackner also approved 
the approach taken by the House of Lords in Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan 
& Sons [1967] 3 WLR 1169 and said (at pp. 1133 and 1135): 
`Where Parliament has made no express provision as to the burden of 
proof, the court must construe the enactment under which the charge is 
laid. But the court is not confined to the language of the statute. It must 
look at the substance and the effect of the enactment . . . The Court of 
Appeal, in construing the relevant statutory provisions in order to 
ascertain where the burden of proof lay, rightly concluded, relying on 
the decision of your Lordships' House in Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan & 
Sons . . ., that they were not restricted to the form or wording of the 
statutory provisions but were entitled to have regard to matters of 
policy.' 
The House of Lords unanimously agreed that H's conviction should be 
quashed as it had been for the prosecution to prove as an essential element 
of the offence that his preparation of morphine was of the prohibited type. 
Lord Griffiths suggested that in a practical sense it would be far easier for 
the prosecution to discharge the burden in such cases because the accused 
would no longer have access to the drugs once they had been seized. A 
further consideration was the seriousness of the offence, which required 
any ambiguity to be resolved in favour of the accused. Lord Ackner 
pointed out that where Parliament had made its intention known, either 
expressly or by necessary implication, the courts were bound to give effect 
to what Parliament had provided. This deference to Parliament, together 
with the desirability of ensuring that the incidence of the burden of proof 
should not vary depending on whether the accused is tried summarily or on 
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indictment, led the House of Lords to follow the decision in R v. Edwards 
[1974] 3 WLR 285 (CA). The policy consideration favouring the adoption 
of a uniform approach in all criminal courts won the day, the trade-off 
being the absence of any consistent approach to the incidence of the legal 
burden of proof where a defence is relied on: if it is a common-law defence 
(other than insanity) the accused bears a mere evidential burden; if it is a 
statutory defence then the common-law equivalent of s. 101 provides that 
the accused should bear the legal burden of proving it. Lord Griffiths 
dismissed the recommendation of the Criminal Law Revision Committee's 
Eleventh Report (Cmnd 4991 (1972) at pp. 87±91) that the accused should 
generally bear only an evidential burden: that was a matter for Parliament. 
In a similar vein Lord Ackner said (at pp. 1137±8): 
`The hypothesis is that by necessary implication Parliament has 
provided in a statute that proof of a particular exculpatory matter 
shall lie on the accused. However, the discharge of an evidential burden 
proves nothing ± it merely raises an issue. Accordingly, the mere raising 
of an issue by the defence would not satisfy the obligation which 
Parliament has imposed.' 
However, what was more worrying about this decision was the extent to 
which the exception to the general rule in Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 
462 (HL) had been enlarged. The distinction between an offence and an 
exception to it is in many respects artificial, for it is the cumulative effect 
of the offence elements and any exception which defines the parameters of 
what is permissible and what is not. As a matter of logic there is no 
difference between the proposition that `driving without a licence is an 
offence' and the proposition that `driving is an offence, except where the 
driver holds a licence'. The actus reus of rape is defined as sexual 
intercourse with a person who does not consent, but logically it could be 
said that sexual intercourse is a criminal offence, save that there is an 
exception if the parties consent. The distinction between the offence and 
any exception to it is devoid of substance, for any definitional element of 
an offence may be removed and turned on its head to become an exception 
to the remaining definitional elements. Indeed, with the demise of the 
`peculiar knowledge' approach to statutory interpretation (according to 
the Court of Appeal in R v. Edwards [1974] 3 WLR 285) cases such as John 
v. Humphreys [1955] 1 WLR 325 (DC) suggest that driving is the offence, 
qualified by an exception for anyone who holds a valid licence. (In DPP v. 
Kavaz [1999] RTR 40, however, the Divisional Court opined that it was 
unnecessary to consider s. 101 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 on the 
ground that there was `overwhelming' authority to the effect that the 
`peculiar knowledge' rule obliged the accused to prove he had an MOT 
certificate for his car.) 
Following the decision of the House of Lords in R v. Hunt the courts 
were no longer limited to finding exceptions and provisos which were 
linguistically described as such. Trial judges could make reference to `other 
considerations' such as the mischief at which the Act was aimed, practical 
factors such as ease of proof, and any relevant considerations of policy. In 
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other words, judges were given a discretion, justified by policy, to create 
exceptions to statutory offences and thereby shift the legal burden of proof 
from the prosecution to the accused. So, in theory at least, judges were 
entitled to pick out an element of a statutory offence, turn it on its head, 
classify it as an exception and thereby impose a legal burden on the 
accused to prove his innocence. It is true that Lord Griffiths sought to 
distinguish between `statutory defences' and the `essential ingredients' of 
the offence, but this might be no more than a semantic distinction (at least 
in respect of any element which is not patently the gravamen of a very 
serious offence). Take, for instance, s. 170(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 
which provides that it is an offence for a driver involved in a road accident 
to fail to report it. Although the accused must know he was involved in an 
accident to be liable, it is for him to prove that he did not have that 
knowledge (Selby v. Chief Constable of Avon [1988] RTR 216 (DC)). The 
accused's state of mind, usually regarded as the mens rea and therefore an 
`essential ingredient' if not the gravamen of the offence, has been held to 
be a defence which the accused himself must prove. 
It will be remembered that the House of Lords was particularly 
influenced by the decision in Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan & Sons [1967] 3 
WLR 1169. That case was an appeal from Scotland concerning the 
interpretation of s. 29(1) of the Factories Act 1961 and, though the case 
concerned a civil action, a breach of s. 29(1) can lead to criminal liability 
(s. 155(1)). Section 29(1) provides that workplaces `shall, so far as is 
reasonably practicable, be . . . kept safe for any person working there'. The 
question for the House of Lords was whether it was for the plaintiff, a 
workman, to prove it had been reasonably practicable for the defendant 
company to keep the workplace safe or for the defendant to prove it had 
not been reasonably practicable. The majority of the House of Lords held 
that the burden of proof lay with the defendant, thereby implying that if a 
prosecution were to be brought under s. 155(1) the offence would be 
defined as not keeping a workplace safe (which would need to be proved 
by the prosecution) but this would be subject to an exception which the 
accused would have to prove, namely that it was not reasonably 
practicable to keep the workplace safe. 
The foregoing must now of course be read in the light of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. In R v. Lambert [2001] 3 WLR 206 (HL) (at p. 233) Lord 
Hope explained that there were three distinct questions which would now 
need to be addressed in respect of any provision of the sort considered in 
R v. Edwards [1974] 3 WLR 285 (CA) and R v. Hunt [1986] 3 WLR 1115 
(HL). First, whether on the proper construction of the enactment the 
defence relied on is actually an exception of this type; second, whether the 
language used by parliament, according to its ordinary meaning, has 
indeed placed the legal burden of proof on the accused; and, third, 
whether the provision is compatible with Article 6(2) of the European 
Convention by reference to the general test applicable to express reverse 
onus provisions (15.2.2.1 ante), replacing the `considerations of policy' test 
formulated in R v. Hunt. Accordingly, there will now need to be an 
expressly stated justification in terms of proportionality for placing the 
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legal burden of proof on the accused, bearing in mind the ease with which 
he would be able to discharge it or the difficulty he would encounter (as 
the case may be) and the obligations borne by the prosecution. In other 
words, the only real difference between the test formulated in R v. Hunt 
and that described in R v. Lambert is that the courts must now consider 
whether the legitimate objective could just as effectively be achieved by 
placing on the accused an evidential burden rather than the legal burden 
of proof. The continuing relevance of factors such as `ease of proof' and 
`accessibility' means that where the accused is obliged by s. 101 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (or its common-law equivalent) to show he 
was licensed to do a particular activity, or to possess a particular item, he 
will still bear the legal burden of proof in relation to that issue. Thus, in R 
(on the application of Grundy & Co Excavations) v. Halton Division 
Magistrates' Court (2003) 167 JP 387 (DC) it was held that the accused 
bore the legal burden of proving he had a felling licence (or that a licence 
was not required) for the purposes of ss. 9 and 17 of the Forestry Act 
1967; and in McNamara v. Television Licensing Region [2002] EWHC 2798 
Admin (QBD) Rose LJ accepted that the user of a television set had to 
prove that he held the requisite licence to avoid liability under s. 1(1) of the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949. It may even be that the continuing 
relevance of the accused's `peculiar knowledge' to the question of ease of 
proof will justify retaining the rule in Selby v. Chief Constable of Avon 
[1988] RTR 216 (DC) that the accused must prove that he was unaware of 
the road accident he was involved in if charged with an offence under 
s. 170(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988; and no doubt the maxim `it is 
easier to prove a positive than a negative' will also have a continuing role 
to play in helping judges and magistrates determine the incidence of the 
legal burden. (This maxim might explain why in R v. Curgerwen (1865) LR 
1 CCR 1 (CCCR) the legal burden of proof was placed on the prosecution 
to disprove the bigamy proviso. It would be truly onerous for the accused 
to have to prove that he did not know his spouse was alive at any time 
during a seven-year period.) 
The principal problem with this area of the law is that much of it is 
uncertain and will remain so until all the express and implied reverse onus 
provisions have been definitively addressed by the appellate courts. For 
the time being trial judges and magistrates are themselves under an 
onerous burden in that they must consider the mischief at which the 
relevant offence and defence were aimed, any considerations of policy, the 
issue of proportionality; and then determine whether the accused ought to 
bear the legal burden of proof or merely an evidential burden. With so 
many considerations to weigh in the balance it may also be impossible for 
the parties to know in advance of the trial who will have to prove or 
disprove the relevant provision. 
15.2.3 The Burden of Proving the Admissibility of Evidence 
The party who wishes to adduce evidence is obliged to prove any 
preliminary collateral facts upon which the admissibility of that evidence 
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is dependent. The tribunal of law is the tribunal of fact for these purposes, 
the question of admissibility being one of law (R v. Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr 
App R 313 (CA)). Generally speaking the standard borne by the 
prosecution is beyond reasonable doubt while the accused need only 
discharge his burden on the balance of probabilities. However, the balance 
of probabilities test applies when determining the competence of any 
witness to give evidence (s. 54(2) of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999). 
Thus, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused's confession was not obtained in the ways set out in s. 76(2) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, that the maker of a hearsay 
statement tendered pursuant to s. 23 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is 
unable to attend court to give oral evidence for one of the reasons 
specified in that section, and that a sample of the accused's handwriting 
was actually written by him (R v. Ewing [1983] 3 WLR 1 (CA)). If the 
prosecution cannot discharge their burden to the requisite standard of 
proof in relation to any such collateral fact the evidence which depends on 
it is inadmissible, for as noted in R v. Ewing (at p. 7) a case cannot be said 
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt if the prosecution merely satisfy the 
judge on the balance of probabilities that their allegedly genuine samples 
of the accused's handwriting are in fact genuine. It would seem, however, 
that where the question is whether a document tendered by the 
prosecution is authentic, something which the jury will need to decide 
for themselves at the end of the trial as a question of fact, the judge need 
only be satisfied of its authenticity on the balance of probabilities, for 
otherwise the jury's role might be usurped (R v. Robson [1972] 1 WLR 651 
(CCC)). 
15.3 The Burden of Proof in Civil Proceedings 
The incidence of the burden of proof is a matter of substantive law 
established by statute or precedent, but generally it lies with the party 
asserting an affirmative proposition to prove it: `he who asserts must 
prove'. In Joseph Constantine Steamship Line v. Imperial Smelting Corpn 
[1942] AC 154 (HL) Lord Maugham said (at p. 174) that this was a general 
rule `founded on considerations of good sense [which] should not be 
departed from without strong reasons'. It would perhaps be more apt to 
describe it as a cogent guiding principle. Lord Maugham also pointed out 
that the incidence of the legal burden `depends on the circumstances in 
which the claim arises' which suggests that a more flexible approach is 
adopted in civil proceedings. This should not be surprising. The `golden 
thread', which acts to protect the reputation and liberty of the individual 
in criminal proceedings, does not warrant such reverence in other 
contexts, where the parties are equal (at least in theory) and the question 
of punishment rarely arises. Having said that, as an underlying principle it 
does have a counterpart in civil proceedings, and Lord Wright expressly 
referred to the `presumption of innocence' in Joseph Constantine 
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Steamship Line v. Imperial Smelting as a justification for placing the legal 
burden of proof upon the party alleging fault. 
The principle that the legal burden lies with the party asserting an 
affirmative proposition does not mean that whenever the claimant's 
assertion is capable of being described as a negative the burden will lie 
with the defendant. If a proposition has been described in negative terms 
but is substantially affirmative in nature it will still fall upon the party 
asserting it to prove it. In Soward v. Leggatt (1836) 7 C & P 613 (CE), for 
example, it was for the landlord to prove his assertion that the tenant `did 
not repair' his premises, in breach of a term of the lease, as the `substance 
and effect' of the assertion was affirmative in nature notwithstanding the 
linguistic formula used in the pleadings. It follows that where the 
claimant's assertion is deemed to be an essential element of the claim, the 
mere form of words used will not affect the incidence of the legal burden 
of proof. A claimant alleging negligence must prove the defendant's 
breach of duty (`D's conduct was not reasonably competent') and his own 
consequential loss; and a claimant alleging breach of contract must prove 
the existence of the contract, its terms and the defendant's breach (`D did 
not perform his obligations'). If the defendant has a counterclaim against 
the claimant he will have to prove his assertions in the same way. 
The principle that a party should have to prove any proposition essential 
to his case makes sense. It is just that the person who institutes proceedings, 
and thereby creates expense and trouble for the defendant, should have to 
justify his conduct and prove his case. In effect it is a different way of stating 
that the presumption of innocence applies to civil proceedings, but (unlike 
the golden thread) it works both ways. The defendant will often raise a 
counterclaim against the claimant so the claimant too is entitled to be 
protected by the presumption and it is for the defendant to prove any such 
assertion. The civil presumption of innocence is also less imposing than its 
criminal counterpart. If a party raises an affirmative defence to a claim or 
counterclaim it is for him to prove that defence. 
However, while the `he who asserts must prove' principle protects 
individuals from having to defend themselves against vexatious and 
unmeritorious allegations, many claims are justifiable demands for 
compensation. The principle, if afforded too much respect, could lead to 
unfairness in cases where the claimant is in the worst position to prove a fact 
in issue. For this reason, to give effect to the policy that proceedings should 
be fair to all parties, it may be appropriate to place the legal burden on the 
party who is in the best position to discharge it; while in other situations 
even wider considerations of policy may be brought into play to ensure a 
just result is reached more often than not in a particular type of claim. 
Contractual disputes often cause problems in practice because of the 
exemption clauses and provisos included amongst the terms of the parties' 
agreement. If the parties have expressly stated where the burden of proof 
lies the judge will give effect to their intentions. Similarly, if a standard 
form commercial contract has been used it may be possible to find a 
precedent to demonstrate how it should be interpreted. In all other cases it 
is for the judge to determine the incidence of the legal burden in a way 
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which will be fair to both parties in the circumstances of the particular 
case. The principle that the legal burden rests with the party making the 
assertion is the obvious place to start. 
In Munro, Brice & Co v. War Risks Association [1918] 2 KB 78 (KBD) it 
was necessary to determine whether the assured shipowners or the marine 
risks underwriters should bear the legal burden in respect of an exclusion 
clause in a policy of marine insurance. The policy covered losses caused by 
perils of the sea, but excluded losses caused by `hostilities or warlike 
operations'. The ship had disappeared without trace in 1917 and the 
owners sought to recover under their policy. There had been no 
communication from the ship prior to her disappearance, and all that 
was known was that submarines had been operating in the area and that 
the ship might have encountered stormy weather. Bailhache J held that it 
was for the underwriters to prove that the exclusion clause applied and, as 
they were unable to prove the ship had been sunk by the enemy, the 
shipowners were entitled to claim under the policy. (A seaworthy ship 
which has disappeared without trace is presumed to have been lost as a 
result of the perils of the sea.) Bailhache J's decision accords with the view 
of the Court of Appeal in The Glendarroch [1894] P 226, a case which was 
concerned with exclusion clauses in a bill of lading. The plaintiffs' cargo of 
cement had been carried on the defendants' ship and rendered worthless 
by an influx of water following the ship's collision with a rock. The cargo 
was never delivered and the plaintiffs sought to recover their loss from the 
defendants under the contract of carriage. The Court of Appeal held that 
once the plaintiffs had proved the existence of the contract and the fact 
that their goods had not been delivered, the defendants were obliged to 
prove the applicability of the exclusion clause which exempted them from 
liability for loss by perils of the sea. It had then been for the plaintiffs to 
prove that the facts actually fell within the scope of a proviso to that 
clause which would prevent the defendants from avoiding liability for any 
loss caused by their negligence. By contrast, in Hurst v. Evans [1917] 1 KB 
352 (KBD) it was held that the applicability of an exclusion clause in a 
policy of insurance which benefited the defendant insurance company had 
to be disproved by the assured. The plaintiff, a jeweller, had obtained a 
policy of insurance from the defendant which covered his property, save 
that an exclusion clause provided that the defendant would not be liable 
for any loss caused by the theft or dishonesty of any of the plaintiff's 
employees. The plaintiff sought to recover part of his loss under the policy 
following a theft from his safe. However, as it was held that the plaintiff 
bore the burden of proving his employees had not been involved, and 
there was evidence which suggested one of them might have been, he was 
unable to recover under the policy. It is implicit in the judgment of the 
court that Lush J wished to place the burden of proof on the party who 
was best placed to discharge it, but it is not clear that the assured in a case 
such as this will always be that party. An assured employer will need to 
prove that each and every one of his employees was not involved in the 
theft and it is difficult to see how he will be able to discharge that burden. 
Ease of proof is certainly a consideration which may be relied on when 
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deciding who should bear the legal burden of proof on civil proceedings. 
This is clear from the decision of the House of Lords in Joseph Constantine 
Steamship Line v. Imperial Smelting Corpn [1942] AC 154. Charterers had 
entered into a contract with the owners of a ship to carry a cargo of ore 
from South Australia to Europe, but while the ship was waiting for a 
loading berth an explosion occurred on board which disabled her and 
rendered the voyage impossible. The charterers claimed damages from the 
shipowners for their breach of contract and the shipowners responded by 
arguing that the contract had been frustrated as a result of the explosion. 
The charterers contended that frustration could not be relied on if the 
explosion had been caused by the shipowners' negligence and that it was 
for the shipowners to prove they had not been negligent. The shipowners 
in turn submitted that it was for the charterers to prove that they (the 
shipowners) had been negligent. The cause of the explosion was unknown 
so the incidence of the legal burden of proof became decisive to the 
outcome of the proceedings. The House of Lords unanimously held that it 
was for the party denying frustration (the charterers) to prove that the 
party relying on the defence (the shipowners) had been negligent. Several 
considerations were advanced to justify this decision: the difficulty 
shipowners would face if obliged to prove a negative (that is, to prove 
the absence of negligence on their part) was cited by Lords Simon, 
Maugham, Russell and Wright; the presumption of innocence was cited by 
Lords Wright and Porter, with Lord Maugham applying the general rule 
that he who asserts an affirmative must prove it; and the desirability of 
achieving a just and reasonable result was cited by Lords Maugham and 
Wright. Viscount Simon said (at p. 161): 
`Suppose that a vessel while on the high seas disappears completely 
during a storm. Can it be that the defence of frustration of the 
adventure depends on the owner's ability to prove that all his servants 
on board were navigating the ship with adequate skill and that there 
was no default which brought about the catastrophe?' 
But in a situation such as this it would be equally difficult for anyone 
else to prove the crew had been at fault. Julius Stone ((1944) 60 LQR 262 
at p. 278) has pointed out that in the great majority of frustration cases 
there is no fault on the part of either party, so if it is impossible to establish 
what has happened a rule requiring the defendant pleading frustration to 
prove the absence of fault would do injustice to the great majority of 
defendants, while a rule requiring the claimant to prove fault would do 
injustice to only a small minority of claimants. Moreover, even if it is not 
impossible to establish what has happened, there will be fewer cases of 
injustice through failure of proof among claimants obliged to prove an 
affirmative than there would be among defendants obliged to prove a 
negative. This analysis suggests that the considerations referred to by the 
House of Lords were applied to minimise the number of miscarriages of 
justice in cases where frustration is pleaded. In this sense policy is brought 
into play to give effect to the principle that miscarriages of justice should 
be kept to a minimum. 
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However, there is no absolute rule that a party should not be obliged to 
prove a negative. If goods are deposited with a bailee for safe keeping and 
he subsequently fails to return them to the bailor, the bailee can avoid 
liability only if he is able to prove he was not at fault (Brook's Wharf & 
Bull Wharf v. Goodman Brothers [1937] 1 KB 534 (CA), Coldman v. Hill 
[1919] 1 KB 443 (CA)). In Joseph Constantine Steamship Line v. Imperial 
Smelting Lord Wright explained this obligation on the bailee to prove 
absence of fault as a rule which had arisen in ancient times from the 
custom of the realm, but the underlying rationale would appear to be that 
the bailee is best placed to prove what happened to the goods while they 
were in his possession (see Levison v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning [1977] 
3 WLR 90 (CA), Easson v. LNER [1944] 1 KB 421 (CA) at p. 423 and, in 
the context of lost travellers' cheques, Braithwaite v. Thomas Cook 
Cheques Ltd [1989] 3 WLR 212 (QBD) at p. 217). 
The party bearing the legal burden of proof on an issue usually bears 
the evidential burden on it too, although the operation of an evidential 
presumption can affect this general position (see 15.5.3 post). Thus, the 
claimant will bear the legal and evidential burden on a number of specific 
issues and by the close of his case he must adduce sufficient evidence in 
respect of each one to prevent a successful submission of no case to 
answer. The claimant must therefore establish a prima facie case against 
the defendant by the close of his case. The judge has to decide whether the 
tribunal of fact would be able to find in the claimant's favour if his 
evidence, as it stands, were believed. If this test is satisfied the trial will 
proceed to the defendant's case. Technically the defendant is under no 
more than a tactical burden to adduce evidence in rebuttal, but this 
understates the true position. If the claimant has adduced cogent and 
credible evidence in support of his claim then at the end of the trial the 
judge, as the tribunal of fact, will inevitably find in his favour if no 
evidence has been adduced in rebuttal. Indeed an inference strengthening 
the claimant's case is almost certain to be drawn from the defendant's 
failure to call any evidence (9.3.1 ante). In this situation the defendant is 
effectively under an evidential burden to adduce evidence in rebuttal for 
otherwise it is inevitable that he will lose. If the defendant were to win 
without adducing evidence in rebuttal, judgment against the claimant 
would be appealable on the ground that it was a perverse decision 
unsupported by the evidence. Whether the defendant is under a tactical or 
evidential burden is therefore a question of degree which depends upon the 
cogency of the claimant's evidence. 
15.4 The Standard of Proof 
15.4.1 Criminal Proceedings 
The standard of proof to be attained for the legal burden to be discharged 
depends on whom the burden rests. In R v. Carr-Briant [1943] 1 KB 607 
the Court of Criminal Appeal held that if it is the accused who bears the 
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legal burden the standard is simply the `balance of probabilities' and the 
jury must be directed accordingly (see also Sodeman v. R [1936] 2 All ER 
1138 (PC)). This is the same standard as that applied in civil proceedings 
and simply means that the fact in issue will be proved if the accused's 
version is considered more probable than any other alternative. It has 
therefore been suggested that the jury should be directed to be satisfied 
that it is `more likely than not' or `more probable than not' that the fact 
has been made out (R v. Swaysland (1987) The Times 15.4.87 (CA)). 
If (as is usually the case) the legal burden rests with the prosecution, the 
standard is `proof beyond reasonable doubt': `If, at the end of and on the 
whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt . . . the prosecution has not 
made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal' 
(Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL) at p. 481). The policy which 
justifies this high standard is inextricably tied up with the golden thread, 
that is, the need to give effect to the fundamental principle that the 
accused should not be convicted of an offence he has not committed. As 
Brennan J said in Re Winship (1970) 397 US 358 (USSC) (at pp. 363±4): 
`The accused during a criminal trial has at stake interests of immense 
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty 
upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be 
stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the 
good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man 
for commission of a crime when there is a reasonable doubt about his 
guilt . . . Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indis-
pensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in 
applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the 
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in 
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.' 
Absolute certainty of guilt is rarely possible and if such a standard were 
to be set for the prosecution few persons would ever be convicted of a 
criminal offence. There will often be the possibility of a mistaken 
conviction and the law seeks to reduce that possibility to a minimum while 
leaving enough scope for the guilty to be convicted. The `beyond 
reasonable doubt' formula is thought to strike the right balance between 
these two competing public interests. In Miller v. Minister of Pensions 
[1947] 2 All ER 372 (KBD) Denning J said (at p. 373): 
`Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow 
of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted 
fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so 
strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour 
which can be dismissed with the sentence of course it is possible, but not 
in the least probable, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but 
nothing short of that will suffice.' 
The high standard of proof in criminal proceedings means, of course, 
that many persons who are guilty of the offence charged will inevitably 
slip through the net and escape conviction, but this type of miscarriage of 
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justice is generally regarded as a lesser evil than the alternative. A lower 
standard of proof would make the conviction of the innocent far more 
likely, amount to a violation of the human rights of a large number of law-
abiding citizens and undermine public confidence in the criminal justice 
system. That said, it is worth noting the view expressed by Denning LJ in 
Bater v. Bater [1951] P 36 (CA) (at pp. 36±7): 
`In criminal cases the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, 
but there may be degrees of proof within that standard. As . . . many . . . 
great judges have said, in proportion as the crime is enormous, so ought 
the proof to be clear.' 
Whether juries and magistrates consciously or subconsciously adopt a 
lower standard of proof (or a lower requirement of cogency in relation to 
the evidence which will satisfy them of the accused's guilt) in cases where 
the allegation is relatively minor is something which remains unclear. The 
theory, at least, is that the same high standard applies across the board, 
whether the allegation is murder or one of the most trivial motoring 
offences. 
The `beyond reasonable doubt' formula would seem to be clear enough 
for juries to understand, if they are directed in accordance with Denning J's 
explanation in Miller v. Minister of Pensions, but this was not the view of 
Lord Goddard CJ who criticised this phrase on a number of occasions and 
established what has now become an acceptable and widely-used 
alternative. In R v. Summers [1952] 1 All ER 1059 (CCA) his Lordship 
said (at p. 1060): 
`I have never yet heard any court give a real definition of what is a 
reasonable doubt, and it would be very much better if that expression 
was not used . . . The jury should be told that it is not for the prisoner to 
prove his innocence, but for the prosecution to prove his guilt, and that 
it is their duty to regard the evidence and see if it satisfies them so that 
they can feel sure, when they give their verdict, that it is a right one.' 
In R v. Hepworth [1955] 3 WLR 331 the `sure' test was preferred over 
two others which met with the approval of the Court of Criminal Appeal 
(those alternatives comprising `completely satisfied' and `satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt'), although a test of being `satisfied' was held to be 
insufficient as it suggested too low a standard. The `sure' test is now well 
established as an acceptable way of directing the jury (R v. Wickramaratne 
[1998] Crim LR 565 (CA)) but, in spite of Lord Goddard's disapproval, 
the `beyond reasonable doubt' test is still in favour (see McGreevy v. DPP 
[1973] 1 WLR 276 (HL), Ferguson v. R [1979] 1 WLR 94 (PC), R v. Sang 
[1979] 3 WLR 263 (HL), R v. Bentley (Deceased) [2001] 1 Cr App R 307 
(CA) and s. 76(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984). It has 
also been said that it is not the particular formula which matters but the 
effect of the summing-up on the jury hearing the case (Walters v. R [1969] 
2 WLR 60 (PC)). However, for obvious reasons trial judges will prefer to 
stay within the limits of what has been expressly approved. 
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In recent years the Court of Appeal has recommended that judges 
should keep their direction on the standard of proof `short and clear' (R v. 
Penny (1991) 94 Cr App R 345) and not try to attempt any gloss upon the 
terms `sure' or `reasonable doubt' by, for example, the use of analogies 
(R v. Yap Chuan Ching (1976) 63 Cr App R 7). In the latter case the trial 
judge had given an explanation that a reasonable doubt was one which 
might influence a person considering some business matter such as a 
mortgage over his house. Although the Court of Appeal dismissed the 
appeal because the effect of the summing-up as a whole had been 
satisfactory, it was made clear that such analogies were not to be used. In 
R v. Gray (1973) 58 Cr App R 177 the Court of Appeal felt a direction in 
terms of what might `affect the mind of a person in the conduct of 
important affairs' would have been acceptable; but the use of the phrase 
`everyday affairs' by the trial judge had set the standard of proof too low. 
An unembellished version of the `sure' test is now recommended by the 
Judicial Studies Board in their specimen direction for Crown Court judges 
(www.jsboard.co.uk); but, while this test has the attraction of being `short 
and clear' it also begs the question, for the jury may not understand what 
`sure' means in the context of criminal proceedings. In R v. Stephens [2002] 
EWCA Crim 1529 the trial judge described `sure' as `less than being 
certain', an explanation which did not find favour in the Court of Appeal 
on the ground that most people would find it difficult to discern any real 
difference between being sure of guilt and being certain of guilt. According 
to the Court, the trial judge faced with a query from the jury should simply 
remind them `that they had to be sure of guilt before they could convict, 
indicating, if he felt it necessary, that that was the limit of the help which 
he could give them'. This simplistic approach is to be contrasted with the 
position adopted in R v. Lifchus [1997] 3 SCR 320. In that case the 
Supreme Court of Canada recognised that there `cannot be a fair trial if 
jurors do not clearly understand the basic and fundamentally important 
concept of the standard of proof that the Crown must meet in order to 
obtain a conviction' and held that the judge should therefore give a 
direction in line with the following `suggested form' (at para. 39): 
`The accused enters these proceedings presumed to be innocent. That 
presumption of innocence remains throughout the case until such time 
as the Crown has on the evidence put before you satisfied you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty . . . A reasonable doubt is not 
an imaginary or frivolous doubt. It must not be based upon sympathy 
or prejudice. Rather, it is based on reason and common sense. It is 
logically derived from the evidence or absence of evidence. Even if you 
believe the accused is probably guilty or likely guilty, that is not 
sufficient. In those circumstances you must give the benefit of the doubt 
to the accused and acquit because the Crown has failed to satisfy you of 
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand 
you must remember that it is virtually impossible to prove anything to 
an absolute certainty and the Crown is not required to do so. Such a 
standard of proof is impossibly high.' 
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For the prosecution to discharge their evidential burden and prevent a 
successful submission of no case to answer at `half time' they must adduce 
enough evidence in respect of each and every issue they are obliged to 
prove for the judge to be satisfied that a reasonable and properly directed 
jury would be able to find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt 
(16.7 post). Where the accused bears an evidential burden (but not the 
legal burden) he must show there is sufficient evidence in support of his 
defence for the judge to be satisfied that a reasonable jury would be able to 
conclude that there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt; but where he 
bears both an evidential and the legal burden of proof in relation to his 
defence the judge must be of the view that there is enough evidence for the 
jury to be able to determine that that defence has been proved on the 
balance of probabilities. In each case the judge will assume the evidence 
will be believed and not contradicted by evidence from the opposing party 
when deciding whether the evidential burden has been discharged. 
15.4.2 Civil Proceedings 
Generally, the degree of cogency required to discharge a legal burden of 
proof in a civil case is proof on the `balance of probabilities'. According to 
Denning J in Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 (KBD) at 
p. 374: `If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say: we think it more 
probable than not, the burden is discharged, but, if the probabilities are 
equal, it is not.' The test is not whether one party's version is more 
probable than the other party's for it may be that neither version of events 
is credible (Rhesa Shipping v. Edmunds [1985] 1 WLR 948 (HL)). The 
party bearing the burden will discharge it only if the tribunal of fact is 
satisfied that his version of events is more probable than any alternative 
version. However, the `balance of probabilities' test says nothing about 
how far above 50 per cent the probability should be that his version of 
events is correct. One theory holds that anything over 50 per cent suffices, 
no matter what the nature of the allegation (the so-called `51 per cent test', 
see Davies v. Taylor [1972] 3 WLR 801 (HL) at p. 810). According to this 
view there is a single standard of proof but as serious impropriety is less 
likely to have occurred than something relatively trivial a serious 
allegation requires highly cogent evidence to overcome that inherent 
unlikelihood and bring the probability of its occurrence over the 50 per 
cent watershed. In Hornal v. Neuberger Products [1956] 3 WLR 1034 (CA) 
Morris LJ said (at p. 1048): 
`The phrase ``balance of probabilities'' is often employed as a 
convenient phrase to express the basis upon which civil issues are 
decided . . . Though no court and no jury would give less careful 
attention to issues lacking gravity than to those marked by it, the very 
elements of gravity become a part of the whole range of circumstances 
which have to be weighed in the scale when deciding as to the balance of 
probabilities . . . In English law the citizen is regarded as being a free 
man of good repute. Issues may be raised in a civil action which affect 
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character and reputation, and these will not be forgotten by judges and 
juries when considering the probabilities in regard to whatever 
misconduct is alleged.' 
This approach was recently approved by the House of Lords in Re H  
(Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] 2 WLR 8 where the 
issue was the standard which had to be met in order to prove that young 
girls were at risk of being sexually abused by their mother's partner. Lord 
Nicholls, in a speech with which Lords Goff and Mustill agreed, said (at 
pp. 23±4): 
`The balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an 
event occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence, the 
occurrence of the event was more likely than not. When assessing the 
probabilities the courts will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent 
is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation 
the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger 
should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is 
established on the balance of probability. Fraud is usually less likely 
than negligence. Deliberate physical injury is usually less likely than 
accidental physical injury. A stepfather is usually less likely to have 
repeatedly raped and had non-consensual oral sex with his under-age 
stepdaughter than on some occasion to have lost his temper and slapped 
her. Built into the preponderance of probability standard is a generous 
degree of flexibility in respect of the seriousness of the offence. 
Although the result is much the same, this does not mean that where a 
serious allegation is in issue the standard of proof required is higher. It 
means only that the inherent probability or improbability of an event is 
itself a matter to be taken into account when weighing the probabilities 
and deciding whether, on balance, the event occurred. The more 
improbable the event, the stronger must be the evidence that it did occur 
before, on the balance of probability, its occurrence will be established.' 
This reflects the approach adopted by the majority of the High Court of 
Australia in Neat Holdings v. Karajan Holdings (1992) 110 ALR 449 (and 
now incorporated into s. 140 of the Evidence Act 1995). The alternative 
theory is that the `balance of probabilities' standard is a sliding scale 
ranging from just over 50 per cent up to proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
According to this view the more serious the allegation the greater the 
probability required for the civil standard to be met. The standard in civil 
proceedings is a flexible one, commensurate with the gravity of the 
allegation made. In Bater v. Bater [1951] P 36 (CA) Denning LJ said (at 
p. 37): 
`[I]n civil cases, the case must be proved by a preponderance of 
probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that 
standard. The degree depends on the subject-matter. A civil court, when 
considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require for itself a higher 
degree of probability than that which it would require when asking if 
negligence is established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a 
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criminal court, even when it is considering a charge of a criminal nature; 
but still it does require a degree of probability which is commensurate 
with the occasion.' 
However, in Re H (Minors) [1996] 2 WLR 8 (HL) Lord Nicholls went on 
to say (at p. 24): 
`If the balance of probability standard were departed from, and a third 
standard were substituted in some civil cases, it would be necessary to 
identify what the standard is and when it applies. Herein lies a difficulty. 
If the standard were to be higher than the balance of probability but 
lower than the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, 
what would it be? The only alternative which suggests itself is that the 
standard should be commensurate with the gravity of the allegation and 
the seriousness of its consequences. A formula to this effect has its 
attractions. But I doubt whether in practice it would add much to the 
present test in civil cases, and it would cause confusion and uncertainty.' 
According to this view there is no `sliding scale' or `third standard' in 
English civil proceedings and, subject to one or two specific exceptions, 
the `balance of probabilities' standard is the test, no matter how serious 
the allegation. In S-T (Formerly J) v. J [1997] 3 WLR 1287 (CA) (at 
p. 1308), Ward LJ expressed the view that, since the decision in Re H  
(Minors), `the standard of proof in all civil proceedings is the ordinary 
civil standard of a balance of probabilities'; and in Re G (a child) (non-
accidental injury: standard of proof) [2001] 1 FCR 97 (CA) (at p. 102) it 
was said that the principles developed in Re H (Minors) `are applied 
equally in civil and in family law cases' and have `become the basis of the 
approach by judges at all levels in dealing with family cases' (see also 
Springsteen v. Masquerade Music [2001] EWCA Civ 563). Similarly, 
whereas in Halford v. Brookes (1991) The Times 3.10.91 (QBD) it was said 
that the standard of proof for a civil allegation of murder was proof 
beyond reasonable doubt, it has since been said that the test is the balance 
of probabilities (Francisco v. Diedrick (1998) The Times 3.4.98 (QBD)). If 
allegations as serious as these are to be governed by the conventional civil 
standard it is difficult to see how a third standard can be expressly justified 
or applied in respect of any other type of allegation, but in Heinl v. Jyske 
Bank [1999] Lloyd's Rep Bank 511 the majority of the Court of Appeal felt 
that a third standard of proof, requiring `a high level of probability', lying 
somewhere between the conventional civil and criminal standards, applied 
when dishonesty was being alleged. Presumably the court had in mind a 
test similar to the `clear and convincing' standard which applies in relation 
to certain types of allegation in the USA (Addington v. State of Texas 
(1979) 441 US 418 (USSC)). 
The position remains unsettled, then, save that there is a well-
established exception to the `balance of probabilities' test in civil 
proceedings which has been recognised for obvious reasons of policy 
(and indeed was recognised by the House of Lords in Re H (Minors)). If 
an order is sought in civil proceedings to commit a person to prison, the 
proceedings, being in effect criminal in nature with an individual's liberty 
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at stake, require that the standard of `proof beyond reasonable doubt' be 
applied (Re Bramblevale [1970] Ch 128 (CA) (contempt of court); 
Mubarak v. Mubarak [2001] 1 FLR 698 (CA) (judgment summons 
application under the Debtors Act 1869)). The criminal standard (rather 
than the Re H (Minors) approach) is also applied by magistrates when an 
application is made to them in civil proceedings for an anti-social 
behaviour order under s. 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, following 
allegations of criminal or quasi-criminal conduct, for the pragmatic reason 
that this standard is easier for magistrates to understand and apply 
(R (McCann) v. Crown Court at Manchester [2002] 3 WLR 1313 (HL) at 
p. 1329; see also B v. Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary 
[2001] 1 WLR 340 (DC) in respect of applications for sex offender orders 
under s. 2 of the Act). 
With regard to the evidential burden in civil proceedings, if it rests with 
the party bearing the legal burden it is discharged by adducing enough 
evidence for the judge to be satisfied that a reasonable tribunal of fact 
would be able find the issue proved on the balance of probabilities. If the 
evidential burden rests with the party who does not bear the legal burden 
of proof on the issue, it is discharged by adducing enough evidence for the 
judge to be satisfied that a reasonable tribunal of fact might find the legal 
burden has not been discharged by that party's opponent. 
15.5 Presumptions 
Confusingly, the word `presumption' is used in the law of evidence to 
describe a number of different concepts which have little in common. In 
one sense the word is used to mean no more than that one particular party 
bears the legal burden of proving an issue to the satisfaction of the court. 
In criminal proceedings one talks of the `presumption of innocence' as a 
shorthand description of the prosecution's obligation to prove the 
accused's guilt. Similarly, the `presumption of sanity' is often used to 
mean no more than that the accused bears the legal burden of proving his 
insanity should he raise that defence. Such presumptions could be 
described as `presumptions without basic facts'. They arise without the 
need to prove any preliminary (or `basic') fact in advance. By contrast, all 
the other types of presumption require the initial proof or admission of 
some other basic fact for the presumption to arise. Presumptions requiring 
the proof of a basic fact are traditionally divided into three classes ± 
`presumptions of fact', `irrebuttable presumptions of law' and `rebuttable 
presumptions of law' ± but the requirement of proof or admission of a 
basic fact is the only thing they have in common. 
An irrebuttable presumption of law (or `conclusive presumption') is 
simply a rule of the substantive law couched in the language of 
presumptions. Such presumptions fall outside the scope of the law of 
evidence for, as their name suggests, no evidence is admissible to rebut 
them. A presumption of fact (or `provisional presumption') is no more 
than an example of commonly occurring circumstantial evidence from 
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which a common-sense inference has been drawn in the past and might be 
drawn again for the same reason. The effect of such evidence is simply to 
cast upon the opposing party a tactical burden to adduce evidence to the 
contrary, for if this is not done the tribunal of fact may (but need not) 
draw that inference. Rebuttable presumptions of law are of two types: 
`persuasive presumptions' and `evidential presumptions'. Rebuttable 
presumptions comprise a mechanism for allocating the legal burden of 
proof (persuasive presumptions) or an evidential burden (evidential 
presumptions) in situations where logic and/or policy dictate that this 
should be so. 
15.5.1 Presumptions of Fact (Provisional Presumptions) 
To say a presumption of fact has arisen is simply to state that as a matter 
of common sense it would be permissible to draw an inference from a 
proven or admitted basic fact. If a jewellery shop has been broken into and 
the accused is found in the vicinity soon after with a bag full of the 
proprietor's goods, common sense would suggest that he was probably 
involved in the burglary and, in the absence of a plausible explanation 
from the defence, it will be open to the jury to draw that inference at his 
trial. There is no fundamental difference between evidence of such `recent 
possession' and any other evidence from which an inference might 
logically be drawn, yet a presumption of fact ± `the presumption of guilty 
mind' ± is said to arise from being found in possession of stolen goods in 
such circumstances simply because evidence of this sort has often been 
adduced for the purpose of persuading the jury to draw that inference. In 
fact any item of evidence from which an inference might reasonably be 
drawn could quite properly be said to give rise to a presumption of fact, 
but the widespread use of the label is not to be encouraged. The better 
approach would be to abandon the label entirely as it falsely implies that 
some types of evidence are inherently more probative than others and 
obscures the reasoning process undertaken by the tribunal of fact. There is 
no better example of this than the way the presumption of guilty mind 
came to be known as `the doctrine of recent possession', a label which 
suggested a rule of law rather than the logical possibility of an inference 
being drawn. Presumptions of fact say nothing about the incidence of the 
legal burden of proof; nor do they give rise to an evidential burden. Once a 
basic fact has been proved or admitted the tribunal of fact may (but need 
not) infer another fact, the presumed fact, in the absence of any or any 
sufficient evidence to the contrary. 
The presumption of guilty mind has been referred to in the context of a 
burglary, although in practice it is more likely to be relied on if the 
allegation is one of handling stolen goods. If the prosecution have 
managed to prove that the alleged handler was found in possession of 
recently stolen goods and he has failed to provide any or any satisfactory 
explanation as to how he came to acquire them, that basic fact gives rise to 
the permissible inference ± the presumed fact ± that he knew or believed 
the goods were stolen when they came into his possession. It is not an 
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inference which must be drawn, but the tribunal of fact is entitled to draw 
it. Although the example given here is one of receiving stolen goods, the 
presumption applies equally to any other type of handling (R v. Ball [1983] 
1 WLR 801 (CA)). In R v. Raviraj (1986) 85 Cr App R 93 (CA) Stocker LJ 
said (at p. 103): 
`The [presumption] is only a particular aspect of the general proposition 
that where suspicious circumstances appear to demand an explanation, 
and no explanation or an entirely incredible explanation is given, the 
lack of explanation may warrant an inference of guilty knowledge in the 
defendant. This again is only part of a wider proposition that guilt may 
be inferred from unreasonable behaviour of a defendant when 
confronted with facts which seem to accuse.' 
Proof or admission of the basic fact of recent possession is 
circumstantial evidence that the accused is guilty of handling but it is no 
more than that. The accused does not bear any legal or evidential burden 
to prevent the inference being drawn, although in a practical sense he 
bears a tactical burden to provide a plausible alternative explanation. If 
the period between the theft and the accused's being found in possession is 
sufficiently short the accused may face a charge of theft (or a charge which 
incorporates theft as an ingredient), in which case the presumption may 
similarly be relied on as circumstantial evidence that he stole the goods. At 
common law the inference of guilty knowledge could only be drawn from 
the accused's refusal to give an explanation prior to his being cautioned, 
imposing upon him a tactical burden to testify or adduce other evidence at 
his trial to justify his pre-trial silence. The scope of the presumption has 
now been increased by ss. 34 to 36 of the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 (9.2.2±3 ante). The `general proposition' referred to by 
Stocker LJ also explains the presumption that the person driving a car at 
any given time is its owner. If an adequate explanation to suggest the 
contrary is not forthcoming at the trial, the tribunal of fact will be entitled 
to draw that inference (Elliot v. Loake [1983] Crim LR 36 (CA)). 
The presumption of continuance is another example of a presumption 
of fact. If it is proved that a certain state of affairs existed at a particular 
time it may be possible to draw an inference that the same state continued 
to exist some time later or earlier, although much will depend on the 
nature of the state of affairs in question and the interval involved. Thus, in 
Beresford v. Justices of St Albans (1905) 22 TLR 1 (DC) as it had been 
proved that the accused was in the driving seat of his car at the third 
milestone from St Albans, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary 
the magistrates had been entitled to infer that he had also been driving the 
car when it passed the seventh milestone eight and a half minutes earlier. 
Similarly, if a man is given a lift into town during the daytime and 
expresses his intention to `get a ride tonight one way or the other' his state 
of mind during the journey can be presumed to have continued until later 
that night when he is alleged to have raped a woman in a park (R v. 
Valentine [1996] 2 Cr App R 213 (CA)). The intention to rape is likely to 
be fairly transitory so, logically, it will not be possible to infer its 
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continuance for more than a relatively short time. A religious, irreligious 
or political belief on the other hand is likely to last for some considerable 
time and an inference as to its continuing existence will be possible, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, for as much as several years after it 
was expressed. In Attorney General v. Bradlaugh (1885) 14 QBD 667 (CA) 
(at p. 711) it was said by Cotton LJ that if there was evidence that a person 
disbelieved in God in 1880 it would be possible to infer that he had the 
same disbelief in 1884. The same is true of a person's character or habits, 
which is why `similar fact evidence' of a party's disposition may be 
admissible in criminal or civil proceedings (see 3.2±3 ante). 
The question of continuance often arises when the issue is whether a 
person was alive on a particular date. Needless to say, whether it would be 
proper to infer that a person was alive on one date just because he was 
known to be alive on an earlier date depends on all the circumstances, 
including his age, health, lifestyle and the duration of the intervening 
period, as explained in Axon v. Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395 (HCA) (at 
pp. 404±5): 
`The greater the length of time the weaker the support for the inference. 
If it appears that there were circumstances of danger to the life in 
question, such as illness, enlistment for active service or participation in 
a perilous enterprise, the presumption will be overturned, at all events 
when reasonable inquiries have been made into the man's fate or 
whereabouts and without result. The presumption of life is but a 
deduction from probabilities and must always depend on the 
accompanying facts.' 
Thus, if it is proved that a man was alive and in good health on one day 
the inference that he was also alive on the next day will be `almost 
irresistible', whereas proof that he was in a dying condition is unlikely to 
justify drawing any such inference (R v. Lumley (1869) LR 1 CCR 196 
(CCCR)). In MacDarmaid v. Attorney-General [1950] P 218 (PD) the fact 
that a normal 27-year-old woman had been seen roller-skating in 1891 
allowed the trial judge to infer that she had lived for a further three years; 
and in Chard v. Chard [1956] P 259 (PD) the trial judge was willing to infer 
that a 28-year-old woman of normal health had lived for a further 16 years. 
A presumption which is particularly important in criminal proceedings 
is based on the generalisation that people intend the natural and probable 
consequences of their conduct. If, for example, the accused is charged with 
the murder of his former employer by caving his skull in with a hammer 
the inference is likely to be irresistible that the accused had the mens rea 
for murder, but there is no obligation on the jury to draw that inference 
because the presumption of intention is one of fact and not law (see s. 8 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1967). 
15.5.2 Irrebuttable Presumptions of Law (Conclusive Presumptions) 
An irrebuttable presumption is simply a rule of law. Once a basic fact has 
been proved or admitted the presumed fact must be presumed and no 
The Mechanics of Proof 461 
evidence in rebuttal is admissible. Thus, it is `conclusively presumed' that 
no child under the age of 10 can be guilty of any offence (s. 50 of the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933); and in an action for libel or 
slander in which the question whether a person did or did not commit an 
offence is relevant to an issue, proof that that person stands convicted of 
that offence `shall be conclusive evidence' that he committed it (s. 13(1) of 
the Civil Evidence Act 1968). The irrebuttable presumption in s. 15(2) of 
the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 ± that, subject to an exception in 
s. 15(3), `it shall be assumed that the proportion of alcohol in the accused's 
breath, blood or urine at the time of the alleged offence was not less than 
in the specimen' provided by the accused at the police station ± has been 
held by the Divisional Court to be compatible with Article 6(2) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Parker v. DPP (2000) 165 JP 
213). However, the s. 15(2) presumption will arise in the case of a breath 
specimen only if the magistrates are satisfied that the approved device used 
to obtain the specimen at the police station was reliable, and the 
presumption that any such device is reliable is rebuttable (see DPP v. 
Brown, DPP v. Teixeira (2001) 166 JP 1 (DC), Cracknell v. Willis [1987] 3 
WLR 1082 (HL) and 15.5.3.4 post). 
15.5.3 Rebuttable Presumptions of Law 
Persuasive and evidential presumptions of law function as a risk-
allocation mechanism where there is little or no evidence (or readily 
available evidence) on a particular issue. It should not be surprising 
therefore that the rationale underlying their existence is an amalgam of 
logic and policy. 
A persuasive presumption is effectively a rule which places the legal 
burden of proof on a particular party once certain basic facts have been 
proved or admitted. The basic facts give rise to the presumed fact, and it is 
for the opposing party to prove the contrary. The presumed fact has no 
evidential value of its own but merely lays down the rule as to the 
incidence of the legal burden of proof. However, the basic facts which give 
rise to the rule may have evidential value, at least where the presumption 
has a logical basis, and this will need to be weighed in the balance at the 
end of the trial to see whether the opposing party has adduced sufficient 
evidence to discharge the legal burden. If no or no sufficient evidence is 
adduced by the opposing party to discharge the burden of proof (that is, 
to rebut the presumption) the tribunal of fact must accept the truth of the 
presumed fact. 
An evidential presumption does not affect the incidence of the legal 
burden of proof but places an evidential burden upon the opposing party 
once certain basic facts have been proved or admitted. The party relying 
on the presumption still bears the legal burden of proving the presumed 
fact but this burden will be deemed to have been discharged, and the 
tribunal of fact will be obliged to accept its truth, if the opposing party has 
failed to adduce sufficient evidence to suggest the contrary. If the 
evidential burden has been discharged, the tribunal of fact will have to 
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weigh in the balance the probative value of the evidence adduced by the 
opposing party against that of the basic facts and any other evidence 
adduced by the party bearing the legal burden, in order to determine 
whether the legal burden has been discharged. 
If a presumption is persuasive the opposing party in civil proceedings 
bears a legal burden of disproof on the balance of probabilities. In 
criminal proceedings the prosecution will have to disprove the presump-
tion beyond reasonable doubt, but it is highly unlikely any such 
presumption would be held to impose a legal burden of disproof upon 
the accused if the prosecution were to rely on it. (At common law the 
accused bears the legal burden of proof only on the issue of insanity 
(Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL)) and this is unlikely to be 
overridden by any presumption developed in the context of civil 
proceedings.) If a presumption is evidential the opposing party will rebut 
it by adducing sufficient evidence for the tribunal of fact to find the 
presumed fact not to have been proved on the balance of probabilities. 
15.5.3.1 The Presumption of Legitimacy 
Generally, if the basic fact is proved that a child was born or conceived 
during lawful wedlock a persuasive presumption arises that the child is the 
legitimate offspring of the parties to the marriage. Thus, in Maturin v. 
Attorney-General [1938] 2 All ER 214 (PD) the presumption arose in 
respect of a child born 10 days after the dissolution of the marriage upon 
the decree absolute; and in the Scottish case of Gardner v. Gardner (1877) 2 
App Cas 723 (HL), where the parties had got married just seven weeks 
before the child's birth, Lord Cairns LC accepted that the presumption 
would have arisen under English law. In Re Overbury [1955] Ch 122 (ChD) 
the child was conceived during one marriage and born two months into 
the mother's second marriage following the death of her first husband. 
The presumption that the child was the legitimate daughter of her 
mother's (first) husband at the time of conception was held to prevail over 
the presumption that she was the legitimate daughter of her mother's 
(second) husband at the time of her birth. Where, however, the parties are 
separated pursuant to a judicial order there is a presumption that sexual 
intercourse between them has stopped and the presumption of legitimacy 
does not arise; indeed a child conceived during such period will be 
presumed to be illegitimate (Hetherington v. Hetherington (1887) 12 PD 
112 (PD)). In all other situations the presumption arises, even where the 
parties are living separately by agreement (Ettenfield v. Ettenfield [1940] P 
96 (CA)) or the decree nisi has been granted prior to the ultimate 
dissolution of their marriage (Knowles v. Knowles [1962] P 161 (PD)). 
In civil proceedings the party who wishes to rebut the presumption of 
legitimacy must prove on the balance of probabilities that the child is 
illegitimate (s. 26 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969). The presumption 
itself carries no probative value but simply determines which of the parties 
bears the legal burden of proof, so even weak evidence against legitimacy 
must prevail if there is no other evidence to counterbalance it (S v. S [1970] 
3 WLR 366 (HL), T v. T [1971] 1 WLR 429 (PD)). The presumption is 
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therefore a mechanism to ensure that children are not held to be 
illegitimate unless that fact can be proved to the satisfaction of the court; 
and it is this policy rather than logic which explains decisions such as 
Ettenfield v. Ettenfield [1940] P 96 (CA) and Knowles v. Knowles [1962] P 
161 (PD). However, that is not to say that logic does not also underlie the 
presumption. As a matter of common sense a child born or conceived 
during lawful wedlock is far more likely to be the legitimate offspring of 
the parties to that marriage than the child of another man, so it is sensible 
that the child should be presumed legitimate in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary. The sort of evidence which might be relied on to rebut the 
presumption could include evidence of the husband's impotence or non-
access, testimony as to the absence of sexual intercourse between the 
parties, the results from blood or DNA tests (as in Leeds Teaching 
Hospitals NHS Trust v. Mr A [2003] EWHC 259 (QBD)), a refusal to 
provide a blood sample (as in F v. Child Support Agency [1999] 2 FLR 244 
(QBD)), the appearance of the child (such as its race), a third party's 
admission of paternity and so on. However, the fact the mother was 
having sexual intercourse with men other than her husband around the 
time of conception will not rebut the presumption if the husband was also 
having sexual intercourse with her around that time (Gordon v. Gordon 
[1903] P 141 (PD)). 
It is doubtful, however, whether the presumption of legitimacy will 
survive for much longer. It has been said on a number of occasions that it 
is in the best interests of the child that paternity doubts should be resolved 
on the best evidence, and in Re H and A (Paternity: Blood Tests) [2002] 1 
FLR 1145 Thorpe LJ, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said (at 
p. 1154): 
`In the nineteenth century, when science had nothing to offer and 
illegitimacy was a social stigma as well as a depriver of rights, the 
presumption was a necessary tool, the use of which required no 
justification . . . But as science has hastened on and as more and more 
children are born out of marriage it seems to me that the paternity of 
any child is to be established by science and not by legal presumption or 
inference.' 
15.5.3.2 The Presumptions of Marriage 
Three presumptions of marriage developed at common law for reasons of 
policy and common sense. If it is proved that the parties to a purported 
marriage went through a ceremony capable of giving rise to a valid 
marriage under the domestic law of the country, a persuasive presumption 
arises ± the presumption of formal validity ± that all the necessary 
formalities were complied with and that the marriage is formally valid. 
Thus, in Piers v. Piers (1849) 2 HL Cas 331 (HL) it was presumed a 
marriage ceremony in a private house was formally valid despite the 
absence of any evidence that the necessary special licence had been 
granted. There is authority to suggest the standard of proof in civil 
proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt (Mahadervan v. Mahadervan 
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[1964] P 233 (DC)), but the trend has been to recognise that the 
conventional civil standard of proof is now of general application in civil 
proceedings (Blyth v. Blyth [1966] 2 WLR 634 (HL), Re H (Minors) [1996] 
2 WLR 8 (HL)) so the standard required to rebut the presumption is now 
likely to be proof on the balance of probabilities. The basic facts which 
give rise to the presumption of formal validity also give rise to the 
presumption of essential validity, that is, that the parties to the marriage 
had the capacity to marry and that they validly consented to it. It may be 
that the presumption of essential validity is evidential rather than 
persuasive. If this is so the difference between it and the presumption of 
formal validity presumably lies in the importance the law attaches to the 
competence and consent of the parties over and above compliance with 
formalities, together with the unlikelihood that any necessary formalities 
have not actually been complied with. In Tweney v. Tweney [1946] P 180 
(PD) it was felt that the presumption of essential validity would stand 
`until some evidence is given which leads the court to doubt that fact' (see 
also Re Peete [1952] 2 All ER 599 (ChD)). A third presumption of 
marriage has been recognised to arise from the basic fact that a man and 
woman have been living together and holding themselves out as a married 
couple with that reputation in their neighbourhood. The presumption has 
traditionally been seen as a persuasive one requiring cogent evidence to 
rebut it (Re Taylor [1961] 1 WLR 9 (CA)), and this was recently reaffirmed 
in Chief Adjudication Officer v. Bath [2000] 1 FLR 8 where, having noted 
the underlying policy that the validity of marriages entered into in good 
faith should be upheld wherever possible, the Court of Appeal held that 
even evidence that the marriage ceremony had been irregular and invalid 
was insufficient to rebut the presumption of marriage arising from a 
couple's 37 years' cohabitation as man and wife. 
15.5.3.3 The Presumption of Death 
If a person has been missing for some considerable time but there is no 
positive evidence of his death it makes sense that a presumption of death 
should arise at some stage. As a matter of logic a person who has failed to 
contact his friends and relatives for a lengthy period of time has either died 
or become a recluse, and as a matter of policy the question should not be 
allowed to hang unanswered until such time that it can be said with 
absolute conviction that he must be dead. Matters of title will need to be 
resolved so that those entitled to his property will be able to inherit it 
during their own lifetime; and the missing person's spouse should not be 
required to remain single indefinitely but permitted to re-marry and enjoy 
family life again. For these reasons, at common law a person's death is 
presumed if four conditions (the basic facts) have been proved: (i) there is 
no acceptable affirmative evidence that he was alive at some time during a 
continuous period of seven years or more; (ii) there are persons who would 
be likely to have heard from him during that period; (iii) those persons 
have not heard from him; and (iv) all due inquiries have been made 
appropriate to the circumstances (Chard v. Chard [1956] P 259 (PD) at 
p. 272). A degree of logic underlies all four conditions to the extent that 
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their cumulative effect is to suggest death rather than some other reason 
for the missing person's absence. Of course the actual period of seven 
years is purely arbitrary and cannot be justified on any logical ground; but 
it is sufficiently lengthy to suggest the possibility of death rather than some 
other reason for the disappearance ± and a line has to be drawn 
somewhere. The seven-year period is significant for it is only after such 
time that the presumption arises as a matter of law; the inference of death 
must be drawn. Before seven years have elapsed the tribunal of fact may, 
but need not, draw the inference that the missing person has died. 
Because of the nature of the basic facts which need to be proved, the 
common-law presumption of death does not fit easily into the classifica-
tion which divides rebuttable presumptions of law into those which are 
persuasive and those which are evidential. If there is any credible evidence 
that the missing person is alive the first condition is not satisfied and the 
presumption will not even arise. The presumption could therefore be said 
to be evidential, though it would be wrong to speak of the evidence 
rebutting the presumption. The evidence would simply prevent the 
presumption from arising in the first place. Whether the evidence that 
the missing person is alive is sufficient to prevent the presumption arising 
is a question for the tribunal of fact (Prudential Assurance v. Edmonds 
(1877) 2 AC 487 (HL)). In the Australian case of Axon v. Axon (1937) 59 
CLR 395 (HCA) the presumption could not be relied on by a woman in 
respect of the husband who had deserted her because he would have had 
every reason for not making his continued existence known to her, not 
least because she was seeking maintenance from him. 
Once the presumption has arisen the missing person is merely presumed 
to have died at some time during the seven-year period but not at any 
particular time; the time of death must be proved by the adduction of 
evidence (Re PheneÂ's Trusts (1870) 5 LR Ch App 139 (CA)). In Lal Chand 
Marwari v. Mahant Ramrup Gir (1925) 42 TLR 159 (PC) it was felt that 
the presumption of death could arise only on the date the issue was raised 
in the proceedings, with the seven-year period running back from then. 
Other authorities suggest that death may be presumed to have occurred 
seven years after the missing person first disappeared (see, for example, 
Chipchase v. Chipchase [1939] P 391 (DC)). 
In addition to the common-law presumption of death, there are several 
statutory provisions which allow the presumption to be drawn. Section 
19(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides that where a married 
person petitions the court under s. 19(1) for a decree of presumption of 
death and dissolution of the marriage, `the fact that for a period of seven 
years or more the other party to the marriage has been continually absent 
from the petitioner and the petitioner has no reason to believe that the 
other party has been living within that time shall be evidence that the other 
party is dead until the contrary is proved'. It is a defence to a charge of 
bigamy if the accused's first spouse was absent for the seven years 
preceding the second marriage and not known by the accused to be living 
within that period (s. 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861). 
Section 184 of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that where two or 
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more persons have died in circumstances rendering it uncertain which of 
them survived the other or others, their deaths shall, for all purposes 
affecting the title to property, be presumed to have occurred in the order 
of seniority, and accordingly the younger shall be deemed to have survived 
the elder. This presumption has no logical basis but can be justified on 
grounds of policy and expediency to ensure that property can be 
distributed where there is no evidence to suggest who in fact died first. 
In Hickman v. Peacey [1945] AC 304 the majority of the House of Lords 
concluded that the presumption applied to the `practically simultaneous' 
deaths caused by a German bomb, which destroyed the house in which the 
deceased had been staying during the Battle of Britain, as it was 
`uncertain' who had died first following the explosion. Thus, although the 
legal burden is on the party challenging the presumption to prove that the 
younger did not survive the elder, if there is any uncertainty as to who died 
first the presumption is irrebuttable. 
15.5.3.4 The Presumption of Regularity 
The vast majority of persons in official positions have been properly 
appointed so common sense dictates that it should be for the opposing 
party to adduce evidence that any person acting in an official capacity was 
not entitled to perform that function. Thus, if the basic fact is proved or 
admitted that an act was performed by a person acting in an official 
capacity a rebuttable presumption arises that the person was properly 
appointed. The presumption is generally thought to impose upon the 
opposing party no more than an evidential burden, although in truth the 
question has not been satisfactorily resolved and there is authority for the 
view that the presumption is persuasive. 
If, for example, it is proved that a person was acting as a police officer it 
is to be presumed, in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary, 
that he was properly acting as such (R v. Gordon (1789) 1 Leach 515 
(CEC)). In Cooper v. Rowlands [1971] RTR 291 the Divisional Court held 
that a police officer who was on duty as a motor patrol officer could be 
presumed to have been in uniform at the time. Some other cases where the 
presumption has been applied include R v. Roberts (1878) 14 Cox CC 101 
(CCCR) (a deputy county court judge), Campbell v. Wallsend Slipway & 
Engineering [1978] ICR 1015 (DC) (an inspector for the Health and Safety 
Executive) and TC Coombs v. IRC [1991] 3 All ER 623 (HL) (a tax 
inspector). In R v. Cresswell (1876) 1 QBD 446 (CCCR) it was presumed 
that the chamber adjacent to a church had been duly licensed for the 
purpose of a marriage ceremony as divine service had been celebrated 
there on a number of previous occasions; and in Gibbins v. Skinner [1951] 
2 KB 379 (DC) the fact that a speed-limit sign had been erected gave rise 
to the presumption that the local authority had complied with its statutory 
duties and properly authorised its erection (cf. Swift v. Barrett (1940) 163 
LT 154 (DC)). However, it may be that in criminal proceedings the 
prosecution are not able to rely on the presumption to establish facts 
which are central to the offence charged. This was certainly the view of the 
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Divisional Court in Scott v. Baker [1968] 3 WLR 796, where it was held 
that it could not be presumed that a breathalyser had been approved by 
the Secretary of State merely because it had been issued to the police, and 
the Privy Council in Dillon v. R [1982] 2 WLR 538. The latter case 
concerned an allegation that a police officer had negligently permitted the 
escape of two persons, the issue on appeal being whether it had been 
permissible for the prosecution to rely on the presumption of regularity to 
prove they had been in the officer's lawful custody. According to the Privy 
Council (at p. 541): 
`The lawfulness of the detention was a necessary pre-condition for the 
offence of permitting escape, and it is well established that the courts 
will not presume the existence of facts which are central to an offence . . . 
Moreover, this particular offence is one which touches the liberty of the 
subject, and on which there is, for that reason alone, no room for 
presumptions in favour of the Crown . . . It has to be remembered that 
in every case where a police officer commits the offence of negligently 
permitting a prisoner to escape from lawful custody, the prisoner 
himself commits an offence by escaping, and it would be contrary to 
fundamental principles of law that the onus should be upon a prisoner 
to rebut a presumption that he was being lawfully detained which he 
could only do by the (notoriously difficult) process of proving a 
negative.' 
The Privy Council assumed that the presumption of regularity imposes 
a legal burden of proof upon the party wishing to rebut it and no doubt 
this influenced its decision (see also R v. Verelst (1813) 3 Camp 432 (KBD) 
at p. 435: `the presumption . . . stands till the contrary is proved'). There is, 
however, recent authority for the view that the presumption is evidential 
(Campbell v. Wallsend Slipway & Engineering [1978] ICR 1015 (DC) at 
pp. 1024±5). Given the number of cases where the prosecution have been 
allowed to rely on the presumption the better view is that the presumption 
is evidential. The accused need only adduce sufficient evidence to raise a 
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the presumed fact for the 
prosecution to be put to proof. 
There is also an evidential presumption that mechanical devices of a 
kind which are usually working properly are working properly at any 
particular time. This presumption is in many respects analogous to the 
presumption of regularity, although it is unnecessary to prove the basic 
fact of general reliability because judicial notice can be taken of it. Thus, in 
Nicholas v. Penny [1950] 2 KB 466 (DC) the speedometer in a police car 
was presumed to have been working properly while the accused's car was 
being followed; and in Tingle Jacobs v. Kennedy [1964] 1 WLR 638 (CA) 
Lord Denning MR accepted that traffic lights could be presumed to be in 
proper working order in the absence of evidence to the contrary. If the 
device is of a type which is not generally known to be working properly the 
presumption cannot arise and evidence will need to be adduced to prove 
the fact. 
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15.5.3.5 Res Ipsa Loquitur 
In cases where negligence is alleged by the claimant he may rely on the 
maxim res ipsa loquitur (`the thing speaks for itself') to raise a prima facie 
case against the defendant. Once it has been proved or admitted that the 
relevant matter was under the management of the defendant or his 
employees, and the accident was such that in the ordinary course of things 
it would not have happened if proper care had been taken by those 
persons, then in the absence of evidence to the contrary a presumption of 
negligence arises (Scott v. The London and St Katherine Docks (1865) 3 
H & C 596 (CEC)). Although there is authority to suggest the presumption 
shifts the legal burden of proof, it is now clear that once the basic facts 
have been established the presumption which arises is evidential (Ng Chun 
Pui v. Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298 (PC), Ratcliffe v. Plymouth & 
Torbay Health Authority [1998] Lloyd's Rep Med 162 (CA), Royal Bank of 
Scotland v. Etridge (No. 2) [2001] 3 WLR 1021 (HL)). On this basis the 
claimant will establish a prima facie case against the defendant at `half 
time', following which the defendant is under an evidential burden to 
adduce sufficient evidence to the contrary; if the defendant cannot 
discharge his evidential burden the judge will be obliged to reach a finding 
of negligence at the end of the trial. However, the legal burden ultimately 
remains with the claimant to prove his allegation of negligence on the 
balance of probabilities. Thus, in Widdowson v. Newgate Meat Corpora-
tion (1997) The Times 4.12.97, a case of alleged negligence arising out of a 
road accident in which the plaintiff had been injured by one of the 
defendant's vehicles, the Court of Appeal held that the presumption had 
given rise to a prima facie case of negligence, so the trial judge should not 
have dismissed the claim following a submission of no case to answer 
simply because the plaintiff had adduced no other evidence. 
In Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No. 2) [2001] 3 WLR 1021 the 
House of Lords compared the operation of the equitable doctrine of 
undue influence with the way in which res ipsa loquitur is invoked to prove 
negligence. Whether a transaction was brought about by the exercise of 
undue influence is a question of fact to be proved by the party asserting it 
and, in the absence of satisfactory evidence to the contrary, the burden of 
proof will be discharged if it is proved (i) that the complainant (C) placed 
trust and confidence in another person (T) in relation to the management 
of C's financial affairs and (ii) that the transaction in question is one which 
is not readily explicable by the relationship of C and T. In other words, 
once these two issues of fact have been proved there is a prima facie case of 
undue influence ± an evidential presumption of undue influence arises ± 
which the other party, for example a bank (B), will need to rebut by the 
adduction of evidence to the contrary. B in effect bears an evidential 
burden, for unless B is able to adduce evidence in rebuttal C's claim that 
the transaction was procured by undue influence will succeed. C will not 
need to adduce evidence to prove the first of these issues of fact, however, 
if the relationship between C and T can be proved to be one of the special 
types of relationship where it is irrebuttably presumed that C reposed trust 
and confidence in T (such as the relationship between solicitor and client). 
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The relationship between husband and wife is not one of these special 
types, so a wife (C) must prove that she actually placed trust and 
confidence in her husband (T) if she wishes to rely on the doctrine. 
An alternative view as to how res ipsa loquitur operates is that proof or 
admission of the basic facts gives rise to a presumption of fact, the weight 
of which depends on the circumstances of the case. According to this 
interpretation, in some cases the circumstances will allow an inference of 
negligence to be drawn which will be insufficient, in the absence of 
supporting evidence, to allow the claimant to discharge his own evidential 
burden by `half time'; in other cases the circumstances may be such that a 
reasonable tribunal of fact would be entitled to infer negligence and the 
judge will rule that there is a prima facie case; while in other cases the 
inference will be so strong that it would be perverse for the judge to rule 
that a prima facie case has not been made out, and perverse of the tribunal 
of fact not to find against the defendant should he fail to adduce any or 
any sufficient evidence to the contrary (see Easson v. LNER [1944] 1 KB 
421 (CA) at p. 425). 
A similar presumption of negligence has also been recognised in 
criminal cases where the allegation is one of careless driving, although the 
maxim res ipsa loquitur has been avoided because of the historical 
uncertainty over whether or not it casts upon the civil defendant ± and 
therefore the accused ± the legal burden of proof. Nonetheless, if the 
accused's vehicle was involved in an accident of a type which can leave no 
reasonable doubt in the mind of the magistrates that the accused was 
negligent then it will be permissible to convict him in the absence of 
evidence suggesting the contrary (Wright v. Wenlock [1971] RTR 228 
(DC), Rabjohns v. Burgar [1971] RTR 234 (DC)). 
15.5.3.6 Other Examples 
There are numerous other rebuttable presumptions of law, and just a few 
examples are given here. There is an evidential presumption that the 
person in possession of property is its owner (Robertson v. French (1803) 4 
East 130 (KBD)) and a persuasive presumption that a deceased person did 
not commit suicide (Re Williams [1969] Crim LR 158 (DC)). There is also 
a statutory persuasive presumption that an engagement ring is given 
absolutely (s. 3(2) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1970); and a statutory evidential presumption that an accident in the 
course of a person's employment arose out of it (s. 94(3) of the Social 
Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992). There was, until recently, a 
persuasive presumption that a child between the age of 10 and 14 was 
incapable of committing a crime, imposing a legal burden on the 
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the child knew that 
what he was doing was seriously wrong and not just naughty. This 
presumption was abolished by s. 34 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
The effect of the `reverse onus' provisions in the law of criminal 
evidence is to give rise to a persuasive presumption in respect of an 
element of the offence which would otherwise have to be proved by the 
prosecution. The accused will rebut the presumption if he is able to prove 
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his statutory `defence' on the balance of probabilities, save that if the 
provision in question is interpreted to place on the accused no more than 
an evidential burden the presumption too is evidential (see 15.2.2 ante). 
For example, the effect of s. 30(2) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, which 
provides, inter alia, that `a man who lives with or is habitually in the 
company of a prostitute . . . shall be presumed to be knowingly living on 
the earnings of prostitution, unless he proves the contrary', is to give rise to 
a persuasive presumption that the accused was living on the earnings of 
prostitution for the purposes of the s. 30(1) offence. The accused will need 
to prove the contrary on the balance of probabilities (R v. Ptohopoulos 
(1967) 52 Cr App R 47 (CA), R v. Wilson (1983) 78 Cr App R 247 (CA)). 
It is unlikely that this provision will now be read down under s. 3(1) of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 so as to impose no more than an evidential 
burden on the accused, given that the European Commission of Human 
Rights held that this reverse onus provision was compatible with Article 
6(2) of the European Convention in X v. United Kingdom (1972) 
Application 5124/71. 
15.6 Proof Without Evidence 
Some factual matters are deemed to be proved, notwithstanding the 
absence of any evidence adduced in support thereof, either because 
`judicial notice' has been taken of them or they have been `formally 
admitted' by the party whose case is thereby undermined. 
15.6.1 Judicial Notice 
For the more efficient use of court time and to ensure consistency of 
approach, the doctrine of judicial notice allows certain facts to be regarded 
as proved, even though no evidence in support has been adduced, if the 
facts are so well known by people generally (or in the general locality) that 
it would be pointless to call evidence. In Crown Court and civil jury trials 
it is for the judge to take judicial notice of any such `notorious facts' and 
direct the jury to find that they exist. For example it would not be 
necessary to adduce evidence to prove that watching television is a normal 
part of everyday life, or that Christmas falls on 25 December. These are 
incontrovertible facts known by the vast majority of people and as such 
may be judicially noted. Once judicial notice has been taken of a fact its 
indisputable nature means a party cannot adduce evidence to rebut it. 
An example is provided by human gestation. It is widely known that a 
human foetus normally takes about nine months to develop in the uterus 
but that some women give birth after a shorter or longer period of time; as 
such it is possible to take judicial notice of both these facts (Preston-Jones 
v. Preston-Jones [1951] AC 391 (HL)). However, where the period in 
question is said to fall either side of the norm it will not generally be 
appropriate to take judicial notice of its impossibility unless the period is 
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so short or so long that it can be taken for granted. Thus in R v. Luffe 
(1807) 8 East 193 (KBD) judicial notice could be taken of the fact that a 
gestation period of two weeks was impossible, whereas in Preston-Jones v. 
Preston-Jones the House of Lords was not willing to accept that judicial 
notice could be taken of the impossibility of a period of 360 days. In the 
latter case the husband petitioned for divorce on the ground of his wife's 
alleged adultery. He had been out of the country for six months but his 
wife gave birth to a normal child weighing over eight pounds just six 
months after his return, meaning that he could have been the father only if 
the gestation period had lasted either 6 months or a year. While it was 
accepted that judicial notice could be taken of the impossibility of a six-
month period for that baby the House of Lords refused to hold that such 
notice could be taken of the longer period, although it was recognised that 
a year might be close to the upper limit after which judicial notice would 
be acceptable. Other examples of judicially-noted facts include: the fact 
that the writing on a postcard is not concealed (Huth v. Huth [1915] 3 KB 
32 (CA)); that Britain was at war on 1 January 1916 (Commonwealth 
Shipping Representative v. P & O Branch Service [1923] AC 191 (HL)); that 
the streets of London are full of traffic (Dennis v. A J White [1916] 2 KB 1 
(CA)); that cats are ordinarily kept for domestic purposes (Nye v. Niblett 
[1918] 1 KB 23 (DC)); that Elvis Presley was resident in the USA (RCA 
Corp v. Pollard [1982] 2 All ER 468 (ChD)); and that `cocaine 
hydrochloride' is a form of cocaine (Attorney General for the Cayman 
Islands v. Roberts [2002] 1 WLR 1842 (PC)). In R v. Jones [1970] 1 WLR 
16 (CA) it was held that judicial notice could be taken of the fact that the 
`Alcotest R80' breathalyser was a device approved by the Secretary of 
State on account of the large number of widely-reported decisions to that 
effect. 
The doctrine of judicial notice helps to keep the length and cost of trials 
to a minimum, but it also ensures that different decisions are not reached 
on the same general questions of fact by different courts. This is a 
particularly important consideration in criminal proceedings where 
certainty in the law is essential. For this reason it is permissible to take 
judicial notice of the fact that certain types of knife, such as flick-knives 
(R v. Simpson (1983) 78 Cr App R 115 (CA)) and butterfly knives (DPP v. 
Hynde (1997) 161 JP 671 (DC)) are manufactured for the purpose of 
causing injury to the person. However, while the original first-instance 
decisions were examples of judicial notice being taken, the appellate 
courts' stamp of authority means that future decisions are not so much 
examples of the doctrine being re-applied but compliance with the 
separate doctrine of binding precedent. A similar point may be made in 
relation to the statutory provisions which impose an obligation to take 
judicial notice, such as s. 3 of the Interpretation Act 1978 (which provides 
that all Acts passed by Parliament since 1850 are to be judicially noticed as 
such) and s. 3(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 (which provides 
that judicial notice shall be taken of, inter alia, the decisions of the 
European Court of Justice and the EC Treaties), save that the relevant 
doctrine here is the supremacy of Parliament. 
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A court may also take judicial notice of indisputable facts `after 
inquiry'. Unlike judicial notice without inquiry, the judge or magistrates 
will first refer to appropriate sources of information in order to decide the 
issue. Although such facts are not sufficiently `notorious' to allow the 
court to take judicial notice without inquiry, this procedure is permitted 
on the ground that certain works of reference are so reliable and 
authoritative that it would be absurd to expect evidence to be adduced to 
prove the indisputable facts contained within them. An obvious example 
would be to refer to a calendar to find out which day of the week it was on 
a certain date; another would be to look at a map to find out the distance 
between two places. It is also permissible for the judge (or magistrates) to 
receive expert opinion evidence before determining a question of this sort, 
as for example in McQuaker v. Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687 (CA) where it 
was necessary to determine whether camels were wild or tame animals. It 
is also permissible for experts to be consulted if it is necessary for the court 
to determine the nature of a professional practice or custom. 
Finally, where the question to be determined is political in nature, such 
as the status of an overseas territory or government, it will be necessary to 
refer to the appropriate government minister in order to avoid the risk of a 
conflict between the judiciary and the executive. The minister's response to 
such a request is conclusive (see Duff Development Co Ltd v. Government 
of Kelantan [1924] AC 797 (HL)). 
15.6.2 The Local and Particular Knowledge of the Tribunal of Fact 
Judges, jurors and magistrates are all permitted to rely on their `local 
knowledge' ± that is, matters generally known by people in the locality ± 
because it amounts to no more than a localised form of judicial notice. 
Indeed one of the benefits of the lay magistracy is that as magistrates are 
drawn from the surrounding area they are likely to be familiar with local 
conditions and, in particular, the geography of the region. Thus, in Paul v. 
DPP (1989) 90 Cr App R 173 (DC), a case of `kerb-crawling', magistrates 
in Luton could rely on the local knowledge that a particular area in that 
town was frequented by prostitutes; and in Clift v. Long [1961] Crim LR 
121 (DC) magistrates in Felixstowe could rely on the local knowledge that 
a car park was a public place. (For other examples see Ingram v. Percival 
[1968] 3 WLR 663 (DC) and Borthwick v. Vickers [1973] Crim LR 
317 (DC).) 
In Bowman v. DPP [1991] RTR 263 the Divisional Court felt that the 
prosecution and defence should have been allowed to comment on the 
magistrates' use of local knowledge regarding the status of a car park in 
Portsmouth. Watkins LJ said (at pp. 269±70): 
`It is always wise of justices to make the fact that local knowledge is 
going to be used known to the defence and the prosecution so as to give 
those representing those parties the opportunity of commenting upon 
the knowledge which the justice or justices claim to have and which they 
aim to use for the purpose of aiding them in reaching a determination 
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. . . It must be recognised in cases of this kind which involve local 
knowledge that justices simply cannot turn out of their minds 
knowledge which they acquire locally nor is it desirable that they 
should. Providing they take special care to keep within proper bounds 
and inform a defendant especially of that locally acquired knowledge 
and the use to which they may seek to put it, the justices act perfectly 
properly and rightly.' 
As a general principle this is a sensible safeguard to ensure that 
magistrates rely on matters which are generally known in the locality and 
do not determine questions which might be in dispute and in respect of 
which either or both parties might wish to adduce evidence. Bowman 
v. DPP [1991] RTR 263 was followed in Norbrook Laboratories (GB) v. 
Health and Safety Executive (1998) The Times 23.2.98 (DC) where a 
conviction was quashed because the magistrates had not made it clear to 
the parties that they were relying on their local knowledge. Local 
professional judges, for example district judges in the county courts, also 
share the regional population's general knowledge and may rely on it in 
the same way (Keane v. Mount Vernon Colliery [1933] AC 309 (HL), 
Reynolds v. Llanelly Associated Tinplate [1948] 1 All ER 140 (CA)). 
Different considerations ought to apply, however, where the knowledge 
is not local but particular to an individual trier of fact. Particular 
knowledge, unlike notorious facts, may be open to dispute and, as noted 
above, the issue ought to be resolved by the adduction of admissible 
evidence by either or both parties in the normal way. 
15.6.2.1 The Particular Knowledge of Judges 
In Reynolds v. Llanelly Associated Tinplate [1948] 1 All ER 140 the Court 
of Appeal held that a county court arbitrator had been wrong to use his 
own particular knowledge of the local employment prospects of a man of 
the applicant's age and experience. The knowledge relied on had not fallen 
within the common knowledge of the people in the locality so evidence 
ought to have been received on the issue. The Court of Appeal went 
further in Owen v. Nicholl [1948] 1 All ER 707 where it was held that a 
county court arbitrator could neither rely on the particular knowledge he 
had picked up from adjudicating in earlier proceedings concerning third 
parties nor refer to the court file relating to those earlier proceedings if the 
file had not been adduced in evidence. Similarly, in Jarvis v. DPP [1996] 
RTR 192 the Divisional Court held that `it was wrong in principle' for a 
stipendiary magistrate to use evidence that he had heard in other cases to 
supplement the evidence in the case before him. 
However, it seems professional judges may now have a wider discretion 
to rely on their own personal knowledge after judgment has been entered, 
at least in the county court. In Mullen v. Hackney LBC [1997] 1 WLR 
1103 a county court judge imposed a fine of £5,000 on Hackney Council 
for being in breach of an undertaking to carry out repair work at one of 
their properties. The severity of the fine was justified on the ground that 
the Council had been in breach of numerous other undertakings to the 
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court, yet no evidence was called to this effect. Despite the absence of any 
evidence, or indeed any indication as to the source of the judge's 
knowledge, the Court of Appeal upheld his decision. The judge had been 
entitled to rely on his knowledge of the Council's previous breaches as it 
could be assumed he had derived it from any one of three acceptable 
sources, namely: his personal experience or the records of the local county 
courts or his local knowledge. It is very doubtful whether the same 
approach would be permitted in a criminal court following a conviction. 
15.6.2.2 The Particular Knowledge of Jurors 
A number of nineteenth century cases suggest that if a juror has particular 
knowledge about a disputed issue in the trial he should give evidence on it 
in open court like any other witness (see, for example, R v. Rosser (1836) 7 
C & P 648 (CCC)). While this procedure would ensure that the juror's 
knowledge is tested by cross-examination and revealed to all the other 
jurors, it is possible to envisage difficulties arising, for example if the 
juror's evidence is inadmissible. A more recent authority is R v. Blick 
(1966) 50 Cr App R 280 (CCA), a case in which a juror passed a note to 
the judge explaining that his own knowledge relating to a public lavatory 
contradicted the accused's testimony that it had been open and used by 
him at the time of the alleged robbery. The approach adopted by the trial 
judge, and upheld on appeal, was to allow the prosecution to call evidence 
relating to the matters in the note which could then be tested by cross-
examination in the normal way. The juror himself was not required to give 
evidence. If it comes to the judge's attention that a juror has 
communicated his particular knowledge to the other jurors during their 
deliberations, and a strong direction to concentrate only on the evidence 
given during the trial would not sufficiently address the problem, the jury 
should be discharged from reaching a verdict (R v. Fricker (1999) The 
Times 13.7.99 (CA)). 
15.6.2.3 The Particular Knowledge of Magistrates 
Magistrates are allowed to rely on their own particular knowledge relating 
to the issues in dispute before them even though it is not concerned with 
their locality, the simple reason being that they are probably unable to 
exclude such matters from their minds. Perhaps the most famous example 
is R v. Field and Others (Justices) ex parte White (1895) 64 LJMC 158 
(DC). A lay bench comprising three men who had served in the Royal 
Navy dismissed an allegation relating to the sale of adulterated cocoa on 
the ground that their experience in the Navy had made them experts in the 
field and they knew that cocoa could not be consumed in its pure state but 
had to contain other ingredients. Wills J said (at pp. 159±60): 
`I do not say that the Justices pursued an altogether prudent course; and 
perhaps if the occasion arose again they would be wiser to hear 
evidence, and keep themselves technically right. However, they decided 
the case as they did upon their own knowledge; and in the nature of 
things, no one in determining a case of this kind can discard his own 
particular knowledge of a subject of this kind. I might as well be asked 
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to decide a question as to the sufficiency of an Alpine rope without 
bringing my personal knowledge into play.' 
The final sentence of this extract is of interest because it suggests that 
professional judges may find it just as difficult as lay magistrates to ignore 
their personal knowledge when trying a case (although this is not the 
official line). 
In Wetherall v. Harrison [1976] 2 WLR 168 (DC) the accused was 
charged with failing to provide a sample of blood contrary to s. 9(3) of the 
Road Traffic Act 1972 and relied on the defence of reasonable excuse on 
the ground that he had had `a sort of fit' at the time the sample was 
requested. The prosecution called the doctor who had seen the accused 
and he gave his expert opinion that the fit had been simulated. The 
accused did not call any medical evidence in rebuttal but the magistrates 
dismissed the charge, relying on their own knowledge of the fear that 
inoculations could cause and the professional opinion of one of their 
number, a medical practitioner. Dismissing an appeal by the prosecution, 
Lord Widgery CJ said (at pp. 172±3): 
`If you have a judge sitting alone, trying a civil case, it is perfectly 
feasible and sensible that he should be instructed and trained to exclude 
certain factors from his consideration of the problem. Justices are not so 
trained . . . Laymen (by which I mean non-lawyers) sitting as justices 
considering a case . . . lack the ability to put out of their minds certain 
features of the case. In particular, if the justice is a specialist, be he a 
doctor, or an engineer or an accountant, or what you will, it is not 
possible for him to approach the decision in the case as though he had 
not got that training . . . So . . . it is not improper for a justice who has 
special knowledge of the circumstances forming the background to a 
particular case to draw on that special knowledge in interpretation of 
the evidence which he has heard . . . He is not there to give evidence to 
himself, still more is he not there to give evidence to other justices; but 
that he can employ his basic knowledge in considering, weighing up and 
assessing the evidence given before the court is I think beyond doubt . . . 
He can explain the evidence they have heard: he can give his views as to 
how the case should go and how it should be decided; but he should not 
be giving evidence himself behind closed doors which is not available to 
the parties.' 
The position would therefore seem to be that while a specialist 
magistrate may give his own expert opinion on the evidence behind closed 
doors, he should not give evidence behind closed doors. Needless to say, 
this distinction is rather difficult to comprehend. In magistrates' courts it 
now seems that controvertible evidence may be given in the retiring room, 
untested by the parties, simply on the ground of expediency. The better 
solution would be for experts in the field to discharge themselves from 
hearing the case, so that it can be decided wholly on the evidence which 
has been adduced in court and openly scrutinised by the parties' own 
experts. That said, if the Divisional Court is of the view that the line 
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between `employing basic knowledge to assess evidence' and `giving 
evidence' has been crossed there will be a remedy for the aggrieved party. 
In Carter v. Eastbourne Borough Council (2000) 164 JP 273 (DC) it was 
held that the magistrates had been wrong to judge for themselves the ages 
of a number of trees, as these questions were `properly the subject matter 
of evidence and not of personal undisclosed belief on the part of the 
tribunal'. 
15.6.3 Formal Admissions 
An issue of fact may be formally admitted by a party. If this is done the 
fact is no longer in issue and the opposing party need not adduce evidence 
to prove it. 
15.6.3.1 Criminal Proceedings 
Any fact may be formally admitted by or on behalf of the accused or the 
prosecution; once this has been done the admission is, as against the party 
making it, conclusive evidence of the fact admitted (s. 10(1) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1967). Any such admission may, however, be 
withdrawn with the leave of the court (s. 10(4)), but if the admission was 
made with the benefit of legal advice the judge is unlikely to give 
permission for it to be withdrawn unless there is cogent evidence that it 
was made on the basis of a mistake or misunderstanding (R v. Kolton 
[2000] Crim LR 761 (CA)). 
Although the accused's legal representative may make a formal 
admission on his behalf, only the accused himself may enter a plea of 
guilty to the charge in court (R v. Ellis (1973) 57 Cr App R 571 (CA)). 
Once the accused has voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to an offence the 
prosecution are no longer obliged to prove their case, save that where 
there is some dispute over the facts it may be necessary to hold a `Newton 
hearing' to determine how the offence was committed (R v. Newton (1982) 
77 Cr App R 13 (CA)). Once the facts have been established in this way 
the judge will know the seriousness of the offence and be able to pass the 
appropriate sentence. The court has a discretion to allow the accused to 
withdraw his guilty plea at any time prior to sentencing (R v. Dodd (1981) 
74 Cr App R 50 (CA)). 
15.6.3.2 Civil Proceedings 
A party to civil proceedings may make a formal admission in a number of 
ways. The most obvious way is expressly to admit a fact in the party's 
statement of case (r. 14.1(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998), but such 
admissions may also be made by the defendant's failure to respond to an 
allegation in the claimant's statement of case (CPR r. 16.5(5), cf. r. 16.7(2)), 
by expressly admitting a fact in answer to a `notice to admit facts' (CPR 
r. 32.18(3)), by voluntarily serving a written admission on the opposing 
party (CPR r. 14.1(2)), or of course by admitting the fact at the trial. 
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Chapter Summary 
.	 The burden of proof is the obligation on a party to prove a fact in issue to the 
standard (the degree of probability) required by law. In criminal proceedings the 
prosecution bear the burden of proof on the various issues which comprise their 
allegation against the accused and the burden of disproof on the accused's 
defence(s), save that the accused bears the burden of proof in respect of insanity 
and a number of statutory defences. In civil proceedings the party who makes a 
particular factual assertion usually has to prove it. A `persuasive presumption' 
places the burden of proof on a particular party once preliminary facts have been 
proved or admitted. 
.	 Whether a fact in issue has been proved to the requisite standard is determined by 
the tribunal of fact at the end of the trial. (A party may, however, have to 
discharge the burden of proof during the course of the trial in respect of a 
collateral fact on which the admissibility of an item of his evidence depends. The 
judge will determine whether the collateral fact has been proved.) 
.	 The standard of proof for the prosecution in respect of a fact in issue on which 
they bear the burden of proof is `beyond reasonable doubt'. For the accused it is 
`on the balance of probabilities' (more probable than any other alternative) which 
is also the standard of proof in civil proceedings. 
.	 If a party bears an evidential burden on an issue he must be able to show that 
sufficient evidence has been adduced or elicited in support of the issue for it to be 
considered by the tribunal of fact at the end of the trial. As a general rule the party 
bearing the burden of proof on an issue also bears an evidential burden on it. 
However, in criminal proceedings the accused will bear an evidential burden on 
an affirmative defence which the prosecution are obliged to disprove. An 
`evidential presumption' places an evidential burden on a party once preliminary 
facts have been proved or admitted. 
.	 Whether an evidential burden has been discharged is a question of law for the 
judge. If the prosecution bear an evidential burden on a fact in issue they must 
adduce sufficient evidence by the close of their case for the judge to be satisfied 
that a reasonable jury would be able to find that issue proved beyond reasonable 
doubt. If the accused bears an evidential burden in respect of a defence on which 
the prosecution bear the burden of disproof he must be able to show by the close 
of his case that there is sufficient evidence for the judge to be satisfied that a 
reasonable jury would be able to conclude that there is a reasonable doubt as to 
his guilt (that is, that there is a reasonable possibility that his defence is true). If 
the accused bears the burden of proof on his defence he must be able to show 
there is sufficient evidence for the judge to be satisfied that a reasonable jury 
would be able to find his defence proved on the balance of probabilities. 
.	 Some facts are so well known that they do not need to be proved by the 
adduction of admissible evidence. Judicial notice may be taken of such `notorious 
facts' without enquiry. Judicial notice may also be taken of other facts after 
enquiry (for example, where the court refers to an authoritative source of 
information to determine the question). The tribunal of fact is also entitled to use 
its own `local knowledge', and lay magistrates are entitled to rely on their own 
particular knowledge in respect of the issues before them. 
.	 A factual issue which is `formally admitted' by the party who does not bear the 
burden of proof on it is no longer in issue between him and the party who would 
otherwise have borne the burden of proof. 
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The Trial 16 
16.1 The Course of the Trial 
The trial process is broadly similar in criminal and civil proceedings, 
although there are significant procedural differences between jury and 
non-jury trials. The claimant or prosecution (`P') will give an opening 
speech outlining his case against the accused or civil defendant (`D') and 
identifying the factual issues which will need to be resolved. P will call his 
witnesses and adduce any other admissible evidence in support of his case. 
Each witness will be questioned by P with a view to eliciting favourable 
testimony (`examination-in-chief'); then questioned by D for the purpose 
of testing that witness's `evidence in chief' (`cross-examination'); and then 
perhaps re-questioned by P on any matters which were raised in cross-
examination (`re-examination'). At the close of P's case (`half time') D 
may make a submission to the court that P has not been able to establish a 
prima facie case against him. If D's `submission of no case to answer' fails, 
D may adduce evidence in support of his defence (and, in civil 
proceedings, any counterclaim he might have). D may make an opening 
speech (subject to a restriction in criminal trials imposed by s. 2 of the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1898) and will then call his witnesses and adduce 
his admissible evidence. In criminal proceedings the accused will usually 
have to give his evidence before any other defence witness to the facts (s. 79 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984). In civil trials D and P will 
each finish off by making a closing speech and any necessary submissions 
on the law. In criminal trials P will make his closing speech before D 
makes his, so that D has the final word. (In summary trials D has no right 
to make a closing speech if he has already made an opening speech, and P 
has no right to make a closing speech at all.) Submissions on the law will 
often be made during the course of the trial, interrupting the flow of 
events, and in civil proceedings the judge may allow a witness's written 
statement to stand as his evidence in chief so that his account need not be 
elicited by time-consuming questioning. In jury trials the judge will 
summarise the facts for the jury at the end of the trial and direct them on 
the law (`the summing-up'), following which the jury will retire to consider 
the case and decide whether the facts in issue have been proved to the 
requisite standard. 
If the accused is tried in the Crown Court on indictment, submissions 
on the admissibility and possible exclusion of evidence are made in the 
absence of the jury so that they will not hear any evidence which the judge 
excludes. Occasionally it is necessary for preliminary questions of fact to 
be determined by the judge so that he can decide whether or not an item of 
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evidence ought to be admitted. This is done by holding a trial-within-the-
trial (a `hearing on the voir dire' or  a  `voir dire') in the absence of the jury. 
The judge may have to decide, for example, whether the prosecution have 
proved that the accused's confession was not obtained by oppression. 
The accused in criminal proceedings has the right to be present during 
his trial; but he has no right to expect the proceedings to be adjourned or 
halted if he chooses not to attend. In cases where the accused is of full age 
and sound mind, and is fully aware of his forthcoming trial, the trial judge 
(or magistrates) may proceed in his absence if he voluntarily absconds, so 
long as a fair trial would still be possible; but if the accused's absence is 
attributable to involuntary illness or incapacity, it would not be 
appropriate to proceed unless he is legally represented and has asked 
that the trial should commence (R v. Jones [2002] 2 WLR 524 (HL)). Thus, 
in R (on the application of R) v. Thames Youth Court [2002] EWHC 
Admin 1670 (QBD) it was held that a juvenile, who had been prevented 
from attending court by virtue of his being under arrest for an unrelated 
matter, should not have been tried in his absence. 
16.2 The Tribunals of Fact and Law 
If a case is being tried before a judge and jury, the jury are the ultimate 
arbiters of fact and it is for them to decide, after the judge's summing-up, 
what facts in issue have or have not been proved. The judge has no part to 
play in these deliberations, although he is entitled to comment on the facts 
during his summing-up. The only fact-finding role the judge has in a jury 
trial arises when he sits as the tribunal of fact and law to determine a 
question of admissibility (which may follow a hearing on the voir dire in 
criminal proceedings). All questions of substantive and procedural law are 
for the judge, so the jury are obliged to follow the judge's directions on 
such matters, subject to their overriding constitutional right in criminal 
proceedings to follow their own conscience and acquit in spite of the law 
and evidence (Bushell's Case (1670) Vaugh 135 (CCP)). However, a 
criminal jury's decision to convict may be challenged on appeal on the 
ground that the verdict is unsafe; and in civil proceedings any verdict of a 
jury may be set aside if it is `plainly wrong' (see Grobbelaar v. News Group 
Newspapers [2002] 1 WLR 3024 (HL) at pp. 3051±3). 
In summary proceedings lay magistrates and district judges (formerly 
stipendiary magistrates) are the tribunal of fact and law, save that lay 
magistrates are expected to accept their clerk's advice on the law. One of 
the principal criticisms levelled against summary trials is the absence of 
any distinction between the tribunals of fact and law, for while magistrates 
may exclude relevant evidence in their role as the tribunal of law they will, 
as the tribunal of fact, still be aware of (and therefore perhaps influenced 
by) that material. In non-jury civil trials the judge is also the tribunal of 
fact and law, but the nature of the proceedings, and the judge's experience 
as a professional lawyer, means that this fusion of roles is less 
objectionable than in criminal proceedings. 
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16.3 The Competence and Compellability of Witnesses 
A person who is lawfully permitted to give oral evidence in civil or 
criminal proceedings is said to be `competent'. As a general rule all 
persons are competent, but this was not always the case. At common law 
no person having an interest in the outcome of a civil or criminal trial was 
competent to testify in those proceedings. Interested persons were 
recognised as competent by the Evidence Act 1843, and parties and their 
spouses became competent in civil proceedings soon after, by virtue of the 
Evidence Act 1851 and the Evidence Amendment Act 1853; but it was not 
until the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 came into force that the general 
prohibition was removed in criminal proceedings, allowing the accused to 
testify in his own defence. Section 53(1) of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 now sets out the general rule that `in criminal 
proceedings all persons are (whatever their age) competent to give 
evidence'. 
Any competent person who may lawfully be ordered to appear in court 
to give evidence is said to be `compellable'; and, as a general rule, anyone 
who is competent is also compellable (Hoskyn v. Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner [1978] 2 WLR 695 (HL)). If a compellable witness refuses to 
comply with an order to testify he will be in contempt of court; and if a 
competent witness gives evidence, but refuses to answer a legitimate 
question, he too will be in contempt unless, exceptionally, he is legally 
entitled or under a legal duty to refrain from answering. 
As a general rule, oral evidence given in court (or through a live 
television link) must be given on oath or on affirmation. A number of 
different oaths are available to suit various religious beliefs (see ss. 1 to 6 
of the Oaths Act 1978). The oath and affirmation give rise to the 
possibility of a sanction ± liability for perjury ± which is meant to 
encourage truthful testimony. In cases where a witness has affirmed, and 
the ground is properly laid for an expectation that he would normally take 
the oath on a holy book relevant to his religious belief, the judge may 
allow the reason why the witness did not take the oath to be explored in 
cross-examination (R v. Mehrban [2002] 1 Cr App R 561 (CA)). Young 
children may be sufficiently intelligent and intelligible to give valuable 
testimony while not necessarily understanding the nature of the oath or 
the duty imposed by it, so provision has been made for child witnesses to 
give unsworn evidence in both civil and criminal proceedings. Indeed, no 
child under the age of 14 may give sworn evidence in criminal proceedings 
(but a penalty may be imposed for wilfully giving false unsworn evidence). 
In civil proceedings, evidence need not be taken on oath if the case has 
been allocated to the `small claims track', where the strict rules of evidence 
do not apply (r. 27.8(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998). 
16.3.1 The Accused 
The accused in criminal proceedings is competent to testify in his own 
defence and for a co-accused, but he is not competent to testify for the 
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prosecution against himself or his co-accused (s. 53(4) of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999). Insofar as the accused is competent, he 
cannot be compelled to give oral evidence (s. 1(1) of the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898 Act; s. 35(4) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994). If the accused pleads guilty, or the charges against him are 
dropped, or the judge rules that he and his co-accused should be tried 
separately, he becomes competent and compellable for the prosecution 
against his erstwhile co-accused (s. 53(5) of the 1999 Act). There is, 
however, a rule of practice to the effect that a person who is still to be tried 
for his alleged involvement in an offence should not be called to give 
evidence for the prosecution at the trial of his alleged accomplice (R v. 
Pipe (1966) 51 Cr App R 17 (CA)). 
16.3.2 The Accused's Spouse 
In criminal proceedings there are restrictions on the compellability (but 
not the competence) of the accused's husband or wife, which are now to be 
found in s. 80 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. These 
restrictions do not encompass any other member of the accused's family, 
however, so his (or her) longstanding unmarried partner or child may be 
compelled to give oral evidence for the prosecution like any other person 
(R v. Pearce [2002] 1 WLR 1553 (CA)), as indeed may be the accused's 
former spouse (s. 80(5)) or the purported spouse of void bigamous 
`marriage' (see R v. Khan (1986) 84 Cr App R 44 (CA)). In cases where the 
accused's spouse is competent but not compellable for the prosecution, 
and she is called to testify against him, she should generally be warned, in 
the absence of the jury and before being sworn, that she need not give 
evidence but that once she has taken the oath she will be treated like any 
ordinary witness (R v. Pitt [1982] 3 WLR 359 (CA)). The failure of the 
accused's spouse to give evidence cannot be commented upon by the 
prosecution (s. 80A), and any comments by the judge should be made with 
`a great deal of circumspection' (R v. Naudeer [1984] 3 All ER 1036 (CA); 
see also R v. Whitton [1998] Crim LR 492 (CA)). 
Subject in all cases to s. 80(4) of the Act ± which affirms that no person 
who is charged in the instant proceedings is compellable ± the accused's 
spouse is compellable to give evidence on behalf of the accused (s. 80(2)); 
and/or on behalf of a co-accused in respect of any `specified offence' with 
which that person is charged (s. 80(2A)(a)); or for the prosecution in respect 
of any `specified offence' with which any person is charged (s. 80(2A)(b)). 
Section 80(3) provides that an offence is a `specified offence' if: (a) it  
involves an assault on, or injury or a threat of injury to, the spouse or a 
person who was at the material time under the age of 16; (b) it is a  sexual  
offence (defined in s. 80(7)) alleged to have been committed in respect of a 
person who was at the material time under that age; or (c) it consists of 
attempting or conspiring to commit, or of aiding, abetting, counselling, 
procuring or inciting the commission of, an offence falling within (a) or (b). 
Before s. 80 of the Act came into force, the accused's spouse was only 
exceptionally competent and never compellable for the prosecution 
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(Hoskyn v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1978] 2 WLR 695 (HL)). 
Although there has always been a public interest in ensuring that persons 
who commit crimes are convicted, this was considered to be subservient to 
the public interest in upholding the sanctity of marriage. Spouses were 
regarded as one and the same person with a unity of interest and affection; 
and the privilege against self-incrimination, the danger of perjury and the 
likelihood of public disquiet were thought to militate against a law which 
would allow or, even worse, compel a person to testify against his or her 
spouse. Section 80 reflects the greater importance now attached to 
convicting offenders, at least in respect of certain types of offence. The 
exception for the s. 80(3) offences, covering, inter alia, sexual and violent 
assaults in the home, can be justified on the basis of their seriousness and 
the unavailability of witnesses other than the spouse; but it is to be noted 
that the subsection has been framed in a way which would allow the 
spouse to be compelled in respect of relatively minor offences falling 
outside the context of domestic assaults, and some very serious offences 
are omitted. For example, a wife may be compelled to give evidence 
against her husband where it is alleged that he drove his car carelessly and 
injured a 15-year-old passer-by in the street; but it would not be possible 
to compel her to give evidence for the prosecution in respect of her 
husband's alleged murder of a 16-year-old boy. Perhaps a more sensible 
approach would be to abolish the general rule, which is now somewhat 
anachronistic, and allow the judge to determine in the exercise of a general 
discretion whether the accused's spouse should be compellable for a 
co-accused or the prosecution, taking into account the seriousness of the 
offence, the availability of other witnesses and evidence, and the 
genuineness, strength and duration of the marriage. Admittedly it might 
be difficult to ascertain the true status of the accused's marriage in some 
cases, but a discretionary approach would certainly be fairer from the 
point of view of a co-accused, who may only exceptionally compel the 
accused's spouse to testify on his behalf, regardless of how weak or, it 
seems, contrived their marriage might be. 
16.3.3 Children and Mentally Defective Adults 
In civil proceedings a child under the age of 18 is competent to give sworn 
evidence so long as he understands the nature of the oath in accordance 
with the test established in R v. Hayes [1977] 1 WLR 234 (CA). The test is 
whether the child has a sufficient appreciation of the solemnity of the 
occasion and the added responsibility to tell the truth, which is involved in 
taking the oath, over and above the duty to tell the truth which is an 
ordinary duty of normal social conduct. If the child does not understand 
the nature of the oath he may nonetheless be competent to give unsworn 
evidence, so long as he understands the duty to speak the truth and has 
sufficient understanding to justify his evidence being heard (s. 96(1)±(2) of 
the Children Act 1989). Adults who are mentally defective, to the extent 
that they do not understand the nature of the oath, are not competent to 
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give sworn evidence; but, unlike children, they may not give unsworn 
evidence. 
In criminal proceedings all persons, whatever their age, are competent 
to give evidence by virtue of s. 53(1) of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999, save that a person is not competent if he is unable to 
understand questions put to him as a witness or give intelligible answers 
(s. 53(3)). If the question of a witness's competence arises, it is for the 
party calling him to satisfy the court, on the balance of probabilities, that 
he is competent (s. 54(2)). The question whether or not a competent 
witness should give sworn evidence is governed by s. 55 of the Act which 
provides, inter alia, that a witness may not be sworn unless he has attained 
the age of 14 and `has a sufficient appreciation of the solemnity of the 
occasion and of the particular responsibility to tell the truth which is 
involved in taking an oath' (s. 55(2)). A witness is presumed to have a 
sufficient appreciation of those matters if he is able to give intelligible 
testimony, but if there is evidence to show the contrary it is for the party 
seeking to have the witness sworn to satisfy the court, on the balance of 
probabilities, that the conditions in s. 55(2) are satisfied (s. 55(3)±(4)). By 
virtue of s. 56 of the Act, any person (including the accused) who is 
competent to give evidence but unable to satisfy the conditions set out in 
s. 55(2) must give his evidence unsworn, either orally or in a written 
deposition; but, either way, it is an offence wilfully to give false unsworn 
evidence (s. 57). In DPP v. M [1998] 2 WLR 604 the Divisional Court 
accepted that the unsworn evidence of a four-year-old could be admissible 
if it was intelligible; and there is research to suggest that some children as 
young as three may be competent (see Jones, `The Evidence of a Three-
Year-Old Child' [1987] Crim LR 677). 
It is doubtful whether a question of competence arises in respect of the 
maker of a hearsay statement tendered under ss. 23 or 24 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988, but the judge will take into consideration the maker's 
poor mental condition, bearing in mind the test in s. 53(3) of the 1999 Act, 
when deciding (under s. 26 of the 1988 Act) whether the statement ought 
to be admitted in the interests of justice (R v. D [2002] 3 WLR 997 (CA)). 
16.3.4 Other Special Cases 
A judge is competent to give evidence on matters of which he has become 
aware as a result of, and relating to, the performance of his judicial 
functions, but he is not compellable to give such evidence (Warren v. 
Warren [1996] 3 WLR 1129 (CA)). The Sovereign, ambassadors, High 
Commissioners (and certain other diplomatic staff) are also competent but 
not compellable. 
16.4 The Examination-in-chief of Witnesses 
A witness is examined `in-chief' when he is questioned in court for the first 
time by the party who has called upon him to testify. The purpose of 
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examination-in-chief is to elicit from the witness everything he knows 
which is relevant to the matters in dispute and favourable to the case of the 
party examining him. The witness must be permitted to give his own 
account of the events in question, so he cannot be asked questions in a way 
which suggests particular answers or assumes the existence of facts which 
have yet to be established. This rule against `leading questions' is not 
absolute, however. Preliminary matters, such as the witness's name and 
address, as well as other undisputed facts, may be elicited in this way. 
Examination-in-chief raises a number of problems, particularly in 
criminal proceedings, and has given rise to a body of rules governing 
matters such as whether (and, if so, in what circumstances) a witness may 
refer to an earlier statement to refresh his memory, or rely on a previous 
consistent statement to bolster his credibility, or have his previous 
inconsistent statement elicited (by the party who called him) to contradict 
the adverse evidence in chief he has given. These and other issues are 
addressed in the following paragraphs. Such problems are less likely to 
arise in civil proceedings, where there is a presumption that a witness's 
written statement should stand as his evidence in chief; but even a witness 
in civil proceedings may be given leave to expand upon his statement if 
there is good reason not to confine his evidence to its contents 
(r. 32.5(2)±(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998). 
16.4.1 Memory-refreshing Notes 
Trials frequently take place some considerable time after the incident in 
question occurred, so it makes sense to allow witnesses to refer to written 
notes made by them soon after the incident when the facts were 
remembered more clearly. Similarly there is nothing objectionable about 
a witness watching a closed-circuit television recording of an incident (R v. 
Roberts (1998) 162 JP 691 (CA)) or listening to an audio recording of a 
conversation (R v. Bailey [2001] EWCA Crim 733) to refresh his memory 
as to what happened or was said on that earlier occasion. 
Written notes used to refresh the memory are not regarded as 
admissible evidence. They merely serve to refresh or elicit what is 
supposedly already in the minds of the witnesses so that they can give 
more reliable testimony. Indeed, because memory-refreshing notes are not 
evidence it is not permissible for a witness to read his notes verbatim in 
court for he would then be no more than a medium transforming 
inadmissible hearsay into admissible testimony. That said, if a witness has 
no present recollection of what happened, but has a documentary record 
of the incident ± `past recollection recorded' ± and is able to verify the 
accuracy of that record, he may nonetheless use it to `refresh his memory' 
(Maugham v. Hubbard (1828) 8 B & C 14 (KB), R v. Bryant (1946) 31 Cr 
App R 146 (CCA)). Thus a witness who has entirely forgotten what 
happened may still `refresh his memory' from a written note of the 
incident even though he is in effect channelling hearsay into court, albeit 
restated in different words. If, however, the witness admits that he has 
forgotten everything, and also admits that he cannot verify the accuracy of 
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the note or (where he can verify its accuracy) admits that it makes no 
difference to his understanding of what happened, he cannot rely on the 
note. 
Until relatively recently the courts drew a firm distinction between notes 
made shortly after the incident in question (contemporaneous notes) and 
notes made later on (non-contemporaneous notes). Only contempora-
neous notes could be used to refresh the witness's memory while he was in 
the witness box; non-contemporaneous notes could be read only before 
the witness was called into court to testify (R v. Richardson [1971] 2 WLR 
889 (CA)). This rather illogical distinction has now largely been 
abandoned. In R v. Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31 a prosecution witness 
started to give evidence about an incident a year earlier but could not 
remember what had happened. He was allowed by the trial judge to 
withdraw from the witness box and refer to a non-contemporaneous 
statement he had made about a month after the incident. The Court of 
Appeal held that the trial judge had a discretion to allow a witness to 
refresh his memory from a non-contemporaneous note, and he could refer 
to it while still in the witness box or outside the court-room so long as four 
criteria were satisfied: first, the witness could no longer remember the 
details of the events because of the lapse of time; second, he had made a 
statement much closer in time to the events which represented his 
recollection at that time; third, he had not read his statement before 
entering the witness box; and, fourth, he wished to read his statement 
before giving further evidence. It was also held, however, that a non-
contemporaneous note (unlike a contemporaneous note) could not be 
used by a witness to refresh his memory during the course of his giving 
testimony. However, in R v. South Ribble Magistrates ex parte Cochrane 
[1996] 2 Cr App R 544 the Divisional Court emphasised that any decision 
on allowing a witness to refresh his memory in court from a non-
contemporaneous note was a matter within the judge's `genuine strong 
discretion' which would rarely be interfered with on appeal. The Da Silva 
criteria were said to be no more than a guide for the judge and, 
accordingly, it was held that a stipendiary magistrate had exercised his 
discretion properly by allowing a witness to refresh his memory from a 
statement which he had already read before going into court. The wide 
ambit of the trial judge's discretion was recently reaffirmed in R v. Gordon 
[2002] EWCA Crim 1, where no fault could be found in a decision to allow 
a functionally-illiterate prosecution witness to be taken through his 
witness statement by counsel, in the absence of the jury, for the purpose of 
refreshing his memory as to the substance of a confession which had been 
made to him by the accused. According to the Court of Appeal, there are 
no `fixed and immutable rules which must be followed before a witness 
may refresh his memory by a document prepared by him when his memory 
was clearer'. 
There is much to be said for removing the distinction between 
contemporaneous and non-contemporaneous notes, for a witness cannot 
be prevented from surreptitiously using a non-contemporaneous note 
before the trial. If any such note has been relied on by a witness to refresh 
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his memory this should be made known so that it can be taken into 
consideration when the reliability of his testimony is assessed. The weight 
to be attached to a witness's testimony is a question of fact and degree 
contingent upon how well the witness is likely to have remembered the 
matter in question when he noted it down. This in turn depends on the 
nature of the matter recorded (for example, its complexity and 
uniqueness), how soon after the incident the note was made, and the 
personality and memory of the particular witness. If a witness testifies that 
the accused confessed his guilt to him, it would not matter that a note of 
the gist of what was confessed was made some days or even several weeks 
after the confession, for the uniqueness of the event and the generality of 
what was said will probably have remained in the witness's memory until 
the note was made. The situation would be quite different, however, if a 
witness were to testify in respect of something far more complex. He 
would need to have made a note very soon after the incident, for any delay 
would severely undermine the reliability of what was noted and therefore 
his evidence. These are all factors the judge should take into account when 
exercising his discretion. For example, a forgetful witness should not be 
allowed to refresh his memory from a note if it relates to a nondescript car 
registration number recorded some weeks after the incident. The reliability 
and probative value of his testimony would be too low. In less extreme 
cases, however, it might be appropriate to allow the witness to refresh his 
memory and then to give the jury an appropriate direction at the end of 
the trial on the factors they ought to take into consideration when 
assessing the weight of his evidence. For these reasons the second guiding 
criterion suggested in R v. Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31 (CA) should be 
reframed. The issue is not so much whether the witness's note `represented 
his recollection at the time' but whether the incident was at that time `still 
fresh in the witness's memory' (Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 of 
1979) (1979) 69 Cr App R 411 (CA) at p. 414). 
If a witness wishes to rely on a note to refresh his memory, that note 
must have been written by the witness himself or, if written by a third 
party, personally verified by the witness while the incident was still clear in 
his mind so as to become his own note by adoption. If this is not done the 
witness will be unable to rely on the note to refresh his memory; and the 
note itself will be inadmissible on account of the exclusionary hearsay rule. 
In R v. Eleftheriou [1993] Crim LR 947, for example, a number of customs 
officers dictated observations to their colleagues for compilation in a log 
but they neither read the entries nor had them read back to them. The 
Court of Appeal therefore held that the officers should not have been 
allowed to use the logs as memory-refreshing documents (see also Jones v. 
Metcalfe [1967] 1 WLR 1286 (DC) and R v. McLean (1967) 52 Cr App R 
80 (CA)). By contrast, in R v. Kelsey (1981) 74 Cr App R 213 a witness 
dictated the registration number of a car to a police officer who then read 
back what he had written down. The witness confirmed that the note was 
correct, although he did not actually read it. The Court of Appeal held 
that it had been permissible for the witness to refresh his memory from the 
note because he had aurally verified its content. Similarly, in Anderson v. 
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Whalley (1852) 3 C & K 54 (CCP) a ship's captain was able to refresh his 
memory from the mate's log as he (the captain) had visually verified the 
log within a week of the entry having been made, while the matters 
referred to were still fresh in his mind. 
It is not uncommon for a person who has made brief jottings or rough 
notes to write them up subsequently in a more coherent way. A neat copy 
of the original note may be used as a memory-refreshing document so long 
as it is substantially the same as the original (R v. Kwok Si Cheng (1976) 63 
Cr App R 20 (CA)); but where the copy represents an embellished version 
of the original, the additional material must have been added while the 
incident was still fresh in the witness's memory (Attorney-General's 
Reference (No. 3 of 1979) (1979) 69 Cr App R 411 (CA)). It seems, 
however, that the original itself, if it is still available, must be used as the 
memory-refreshing document in `past recollection recorded' cases. In R v. 
Harvey (1869) 11 Cox CC 546 (Assizes) the bank clerk who entered the 
numbers of bank notes in a ledger when cheques were cashed was called to 
show that the accused had cashed a forged cheque at his bank. The clerk 
sought to refresh his memory in court from a memorandum of the 
numbers, copied by him from the original ledger, but as he had not been 
able to remember the incident at the time the copy was made he could not 
rely on it. However, if the original is no longer available it is permissible 
for the witness to rely on an accurate copy (Topham v. M'Gregor (1844) 1 
C & K 320 (Assizes)). The decision in R v. Chisnell [1992] Crim LR 507 
would appear to be a recent application of this principle. The Court of 
Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to allow a police officer to refresh 
his memory from a statement accurately compiled from a (since lost) 
original contemporaneous note of an interview some nine months after it 
took place. 
The mere use of a memory-refreshing document does not make its 
content admissible evidence, but if the opposing party, having inspected 
the document as he is entitled to do, cross-examines the witness on parts 
which were not relied on by the witness to refresh his memory, then the 
party who called the witness is entitled to have the document admitted 
(Senat v. Senat [1965] 2 WLR 981 (PD)). In criminal proceedings a 
document admitted in this way is not admissible hearsay, but it may be 
relied on to bolster the credibility of the witness by showing his 
consistency (R v. Virgo (1978) 67 Cr App R 323 (CA), R v. Britton 
[1987] 1 WLR 539 (CA)). In civil proceedings, however, any such 
document is not only evidence of the witness's consistency but also 
evidence of the truth of the matters stated (ss. 1(1) and 6(4)±(5) of the Civil 
Evidence Act 1995). The same rules on disclosure and cross-examination 
apply whether the witness has refreshed his memory before being called to 
testify or while in the witness box (Owen v. Edwards (1983) 77 Cr App R 
191 (DC)). 
The Law Commission has suggested reforming the law on memory-
refreshing notes, recognising that valuable testimony is lost where there 
has been a failure to verify a note made by a third party or where the 
witness cannot remember the incident in spite of his notes (see Law Com 
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No. 245 (1997) at pp. 159±64). The suggestion is that if a witness does not 
(and cannot reasonably be expected to) remember a matter well enough to 
be able to give oral evidence of it, and he has previously made a statement 
of that matter when it was fresh in his memory, it should be admissible as 
evidence of the truth of the matters stated. 
16.4.2 The Rule Against Previous Consistent Statements 
A witness's earlier out-of-court statement, being consistent with his 
present testimony, may be inadmissible for two separate reasons. If it is 
tendered to prove the truth of the matters stated it will fall foul of the 
exclusionary hearsay rule (5.1 ante). If it is tendered simply to prove that 
the statement was made, suggesting that the witness has been consistent 
and that his testimony is therefore more likely to be true, it will fall foul of 
the `rule against previous consistent statements' (also known as the `rule 
against narrative'). The rule has evolved to exclude self-serving, super-
fluous evidence of little probative value which could easily have been 
manufactured by the witness to bolster his credibility. Thus, in R v. 
Roberts (1942) 28 Cr App R 102 (CCA) the accused, whose defence to 
murder was that his rifle had gone off accidentally, could not adduce 
evidence of an earlier statement he had made to his father to the effect that 
the death had been accidental; and in Jones v. South-Eastern and Chatham 
Railway Co [1918] 87 LJKB 775 (CA) the plaintiff's evidence that she had 
pricked her thumb on a nail at work could not be bolstered by evidence 
that she had made similar statements before the trial (see also Corke v. 
Corke [1958] P 93 (CA) and R v. Jarvis [1991] Crim LR 374 (CA)). 
However, the rule does not apply to prevent the accused from eliciting 
from a prosecution witness during cross-examination previous consistent 
statements made by that witness with a view to bolstering his credibility 
where his testimony has been favourable to the accused's defence (R v. 
Evans [2001] EWCA Crim 730). 
The rule against narrative is just one facet of a more general prohibition 
on credibility-bolstering evidence. Although in criminal proceedings the 
accused is entitled to have his good character considered by the jury when 
assessing his credibility and determining the likelihood that he committed 
the offence charged (3.4.2 ante), other witnesses are presumed to be of 
good character and, as a general rule, evidence which might bolster their 
credibility (such as the absence of previous convictions) is deemed to be 
irrelevant and inadmissible. 
However, evidence of a witness's general reputation for truthfulness 
may be adduced to rebut evidence of his general reputation for 
untruthfulness, and any witness may state his occupation notwithstanding 
the bearing this may have on the jury's view of his testimony (R v. 
Hamilton (1998) The Times 25.7.98 (97/6511/W2) (CA), R v. Beard [1998] 
Crim LR 585 (CA), R v. DS [1999] Crim LR 911 (CA)). Furthermore, 
although it has been said that `on general principles' the prosecution 
cannot in any criminal case lead evidence to support the credibility of their 
witnesses (R v. Keast [1998] Crim LR 748 (CA)), there is an exception if 
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the good character of a prosecution witness is deemed to be relevant to an 
issue. In  R v. Amado-Taylor (No. 2) [2001] EWCA Crim 1898, a case of 
alleged rape where the sole issue was consent and the accused was almost a 
stranger to the complainant, it was held that evidence of the complainant's 
virginity and her strong religious objection to pre-marital sexual 
intercourse had been properly admitted on the ground that in sexual 
offence cases where consent is in issue the complainant's disposition not to 
engage in sexual intercourse is relevant to the determination of that issue 
(an exception to the general exclusionary rule which might be inferred 
from s. 41(5)(a) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, 
17.4 post). This approach was followed in R v. Tobin [2003] Crim LR 408 
(CA), a case of alleged indecent assault involving forced oral sex where, 
again, the sole issue was consent. The Court of Appeal held that the trial 
judge had been correct to admit evidence that the complainant was, inter 
alia, very polite and respectful as her character was relevant to the issue of 
consent and the collateral question of her credibility. Reliance was placed 
on the decision in R v. Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 (CA) (16.5.2 post), 
where it was said that `where the disputed issue is a sexual one between 
two persons in private the difference between questions going to credit and 
questions going to the issue is reduced to vanishing point'. In R v. G(R) 
[2003] Crim LR 43 the Court of Appeal was willing to assume that, in a 
case where the accused is charged with murder and his defence is that he 
disarmed the deceased and stabbed him in self-defence, the deceased's 
friends would be able to give a negative answer to the prosecution's 
question `have you ever known [the deceased] to carry a knife?', so long as 
their answers would satisfy the test of sufficiency of probative value. 
Although previous consistent statements are generally inadmissible, the 
common law has come to recognise a number of exceptions where the 
circumstances are such that the possibility of fabrication is likely to be 
lower than usual, or it is otherwise expedient to admit the evidence. If an 
exception applies, the earlier statement is admissible evidence of the 
witness's consistency and therefore his credibility; but, unless the 
statement also falls within an exception to the rule against hearsay, it 
cannot be relied on as evidence of the truth of the matters stated. In civil 
proceedings the common-law exceptions have largely been replaced by an 
inclusionary discretion (s. 6(2)(a) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995); and, by 
virtue of ss. 1(1) and 6(5) of the 1995 Act, an admissible previous 
consistent statement is evidence of the witness's consistency and the truth 
of the matters stated. 
16.4.2.1 Previous Statements used to Refresh the Memory 
Memory-refreshing statements may become admissible evidence of 
consistency in criminal trials and of consistency and the truth of the 
matters stated in civil trials (see 16.4.1 ante). 
16.4.2.2 Previous Statements of Complainants in Sexual Offence Cases 
If the accused is on trial for a sexual offence, the complainant is permitted 
to bolster her testimony by referring to a voluntary complaint made by her 
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to a third party within a reasonable period after the alleged offence. The 
exception applies whether the complainant is male or female (R v. 
Camelleri [1922] 2 KB 122 (CCA)). The modern justification for this 
exception seems to be that, because many sexual offences occur in private, 
the credibility of the complainant is of more importance in proceedings of 
this sort than in other proceedings (see R v. Jarvis [1991] Crim LR 374 
(CA)); but it has also been said that such evidence should be admitted `as a 
matter of common sense' (R v. Churchill [1999] Crim LR 664 (CA)). If the 
exception is a concession to the complainant in sexual offence cases 
because of the unavailability of other evidence, logically it should be 
extended to cover any offence where there is little or no independent 
evidence. The exception has also been criticised on the ground that it 
perpetuates an assumption that genuine victims of sexual offences are 
likely to complain very soon after their attack, implying that complainants 
who have not acted in this way are more likely to be lying. In fact the 
exception has its historical roots in the doubt attached to the veracity of 
any woman alleging rape who had not immediately afterwards raised a 
`hue and cry' about it (R v. Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 (CCCR)). 
The modern rule was established in R v. Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 
(CCCR), where it was held that the person to whom the complaint was 
made could be called to give evidence of what was said, including the full 
particulars, so long as the complaint was made `as speedily after the acts 
complained of as could reasonably be expected'. To determine whether the 
complaint was made within a reasonable time, the trial judge will look at 
all the circumstances, including the character of the complainant and 
whether a suitable or trustworthy third party was available. As noted in 
R v. Valentine [1996] 2 Cr App R 213 (CA), where an overnight delay was 
regarded as reasonable, `some victims will find it impossible to complain 
to anyone other than a parent or member of their family whereas others 
may feel it quite impossible to tell their parents or members of their family' 
(see also R v. Cummings [1948] 1 All ER 551 (CCA) and R v. Adams [1997] 
1 Cr App R 369 (CA)). Decided cases can provide guidance on the sort of 
factors which might make a delay reasonable but, because each case turns 
on its own facts, it would be pointless to try to reconcile the various 
decisions. For example in R v. Hedges (1909) 3 Cr App R 262 (CCA) a 
week's delay was considered reasonable, whereas in R v. Rush (1896) 60 JP 
777 (CCC) a day's delay was regarded as unreasonable. 
It may be that the concept of reasonable time has been extended for 
cases where the allegation of sexual abuse relates to events which occurred 
many years before the trial, at a time when the complainant was a young 
child who might have misunderstood what was happening or been too 
frightened to speak out. In R v. NK [1999] Crim LR 980 (98/7601/Y3) the 
Court of Appeal would appear to have accepted that a written complaint, 
contained in an unsent letter from the (then) 17-year-old complainant to 
her boyfriend, had been properly admitted as a recent complaint 
regardless of the considerable period of time between the occurrence of 
the alleged offences (the mid-1980s) and the occasion when the letter was 
written (1997). The appeal was allowed, not because this complaint (or an 
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earlier, oral complaint) had actually been admitted, but because the judge 
had failed properly to direct the jury on its evidential value. The same 
reasoning would appear to underlie the (somewhat confused) decision of 
the Court of Appeal in R v. GBL (2000) unreported (00/1697/Z1), where 
the complainant's unsent letter to an `agony aunt', written when she was 
16, was admitted in respect of childhood abuse which allegedly took place 
until she was 14. Moreover, in R v. Milner [2000] All ER (D) 1163 (99/ 
7320/Z2) the Court of Appeal held that an unsent letter written in 1988 by 
the (then) 16-year-old complainant, describing the sexual abuse she had 
suffered at the hands of her father from 1983 until 1987, had been 
admissible as a recent complaint at her father's trial in 1999. None of these 
cases was referred to by counsel in R v. Birks [2003] 2 Cr App R 122, 
however, where the complaint was made up to a year after the final 
incident of alleged abuse, some 12 or 13 years before the trial. Relying on 
the cases which did not concern allegations of historical abuse, the Court 
of Appeal reluctantly held that the complaint had been wrongly admitted. 
In R v. Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 the 12-year-old complainant's friend 
and sister asked her why she had not waited for them at the accused's chip 
shop, to which she replied that the accused had indecently assaulted her. 
According to the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, a recent complaint is 
admissible only if it has been made voluntarily, but the mere fact it has 
been made in response to a question does not necessarily render it 
involuntary. If, as in the instant case, the questioning was not suggestive or 
leading in character ± such as `What is the matter?' or `Why are you 
crying?' ± the reply would still be voluntary and admissible. If, however, the 
questions were suggestive ± such as `Did [the accused] assault you?' or `Did 
[the accused] do this and that to you?' ± the complaint would be 
inadmissible. To determine whether a complaint was given voluntarily in 
accordance with this test, the judge will consider all the circumstances of 
the case, including the nature of any question put and the relationship 
between the questioner and the complainant. In R v. Norcott [1917] 1 KB 
347 (CCA) a complaint was regarded as sufficiently voluntary and 
spontaneous to be admissible even though the complainant had been 
pressed to speak out by a questioner who had said, `I won't let you go until 
you do tell me' (see also R v. Wilbourne (1917) 12 Cr App R 280 (CCA)). 
Recent complaints are admissible as an exception to the rule against 
narrative to show the complainant's consistency as a witness. If there is no 
testimonial evidence from the complainant her recent complaint will be 
inadmissible, as in R v. Wallwork (1958) 42 Cr App R 153 (CCA) where 
the complainant was too afraid to testify (see also R v. Wright (1987) 90 Cr 
App R 91 (CA)). A recent complaint is admissible, however, if the 
complainant's (admissible) hearsay evidence has been placed before the 
jury, even though she has not given live oral evidence from the witness box 
(R v. Archibald [2002] EWCA Crim 858, where the complainant's evidence 
was given in the form of a pre-recorded video tape pursuant to ss. 23 and 
26 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988). In R v. Islam [1999] 1 Cr App R 23 
the Court of Appeal held that a recent complaint is `not evidence of the 
facts complained of' and that the jury must be directed that its value is 
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limited to helping them decide whether the complainant is telling the truth, 
a point recently reaffirmed in R v. Croad [2001] EWCA Crim 644 and R v. 
Hussain [2002] EWCA Crim 2617. 
In R v. Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 the Court for Crown Cases Reserved 
recognised that a recent complaint was not evidence of the truth of the 
matters stated, but added that it was relevant to the issue of consent. It 
now seems to be clear, however, that a recent complaint is not admissible 
hearsay in relation to the issue of consent; rather, it supports the 
complainant's testimonial evidence that she did not consent when the 
alleged offence took place (R v. Archibald [2002] EWCA Crim 858; see 
also Papakosmas v. R (1999) 196 CLR 297 (HCA) at p. 305). 
If the complaint was communicated orally to a third party its terms 
must be proved by that person otherwise the complainant's own testimony 
that she made the complaint will be disregarded (White v. R [1998] 3 WLR 
992 (PC)). However, a written complaint does not need to have been 
communicated to any third party to be admissible, so long as it is `in form 
a complaint' and not `mere narrative' (R v. Milner [2000] All ER (D) 1163 
(CA)). It should also be noted that a recent complaint will not necessarily 
be excluded just because the complainant made an even earlier complaint 
to some other person (R v. Lee (1911) 7 Cr App R 31 (CCA), R v. 
Wilbourne (1917) 12 Cr App R 280 (CCA), R v. Valentine [1996] 2 Cr App 
R 213 (CA)). 
The trial judge is best placed to decide whether a recent complaint 
satisfies the test for admissibility, so the Court of Appeal will not lightly 
interfere with his ruling (R v. Valentine [1996] 2 Cr App R 213 (CA)). 
16.4.2.3 Previous Statements to Rebut an Allegation of Recent 
Fabrication 
If during cross-examination a witness's testimony is challenged as being a 
recent invention, it is permissible to adduce rebuttal evidence of an out-of-
court statement made by the witness which is consistent with his present 
testimony (Fox v. General Medical Council [1960] 1 WLR 1017 (PC), R v. 
Oyesiku (1971) 56 Cr App R 240 (CA)). In this context an allegation of 
`recent' fabrication means an allegation that the witness's account of what 
happened was fabricated after a particular incident or date (R v. Sekhon 
(1986) 85 Cr App R 19 (CA), R v. Okai [1987] Crim LR 259 (CA)). In 
other words, if an allegation of fabrication has been made, the previous 
statement is admissible to show that the witness's version of events before 
that incident or date is the same as the version given by him during the 
trial. Accordingly, a previous statement cannot be admitted under this 
exception just because it has been alleged that the witness's testimony is 
false or because the witness has been cross-examined on a previous 
inconsistent statement (R v. Beattie (1989) 89 Cr App R 302 (CA), R v. P 
[1998] Crim LR 663 (CA)). 
The trial judge must first of all decide whether there has been an 
allegation of recent fabrication and then determine, taking into 
consideration the time and relevant circumstances, whether the statement 
actually rebuts the allegation. This is a matter of judicial discretion and as 
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such the Court of Appeal will be reluctant to reach a different conclusion 
(R v. Oyesiku (1971) 56 Cr App R 240 (CA)). In Flanagan v. Fahy [1918] 2 
IR 361 (CAI)), for example, it was alleged in cross-examination that a 
witness had fabricated his evidence against the plaintiff because of their 
mutual hostility. It was therefore permissible to adduce evidence that the 
witness had told his employer the same story on an occasion prior to the 
cause of that hostility. In R v. Tyndale [1999] Crim LR 320 (CA) it was put 
to the complainant's mother in cross-examination that she had incited the 
complainant to make her allegation of sexual abuse against the accused 
because she (the mother) had discovered he was having an affair and was 
out for revenge. The prosecution were therefore allowed to adduce the 
complainant's previous consistent statement, made prior to the mother's 
discovery of the affair, to rebut that allegation. By way of contrast, in R v. 
Williams [1998] Crim LR 494 (CA) the prosecution case was that the 
accused's version of events had been fabricated from the outset, so it was 
not possible for the accused to rely on a consistent statement made at an 
early stage in the proceedings because it in no way rebutted the allegation 
of fabrication (see also R v. Y [1995] Crim LR 155 (CA)). 
If the accused relies on a defence which he did not mention when 
questioned by the police, the jury may be invited to infer that it has since 
been fabricated (see 9.2.2 ante). To prevent this inference being drawn, the 
accused may call a third party to give evidence that he communicated his 
defence to him at or about the time of the interview. If the accused calls his 
solicitor to give such evidence he does not thereby waive the legal 
professional privilege which protects their communications (R v. Condron 
[1997] 1 WLR 827 (CA), R v. Bowden [1999] 1 WLR 823 (CA)). 
In criminal proceedings a previous consistent statement adduced to 
rebut an allegation of recent fabrication is evidence of the witness's 
consistency; it is not evidence of the truth of the matters stated (R v. 
Benjamin (1913) 8 Cr App R 146 (CCA), R v. M (1999) unreported 
(97/4138/X3) (CA)). In civil proceedings, however, a statement of this 
sort, admissible under s. 6(2)(b) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995, is also 
admissible hearsay (see ss. 1(1) and 6(5)). 
Finally, in R v. L [2001] EWCA Crim 1425 it was held that in cases of 
historical sexual abuse where it is alleged that the complainant was 
sexually abused as a child, many years before the police were approached, 
the complainant may give evidence in chief that she raised the abuse with a 
third party during the intervening period as part of the history of the case, 
`to explain the delay wholly or in part without waiting to see whether the 
allegation of recent fabrication is put in terms'. If the evidence is admitted 
on this limited basis it is not permissible for the complainant to explain 
what she said; and the fact of the complaint is not evidence of the 
complainant's consistency as a witness. 
16.4.2.4 Exculpatory Statements made in Response to a Criminal 
Allegation 
The accused's wholly or partly inculpatory out-of-court statement is 
admissible against him under the `confessions' exception to the hearsay 
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rule (7.1.1 ante). A purely exculpatory (self-serving) statement made in 
reply to an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence may also 
be admissible at his trial for that offence, not under an exception to the 
hearsay rule but as evidence of his attitude at an early stage in the 
investigation. In R v. Storey (1968) 52 Cr App R 334 (CA) it was felt that 
an exculpatory statement made `when first taxed with incriminating facts', 
though inadmissible to prove the truth of the matters stated, was 
admissible to show the accused's reaction at that time. The exception was 
extended in R v. Pearce (1979) 69 Cr App R 365 (CA) to cover exculpatory 
statements made on subsequent encounters with the police, save that a 
statement made when `first taxed' would be likely to carry more weight. 
This does not mean that an exculpatory statement made at any stage in the 
pre-trial proceedings will be admissible, however, for if its weight is 
negligible it may be excluded on the ground of irrelevance. Indeed a 
written statement carefully prepared in advance and presented to the 
police with a view to its being adduced as part of the prosecution case is 
not to be admitted under this exception (R v. Pearce (1979) 69 Cr App R 
365 (CA), R v. Newsome (1980) 71 Cr App R 325 (CA), R v. Hutton (1988) 
The Times 27.10.88 (CA)). If the statement is not inadmissible for that 
reason, the judge has a discretion as to whether it should be admitted. In 
other words, the judge will allow the statement to be admitted if it is 
sufficiently probative of the accused's consistency, considering the degree 
of spontaneity involved, and not superfluous (R v. Tooke (1989) 90 Cr 
App R 417 (CA)). 
It would appear that the question of admissibility is not dependent on 
the accused actually giving oral evidence (R v. McCarthy (1980) 71 Cr App 
R 142 (CA); cf. R v. Barbery (1975) 62 Cr App R 248 (CA)). If the accused 
does not testify in his own defence the question of his consistency as a 
witness does not arise, so the value of the statement in such cases (if 
admitted) must be to show the consistency of his denial of guilt and, where 
his affirmative defence (if any) is the same as that mentioned by him to the 
police, the consistency of the basis for that denial. 
16.4.2.5 Previous Statements of Identification 
There is a well-established exception to the rule against narrative which 
allows a criminal court to hear that a witness identified the accused on an 
occasion before the trial, for example at an identification parade. Evidence 
of the out-of-court statement of identification may be given by the 
identifying witness himself or by a third party who witnessed the 
identification. In R v. Christie [1914] AC 545 (HL) the accused, who 
was alleged to have indecently assaulted a boy, was identified by the boy 
during the trial. It was held that the boy's mother and a police officer had 
been entitled to give evidence that the boy had gone up to the accused 
soon after the alleged incident and said, `That is the man'. The evidence 
was admissible to show the boy's consistency: `to exclude the idea that the 
identification of the prisoner in the dock was an afterthought or mistake'. 
If the evidence of a previous identification goes only to the question of 
consistency and there has been no identification by the witness during the 
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trial, then, logically, the previous identification should be inadmissible. To 
admit an earlier identification in the absence of any identification in court 
would amount to a new exception to the rule against hearsay, for the 
relevance of the out-of-court statement would lie solely in its being 
accepted as evidence of the truth of the matters stated. The decision in R v. 
Osbourne [1973] 2 WLR 209 suggests that the present exception to the rule 
against narrative has indeed been widened to become an exception to the 
rule against hearsay too. In that case two witnesses, Mrs B and Mrs H, 
were called at the trial to identify the accused, and they were each asked 
whether they could pick out from those in the dock the men they had 
identified at an identification parade some eight months earlier. Mrs B 
replied that she could not remember having picked out anyone at the 
parade; Mrs H was very nervous in the witness box and said the man she 
had picked out was not in the dock. As a result, the officer in charge of the 
parade was called and gave evidence of the witnesses' earlier identifica-
tions. The Court of Appeal held that there was `no reason at all in 
principle why evidence of that kind should not be admitted'. The hearsay 
problem was expressly addressed, however, in the similar case of R v. 
McCay [1990] 1 WLR 645 (CA). The witness in that case could not 
remember whom he had identified at the identification parade three 
months earlier, so a police officer was called to give evidence that the 
witness had identified the accused by saying, `It is number eight'. The 
admissibility of this evidence was justified on the ground that it fell within 
the res gestae exception to the rule against hearsay as a statement 
explaining a contemporaneous act (see 6.1.1.4 ante). 
It has also been held that evidence such as a photofit or sketch prepared 
by a police officer or artist from an eye-witness's description does not 
amount to a statement. This sort of evidence is admissible as real evidence 
(like photographs). It is not covered by the hearsay rule or the rule against 
narrative (R v. Cook [1987] 2 WLR 775 (CA), R v. Constantinou (1989) 91 
Cr App R 74 (CA)). In reality, of course, a photofit or sketch is nothing 
more than a compilation of descriptive statements made by the identifying 
witness and, as such, ought logically to be covered by both rules unless an 
exception applies. 
16.4.2.6 Previous Statements Forming Part of the Res Gestae 
A number of common-law exceptions to the hearsay rule allow out-of-
court statements to be admitted if they formed part of the res gestae (see 
6.1 ante). It is not strictly necessary for the declarant to be unavailable for 
any such exception to apply, so a previous consistent statement forming 
part of the res gestae, if tendered to prove the truth of the matters stated, 
will also stand as evidence of the declarant's consistency if he does give 
evidence (R v. Shickle (1997) unreported (97/1947/W4) (CA)). 
16.4.2.7 A Closed List of Exceptions 
It has been seen that the test in criminal proceedings for admitting the 
accused's exculpatory statement (16.4.2.4 ante) is in effect the same as the 
general test governing the determination of `relevance'. There would seem 
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to be no good reason why the admissibility of any previous consistent 
statement should not be governed by the same test, dependent on the 
probative value of the evidence in question and the strength of competing 
policy considerations (such as the desirability of excluding superfluous 
evidence) rather than on whether a recognised exception applies. 
However, as the law stands if a previous consistent statement cannot be 
brought within one of the established exceptions it must be excluded. An 
example is provided by Fennell v. Jerome Property (1986) The Times 
26.11.86 (QBD), where it was held that out-of-court statements obtained 
by way of truth drugs, lie detectors or hypnosis were inadmissible (see also 
R v. BeÂland [1987] 2 SCR 398 (SCC) and R v. McKay [1967] NZLR 139 
(NZCA)). 
16.4.2.8 Reforming the Law on Previous Consistent Statements 
The Law Commission has suggested reforms which would allow previous 
consistent statements to be admissible hearsay in circumstances where 
such statements are likely to be of better quality than the testimony 
available at trial (Law Com No. 245 (1997) at pp. 144±58). The present 
law is criticised for its illogicality, arbitrary scope and capacity to 
prejudice the accused; and for the fact that lay tribunals of fact are 
unlikely to be able to differentiate between the evidential value of out-of-
court statements going only to credit and out-of-court statements which 
are admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. The Commission 
has therefore recommended that a witness's previous statement should be 
admissible evidence of both his consistency and the truth of the matters 
stated in three situations: (i) where the witness is alleged to have recently 
fabricated his testimony, (ii) where the witness has made a prior 
identification and (iii) where the witness has made a recent complaint 
(in any type of case). 
16.4.3 Unfavourable and Hostile Witnesses 
In R v. Honeyghon [1999] Crim LR 221 (97/4136/X4) (CA), Beldam LJ 
said: 
`The investigation of serious offences is increasingly rendered difficult 
or even impossible by the reluctance of witnesses to come forward to 
assist the police. In some instances witnesses who have given 
information resile from their statements, declining to testify or suffering 
inexplicable amnesia. Other witnesses change their testimony, refuting 
earlier statements and even inconsistently support the defence.' 
If a party calls a witness, and that witness turns out to be unfavourable 
in that he does not say what was expected of him for some innocent 
reason, such as forgetfulness, it is not permissible for that party to 
question him on a previous statement, whether to elicit a more favourable 
response or to discredit him (The Filiatra Legacy [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 337 
(CA) at p. 361). (Nor is it permissible to discredit any such witness by 
adducing evidence of his bad character: s. 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
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1865.) The solution to the problem is to allow the unfavourable witness to 
refresh his memory from an earlier statement made or verified by him 
(16.4.1 ante). 
If a witness takes the oath and then either refuses to say anything or 
adopts an adverse attitude with no intention of speaking the truth, the 
judge may rule the witness to be hostile. The witness's motive for not 
wishing to speak the truth is irrelevant; he may be regarded as hostile even 
if he favours the party calling him but, for example, fears the consequences 
of testifying against the other party. In R v. Prefas (1986) 86 Cr App R 111 
the Court of Appeal accepted that a witness could be regarded as hostile 
simply on the ground that he was `not desirous of telling the truth . . . at 
the instance of the party calling him'. A non-compellable individual (such 
as a spouse) may be treated as a hostile witness, like any other witness, 
once he has been sworn (R v. Pitt [1982] 3 WLR 359 (CA)). 
At common law a witness who is `decidedly adverse' to the party calling 
him may, with the leave of the judge, be cross-examined by that party as a 
hostile witness. This was confirmed in R v. Thompson (1976) 64 Cr App R 
96, a case in which the accused was charged with incest and a prosecution 
witness, his 16-year-old daughter, pointedly refused to give any evidence 
once sworn. The Court of Appeal held that the judge had properly allowed 
the prosecution to cross-examine her on the written statement she had 
made to the police before the trial. In addition to this common-law rule, 
s. 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (which applies to both civil and 
criminal proceedings) provides that once the judge has ruled a witness to 
be `adverse' (that is, hostile) the party calling him may contradict him by 
other evidence or, with the judge's leave, prove that the witness has 
previously made a `statement inconsistent with his present testimony' so 
long as the witness is first told the circumstances of the statement and 
asked whether or not he made it. (In R v. Thompson the witness gave no 
oral evidence ± her written statement was not `inconsistent' with any 
`present testimony' ± so the common law was applied.) In R v. Prefas 
(1986) 86 Cr App R 111, a case of arson, a prosecution witness, K, was 
treated as hostile as he had deliberately refrained from telling the truth by 
testifying that he did not recognise the accused as the person to whom he 
had given certain containers found at the scene of the fire. The prosecution 
were permitted to cross-examine K and then to call two police witnesses to 
give evidence that he had told them prior to the trial that he had identified 
the accused at an identification parade but had refrained from saying so at 
the time because he was frightened for his family's safety. The Court of 
Appeal held that the trial judge had been correct to treat K as hostile and 
to allow the police witnesses to give evidence of K's oral statement to 
them. Curiously, the Court did not refer to s. 3 of the 1865 Act but based 
its judgment on the common law as set out by Stephen in Article 147 of his 
Digest of the Law of Evidence, even though this was a case where the 
hostile witness had testified in a way which was inconsistent with an earlier 
statement. 
The common law prior to what is now s. 3 of the 1865 Act also allowed 
an unfavourable witness to be contradicted by the adduction of additional 
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evidence (Ewer v. Ambrose (1825) 3 B & C 746 (KB)). Section 3 could be 
said to suggest that only a hostile witness can now be contradicted by 
other evidence, but the provision has not been so interpreted and the 
common-law position survives (Greenough v. Eccles (1859) 5 CB(NS) 786 
(CCP), The Filiatra Legacy [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 337 (CA)). 
There is still some confusion over the extent to which a hostile witness 
may be cross-examined by the party calling him. It may be that the 
prohibition in s. 3 on impeaching the credit of a party's own witness by 
`general evidence of bad character' applies even if the witness is ruled to be 
hostile, preventing cross-examination as to credit as well as the adduction 
of bad-character evidence. Yet Stephen's view of the common law, which 
was relied on by the Court of Appeal in R v. Prefas (1986) 86 Cr App R 
111, would permit `cross-examination [of a hostile witness] to the extent to 
which the judge considers necessary for the purpose of doing justice' 
including cross-examination as to `factors affecting his accuracy, veracity 
or credibility'. If this is correct it would seem a hostile witness may be 
cross-examined at common law to the same extent as an opposing party's 
witness, which suggests that the same must be true for s. 3 of the 1865 Act. 
The problem is that Stephen's Digest was not referred to by the Court of 
Appeal in the common-law case of R v. Thompson (1976) 64 Cr App R 96, 
where it was assumed that a hostile witness could be cross-examined only 
to the extent that he could be asked leading questions. It is difficult to 
appreciate why a hostile witness ± particularly a hostile witness who 
provides overt support for the opposing party's case ± should not be cross-
examined as to credit. It would therefore make sense if Article 147 of 
Stephen's Digest were to be recognised as representing both the common 
law and the correct interpretation of s. 3. The judge would then have a 
discretion to allow cross-examination as to credit where `necessary for the 
purpose of doing justice' in the case before him. The most recent 
pronouncement on the position at common law was in R v. Honeyghon 
[1999] Crim LR 221 (97/4136/X4) (CA), where it was said that the party 
may `ask leading questions of the witness and if necessary cross-
examine him'. 
The question of hostility is determined by the trial judge on the basis of 
the answers (if any) given by the witness during the trial, his demeanour in 
court and any out-of-court statements made by him which have been 
placed before the judge (R v. Fraser (1956) 40 Cr App R 160 (CCA), R v. 
Darby [1989] Crim LR 817 (CA)). However, in cases where it is not 
immediately evident that the witness is displaying hostility, the judge 
should first consider the `intermediate step' of inviting the witness to 
refresh his memory from his previous statement (R v. Maw [1994] Crim 
LR 841 (CA)). Because the judge is best placed to reach a decision on 
hostility, any such ruling is treated as an exercise of judicial discretion and, 
as such, an appeal based on a determination of hostility is unlikely to 
prove successful (R v. Manning [1968] Crim LR 675 (CA)). In R v. Dat 
[1998] Crim LR 488 a prosecution witness had made two inconsistent 
written statements and, when examined in-chief, she gave evidence in 
accordance with her second (unfavourable) statement. The trial judge 
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allowed the prosecution to treat her as hostile and she was cross-examined 
on her first (favourable) statement. The Court of Appeal held that the 
judge had been entitled to exercise his discretion in that way. 
The evidential value of a hostile witness's testimony and any previous 
statement proved under s. 3 of the 1865 Act (or the common law) depends 
on the nature of the proceedings. If a hostile witness in a criminal trial 
refuses to accept the truth of an earlier statement, that statement does not 
become evidence of the truth of the matters stated. Its value is limited to 
showing the witness's lack of credibility and the jury must be told this 
(R v. Golder [1960] 1 WLR 1169 (CCA), R v. Oliva [1965] 1 WLR 1028 
(CCA)). (The jury should not be allowed to retire with such a written 
statement lest they misconstrue its evidential value (R v. Darby [1989] 
Crim LR 817 (CA)).) In practical terms, the effect of a previous 
inconsistent statement will be to nullify the hostile witness's adverse 
testimony, but that is not to say that his testimony should be totally 
disregarded. Although in R v. Golder [1960] 1 WLR 1169 it was felt that 
the jury ought to be directed that a hostile witness's evidence should be 
regarded as unreliable, a more flexible approach has now been adopted. In 
R v. Pestano [1981] Crim LR 397 the Court of Appeal felt that it was for 
the jury to decide which parts of a hostile witness's testimony were true or 
untrue, guided by a warning from the judge on the weight, if any, to be 
attached to it (see also R v. Goodway (1993) 98 Cr App R 11 (CA) and R v. 
Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Alves [1992] 3 WLR 844 (HL) at 
pp. 849±50). 
If in criminal proceedings a hostile witness accepts that some or all of 
his out-of-court statement (rather than his present testimony) represents 
the truth, and the judge concludes that he is sufficiently creditworthy for 
his evidence to be considered by the jury, his subsequent testimony may be 
relied on by them, guided by a suitable warning relating to the witness's 
purported reasons for being inconsistent and how that inconsistency might 
affect his credibility and the weight of his evidence (R v. Maw [1994] Crim 
LR 841 (CA)). Similarly, where a witness has been treated as hostile on 
account of his refusal to answer questions in the witness box, and has 
accepted his out-of-court statement as a result of that ruling, the jury 
should be told to bear that fact in mind when assessing the weight of his 
evidence (R v. Ugorji [1999] All ER (D) 603 (CA)). Where the judge 
decides to adjourn the trial so that a potentially hostile witness can refresh 
his memory from his out-of-court statement, and the witness subsequently 
testifies in accordance with that statement, the jury should be given a 
summing-up on the sequence of events and a direction `akin to a hostile 
witness direction' (R v. Corcoran [2003] EWCA Crim 43). 
In civil proceedings an out-of-court statement proved against a hostile 
witness will similarly form part of the witness's subsequent testimony if its 
truth is accepted by him. But even if the truth of the statement is not 
accepted, it will still stand as evidence of the truth of the matters stated 
(that is, as admissible hearsay) by virtue of ss. 1(1) and 6(5) of the Civil 
Evidence Act 1995. 
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If a person has provided a written statement to the police but is 
subsequently unwilling to attend court, the prosecution may compel the 
attendance of that person in the hope that he will give evidence once 
sworn, and apply to have him treated as a hostile witness if he refuses to 
provide assistance. This is an acceptable practice so long as the 
prosecution have an open mind as to how the witness's evidence will 
come out at trial (see R v. Mann (1972) 56 Cr App R 750 (CA)). 
16.4.4 Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses 
The traditional criminal trial, occurring many months after the alleged 
offence, with its intimidating formality and the stresses associated with the 
requirement that witnesses give their oral evidence and (in particular) face 
cross-examination in open court, may adversely affect the quality of some 
witnesses' testimony. Until recently the criminal courts could overcome 
this problem to some extent by utilising their inherent jurisdiction to 
control the proceedings or the limited statutory powers available in respect 
of child witnesses, but Chapter I of Part II of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 has now introduced a range of measures 
designed to improve the quality of evidence given by any vulnerable or 
intimidated witness (other than the accused) in criminal proceedings. The 
relevant provisions are extremely convoluted but, in short, ss. 23 to 30 
describe the `special measures' which certain witness may be able to benefit 
from, ss. 16 to 18 explain who those witnesses are, and ss. 19 to 22 set out 
the rules on `special measures directions'. Most of these provisions are 
now in force (the exceptions being ss. 28 and 29) save that, by virtue of 
s. 18(2)(a), a special measure cannot be taken to be available until the 
court has been notified by the Home Office that relevant arrangements 
may be made available in its area. 
Sections 16(1)±(2) and 18(1)(a) provide that a witness (other than the 
accused) is eligible for a special measures direction under ss. 23 to 30 if he 
is under the age of 17 (a `child witness', by virtue of s. 21(1)(a)); or the 
quality of his evidence is likely to be diminished by reason of mental 
disorder (or a significant impairment of intelligence and social function-
ing) or a physical disability or disorder. In this context, the quality of a 
witness's evidence means its quality in terms of `completeness, coherence 
and accuracy' (s. 16(5)). Sections 17(1)±(2) and 18(1)(b) provide that a 
witness (other than the accused) is eligible for a special measures direction 
under ss. 23 to 28 if the quality of his evidence is likely to be diminished 
`by reason of fear or distress . . . in connection with testifying', considering, 
in particular, the nature and alleged circumstances of the offence; the 
witness's age; his (relevant) background, ethnicity, domestic and employ-
ment circumstances, religious beliefs and political opinions (if any); and 
any behaviour towards the witness on the part of the accused, the 
accused's family or associates or any other person who is likely to be on 
trial or a witness in the proceedings. The complainant who intends to give 
evidence in respect of an alleged sexual offence (defined in s. 62) is 
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automatically eligible for a special measures direction under ss. 23 to 28 
(s. 17(4)). 
By virtue of s. 19(2)±(3), once the eligibility of a witness has been 
established under ss. 16 or 17, the court must determine whether any (or 
any combination) of the applicable special measures would be likely to 
improve the quality of his evidence and, if so, which of those measures, or 
combination of measures, would be likely to maximise the quality, having 
taken into consideration all the circumstances of the case including, in 
particular, the witness's views and whether the measure(s) might tend to 
inhibit his evidence being effectively tested. The court will then give a 
`special measures direction' providing for the measure(s) so determined to 
apply to the evidence given by him. Subject to s. 21(8)±(9), a special 
measures direction will remain in force until the end of the proceedings, 
unless the interests of justice demand that it be discharged or varied 
(s. 20(1)±(2)). 
The possible special measures which may be made in respect of a 
witness's evidence are: screening the witness from the accused (s. 23); 
allowing the witness to give evidence by means of a live television link or 
similar arrangement (s. 24); providing for the exclusion of specified 
persons (other than the accused, legal representatives or any person 
appointed to assist the witness) in cases where the proceedings relate to a 
sexual offence (defined in s. 62) or there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that a person other than the accused has sought, or will seek, to 
intimidate the witness (s. 25); providing for the wearing of wigs and gowns 
to be dispensed with (s. 26); providing for a video recording of an 
interview with the witness to be admitted as the witness's evidence in chief, 
unless the interests of justice demand that it should not be admitted 
(s. 27); and providing the witness with a device to enable questions or 
answers to be communicated to or by him (s. 30). Section 28 will enable 
the court to provide for the witness's cross-examination and re-examination 
to be recorded by means of a video recording and admitted (if a s. 27 
direction provides for the admission of a recording as his evidence in 
chief). Section 29 will enable the court to provide for any examination of 
the witness to be conducted through an interpreter or other approved 
intermediary who will `explain' the questions or answers. For a recording 
to be admitted under s. 27 the witness must be called to attend for 
cross-examination by the party tendering the recording unless a special 
measures direction provides for his evidence on cross-examination to be 
given `otherwise than by testimony in court', or the parties have agreed 
that he need not be available (s. 27(5)(a)). If the witness is unavailable, and 
s. 27 cannot be relied on, the party tendering the recording may have to 
fall back on the hearsay exceptions in ss. 23 or 24 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988. 
Section 21(2) provides that, in making a determination for the purposes 
of s. 19(2) in respect of a `child witness', the court must first have regard to 
s. 21(3)±(7). Section 21(3) sets out the `primary rule' that a special 
measures direction must be given which provides, first, for the admission 
under s. 27 of a video recording of an interview with the child, which was 
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made with a view to its being admitted as his evidence in chief (a `relevant 
recording'); and, second, for the child's live evidence in the proceedings to 
be given by means of a live link in accordance with s. 24. However, the 
primary rule is subject to s. 21(4)±(5), which provides, inter alia, that it 
does not apply if compliance with it would not be likely to maximise the 
quality of the child's evidence, unless the offence (or any of the offences) 
to which the proceedings relate is one falling within s. 35(3)(a)±(d), in 
which case the child is `in need of special protection' (s. 21(1)(b)). Where a 
child is in need of special protection because the accused is charged with a 
(sexual) offence in s. 35(3)(a), any special measures direction must provide 
for the special measures available under s. 28 (when it is in force) to apply 
in relation to his cross-examination and re-examination (s. 21(6)), unless 
the child informs the court that he does not want that measure to apply 
(s. 21(7)(b)). Section 22 provides that, in relation to a witness (a `qualifying 
witness') who was under the age of 17 when a relevant recording was 
made, but is no longer an eligible witness at the time it falls for the court to 
make a determination on special measures, then: s. 21(2)±(4) applies in 
relation to the admission of the relevant recording; s. 21(5) applies if the 
qualifying witness is in need of special protection; and s. 21(6)±(7) applies 
if the need for special protection arises because the offence falls within 
s. 35(3)(a). 
Where a child witness is eligible by reason only of his age, any special 
measure direction ceases once he reaches the age of 17 unless he has 
already begun to give evidence in the proceedings (s. 21(8)), save that a 
direction which provides for a video recording to be admitted under s. 27, 
or for a s. 28 measure to apply, shall continue to have effect (in respect of 
those measures) when the witness attains the age of 17 if he was still under 
that age when the video recording was made (s. 21(9)). 
Section 31 provides that a statement made by a witness which (in 
accordance with a special measures direction) is not made in direct oral 
testimony in court is to be treated as testimony. Section 32 requires the 
trial judge to give the jury such warning (if any) as he considers necessary 
to ensure that the accused is not prejudiced by that fact that a witness's 
evidence has been given in accordance with a special measures direction. 
Although witnesses excluded by the eligibility provisions cannot benefit 
from a statutory special measures direction, a direction may still be made 
by the court `in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction or otherwise' 
(s. 19(6)). Thus, a non-eligible prosecution witness may be given leave to 
testify from behind a screen, so long as the jury are warned not to draw an 
inference adverse to the accused (R v. X (1989) 91 Cr App R 36 (CA), R v. 
Cooper [1994] Crim LR 531 (CA), R v. Foster [1995] Crim LR 333 (CA)); 
or the witness may be allowed the assistance of an interpreter (R v. 
O'Brien (1845) 1 Cox CC 185 (Assizes), R v. Duffy [1998] 3 WLR 1060 
(CA)); or, exceptionally, the judge may exclude certain individuals from 
court while a witness is giving evidence if the administration of justice 
would otherwise be frustrated or rendered impracticable (Attorney-
General v. Leveller Magazine [1979] 2 WLR 247 (HL) at p. 252, R v. 
Richards (1998) 163 JP 246 (CA); see also s. 37(1) of the Children and 
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Young Persons Act 1933 and Practice Direction (Criminal Proceedings: 
Consolidation) [2002] 1 WLR 2870 (SC) at pp. 2895±6). The judge can also 
require advocates to rephrase their questions, particularly those put in 
cross-examination, to ensure that they are fully understood by the witness 
(R v. Mitchell [2003] EWCA Crim 907). 
The accused's exclusion from the statutory scheme is difficult to justify 
or understand, given the presumption of innocence. The court's inherent 
power to control the conduct of proceedings is not wide enough 
completely to redress the imbalance created by the accused's exclusion, 
so the compatibility of this part of the Act with Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights will almost certainly be challenged. In this 
context it is to be noted that Article 6(3)(d) of the Convention provides 
that the accused has the right `to examine or have examined witnesses 
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on 
his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him'; and that the 
European Court of Human Rights has held it to be `essential that a child 
charged with an offence is dealt with in a manner which takes full account 
of his age, level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities, and 
that steps are taken to promote his ability to understand and participate in 
the proceedings' (V v. United Kingdom (1999) 30 EHRR 121 at p. 179). 
Notwithstanding the accused's exclusion, the courts can be expected to 
do everything within their present powers to accommodate his special 
needs, insofar as those needs affect his understanding of the proceedings 
or his ability to give evidence. In R v. H [2003] EWCA Crim 1208, for 
instance, guidelines were laid down for cases where the accused has 
learning difficulties: the accused may be permitted the services of `the 
equivalent of an interpreter' while giving evidence; a detailed defence 
statement may be read to the jury if there is concern about the accused's 
ability to recall everything that he wants to say; and the accused may be 
permitted to recall matters by way of reference to a past coherent account 
of events he has given, in response to leading questions from his advocate 
if necessary. 
The use of special measures for prosecution witnesses will not 
necessarily prevent the accused from having a fair trial, for the purposes 
of Article 6(1) and (3)(d) of the European Convention. It has been held 
that `principles of fair trial also require that in appropriate cases the 
interests of the defence are balanced against those of witnesses or victims 
called upon to testify' and that criminal proceedings should be organised 
so that the interests of (prosecution) witnesses `are not unjustifiably 
imperilled' (Doorson v. Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330 (ECtHR) at 
p. 358). Thus, so long as the special measures for vulnerable witnesses do 
not go beyond what is necessary to accomplish the objective of eliciting the 
best evidence from them, and the accused is afforded an opportunity 
effectively to challenge their evidence, the accused's Article 6(1) right to a 
fair trial will not be infringed. 
The 1999 Act preserves the accused's right to have the relevant 
witnesses' evidence challenged by cross-examination, and requires that the 
jury be warned, where necessary, against drawing an inference against the 
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accused if a special measure has been used, so it is difficult to see how an 
effective challenge on the fairness of the trial can be made if the sole 
argument is that there has been an infringement of Article 6(3)(d). Indeed, 
the validity of the policy considerations underlying the use of pre-recorded 
evidence in chief and live television links for child witnesses (under earlier 
legislation) was recognised in R (DPP) v. Redbridge Youth Court [2001] 2 
Cr App R 458 where, relying on Doorson v. Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 
330, the Divisional Court held that protection of this sort for a vulnerable 
child witness `cannot result in unfairness to a defendant provided always 
that [he] is given a fair opportunity both to test that evidence and to 
answer it'. More important, in R (on the application of D) v. Camberwell 
Green Youth Court (2003) 167 JP 210 the Divisional Court held that 
s. 21(5) of the 1999 Act, which provides that the s. 21(3) `primary rule' 
requiring special measures directions under ss. 24 and 27 for child 
witnesses applies in any case where the child is in need of special 
protection, was compatible with the accused's Article 6(1) right to a fair 
trial because of the safeguards in ss. 20(2) and 24(3) and the court's 
uninhibited common-law power to prevent unfairness (and, the Court 
might have added, s. 27(2)). With regard to Article 6(3)(d), Rose LJ said (at 
p. 222): `Neither live link, nor a video recording of evidence in chief, in my 
view infringes that right, provided, as here, the defendant's lawyers can see 
as well as hear the witness and can cross-examine.' 
The most radical provision in the package of reforms (indeed, the only 
real innovation) is the removal of the accused's entitlement to have a 
vulnerable witness cross-examined live during the course of the trial. 
When s. 28 comes into force the cross-examination in some cases will take 
place in advance of the trial, and be admitted in the form of a pre-recorded 
video tape for the jury to watch along with the witness's pre-recorded 
evidence in chief (s. 27). The Strasbourg jurisprudence does not require 
that the accused should be able to challenge the evidence of prosecution 
witnesses during the trial itself, or even that the witness should actually 
attend; but it is desirable (if not always necessary) that the accused should 
have an opportunity to make an effective challenge at some stage in the 
proceedings (6.2.5 ante). In PS v. Germany (2001) 36 EHRR 1139 the 
European Court of Human Rights said (at pp. 1143±4): 
`All the evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing, in the 
presence of the accused, with a view to adversarial argument. There are 
exceptions to this principle, but they must not infringe the rights of the 
defence. As a general rule, the accused must be given an adequate and 
proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, 
either when he makes his statement or at a later stage . . . In appropriate 
cases, principles of fair trial require that the interests of the defence are 
balanced against those of witnesses or victims called upon to testify, in 
particular where life, liberty or security of person are at stake, or 
interests coming generally within the ambit of Article 8 of the 
Convention . . . However, only such measures restricting the rights of 
the defence which are strictly necessary are permissible under Article 6. 
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Moreover, in order to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial, any 
difficulties caused to the defence by a limitation on its rights must be 
sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial 
authorities . . .' 
In SN v. Sweden (2002) Application No. 34209/96 the European Court 
of Human Rights held that the applicant had received a fair trial in respect 
of an allegation of sexual abuse against a 10-year-old boy, even though the 
boy (who had been available) had not been called by the prosecution to 
give live evidence and neither the accused nor his legal representative had 
questioned him (or even seen him being questioned) before the trial. Nor 
did it matter that the boy's pre-recorded evidence in chief ± a video 
recording of an initial interview conducted by a police officer ± had been 
the only evidence that the applicant had abused him. According to the 
Court, `in criminal proceedings concerning sexual abuse certain measures 
may be taken for the purposes of protecting the [complainant], provided 
that such measures can be reconciled with an adequate and effective 
exercise of the rights of the defence'; and, in the instant case, the 
applicant's right to challenge the boy's evidence and credibility had been 
sufficiently protected by the admission at his trial of the transcript (and 
the admission, on appeal, of the audio recording) of a second interview 
between the officer and the boy during which that officer had asked the 
questions to which the defence required answers. 
The safeguards in s. 28(2) of the 1999 Act should ensure that the 
accused is able effectively to challenge the witness's evidence in chief, so 
s. 28, like s. 27, will no doubt be held to comply with the requirements of 
Article 6. The use of an intermediary during the trial itself should also be 
acceptable, given the safeguards in s. 29(3)±(7) of the Act. The other 
special measures are equally unlikely to provide the accused with an 
effective challenge on human rights grounds. It is to be noted that the 
European Commission of Human Rights accepted that it was legitimate in 
some cases to screen a prosecution witness from the accused and the public 
(AM v. United Kingdom (1992) Application No. 20657/92); and Article 
6(1) of the Convention expressly provides that `the press and public may 
be excluded from all or part of the trial . . . where the interests of juveniles 
or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the 
extent strictly necessary . . . in special circumstances where publicity would 
prejudice the interests of justice'. 
An interview with a child or mentally-disabled witness which is 
recorded with a view to its being admitted under s. 27(1) of the 1999 
Act should be conducted by a skilled interviewer in accordance with Home 
Office guidelines ± formerly the Memorandum of Good Practice, now 
Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance for Vulnerable 
or Intimidated Witnesses, Including Children ± to ensure that the witness is 
not expressly or impliedly led into giving particular answers and that his 
evidence is reliable. Section 27(2) provides that a pre-recorded video of the 
witness's evidence should not be admitted if the court is of the opinion, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that its admission would 
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not be in the interests of justice. A relevant factor for this test is whether 
the witness's evidence is likely to be reliable. Under the old statutory 
regime governing the admission of pre-recorded evidence of children in 
criminal proceedings, an important consideration for the court when 
assessing reliability was the extent to which the Memorandum of Good 
Practice had been complied with (G v. DPP [1998] 2 WLR 609 (DC)). In 
R v. P [1998] Crim LR 663 (CA), for example, a video-recording was 
excluded because the way in which the interview had been conducted 
presumed the accused's guilt. It was also held that the judge could allow 
the jury to refer to a transcript of the recording while it is being played to 
them if it would be likely to help them follow the child's evidence, but that 
they should not normally be permitted to retire with it in case its value is 
over-emphasised (R v. Welstead [1996] 1 Cr App R 59 (CA), R v. Morris 
[1998] Crim LR 416 (CA)). 
Pre-recorded interviews with children will normally be admitted in civil 
(family) proceedings concerned with the welfare of a child under s. 96(3) 
and (5)(a) of the Children Act 1989 and the Children (Admissibility of 
Hearsay Evidence) Order 1993 (SI 1993 No. 621). As a general rule, adults 
will be expected to give live oral evidence (Re D (Sexual Abuse 
Allegations: Evidence of Adult Victim) [2002] 1 FLR 723 (FD)). As with 
interviews conducted for criminal proceedings, where there is an allegation 
of sexual abuse against a child the interviewer should have reference to the 
guidance provided by the Home Office to ensure that the child's evidence 
is reliable (Re D (Child Abuse: Interviews) [1998] 2 FLR 10 (CA)). 
16.4.5 Live Television Links 
In addition to the special measure available under s. 24 of the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (16.4.4 ante), s. 32(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 Act (read with SI 1990 No. 2084) may be relied 
on in criminal proceedings for homicide or serious fraud to allow a witness 
outside the United Kingdom (other than the accused) to give his evidence 
through a live television link. Evidence given by way of a live television 
link under s. 24 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 or 
s. 32(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is regarded as oral evidence given 
in the proceedings (see s. 31(1)±(2) of the 1999 Act and s. 32(3) of the 1988 
Act). Accordingly, unless exempt, a witness who is to be examined in chief 
or cross-examined in this way must first take the oath or affirm (R v. 
Sharman [1998] 1 Cr App R 406 (CA)). 
In civil proceedings, r. 32.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 provides 
that the court `may allow a witness to give evidence through a video link 
or by other means'. Guidance on the use of video conferencing has been 
annexed to the practice direction which supplements Part 32 of the Rules. 
In Rowland v. Bock [2002] 4 All ER 370 (QBD) it was held that no defined 
limit or set of circumstances should be placed on the judicial discretion to 
permit video link evidence, save that `costs, time, inconvenience and so 
forth' are relevant considerations, as is an overseas witness's reason for 
being unable to attend court in England. In that case the reason for the 
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claimant's refusal to attend court to testify was the risk that he would be 
placed under arrest if he entered England. According to Newman J, 
however, `full access to the court for justice in a civil matter should not, 
save in exceptional circumstances, be at a price of the litigant losing his 
liberty and facing criminal proceedings'. 
16.5 The Cross-examination of Witnesses 
`Human evidence shares the frailties of those who give it. It is subject to 
many cross-currents such as partiality, prejudice, self-interest and, 
above all, imagination and inaccuracy. Those are matters with which 
the jury, helped by cross-examination and common sense, must do their 
best.' (Toohey v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] 2 WLR 439 
(HL) at p. 446) 
Cross-examination has been described as `a powerful and valuable weapon 
for the purpose of testing the veracity of a witness and the accuracy and 
completeness of his story' (Mechanical and General Inventions v. Austin 
[1935] AC 346 (HL) at p. 359). A witness may be cross-examined by any 
party to the proceedings other than the party who called him (unless the 
witness is `hostile') the purpose being to elicit from the witness any 
evidence which may undermine the case of the party who called him 
and/or support the case of the party for whose benefit the cross-
examination is being conducted. Once a witness has entered the witness-
box and (where necessary) been sworn, he may be cross-examined 
regardless of whether he actually gave any evidence in chief (R v. Bingham 
[1999] 1 WLR 598 (HL)); and, in civil proceedings, a witness may be cross-
examined on his witness statement regardless of whether any part of it was 
referred to during the course of his examination-in-chief (r. 32.11 of the 
Civil Procedure Rules 1998). If it is not possible to elicit anything 
favourable from the witness, the cross-examiner may have no choice but to 
cross-examine him `as to credit'; that is to say, the cross-examiner will seek 
to undermine the weight of the witness's adverse evidence by attacking his 
credibility. He may try to show that the witness ought not to be believed 
on oath because of his past conduct, his previous convictions, his close 
relationship with the party who called him (or the alleged victim), his poor 
relationship with the cross-examining party, his relevant mental or 
physical condition or disability, or the fact that he has made statements 
which are inconsistent with his present testimony. Although there are 
certain common-law and statutory limits on the permissibility of cross-
examination as to credit (16.5.1 post), as a general rule witnesses are under 
a legal obligation to answer any questions put to them during cross-
examination. 
During the course of cross-examination, the cross-examining party's 
version of events should be put to the witness so that he has an 
opportunity to comment on any differences between their respective 
stories. If any aspect of the witness's version is not questioned in this way 
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the cross-examining party may be deemed to have accepted that version as 
correct and may therefore be unable to assert anything to the contrary 
later (Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), R v. Hart (1932) 23 Cr App R 
202 (CCA)). In R v. Bircham [1972] Crim LR 430 (CA), for example, the 
accused could not suggest that the co-accused or a prosecution witness 
had been involved in the offence because such allegations had not been put 
to them in cross-examination. The rule in Browne v. Dunn does not apply 
in summary proceedings (O'Connell v. Adams [1973] RTR 150 (DC)), so in 
Wilkinson v. DPP [2003] EWHC 865 Admin (QBD) a district judge was 
entitled to reject the accused's evidence, even though the prosecution had 
failed to cross-examine her. 
The cross-examiner, unlike the examiner-in-chief, is entitled to ask the 
witness leading questions which suggest a particular (desired) answer. 
Indeed this is the sort of questioning which is most likely to be adopted, so 
that the cross-examining advocate can exercise full control over what the 
witness says. If, however, the cross-examining party has the same interest 
as the party who called the witness (for example, where the accused's 
witness is being cross-examined by a friendly co-accused) the answers 
elicited by leading questions are unlikely to carry much weight with the 
tribunal of fact. Moreover, it would be improper to question a favourable 
witness in this way. 
16.5.1 Limits on Cross-examination 
There are a number of common-law and statutory limits on cross-
examination. In civil proceedings, r. 32.1(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules 
1998 expressly provides that cross-examination may be limited, in 
accordance with the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly 
(r. 1.1(1)). Cross-examination may also be limited during the hearing of a 
small claim (r. 27.8(5)) In criminal proceedings, the accused is given a 
degree of protection from cross-examination on his bad character by s. 1(3) 
of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (4.3±7 ante) and the prosecution should 
not seek to elicit answers from him in cross-examination which would lose 
him that protection (R v. Baldwin (1925) 18 Cr App R 175 (CCA)). In 
proceedings for a sexual offence, ss. 41 to 43 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 limit the extent to which the complainant may 
be cross-examined on her other sexual experiences (see 17.4 post). 
Furthermore, by virtue of ss. 34 to 36 of the 1999 Act, it is not 
permissible for the accused himself to cross-examine the complainant in 
proceedings for a sexual offence (defined in s. 62) or a `protected witness' 
(child complainant or child witness) where the alleged offence falls within 
s. 35(3) or any witness in respect of whom a specific direction has been 
made (under s. 36). However, if the accused is prevented from cross-
examining a witness in person, he will be permitted (and may be required) 
to have a legal representative to do it for him (s. 38); and the jury may 
need to be warned against drawing a prejudicial inference against him 
(s. 39). It would be difficult to support an argument that this prohibition 
on cross-examination in person denies the accused a fair trial, even though 
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Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights expressly 
provides, inter alia, that the accused has the right `to defend himself in 
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing'. The `principles of 
fair trial also require that in appropriate cases the interests of the defence 
are balanced against those of witnesses or victims called upon to testify' 
(Doorson v. Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330 (ECtHR) at p. 358). Thus in 
Croissant v. Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 135 (ECtHR) a provision requiring 
that the accused be legally represented in any case before the German 
Regional Court was held to be compatible with Article 6. 
It is inappropriate in any proceedings to cross-examine a witness as to 
credit on trivial matters, or matters from long ago or of such a nature that 
they would not materially affect his credibility; nor should matters be 
raised which would severely affect the witness's character if his evidence is 
not particularly important (see Hobbs v. Tinling [1929] 2 KB 1 (CA) at 
p. 51 and R v. Meads [1996] Crim LR 519 (CA)). In R v. Sweet-Escott 
(1971) 55 Cr App R 316 (Assizes), Lawton J stated that since `the purpose 
of cross-examination as to credit is to show that the witness ought not to 
be believed on oath, the matters about which he is questioned must relate 
to his likely standing after cross-examination with the tribunal which is 
trying him' and suggested, as an example, that it would be inappropriate 
to cross-examine an elderly witness about his having been caned as a 
schoolboy for petty theft from a class-mate. This test was applied by the 
Court of Appeal in R v. Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 and, for civil 
proceedings, in Watson v. Chief Constable of Cleveland Police [2001] 
EWCA Civ 1547. Cross-examination should not be protracted, and it is 
`indefensible' to cross-examine a witness in a discourteous manner 
(Mechanical and General Inventions v. Austin [1935] AC 346 (HL) at 
p. 360; see also R v. Kalia [1975] Crim LR 181 (CA)). Nor should 
questions be asked if the intention is to vilify, insult or annoy the witness 
or any other person. In R v. Brown [1998] 2 Cr App R 364 (CA) it was held 
that the trial judge should do everything he could, consistent with giving 
the accused a fair trial, to minimise the trauma suffered by other 
participants in the proceedings. 
It goes without saying that a witness should not be asked questions in 
cross-examination about irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence 
(R v. Treacy [1944] 2 All ER 229 (CCA)). If, however, a witness is handed 
and asked to read to himself a document written by a third party, his 
acceptance of the substance of the document allows it to become 
admissible hearsay evidence and he may then be questioned about it; 
but if he does not accept the truth of the document it remains inadmissible 
and cross-examination on it is prohibited (R v. Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App 
R 172 (CA), R v. Cross (1990) 91 Cr App R 115 (CA)). 
It has recently been held that if the accused's defence is that the 
allegation against him is a complete fabrication, the prosecution are 
entitled to ask him in cross-examination whether he knows of anything 
which might explain why the complainant has given false evidence against 
him, even if the prosecution anticipate a negative answer. In R v. Brook 
[2003] EWCA Crim 951 the Court of Appeal held that the question is 
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relevant and so permissible for if there is anything known to the accused 
which would provide a reason for the complainant to lie, this would 
undermine the complainant's credibility as a witness, and the fact that a 
negative answer is anticipated cannot determine admissibility. According 
to the Court, moreover, a question of this sort does not invite speculation, 
or seek to elicit inadmissible opinion evidence from the accused, because it 
is directed at establishing the state of his knowledge. Nevertheless, this is a 
controversial decision for the accused may feel obliged to provide an 
explanation, and may therefore appear evasive in the witness box as he 
tries to come up with something which might satisfy the jury. In other 
words, the accused may feel obliged to speculate, even though, as a 
presumptively innocent person, he is under no burden to provide an 
explanation. 
16.5.2 The Rule on the Finality of Answers on Collateral Matters 
As a general rule, if a witness is cross-examined about a collateral matter 
his answer is said to be `final', meaning that while the cross-examiner is 
not obliged to accept the truth of the answer, and may pursue the point 
with further questioning, he is not permitted to adduce evidence to show 
the contrary (Attorney-General v. Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 (CE), Hobbs 
v. Tinling [1929] 2 KB 1 (CA)). This prohibition on the adduction of 
evidence in rebuttal arose at common law to ensure that jurors would not 
be overburdened or confused by a morass of peripheral matters which 
would distract them from the essential issues (see Toohey v. Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner [1965] 2 WLR 439 (HL) at p. 446). 
The rule on the finality of answers does not apply to cross-examination 
on matters which are directly relevant to an issue in the proceedings, 
though of course the distinction between collateral relevance and direct 
relevance is somewhat artificial, for collateral facts also have a bearing on 
the determination of the issues in dispute. The rule is therefore one `of 
convenience, and not of principle' (R v. Burke (1858) 8 Cox CC 44 (CCAI) 
at p. 53, R v. Neale [1998] Crim LR 737 (CA)). If the judge rules that a 
question relates solely to a collateral matter, and that matter does not fall 
within an exception to the general exclusionary rule, it is not permissible 
for the cross-examining party to rebut the witness's answer by the 
adduction of additional evidence, even if that evidence would show that 
the witness is lying or mistaken on a matter of some importance. The 
utility of this rule is demonstrated by the facts of R v. Colwill [2002] 
EWCA Crim 1320, which concerned an allegation of rape where the only 
issue was whether or not the complainant consented. To undermine the 
complainant's assertion of non-consensual intercourse, counsel for the 
defence sought to undermine her credibility, and would have sought to 
question a prosecution witness (G) about her negative view of the 
complainant's credibility following a possibly false allegation the 
complainant had made against her (concerning the way G had been 
treating her children). The Court of Appeal held that the complainant 
herself could have been cross-examined on the allegations made by her 
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but, as she would have asserted her belief in the truth of those allegations, 
the rule on the finality of answers on collateral matters would have 
prevented the defence from seeking to elicit evidence from G as to the 
falsity of the allegations. The truth or falsity of the allegations was `truly 
collateral' to the issue of consent, notwithstanding the importance of the 
complainant's credibility to the determination of that issue: 
`Sensible investigation of the truth or falsity of [the complainant's] 
telephone complaints to the police would have involved calling the two 
children, the investigating police officers and the representative of the 
Social Services Department as to the injuries . . . Otherwise it would 
have been impossible for the jury to draw any real conclusion about 
those matters. It would have involved the further question whether, 
notwithstanding that the substance of [her] telephone complaints was 
untrue, she honestly believed them to be justified from all that which she 
saw and heard. It would have involved the jury embarking on an 
extremely difficult and complex task and . . . would have overwhelmed 
the evidence . . . on the real issue in the case.' 
In Attorney-General v. Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 (CE) it was said that 
the test for determining whether evidence could be adduced to rebut an 
answer given in cross-examination was whether that evidence would be 
admissible in chief as part of the cross-examining party's case. In 
Piddington v. Bennett (1940) 63 CLR 533, which concerned a personal 
injury claim arising out of a road accident in Australia, one of the 
plaintiff's witnesses said he had seen the accident while returning from a 
bank, having done some business for a Mr J. The defendant cross-
examined the witness about his presence at the scene and was later allowed 
to call the bank manager to say that there had been no transaction in 
respect of Mr J on that day. The majority of the High Court of Australia 
held that the bank manager should not have been called to give evidence in 
rebuttal as the witness's answer had related solely to a collateral matter 
(that is, the witness's memory or veracity). Although the manager's 
evidence was of some importance, suggesting that the plaintiff's witness 
had not actually been at the scene of the accident, it was not a matter the 
defendant would have sought to adduce as part of his defence if it had not 
arisen in cross-examination. Similarly, in R v. Burke (1858) 8 Cox CC 44 
(CCAI), where the accused's witness was cross-examined on his purported 
inability to speak English, it was held that prosecution witnesses should 
not have been called to testify that he could speak English. The witness's 
knowledge or ignorance of English was relevant to nothing other than his 
credibility. 
Thus, if a witness denies an allegation which relates solely to his 
credibility then, as a general rule, the cross-examining party will not be 
able to adduce evidence in rebuttal. This rule is subject to two broad 
qualifications, however. First, there are several specific exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule which allow evidence to be adduced in rebuttal even 
though the witness's answer relates to nothing other than his credibility 
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(16.5.4 post). Second, the witness's credibility may be so important in the 
context of the case that evidence undermining it may be regarded by the 
judge as directly relevant to an issue, in which case the rule on the finality 
of answers does not apply. An example is where the accused is on trial for 
rape, and his defence is that he and the complainant engaged in consensual 
sexual intercourse. Whether the jury find the accused guilty will depend 
heavily on the view they take of the complainant's testimony, which will of 
course depend on their assessment of her credibility as a witness. The 
complainant's credibility is therefore inextricably connected with the 
central (indeed the only) issue in the trial, so any evidence which would 
undermine her credibility may be said to have a direct bearing on that 
issue. The Court of Appeal acknowledged as much in R v. Funderburk 
[1990] 1 WLR 587 (at p. 597) where it was said that `where the disputed 
issue is a sexual one between two persons in private the difference between 
questions going to credit and questions going to the issue is reduced to 
vanishing point'. The importance of any particular witness's credibility, 
and whether it might properly be said to have a direct bearing on an issue 
in the proceedings, is a matter of degree. For this reason the Court of 
Appeal has now accepted that the trial judge has a `wide ambit of 
discretion' which allows him to determine whether the matter on which a 
witness's credibility is being tested may be said to have a direct bearing on 
an issue, bearing in mind the justifications for the exclusionary rule (R v. 
Somers [1999] Crim LR 744, following the approach of the Federal Court 
of Australia in Natta v. Canham (1991) 104 ALR 143). Relevant 
considerations include the importance of the witness's credibility to the 
issue, the importance of the evidence to that witness's credibility and `the 
necessity in the interests of justice to avoid multiplicity of issues where 
possible' (R v. Colwill [2002] EWCA Crim 1320). In other words, the judge 
should `have in mind questions of practicality, in the sense of trying to 
ensure that, while maintaining fairness, the trial [does] not get out of hand, 
nor the jury become confused by evidence and dispute on matters which 
were essentially collateral' (R v. James (1998) unreported (97/2785/Y4) 
(CA), referring with approval to R v. S [1992] Crim LR 307 (CA), 
16.5.3 post). 
16.5.3 Previous Inconsistent Statements 
An effective way of undermining a witness's testimony is to cross-examine 
him on an earlier statement made by him which contradicts the version of 
events he has just given in chief. The admissibility of such statements is 
governed by ss. 4 and 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865, which apply 
to civil as well as criminal proceedings. 
Section 5 of the Act covers `previous statements made by [the witness] in 
writing, or reduced into writing, relative to the subject matter of the 
indictment or proceeding'. For a statement of this sort to be admissible, 
the witness must first be allowed to see those parts which will be used to 
contradict him. If the witness is cross-examined only on certain parts of his 
previous statement, the judge has a discretion as to whether the jury 
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should be permitted to see the entire statement or just those parts (R v. 
Beattie (1989) 89 Cr App R 302 (CA)). Section 4 covers `any former 
statement made by [the witness] relative to the subject matter of the 
indictment or proceeding, and inconsistent with his present testimony' and 
provides that if the witness `does not distinctly admit that he has made 
such statement, proof may be given that he did in fact make it', so long as 
he is first told about the circumstances of the statement and asked whether 
or not he made it. In R v. Derby Magistrates' Court ex parte B [1995] 3 
WLR 681 (HL) (at pp. 687±8) it was felt that s. 4 allows proof of both oral 
and written statements which a witness does not distinctly admit, whereas 
s. 5 additionally permits the admission of a written statement even if the 
witness admits that he made it but adheres to evidence inconsistent with it. 
It is important to appreciate that these two sections apply only to 
statements which are `relative to the subject matter of the indictment or 
proceeding'. In other words, the inconsistencies must be relevant to an 
issue in the trial as opposed to a collateral matter (the witness's credibility) 
in line with the general common-law rule on the finality of answers on 
collateral matters. In R v. Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 the accused was 
charged with unlawful sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old girl. She gave 
evidence which strongly suggested that the accused had taken her virginity 
and described in detail the alleged acts of intercourse. The accused denied 
the allegation and sought leave to cross-examine her on a statement she 
had made in conversation with a Miss P to the effect that the complainant 
had had sexual intercourse with two other men prior to the alleged 
offence. The accused also sought leave to adduce, if necessary, evidence in 
rebuttal by calling Miss P to testify. The Court of Appeal held that the 
accused should have been permitted to cross-examine the complainant on 
her previous inconsistent statement. Furthermore, he should, if necessary, 
have been permitted to rely on s. 4 of the 1865 Act to call Miss P to rebut 
the complainant's denial. Given the nature and circumstances of the 
allegation, the complainant's conflicting statements had been relevant to 
whether the accused had actually had sex with her. 
In R v. Nagrecha [1997] 2 Cr App R 401, a case of alleged indecent 
assault, the Court of Appeal went further. The accused was permitted to 
cross-examine the complainant on a previous allegation of sexual 
impropriety she had made against her former manager. The complainant 
denied having made such an allegation, but admitted that she had 
complained about the manager's `aggressive behaviour'. The accused was 
not permitted to call the manager to give evidence of the nature of her 
allegation as a previous inconsistent statement, and he was convicted. 
According to the Court of Appeal, the manager's evidence should have 
been admitted as it `went not merely to credit, but to the heart of the case, 
in that it bore on the crucial issue as to whether or not there had been any 
indecent assault'. This test (which was approved by the Privy Council in 
Tiwari v. The State [2002] UKPC 29) suggests that where a case turns on 
the respective credibility of a prosecution witness and the accused, any 
evidence which would significantly undermine that witness's credibility 
may also be regarded as relevant to an issue, allowing the rule on the 
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finality of answers to be side-stepped (see also R v. Ellis [1998] Crim LR 
661 (CA)). 
It should be remembered, however, that relevance is just one part of the 
equation; the judge should also consider any countervailing questions of 
practicality (see 16.5.2 and, generally, 3.1.3 ante). In R v. S [1992] Crim 
LR 307 the trial judge ruled that the complainant's previous complaint 
against a third party went only to her credibility, so the accused could not 
call that person to rebut her assertion that the previous complaint had 
been true. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge's ruling on the basis that 
criminal trials have to be kept within bounds and the jury should not be 
distracted from the issues in dispute by collateral matters, although it was 
accepted that, if the third party had been abroad at the time of the alleged 
incident, it would have been permissible to adduce evidence of that `single 
and distinct fact'. This would seem to be the more sensible approach from 
a practical point of view, for otherwise there would need to be a collateral 
trial for the determination of whether there was an offence by the third 
party, in addition to the trial of the accused himself. This could lead to 
further collateral matters arising as the third party is cross-examined, and 
perhaps the prosecution would feel obliged to adduce further evidence in 
rebuttal. These matters would serve only to confuse the jury and distract 
them from the principal issues. That said, a third party's evidence may be 
highly probative of the complainant's credibility, particularly if the 
extraneous allegation is similar to that which has been made against the 
accused. In the final analysis, so long as it is understood that the 
distinction between `relevance to an issue' and `relevance to credit' is a 
matter of degree, with each case turning on its own facts, it will be 
appreciated that where the line is drawn must depend on the importance 
of the prosecution witness's evidence and the significance of the evidence 
which would show that witness to be untruthful. In practice this may turn 
out to depend on what the court perceives to be `fair play rather than any 
philosophic or analytical process' (R v. Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 
(CA) at p. 598). In other words, it is a matter which the judge ought to be 
allowed to determine in accordance with the broad discretion recognised 
by the Court of Appeal in R v. Somers [1999] Crim LR 744. 
If a previous inconsistent statement is admissible in criminal proceed-
ings pursuant to ss. 4 or 5 of the 1865 Act, its evidential value (in cases 
where the witness does not adopt it as part of his testimony) is limited to 
undermining the witness's credibility and the jury must be told this (R v. 
Askew [1981] Crim LR 398 (CA), R v. Jarvis [1991] Crim LR 374 (CA)). In 
civil proceedings a previous inconsistent statement is also admissible to 
prove the truth of the matters stated, as an exception to the rule against 
hearsay (ss. 1(1) and 6(5) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995). 
16.5.4 Exceptions to the Rule on the Finality of Answers on 
Collateral Matters 
In R v. Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 (CA) Henry J explained that the 
exceptions to the rule on the finality of answers `demonstrate the obvious 
516 Evidence 
proposition that a general rule designed to serve the interests of justice 
should not be used where so far from serving those interests it might defeat 
them'. There are at present four recognised exceptions which may be relied 
on in criminal or civil proceedings to undermine a witness's credibility. 
Three of these provide for the adduction of evidence suggesting 
untruthfulness (that is, evidence of previous convictions, bias and 
dishonesty); the fourth permits the adduction of evidence of honest 
unreliability (that is, evidence of a relevant physical or mental disability). 
A further exception, which is discussed elsewhere, may be relied on only in 
criminal proceedings (see 6.2.4 ante). 
The rules of evidence apply equally to evidence tendered in rebuttal, so 
the cross-examining party cannot adduce any evidence of dishonesty or 
honest unreliability if it is inadmissible. Moreover, if a witness is called to 
give evidence in rebuttal (for example, to show that the cross-examined 
witness is biased), the rebutting witness will also have to face cross-
examination; and if he denies an allegation which falls within one of the 
exceptions (for example, having a reputation for dishonesty) a further 
witness may be called to rebut his evidence. In practice this is uncommon 
because there are few recognised exceptions, but the way in which a 
multiplicity of collateral matters can arise demonstrates why the general 
rule on the finality of answers was established. 
16.5.4.1 Evidence of Previous Convictions 
If it is put to a witness in civil or criminal proceedings that he has previous 
convictions, and he denies that he was so convicted (or he remains silent), 
then evidence of those convictions may be adduced under s. 6 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (in accordance with s. 6(1) of the Act in civil 
proceedings and s. 73 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in 
criminal proceedings, 12.3.5 ante). This power must be read in the light of 
a number of other statutory provisions and the judge's common-law 
power to limit cross-examination which would have no bearing on the 
witness's credibility (R v. Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Cr App R 316 (Assizes), 
R v. Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 (CA), 16.5.1 ante). 
With regard to other provisions, the accused in criminal proceedings 
may be cross-examined on his previous convictions only if he has lost the 
`shield' provided by s. 1(3) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (4.3±7 ante); 
and s. 16(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 provides that, if 
the accused is over 21, his convictions dating from when he was under the 
age of 14 are inadmissible and he must not be asked about them, even if he 
has lost his s. 1(3) shield. 
Furthermore, s. 4(1) of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
provides that a `rehabilitated person' is generally to be treated as `a person 
who has not committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or 
convicted of or sentenced for the offence or offences which were the 
subject of that conviction'. Such convictions are said to be `spent', the 
rehabilitation period for a given offence being dependent on the sentence 
received (see s. 5). Section 4(1) is subject to a number of exceptions, 
however, the most important of which is found in s. 7(2)(a) which excludes 
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criminal proceedings from its scope, although Practice Direction (Criminal 
Proceedings: Consolidation) [2002] 1 WLR 2870 (SC) recommends that no 
reference should be made to a spent conviction if it can be reasonably 
avoided and that no-one should refer in open court to a spent conviction 
without the authority of the judge. The Practice Direction could be 
regarded as invalid, insofar as it might be said to contradict the express 
will of Parliament, but in reality it does little more than restate the judge's 
common-law power to restrict cross-examination on matters which have 
little if any bearing on a witness's present credibility. In other words, 
although a spent conviction is prima facie admissible in criminal 
proceedings by virtue of s. 7(2)(a) of the Act, the judge may exclude such 
evidence on the ground that it has insufficient probative value to be 
regarded as `relevant' (a point acknowledged by the Court of Appeal in 
R v. Lawler (1999) unreported (98/6952/W3)). Spent convictions may be 
admitted in civil proceedings if justice cannot otherwise be done in the case 
(see s. 7(3) of the Act and Thomas v. Commissioner of Police [1997] 2 WLR 
593 (CA)). 
Trial judges have a wide discretion over the admissibility of spent 
convictions in criminal proceedings (R v. Lawrence [1995] Crim LR 815 
(CA)), but in an appropriate case a ruling which prevents the accused from 
cross-examining a prosecution witness on his spent convictions can lead to 
a successful appeal. One such case was R v. Evans (1991) 156 JP 539, 
where there was a direct conflict between the accused and the complainant 
over what had happened between them in private during a `domestic' 
fight. His defence was that the complainant had tried to stab him and that 
he had fought her off in self-defence, but he was prevented from being able 
to cross-examine her on her spent convictions which included convictions 
for offences of dishonesty, possessing an offensive weapon and attempting 
to stab a police officer. The Court of Appeal held that, because of the 
direct conflict of testimony, the jury had been entitled to know about her 
criminal record in order to evaluate her credibility. This approach was 
followed in R v. Harrington [2001] EWCA Crim 2096 (in respect of police 
cautions which would have been spent under the 1974 Act had they been 
convictions). 
16.5.4.2 Evidence of Bias 
If a witness denies being biased, it is permissible to adduce evidence to 
rebut that denial. In R v. Mendy (1976) 64 Cr App R 4 it was put to a 
defence witness that he had been talking to a person who had been taking 
notes during the prosecution case. The witness denied the allegation, so a 
police officer was called to give evidence of what he had seen going on 
outside the court-room. The Court of Appeal held that the prosecution 
had been entitled to call that evidence in rebuttal as it showed the witness 
was `prepared to cheat in order to deceive the jury and help the defendant'. 
An earlier example is provided by Thomas v. David (1836) 7 C & P 350 
(Assizes) where evidence was admissible to rebut a witness's denial that 
she was sexually involved with the party who had called her (see also R v. 
Shaw (1888) 16 Cox CC 503 (Assizes)). 
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Where the evidence is relevant to an issue it is of course unnecessary to 
invoke the bias exception. Thus, in R v. Whelan [1996] Crim LR 423 (CA), 
a case of unlawful wounding, evidence that the complainant had made 
threatening telephone calls to the accused prior to their fight was 
admissible `not merely on the ground of the exception of bias' but because, 
as original evidence relevant to the accused's fearful state of mind, it was 
relevant to the issue of self-defence. R v. Phillips (1936) 26 Cr App R 17 is 
a more difficult case. The accused in that case was charged with incest 
against his children, his defence being that the girls had been coached by 
their mother to give false evidence against him. In cross-examination each 
girl denied admitting to a woman that she had fabricated her evidence at 
her mother's instigation at the accused's earlier trial for indecent assault. 
The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the accused should have been 
permitted to call the two women to give evidence that the children had 
made such admissions to them, as the evidence went not to the question of 
the children's credibility but to the `very foundation' of the accused's 
defence. The problem with this decision is that the children's out-of-court 
admissions to the women were hearsay and therefore inadmissible for the 
purpose of proving that they had been coached by their mother in the past 
to lie on oath, but this seems to be the reason why it was felt the women's 
evidence was admissible. Even if the bias exception had been expressly 
applied by the Court, the accused would still have been relying on hearsay 
evidence to prove that the children were biased. Perhaps the decision can 
best be explained as an application of s. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
1865 (16.5.3 ante) with the women's evidence of what the girls told them 
being admissible as a previous inconsistent statement `relative to the 
subject matter of the indictment'. If under cross-examination the children 
had said they were not influenced by their mother, by denying that they 
had made inconsistent statements to the women, the women's evidence 
would have been admissible not as hearsay (that is, not to prove the truth 
of the girls' out-of-court admissions) but merely to show the girls had said 
something inconsistent with their answers in cross-examination. 
One type of bias which has attracted interest in recent years is that of 
police officers who have fabricated evidence or gone to improper lengths 
to secure a conviction. In R v. Busby (1981) 75 Cr App R 79, for example, 
police officers were cross-examined to the effect that one of them had 
threatened a potential witness, Mr W, to prevent him from testifying for 
the accused. The officers denied the allegation. The Court of Appeal held 
that Mr W should have been allowed to give evidence that he had been 
threatened, by analogy with the decisions in R v. Mendy (1976) 64 Cr App 
R 4 (CA) and R v. Phillips (1936) 26 Cr App R 17 (CCA). However, it was 
felt that the evidence of impropriety went beyond the question of 
credibility to an issue in the trial. It was part of the accused's case that the 
officers had fabricated admissions attributed to him, so the evidence of 
their impropriety against him in other respects would have made his 
defence more credible. In R v. Edwards [1991] 1 WLR 207 the Court of 
Appeal accepted that an allegation of police impropriety in cross-
examination fell within the bias exception to the rule on the finality of 
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answers, but was unwilling to recognise the existence of a general 
exception based on police misconduct against third parties (see also 3.3.19 
ante). 
16.5.4.3 Evidence of Dishonesty 
In R v. Richardson [1968] 3 WLR 15 the Court of Appeal summarised this 
exception in the following terms (at p. 19): 
`1. A witness may be asked whether he has knowledge of the impugned 
witness's general reputation for veracity and whether (from such 
knowledge) he would believe the impugned witness's sworn testimony. 
2. The witness called to impeach the credibility of a previous witness 
may also express his individual opinion (based upon his personal 
knowledge) as to whether the latter is to be believed upon his oath and 
is not confined to giving evidence merely of general reputation. 3. But 
whether his opinion as to the impugned witness's credibility be based 
simply upon the latter's general reputation for veracity or upon his 
personal knowledge, the witness cannot be permitted to indicate during 
his examination-in-chief the particular facts, circumstances or incidents 
which formed the basis of his opinion, although he may be cross-
examined as to them.' 
Given the general rule on the inadmissibility of opinions, it is curious that 
opinion evidence of untruthfulness, based on little more than rumour and 
gossip, should be admissible. Opinion evidence based on personal 
knowledge of specific incidents or circumstances is less objectionable, 
but it is difficult to understand why the foundation facts upon which that 
opinion is based should not be elicited during the witness's examination-
in-chief. 
Although the impeaching witness may be cross-examined on the reasons 
for his opinion, this can lead to real difficulties for the party who called the 
impugned witness. He is unlikely to know the reasons for the impeaching 
witness's opinion, and to cross-examine a witness and have those 
unknown reasons revealed is very risky (and contrary to one of the 
golden rules of advocacy). But it is equally dangerous to allow an 
impeaching witness's evidence to stand unchallenged. Furthermore, if the 
impeaching witness's reasons are revealed it is not permissible to adduce 
evidence to contradict him (R v. Gunewardene [1951] 2 KB 600 (CCA)). 
However, the impugned witness's character may be re-established by 
calling witnesses to testify as to his general reputation for truthfulness (R v. 
Hamilton (1998) The Times 25.7.98 (CA), R v. Beard [1998] Crim LR 585 
(CA), R v. DS [1999] Crim LR 911 (CA)). (In R v. Hamilton the Court of 
Appeal doubted R v. O'Connor (1996) unreported (96/6365/Y4) (CA) 
where it was held that the trial judge has a discretion as to whether the 
prosecution may elicit from their police officer witnesses that they have no 
convictions or adverse disciplinary findings, following cross-examination 
on allegations of previous misconduct.) 
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Needless to say, if an impeaching witness is called to give his individual 
opinion based upon his personal knowledge as to whether the impugned 
witness ought to be believed, that personal knowledge must relate to the 
impugned witness's present character. In R v. N [2002] EWCA Crim 1595 
one of the reasons why the father of a woman in her mid-thirties could not 
testify as to her untruthful character was that his personal knowledge 
related solely to her dishonest behaviour as a child. 
16.5.4.4 Evidence of Physical or Mental Incapacity 
A witness's reliability may be challenged by the adduction of evidence of a 
relevant mental or physical condition. In Toohey v. Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner [1965] 2 WLR 439 (HL) Lord Pearce said (at pp. 446±7): 
`If a witness purported to give evidence of something which he believed 
that he had seen at a distance of 50 yards, it must surely be possible to 
call the evidence of an oculist to the effect that the witness could not 
possibly see anything at a greater distance than 20 yards . . . So, too, 
must it be allowable to call medical evidence of mental illness which 
makes a witness incapable of giving reliable evidence, whether through 
the existence of delusions or otherwise.' 
For example, in R v. Eades [1972] Crim LR 99 (Assizes), a case of 
causing death by dangerous driving, the trial judge ruled that a 
psychiatrist could be called by the prosecution to give his opinion on 
the unlikelihood that the accused had had a sudden recollection of the 
circumstances of the road accident. If, as will usually be the case, the 
witness's condition requires an expert medical opinion, that expert may 
give his diagnosis and evidence of `all the matters necessary to show, not 
only the foundation of and reason for the diagnosis, but also the extent to 
which the credibility of the witness is affected' (Toohey v. Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner at p. 447). 
16.5.4.5 Calling Evidence in Rebuttal 
A party is expected to adduce all his evidence before the close of his case. 
Additional evidence may be adduced, however, if that party is relying on 
an exception to the rule on the finality of answers. In criminal proceedings 
the prosecution may be given leave to adduce further evidence after the 
close of their case in other circumstances, the question being one for the 
judge (or magistrates) to determine in the exercise of a general discretion 
rather than in accordance with a narrow list of specific exceptions to a 
general exclusionary rule (R v. Francis (1990) 91 Cr App R 271 (CA), Jolly 
v. DPP [2000] Crim LR 471 (DC), Cook v. DPP [2001] Crim LR 321 
(DC), R v. Hinchcliffe [2002] EWCA Crim 837). 
16.5.4.6 A New Approach 
The general rule on the finality of answers is a rule of convenience and not 
of principle, apparently predicated on the assumption that evidence 
undermining a witness's credibility has less probative value than evidence 
which is deemed to be more directly relevant to an issue. That this 
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assumption is incorrect is demonstrated by the exceptions. An eye-
witness's poor eyesight or biased disposition is a collateral matter, but it 
may have a very significant bearing on the value of his testimony and the 
determination of any issue which depends on it. It is therefore illogical to 
adopt an artificial distinction between relevance to credit and relevance to 
an issue, with admissibility being determined on that basis subject to an 
immutable collection of recognised exceptions. This approach can lead to 
the exclusion of highly probative evidence, as demonstrated by the 
Australian case of Piddington v. Bennett (1940) 63 CLR 533 (HCA) 
(16.5.2 ante). 
In R v. Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 (CA) Henry J recognised that the 
exceptions exist to serve the interest of justice and stated that it `may be 
that the categories of exception . . . are not closed'; and in R v. S [1992] 
Crim LR 307 the Court of Appeal was willing to accept that it would be 
permissible to rebut an answer on a collateral question if the matter could 
be reduced to a `single and distinct fact' such as whether a witness had 
been abroad at a certain time. Building upon these developments the 
Court of Appeal has now recognised that the trial judge has a broad 
discretion to hold that a particular witness's credibility is directly relevant 
to an issue in the trial, allowing the rule on the finality of answers on 
collateral matters to be side-stepped in cases where this would not result in 
an unduly complex trial (R v. James (1998) unreported (97/2785/Y4), R v. 
Somers [1999] Crim LR 744). 
16.5.5 Reforming the Law on Previous Inconsistent Statements 
The Law Commission has suggested that previous inconsistent statements 
admitted under ss. 3±5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 should be 
admissible as evidence of the matters stated in any proceedings, save that 
the tribunal of fact in criminal proceedings should not be allowed to retire 
with evidence of this sort (Law Com No. 245 (1997) at pp. 165±9). 
16.6 The Re-examination of Witnesses 
Once a witness has been cross-examined, the party who called him is 
entitled to try to repair any damage done to his evidence in chief by asking 
further questions on the matters which arose during cross-examination. 
The leave of the court is required before other questions can be put. The 
rules applicable to examination-in-chief apply equally to re-examination. 
16.7 The Submission of No Case to Answer 
Unless the proceedings are an abuse of process or otherwise oppressive or 
vexatious, a criminal trial cannot be halted before the close of the 
prosecution case (Attorney-General's Reference (No. 2 of 2000) [2001] 1 Cr 
App R 503 (CA)). However, at the close of the prosecution case a `half-
time' submission may be made to the judge or magistrates that the 
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prosecution's evidential burden has not been discharged in respect of a 
fact (or facts) in issue, and that the accused ought therefore to be 
acquitted. For trials on indictment, a submission of no case to answer will 
succeed if the prosecution evidence taken at its highest is such that a 
properly directed jury would be unable properly to convict on it; but it will 
fail if, on one possible view of the evidence, the jury could properly find 
the accused guilty (R v. Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039 (CA)). However, 
taking the prosecution evidence at its highest does not mean `picking out 
the plums and leaving the duff behind', so the case against the accused will 
be withdrawn if the jury could find the accused guilty (on one possible view 
of the evidence) but would not properly find him guilty, such as where the 
prosecution witnesses have been discredited as a result of cross-
examination or the accused's confession is manifestly unreliable (R v. 
Shippey [1988] Crim LR 767 (CC), R v. Mackenzie (1992) 96 Cr App R 98 
(CA), R v. Shire [2001] EWCA Crim 2800). If the prosecution fail to 
discharge their evidential burden, but the judge nonetheless rejects the 
accused's submission of no case to answer and allows the trial to proceed, 
the Court of Appeal will quash the subsequent conviction on the ground 
that the trial should have been halted, even if the accused admitted his 
guilt from the witness box (R v. Smith [1999] 2 Cr App R 238 (CA), R v. 
Davis [2001] 1 Cr App R 115 (CA)). 
The judge need not withdraw the case from the jury in any case 
dependent on circumstantial evidence just because some inference other 
than guilt could reasonably be drawn from the evidentiary facts proved, 
save that there may be an exception for cases where the prosecution are 
seeking to prove the accused's guilt on the basis of an inference drawn 
from just one item of circumstantial evidence (R v. Van Bokkum (2000) 
unreported (99/0333/Z3) (CA)). 
If the accused is tried on indictment the submission is made to the judge 
in the absence of the jury; and if the judge rules that there is a case to 
answer, this should not be mentioned to the jury (R v. Smith (1986) 85 Cr 
App R 197 (CA)). The judge is under a continuing duty to keep the matter 
under review, however, and may raise it with counsel and, having heard 
submissions, withdraw the case from the jury at any stage during (or at the 
close of) the defence case, regardless of whether a submission was made at 
`half time' (R v. Brown (Jamie) [1998] Crim LR 196 (CA), R v. Anderson 
(1998) The Independent 13.7.98 (CA), R v. Brown (Davina) [2002] 1 Cr 
App R 46 (CA)). In summary proceedings, magistrates have the power to 
dismiss a case of their own motion so long as they first invite submissions 
from the prosecution (R v. Barking and Dagenham Justices ex parte DPP 
(1995) 159 JP 373 (DC)). 
In civil proceedings, if the judge is trying the case without a jury the 
general position is that a submission of no case to answer should be heard 
and ruled on only if the defendant has elected not to call any evidence, 
although the judge retains a discretion (for use in rare cases) to entertain 
such a submission without requiring any election (Alexander v. Rayson 
[1936] 1 KB 169 (CA), Boyce v. Wyatt Engineering [2001] EWCA Civ 692). 
If the defendant elects to call no evidence and makes a submission, the 
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judge should consider whether the claimant's case is made out on the 
balance of probabilities; but if a submission is entertained without the 
defendant having been put to his election, the standard is whether the 
claimant's case has any reasonable prospect of success (Miller (t/a 
Waterloo Plan) v. Crawley [2002] EWCA Civ 1100). In jury trials the 
judge may hear and rule on a submission of no case to answer without the 
defendant having to give any such undertaking (Young v. Rank [1950] 2 
KB 510 (KBD)). By analogy with criminal trials on indictment, if the 
judge concludes that the claimant's evidence, taken at its highest, is such 
that a properly directed jury could not properly reach a necessary factual 
conclusion on an issue which the claimant has to prove, he must withdraw 
that issue from them (Alexander v. Arts Council of Wales [2001] 1 WLR 
1840 (CA)). 
16.8 The Trial Judge's Role 
In addition to being the tribunal of law, ruling on questions of 
admissibility, the judge is supposed to act as an impartial `umpire' 
controlling the proceedings to ensure matters are dealt with efficiently, 
fairly and courteously. The analogy should not be taken too far, however, 
for the judge also has the right to adopt a more proactive and inquisitorial 
role and, in criminal trials, may question and even call witnesses of his 
own volition (R v. Roberts (1984) 80 Cr App R 89 (CA); see also R v. 
Haringey Justices ex parte DPP [1996] 2 WLR 114 (DC)). In civil trials, it 
has been held that the parties' consent is required before the judge can call 
further witnesses (Re Enoch & Zaretzky [1910] 1 KB 327 (CA)), but 
r. 32.1(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 now provides that the court 
`may control the evidence by giving directions as to . . . the nature of the 
evidence which it requires . . . and the way in which the evidence is to be 
placed before the court'. 
In criminal proceedings the judge is entitled to question any witness, but 
he is expected to exercise restraint, particularly when it is the accused who 
is testifying (R v. Marsh (1993) The Times 6.7.93 (CA)). The judge may 
even take over the cross-examination of a child complainant in a rape case 
if she refuses to answer the questions put by defence counsel (R v. 
Cameron [2001] Crim LR 587 (CA)). According to the Court of Appeal in 
R v. Mitchell [2003] EWCA Crim 907, the judge may `put questions to 
clarify matters and to intervene to prevent repetition, discursiveness or 
oppression of witnesses and to ensure that irrelevant matters are not 
pursued' but: 
`he must be careful not to appear to enter the arena or to give the 
impression to the jury that he thinks little or nothing of the defendant's 
case or is promoting a witness as one whom he thinks the jury ought to 
believe. And the defendant must be permitted to give his evidence so 
that his case, however implausible the judge may think it to be, is 
properly put before the jury and he is not thrown off course by judicial 
interruptions.' 
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The judge's excessive intervention may be a ground for appealing 
against conviction as it undermines the adversarial system, but the number 
of interventions is not of itself determinative; the critical aspect of the 
investigation is the quality of the interventions as they relate to the 
attitude of the judge before the jury and the effect of those interventions 
upon `the orderly, proper and lucid deployment of the case for the 
defendant by his advocate or upon the efficacy of the attack to be made on 
the defendant's behalf upon vital prosecution witnesses by cross-
examination' (R v. Matthews (1983) 78 Cr App R 23 (CA) at p. 32, R v. 
Hardwick [2002] EWCA Crim 2379, R v. Mitchell [2003] EWCA Crim 
907). In R v. Frixou [1998] Crim LR 352 (CA), for example, a conviction 
was quashed because the judge had taken over the questioning during 
what was supposed to be the accused's examination-in-chief, cross-
examining him in a hostile, sarcastic and peremptory manner, thereby 
depriving him of the opportunity he should have had to put his case before 
the jury in an ordered and structured form; and in R v. Gunning (1980) 98 
Cr App R 303 (CA), where there was no such hostility or sarcasm, the 165 
questions put by the judge during the accused's examination-in-chief 
nonetheless prevented him from being able properly to give his evidence in 
chief and may have given the impression that the judge did not believe a 
word he was saying. The European Court of Human Rights has accepted 
that the nature and frequency of the judge's interventions may render a 
criminal trial unfair for the purposes of Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention, but particular weight is attached to the Court of Appeal's 
assessment because of its knowledge and experience of jury trials (CG v. 
United Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 789). 
In R v. Curtin (1996) unreported (93/6847/Y3) the Court of Appeal stated 
that it was the trial judge's duty when summing up `to give directions about 
the relevant law, to refer to the salient pieces of evidence, to identify and 
focus attention upon the issues, and in each of those respects to do so as 
succinctly as the case permits.' The judge must therefore explain the 
respective roles of judge and jury, direct the jury on the substantive law and 
on the burden and standard of proof, give any necessary warnings or 
directions on the evidence and the inferences which may properly be drawn 
from it, and explain the value of the various items of evidence. This last 
point would include directing the jury on the evidential value of an 
admissible out-of-court statement (that is, whether it is evidence of the truth 
of the facts stated or relevant only to the maker's consistency as a witness) 
and the relevance of the accused's good or bad character. 
If the trial has gone on for a few days or more, the judge must give the 
jury an impartial review of the evidence; the factual issues not in dispute 
should be summarised, and where there is a significant dispute as to 
material facts the items of evidence which are in conflict should be 
succinctly identified so that the jury's attention is focused on the issues 
they have to resolve (R v. Farr (1998) 163 JP 193 (CA), R v. Amado-Taylor 
(No. 1) [2000] 2 Cr App R 189 (CA)). In particular, the judge must give a 
full and proper direction on any defence relied on by the accused and, 
indeed, on any other defence which is a reasonably possible (as opposed to 
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a fanciful) issue in the light of the evidence adduced or elicited during the 
trial, such as self-defence where the accused has relied on `accident' (R v. 
Phillips [1999] All ER (D) 1372 (CA), Von Starck v. R [2000] 1 WLR 
1270 (PC)). 
In R v. Marr (1989) 90 Cr App R 154 (CA) Lord Lane CJ said: `It is . . . 
an inherent principle of our system of trial that however distasteful the 
offence, however repulsive the defendant, however laughable his defence, 
he is nevertheless entitled to have his case fairly presented to the jury both 
by counsel and by the judge.' Further, according to the Court of Appeal in 
R v. Reid (1999) The Times 17.8.99 (98/8082/W3), where the case against 
the accused is strong, and his defence correspondingly weak, the judge 
must be scrupulous to ensure that the defence is presented in an even-
handed and impartial manner, for justice `is best served by a constant 
striving to give the accused what is his absolute right, that is a fair trial by 
an impartial tribunal, guided and directed by an impartial judge'. 
However, this does not mean that the accused is entitled to have his 
defence rehearsed blandly and uncritically by the judge in his summing-up. 
According to Simon Brown LJ in R v. Nelson [1997] Crim LR 234 (95/ 
5258/W5) (CA): 
`[T]he judge must remain impartial. But if common sense and reason 
demonstrate that a given defence is riddled with implausibilities, 
inconsistencies and illogicalities . . . there is no reason for the judge to 
withhold from the jury the benefit of his own powers of logic and 
analysis . . . Impartiality means no more and no less than that the judge 
shall fairly state and analyse the case for both sides. Justice moreover 
requires that he assists the jury to reach a logical and reasoned 
conclusion on the evidence.' 
The judge may therefore comment on the evidence and its weight during 
the course of his summing-up, and may even express his own view in 
strong terms. This is acceptable practice so long as he reminds the jury 
that all questions of fact are for them alone to decide and his comments do 
not have the effect of undermining the jury's freedom to decide those 
questions for themselves. For obvious reasons the jury should be told that 
they may disregard the judge's own view of the facts before he gives his 
opinion, that is, at the beginning of his summing-up (R v. Everett [1995] 
Crim LR 76 (CA)). If the judge's summing-up is fundamentally 
unbalanced, however, the mere repetition of a direction that questions 
of fact are for the jury will not remedy that unfairness (Mears v. R [1993] 1 
WLR 818 (PC), R v. Wood [1996] 1 Cr App R 207 (CA)). 
The judge's summing-up went beyond the proper bounds of judicial 
comment, resulting in a successful appeal, in R v. Winn-Pope [1996] Crim 
LR 521 (CA), where the judge referred to the accused as a `con man' who 
always had a `ready answer'; and in R v. Langford (2000) The Times 
12.01.01 (00/1697/Z1) the Court of Appeal quashed a conviction because, 
inter alia, the judge had usurped the role of the jury, in effect directing 
them to accept the complainant's evidence as truthful. Perhaps the most 
notorious example of an unfair summing-up in recent history was that 
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given in the case of R v. Bentley (Deceased) [2001] 1 Cr App R 307. 
Bentley's conviction for murder in 1952, for which he was hanged about 
six weeks later, was quashed by the Court of Appeal in 1998 on the 
ground, inter alia, that the trial judge, Lord Goddard CJ, had failed 
adequately to put his defence to the jury and his summing-up was such as 
to deny him `that fair trial which is the birthright of every British citizen'. 
The summing-up was criticised for being `a highly rhetorical and strongly 
worded denunciation' of Bentley and his defence which `must . . . have 
driven the jury to conclude that they had little choice but to convict'. 
Another aspect of the summing-up which was criticised was Lord 
Goddard's treatment of the evidence of the police officers who had 
testified that Bentley had encouraged murder by shouting `Let him have 
it'. The police officers were commended for their `highest gallantry and 
resolution' and `devotion to duty', whereas Bentley's evidence that he had 
not spoken those words was dismissed as `the denial of a man in grievous 
peril'. The Court of Appeal noted that in recent years the courts have 
deprecated judicial comments which suggest that police officers will be 
professionally ruined if the accused is acquitted or which place police 
officers in a different position from other witnesses; and that Lord 
Goddard had fallen into the pitfall of inviting the jury `to approach the 
evidence on the assumption that police officers, because they are police 
officers, are likely to be accurate and reliable witnesses and defendants, 
because they are defendants, likely to be inaccurate and unreliable' (see 
also R v. Culbertson (1970) 54 Cr App R 310 (CA), R v. Harris [1986] Crim 
LR 123 (CA) and R v. Beycan [1990] Crim LR 185 (CA)). Just as police 
officers should not be treated as a special type of witness, the judge should 
not expressly state that he disbelieves a witness for the defence, even if his 
evidence warrants incredulity (R v. Iroegbu (1988) The Times 2.8.88 (CA)). 
The accused's trial must not only be fair but be seen to be fair, so it is 
important that any judicial rebuke to the accused's advocate in the 
presence of the jury is delivered in measured tones, and that the judge does 
nothing which might lead the jury to conclude that he is unfairly 
prejudiced against him (R v. Kartal (1999) unreported (98/4147/X5) (CA)). 
In R v. Wood [2002] EWCA Crim 832 the accused was denied a fair trial 
because of the way the judge had undermined his counsel in the eyes of the 
jury and the knock-on effect this had had on the substance of his defence. 
Finally, although the judge is entitled to direct the jury to acquit the 
accused, he may not direct them to convict, even if the accused has in 
effect admitted his guilt during the course of his testimony, unless 
(perhaps) the accused has made `something in the nature of a formal 
admission of guilt' (R v. Gent (1989) 89 Cr App R 247 (CA)). 
16.9 The Jury's Deliberations 
Once the jury have retired to consider their verdict no further evidence or 
equipment is admissible to assist them in their deliberations, although they 
may ask the judge to repeat evidence they have already heard or seen 
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during the trial (R v. Davis (1975) 62 Cr App R 194 (CA)). In R v. Stewart 
(1989) 89 Cr App R 273 (CA), for example, a conviction was quashed on 
the ground that the jury had been given weighing scales with which to 
conduct experiments in the jury room. The reason for the bar on 
equipment is to prevent speculative re-enactments by the jury in private 
which counsel and the judge would be unable to comment on and from 
which the jury might draw erroneous inferences. Indeed, if the jury indicate 
that they are considering a re-enactment the judge is obliged to warn them 
of the dangers involved in such an exercise and to try to dissuade them 
from conducting it (R v. Crees [1996] Crim LR 830 (CA)). That said, the 
jury are entitled to ask for the sort of equipment which any juror might 
reasonably be expected to have on his own person, such as a magnifying 
glass, ruler or tape measure (R v. Maggs (1990) 91 Cr App R 243 (CA)). 
Although a conviction is likely to be quashed if it is apparent that the 
jury conducted an experiment or re-enactment, in practice s. 8(1) of the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 (which prohibits the disclosure of what 
occurred during the jury's deliberations) means that juries could be 
secretly conducting experiments on a regular basis without anyone 
knowing. In R v. Young [1995] 2 WLR 430 the accused was convicted 
of two counts of murder following the use by several jurors of a ouija 
board to contact the deceased. This came to light when a juror reported 
the matter to a solicitor, but the Court of Appeal nonetheless felt that 
s. 8(1) would have prohibited any inquiry into this irregularity if it had 
occurred during the jury's formal deliberations. As it was, the ouija board 
had been used by only four of the jurors during their overnight detention 
in a hotel, so it was not regarded as part of the deliberations and evidence 
of what had happened could be received. 
The European Court of Human Rights has recognised that `the rule 
governing the secrecy of jury deliberations is a crucial and legitimate 
feature of English trial law which serves to reinforce the jury's role as the 
ultimate arbiter of fact and to guarantee open and frank deliberations 
among jurors on the evidence which they have heard' (Gregory v. United 
Kingdom (1997) 25 EHRR 577 at p. 594). This rule has the effect of 
prohibiting an appeal against conviction based on a post-verdict complaint 
of alleged irregularities in the jury's deliberations, notwithstanding Article 
6(1) of the European Convention (R v. Qureshi [2002] 1 WLR 518 (CA), 
R v. Osmanioglu [2002] EWCA Crim 930, R v. Mirza [2002] Crim LR 921 
(CA)). However, it does not prevent the judge from investigating 
irregularities during the course of the trial (for example, where there is 
an allegation of bias on the part of one or more jurors within the confines 
of their room) if the irregularity can be established without undertaking an 
investigation into the jury's private deliberations. If a real danger of bias is 
established the judge may discharge up to three jurors or the entire jury. 
According to the European Court of Human Rights, this may be the only 
viable course of action in some cases if the accused is to have a fair trial 
(Sander v. United Kingdom (2000) 31 EHRR 1003 at p. 1010). In other 
cases a firm direction to try the accused on the evidence may be sufficient. 
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Chapter Summary 
.	 As a general rule all individuals are competent to give (sworn or unsworn) 
evidence, and all competent individuals are compellable. However, in criminal 
proceedings the accused is not compellable for the defence (and not competent 
for the prosecution); the accused's spouse is only exceptionally compellable for 
the prosecution or a co-accused; and no individual (child or adult) is competent if 
he cannot understand the questions put to him or provide intelligible answers. In 
civil proceedings a child is competent so long as he understands the duty to speak 
the truth and has sufficient understanding to justify his evidence being heard, but 
adults are competent only if they understand the nature of the oath. A number of 
special measures are now available in criminal proceedings to improve the quality 
of the evidence given by vulnerable witnesses (other than the accused). There is 
an inherent jurisdiction to provide special measures in other cases. 
.	 As a general rule a witness is not entitled to have his credibility bolstered by 
evidence of his good character (for example it is not permissible for a witness's 
credibility to be supported by evidence that he has made an out-of-court 
statement consistent with his present testimony). There are a number of 
exceptions to this rule. First, the accused is entitled to have evidence of his 
good character placed before the jury, on the ground that it is relevant to his 
credibility and disposition. Second, if it is alleged that the accused committed a 
sexual offence against the complainant and the issue is consent, evidence of the 
complainant's good character is admissible to prove that she did not consent and 
to bolster her credibility. Third, if evidence is adduced to show that a witness has a 
reputation for dishonesty, evidence may be adduced to prove the contrary. Fourth, 
there are a number of exceptions to the rule against the admission of previous 
consistent statements which permit the following types of statement to be 
adduced ± the complainant's `recent complaint' in a sexual offence case; a 
statement which rebuts an allegation of recent fabrication; the accused's 
exculpatory statement when the police made their allegation against him; 
statements of out-of-court identification; res gestae statements; and statements 
in (admissible) memory-refreshing documents. 
.	 A witness who turns out to be `hostile' to the party who called him may be cross-
examined by that party on a previous inconsistent statement at common law or 
under s. 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (which allows the statement to be 
proved). 
.	 The rule on the finality of answers on collateral matters prevents the cross-
examining party from adducing evidence to rebut an answer given by the witness 
which is relevant only to a collateral matter such as his credibility. However, if the 
resolution of a disputed issue is heavily dependent on that witness's credibility the 
rule will not be applied (and it will therefore be possible to adduce evidence of a 
previous inconsistent statement made by that witness under ss. 4 or 5 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1865). If the rule on the finality of answers does apply it is 
subject to exceptions which allow the cross-examining party to adduce (where 
relevant) evidence of the witness's: previous convictions, bias, reputation for 
dishonesty, and physical or mental incapacity. 
.	 At the end of the trial the judge will give the jury directions on the relevant law 
and review the issues and evidence for them. The judge may comment, within 
limits, on the evidence and its weight, but he must remind the jury that the 
questions of fact are ultimately for them to decide. 
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Sexual Behaviour as Evidence 17 
17.1 Introduction 
It will be remembered that for any item of evidence to be admissible it 
must be logically relevant to a fact in issue or a collateral fact (or 
contribute to an explanation of the `background'). To determine whether 
evidence is logically relevant to a matter requiring proof the judge must 
formulate a generalisation from his own experience and what he 
understands to be conventional wisdom. There is a problem with this 
approach, however, for some aspects of human life are more widely 
understood than others, and what is thought to be a valid generalisation 
may in fact be no more than a vague stereotype. Moreover, conventional 
wisdom itself may be suspect because different cultural groups (including 
different generations) are unlikely to view the world in the same way or 
share the same values. What might appear to be a valid generalisation to 
one generation might well be considered absurd by another. Problems 
such as these have bedevilled the law governing the admissibility of the 
complainant's sexual experience in cases where the accused is alleged to 
have committed rape or some other sexual offence against her. 
Depending on the generalisation relied on, evidence of the complai-
nant's sexual experience may be considered logically relevant to her 
credibility or an issue in the proceedings or both. The judiciary's approach 
to evidence of this sort has altered with the changing moral values of 
English society, but even if the question of sexual morality is put to one 
side, as it now is, evidence of the complainant's sexual experience is quite 
capable of supporting the accused's defence. It is equally apparent, 
however, that if such evidence is adduced or elicited in cross-examination 
the complainant is likely to suffer a great deal of distress. This may have 
the knock-on effect of deterring genuine victims from coming forward to 
testify against men who have raped or otherwise sexually abused them. In 
other words, there is a clear conflict between the interests of the accused 
and the interests of the complainant (and society as a whole). 
The accused has a considerable number of rights, both at common law 
and under the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, he 
is presumed to be innocent (Article 6(2)) and is entitled to a fair trial 
(Article 6(1)). To this end he should in principle be entitled to adduce or 
elicit any evidence relevant to his defence to ensure that he is not convicted 
of an offence he did not commit. Certainly he should be able to have the 
evidence and credibility of his accuser challenged, and this is reflected in 
Article 6(3)(d) of the Convention which affirms the accused's `minimum 
right' `to examine or have examined witnesses against him'. These rights 
apply in any trial of course, but they take on particular significance in 
cases where the allegation is one of sexual impropriety, a fortiori if the 
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allegation is that the accused raped the complainant. A convicted rapist 
faces many years in prison, segregated from other offenders and 
universally despised and detested. For an innocent man to be convicted 
of and punished for rape is perhaps the greatest injustice the criminal 
justice system can now deliver. And it is important to understand that men 
are sometimes falsely accused of rape by mendacious complainants. 
The researchers Jessica Harris and Sharon Grace found that out of a 
sample of nearly 500 incidents initially recorded by the police as rape in 
1996 some 25 per cent were `no-crimed' by the police, the most common 
reason being the conclusion that the complainant was lying or malicious 
(see `A question of evidence? Investigating and prosecuting rape in the 
1990s', Home Office Research Study 196). But not every false allegation is 
filtered out before the trial. It is clear that innocent men have been (and no 
doubt are still being) wrongly convicted of rape on the basis of fabricated 
allegations. For example, in April 2000 a man who was sentenced in 1986 
to a term of life imprisonment for rape and buggery, and who had served 
nearly 15 years of his sentence, was freed when the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the offences `almost certainly never happened at all' (R v. 
Burnett (2000) unreported (99/4959/Z4)); and in December 2001 a man 
who had spent three years in prison out of a nine-year sentence had his 
convictions for rape and attempted rape quashed when the complainant 
admitted that she had lied to get her mother's attention (R v. Beardmore 
(2001) unreported (01/2705/Y5) (CA); see also R v. Smith [1999] All ER 
(D) 1455 (CA)). Various reasons have been put forward to explain why 
some complainants fabricate their allegations. These include a desire for 
revenge following the collapse of a relationship, guilt, fear and mental 
instability. A complainant may even bring a false allegation motivated by 
nothing more than financial gain (R v. Milroy-Sloan (2003) The Times 
(news report) 17.5.03 (CCC)). 
A particularly interesting finding of the Home Office research study was 
that only 12 per cent of the sample involved allegations of `stranger rape' 
(the other 88 per cent comprising allegations made against `acquaintances' 
(45 per cent) and `intimates' (43 per cent)) and that almost 25 per cent of 
complainants had had a prior sexual relationship with the alleged rapist. It 
follows that the evidence in a large proportion of the rape cases which 
reach court comprise nothing more than the protagonists' diametrically 
opposing views as to what happened in private between them, with the 
complainant alleging rape and the accused countering that there was no 
sex between them at all or that there was consensual sex and/or that he 
genuinely believed the complainant was consenting. In the first and second 
of these scenarios the outcome will turn on the jury's assessment of the 
credibility of both protagonists, and (given the presumption of innocence) 
the presumption has to be that the complainant is lying. In such cases 
there is no rape and no victim until the jury conclude at the end of the trial 
that the accused is actually guilty. The presumption of fabrication must 
stand unless the jury can be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the 
complainant is actually telling the truth. As Lord Bingham CJ pointed out 
in R v. Brown [1998] 2 Cr App R 364 (CA) (at p. 370): 
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`Where . . . a defendant is accused of rape, the trial cannot be conducted 
on the assumption that he is a rapist and the complainant a victim, since 
the whole purpose of the proceeding is to establish whether that is so 
or not.' 
The presumption that the complainant is lying is a natural consequence 
of the importance attached by a rights-based democratic society to the 
acquittal of its innocent citizens, even if some perpetrators of very serious 
offences are able to escape liability as a result. That said, rape is a most 
cowardly and brutal crime, and can profoundly affect a genuine victim's 
quality of life. Society has an interest in ensuring that men who do rape or 
sexually abuse women (or indeed other men) are tried and convicted, and 
it is reasonable to assume that the risk of being cross-examined on their 
(relevant) sexual experience will deter some victims from pursuing their 
complaints up to and including the trial process. If the complainant has 
indeed been raped by the accused then a trial in which she faces cross-
examination on her most intimate private behaviour can only worsen what 
must have been a horrendous ordeal. Complainants, as witnesses, also 
have rights. Cross-examination on extraneous sexual experience which has 
little probative value may even amount to a violation of the complainant's 
right under Article 8 of the European Convention to have her private life 
respected. The point was made by the European Court of Human Rights 
(albeit in a different context) in Doorson v. Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 
330 (at p. 358): 
`It is true that Article 6 does not explicitly require the interests of 
witnesses in general, and those of victims called upon to testify in 
particular, to be taken into consideration. However, their life, liberty or 
security of person may be at stake, as may interests coming generally 
within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention . . . Contracting States 
should organise their criminal proceedings in such a way that those 
interests are not unjustifiably imperilled. Against this background, 
principles of fair trial also require that in appropriate cases the interests 
of the defence are balanced against those of witnesses or victims called 
upon to testify.' 
The decision in Doorson v. Netherlands was referred to with approval in 
Oyston v. United Kingdom (2002) Application No. 42011/98 (ECtHR), an 
admissibility decision on s. 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1976 (17.3 post). 
The crux of the problem, then, is that the law must try to reconcile what 
is perhaps irreconcilable. The accused is presumed to be innocent and the 
complainant will in many cases be presumed to be lying. To undermine 
this presumption of fabrication would be to undermine the presumption of 
innocence and run the risk of violating Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention. If the complainant's sexual experience is indeed relevant to 
an issue in the trial ± which in the context of sexual intercourse in private 
may be no more than her credibility (16.5.2 ante) ± the accused should be 
entitled to cross-examine her on it. Any evidence which can help the jury 
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decide who is telling the truth ought to be admitted. But if the accused is 
permitted to cross-examine the complainant on any logically relevant 
sexual experience, regardless of how much or how little probative value 
that evidence has, there is a real risk that the complainant's own rights will 
be violated and that genuine rape victims will be deterred from pursuing 
their complaints. This would allow many rapists to re-offend with 
impunity. Accordingly it is necessary to try to strike some kind of balance 
between the interests of the accused and those of the complainant, insofar 
as it is possible to do so without denying the accused his right to defend 
himself in an effective manner. 
The focus must therefore be on the probative value of the evidence. The 
exclusion of aspects of the complainant's sexual behaviour which are 
unlikely to assist the jury in any meaningful sense ± and which might 
distract the jury from other evidence or cause them to attach less weight to 
the complainant's testimony for an illegitimate reason or cause her 
unnecessary distress ± could be justified on the ground of `irrelevance' 
(3.1.2±3 ante). Ultimately a test along these lines can be the only 
acceptable way of reconciling the accused's right to a fair trial with the 
complainant's right to have her private life respected; and if there is any 
doubt as to whether the evidence ought to be adduced or elicited it should 
be resolved in the accused's favour. Any reformative measure which seeks 
to assist complainants and increase the number of convictions for rape 
must ensure that the presumption of innocence and the accused's right to a 
fair trial in other respects are not undermined. Parliament has twice 
introduced legislation to shift the emphasis towards the protection of the 
complainant, but (inevitably) both attempts have resulted in a reversion to 
a test based on relevance and sufficiency of probative value. 
Finally, while it is often reported that fewer than ten per cent of rape 
allegations end in a conviction, this should not be read as an indictment of 
the law of evidence, although no doubt some genuine victims are deterred 
from testifying by the nature of the questions they assume will be asked. It 
has already been mentioned that 25 per cent of all alleged rapes are 
`no-crimed' by the police; and there is a continuing process of attrition 
thereafter. The Home Office research study reports that of the accused 
who are actually brought before the Crown Court for trial, 28 per cent are 
convicted of rape and 38 per cent are convicted of some other offence. 
Fewer than one in four (23 per cent) are acquitted of all charges. (The 
remaining 11 per cent are `not known', `case discharged' and `case to lie 
on file'.) 
17.2	 The Relevance of the Complainant's Sexual 
Experience 
Evidence of a complainant's sexual experience could be elicited in cross-
examination at common law as it was deemed to be relevant to her general 
credibility as a witness. Unchaste women, supposedly lacking in general 
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moral credibility, were thought to be more capable of deception than 
chaste women; so a complainant could be cross-examined on her sexual 
acts with other men as a way of undermining the value of her testimony 
(R v. Holmes (1871) LR1 CCR 334 (CCCR)). The purported connection 
between a witness's sexual experience and credibility was occasionally 
applied in other types of proceedings, but if the complainant's allegation 
was one of sexual abuse, such as rape or indecent assault, her sexual 
experience was elicited as a matter of course. There were two reasons for 
this. First, it was hoped the jury would despise the moral character of the 
complainant and therefore attach little weight to her evidence. Second, it 
was hoped the jury would realise that the accused deserved to be 
acquitted, despite the evidence against him, because of the complainant's 
character. 
The belief that the complainant's sexual history was relevant to her 
veracity was not surprising given the moral climate until a few decades 
ago. If a woman had acted immorally in one way her entire moral 
credibility was tarnished, the assumption being that a woman who was 
willing to fornicate would also be willing to fabricate allegations and lie on 
oath. But there are two fundamental problems with the view that a 
woman's sexual experience is relevant to her credibility. First, in England 
and Wales pre-marital sexual relations are, as a general rule, no longer 
regarded as morally disreputable and so cannot be brought within the 
class of activities which might be referred to as objectively immoral. As 
such it is difficult to justify the view that evidence of this sort has any 
bearing on the complainant's moral credibility and therefore her veracity 
as a witness. Second, a woman who has freely consented to sexual 
activities with other men is perhaps less likely than a chaste woman to 
raise a false allegation of sexual abuse. Reasons why complainants lie 
include the desire for revenge, the need to protect their reputation and self-
denial through shame; but the last two of these reasons are unlikely to 
arise if the complainant is sexually experienced. (It is pertinent to note that 
Home Office Research Study 196 (1999) reports a finding that those 
involved in the criminal justice system perceive prostitutes as convincing 
witnesses on the ground that, given the nature of their work, they are 
unlikely to `cry rape'.) 
Interestingly, at common law the complainant's sexual experience was 
regarded as irrelevant to any issue in the proceedings, although there were 
a few exceptions to this general rule. The sexual experience of certain types 
of complainant was considered relevant to the issue of consent, but only if 
the evidence showed the complainant to be notoriously sexually immoral 
(R v. Greatbanks [1959] Crim LR 450 (CCC)) or a prostitute (R v. Bashir 
[1969] 1 WLR 1303 (Assizes)) or it was evidence that the complainant had 
consented to sexual activity with the accused on some other occasion (R v. 
Riley (1887) 18 QBD 481 (CCCR)). In such cases, if the complainant 
denied what was put to her in cross-examination, evidence could be 
adduced in rebuttal. Such evidence could also be adduced in chief as part 
of the accused's case. In all other cases the complainant's sexual 
experience was regarded as relevant only to the collateral question of 
Sexual Behaviour as Evidence 535 
her credibility, so if she denied the allegation put to her in cross-
examination the accused was bound by the rule on the finality of answers 
on collateral matters (16.5.2 ante) and unable to adduce evidence to show 
that she was lying (R v. Holmes (1871) LR1 CCR 334 (CCCR), R v. 
Cargill [1913] 2 KB 271 (CCA)). 
Much of the common-law approach to relevance has now been 
abandoned as untenable, but there is clear logic in the view that the 
complainant's consensual sexual relationship with the accused himself can 
have a bearing on whether his defence is true. First, common sense dictates 
that a woman is unlikely to consent to sex with a man who has already 
raped her. Second, depending on the circumstances, a lengthy consensual 
sexual relationship prior to the alleged offence may allow the inference to 
be drawn that the alleged rape was also consensual sex or that the accused 
believed the complainant was consenting (the `defence' of no mens rea). 
Certainly the defence of mistaken belief in consent where the allegation is 
one of indecent assault is far more likely to be true if the accused and 
complainant were involved in a lengthy sexual relationship prior to the 
incident, and it would be absurd to keep the jury (or magistrates) in the 
dark about that relationship. Alternatively, the turbulent nature of the 
protagonists' previous sexual relationship, or the way in which their 
relationship ended, might provide a motive supporting the accused's 
defence that the complainant has fabricated the allegation against him. 
It is also clear, moreover, that the complainant's sexual experience with 
other persons may be logically relevant to an issue in the trial, particularly 
as her credibility will very often be inseparable from the issue whether 
sexual intercourse occurred or, if intercourse is admitted, whether she 
consented. Where the sole issue is consent and the complainant lies on 
oath, suggesting she would never have consented to sex in the 
circumstances of the admitted intercourse, the accused should be entitled 
to cross-examine her on any sexual experience which contradicts her 
testimony on the basis that it will undermine her credibility as a witness 
and therefore her testimony that she was raped. If, for example, it is 
alleged that the accused raped the complainant in her room while her child 
was sleeping near by, and the complainant testifies that she would never 
have consented to sex in those circumstances, it should be permissible to 
cross-examine her on the consensual sex she has had with boyfriends in 
her room while her child was sleeping there (see R v. Riley [1991] Crim LR 
460 (CA)). Similarly, if the complainant testifies that prior to the alleged 
rape she was a virgin, and the accused is so unappealing that the jury 
would find it hard to believe that she would have consented to her first act 
of sex with him, evidence that she was in fact sexually experienced with 
other unappealing men would not only undermine her credibility as a 
witness (and therefore her evidence that she did not consent) but would 
also suggest to the jury that she might have been more willing to consent 
to sex in those circumstances (cf. R v. SMS [1992] Crim LR 310 (CA)). 
Conversely, the complainant's sexual experience with other men may 
support the accused's defence of consent in a more direct way, 
undermining her credibility as a collateral consequence. If the accused's 
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defence to rape is that the complainant consented to sex but then 
demanded payment and `cried rape' when he refused to comply, evidence 
that she conducted herself in precisely the same way with other men would 
logically support the accused's defence, not on the ground that it directly 
contradicts her testimony but because of the probative value in the 
`striking similarity' of her behaviour on different occasions (cf. R v. Krausz 
(1973) 57 Cr App R 466 (CA)). In other words, a pattern of peculiar 
conduct may allow an inference to be drawn that the complainant acted in 
the same way at the time of the alleged offence. For example, if the 
complainant alleges that she was raped by her personal fitness trainer, and 
his defence is that she threw herself at him and had consensual sex, after 
which she took umbrage at his decision not to pursue the relationship, 
evidence of consensual sexual relationships with a string of other personal 
fitness trainers in the preceding year, in which the complainant took the 
initiative, would materially support his version of events and increase the 
likelihood that she is not telling the truth. 
As a matter of strict logic, if the allegation is one of vaginal rape outside 
marriage, evidence of any previous consensual extramarital sex by the 
complainant will be relevant to the issue of consent on the ground that it 
places the complainant in a particular category of woman (that is, women 
who are not absolutely opposed to fornication). The probative value of 
such evidence will of course be extremely low in the vast majority of cases 
and ought to be excluded on the ground of `irrelevance' (3.1.3 ante). But 
the mere fact of extraneous consensual sex may have significant probative 
value in certain circumstances, particularly if the sexual acts are closely 
connected with the alleged rape. If, for example, the complainant was 
indulging in consensual sex with a stranger just a couple of hours after the 
alleged rape this would suggest that sex with the accused was also 
consensual, the generalisation being that women who have just been raped 
are unlikely to have casual sex so soon afterwards. 
The complainant's extraneous sexual behaviour may also have a 
bearing on an issue other than consent. The accused may deny that he had 
sex with the complainant, and if she supports her allegation of rape with 
medical evidence of intercourse, evidence that she had sex with another 
man at about the same time as the alleged rape would logically undermine 
the prosecution case. Similarly, evidence of the complainant's sexual 
relationship with a man suffering from a sexually-transmitted disease 
would undermine her allegation that it was the accused, carrying no such 
disease, who raped and infected her. Alternatively, the accused's defence 
may be that he genuinely believed the complainant was consenting, even if 
it subsequently transpires that she was not. If the complainant says that 
she put up a fight during the alleged rape, evidence that she habitually 
pretended to put up a fight when having consensual sex with other men 
(and that the accused was aware of this) would materially support his 
defence. 
In short, the complainant's extraneous sexual conduct may be logically 
relevant to her credibility as a witness or to an issue in the trial (or both) 
but it should not be regarded as relevant to her credibility on the basis that 
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a sexually active woman is somehow inherently less trustworthy as a 
witness than a woman who is chaste. Nor in general should it be 
permissible to argue that the sexually promiscuous disposition of the 
complainant renders it more likely that she consented to sex with the 
accused. The `moral credibility' argument has no basis in logic and any 
such evidence or line of questioning should be barred for that reason. The 
`disposition' argument has some basis in logic, but the principle of free 
proof will in most cases carry insufficient weight when compared with 
countervailing considerations, such as the desirability of preventing 
prejudicial evidence from being placed before the jury (which might 
distract them or otherwise adversely affect their ability to consider the 
material evidence in a disinterested fashion), the need to respect the 
private life of the complainant (and prevent her from being unnecessarily 
distressed) and the public interest in encouraging genuine victims to bring 
their cases to court. Any evidence may be excluded on the ground of 
`irrelevance' if its probative value is outweighed by competing policy 
considerations, a point noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. 
Darrach [2000] 2 SCR 443 (at p. 467): `An accused has never had a right to 
adduce irrelevant evidence. Nor does he have the right to adduce 
misleading evidence to support illegitimate inferences: the accused is not 
permitted to distort the truth-seeking function of the trial process.' 
The common-law test for determining `relevance', requiring an 
assessment of the probative value of the evidence (in the context of the 
issues and the factual matrix of the case) and any countervailing 
considerations of policy, is a sufficient basis for determining whether 
evidence of the complainant's extraneous sexual behaviour should be 
adduced or elicited, and statutory control over the admissibility of such 
evidence is necessary only insofar as it provides the judge with guidance on 
how his discretion ought to be exercised and the sort of policy 
considerations which need to be taken into account. In other words, 
because every case is factually unique and probative value cannot be 
determined in a vacuum, the test for admissibility should be one of guided 
discretion. This was recognised by the majority of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R v. Seaboyer [1991] 2 SCR 577. It is certainly true that 
statutory provisions prohibiting the admission of the complainant's sexual 
experience may have a symbolic importance, but the desirability of 
appeasing political lobbyists is hardly an appropriate justification for 
enacting legislation which might exclude evidence of the accused's 
innocence in proceedings for very serious offences. 
17.3 The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 
The common-law approach to relevance was significantly altered by s. 2 of 
the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, the first statutory shield 
against intrusive questioning on the complainant's sexual history, which 
discarded the assumption that the complainant's sexual experience was 
always relevant to her credibility. Although this provision has now been 
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repealed and supplanted by s. 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 (17.4 post), the case-law to which it gave rise provides a 
number of examples of how a complainant's sexual experience may be 
relevant (and indeed highly probative) evidence of the accused's 
innocence. 
Section 2 had its origins in the Heilbron Report (the Report of the 
Advisory Group on the Law of Rape, Cmnd 6352 (1975)). The Advisory 
Group felt that evidence of the complainant's sexual experience with 
persons other than the accused should be admissible only in exceptional 
circumstances on the ground that it was irrelevant to the complainant's 
credibility and would only rarely be relevant to any issue. The suggestion 
was that such evidence should be admissible only if it satisfied a similar 
facts test of `striking similarity' analogous to the test established in DPP v. 
Boardman [1974] 3 WLR 673 (HL) (3.3.5 ante). This test did not become 
law as it was felt by Parliament to be unduly narrow. The need for reform 
was unquestionable, however, and the approach adopted in s. 2, although 
wider than the Heilbron proposal, was far more restrictive than the 
traditional common-law position, prohibiting cross-examination which 
amounted to no more than an attack on the sexual morality of the 
complainant as a way of suggesting that she was unlikely to be a truthful 
witness (R v. Viola [1982] 1 WLR 1138 (CA) at pp. 1142±3). 
In most cases the mere fact that a complainant has had consensual sex 
with other persons will have little if any probative value with regard to 
whether she consented to sex with the accused on the occasion in question, 
but there may be circumstances where the probative value of her conduct 
is particularly high. In fact because the evidence under consideration is not 
directly associated with the facts of the allegation, its probative value can 
be determined by applying the same sort of reasoning which is used to 
determine the probative value of similar fact evidence (3.3.1 ante). The 
crucial difference is that because the accused is on trial (and is presumed to 
be innocent) the evidence of his past misconduct must be extremely 
probative of his guilt before its admission can be justified, on account of 
the risk that his defence will be unduly prejudiced. The complainant in a 
case of rape is in an entirely different category. The probative value of her 
sexual experience will be determined in the same way, but the risk of 
undue prejudice against her as a prosecution witness pales into 
insignificance when weighed against the need to ensure that an innocent 
man is not convicted of a serious offence. The Heilbron view that 
admissibility should be determined on the basis of a `striking similarity' 
test was flawed for two reasons. First, past conduct can be highly 
probative in the absence of striking similarity (3.3.5 ante). Second, the 
strict test for the admissibility of similar fact evidence against the accused 
has developed in criminal trials so that the accused will get a fair trial. The 
Heilbron approach would have undermined that right. 
Section 2(1) of the 1976 Act provided that no evidence could be 
adduced or elicited in cross-examination (by or on behalf of the accused) 
about the sexual experience of the complainant with any person other than 
the accused unless the judge gave leave. The judge was permitted to give 
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leave under s. 2(2) only if it would be unfair to the accused to refuse to 
allow the evidence to be adduced or elicited. The judge had to apply a two-
stage test which entailed first determining whether the evidence was 
relevant and then deciding whether it would be unfair to the accused to 
prevent the introduction of that evidence. 
Although s. 2 applied only to `rape offences', it was held that the spirit 
of the legislation should be applied to sexual offences generally (R v. 
Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 (CA)). The provision did not, however, 
cover the complainant's other sexual acts with the accused himself or with 
things other than a person. Nor did it provide any guidance on how to 
determine the relevance of the complainant's sexual experience or the 
question of unfairness. It was for the judge in each case to look at the 
issues and evidence and apply his own judgment to determine whether the 
evidence was logically relevant to the accused's defence. If the relevance 
lay solely in attempting to undermine the complainant's broad moral 
credibility the questions would not be allowed. Generally, then, the 
accused had to show that the complainant's sexual experience was relevant 
to an issue in the trial; but because the question of the accused's guilt 
would often turn on whether the jury believed the accused or the 
complainant, her credibility would in practice be inextricably tied up with 
the credibility of the accused's defence. Accordingly leave to cross-
examine under s. 2(2) could be obtained to attack the complainant's 
specific credibility, her veracity as a witness, so long as the resolution of an 
issue depended on whom the jury believed. If consent was in issue and 
there was no independent evidence to show what took place, any sexual 
experience which threw doubt on the complainant's veracity would be 
relevant to that issue and cross-examination on it was likely to be 
permitted ± so long of course as its relevance did not depend on the 
discredited argument which had previously allowed juries to reason from 
promiscuity to untruthfulness. 
Thus, it was not unfair to prevent the accused from cross-examining the 
complainant on her promiscuity if the sole argument was that her 
willingness freely to consent to sex with others made it more likely that she 
consented to sex with the accused (R v. Brown (1988) 89 Cr App R 97 
(CA)); but promiscuity which was very proximate to the alleged rape could 
be sufficiently probative of consent to make its exclusion unfair to the 
accused. In R v. Viola [1982] 1 WLR 1138 the Court of Appeal was of the 
view that the accused should have been allowed to cross-examine the 
complainant on her sexual advances to other male acquaintances less than 
two hours before the alleged rape, and also on the fact that a naked man 
had been found lying on her sofa eight or nine hours after the alleged rape. 
This evidence was relevant to the issue of consent and sufficiently 
probative of the accused's innocence to be admitted. 
In R v. Cox (1986) 84 Cr App R 132 the complainant had told her 
boyfriend that the accused had raped her the day before, when the 
boyfriend had been in police custody. The accused's defence was consent, 
and he sought leave to cross-examine the complainant on an earlier 
occasion when she had had sex with another man while her boyfriend was 
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away and then made a false allegation of rape when the boyfriend had 
found out. The judge did not give leave and the accused was convicted. 
The Court of Appeal held that the cross-examination should have been 
permitted as it went to her credibility and the jury might well have come to 
a different conclusion if they had been allowed to hear it. The purpose of 
the intended cross-examination was not to attack the complainant's moral 
credibility as a promiscuous woman, but to attack her credibility in the 
legitimate sense of revealing to the jury that she was the sort of person who 
would have consensual intercourse and then fabricate an allegation of 
rape. Similarly, in R v. Cleland [1995] Crim LR 742, where  the  
complainant claimed she had not had unprotected sex with her boyfriend 
and attributed her pregnancy to the alleged rape, the Court of Appeal held 
she should have been cross-examined on an abortion she had had before 
the alleged rape (and on the fact that she had menstruated after the alleged 
rape). In R v. Redguard [1991] Crim LR 213 the Court of Appeal held that 
cross-examination on the complainant's sexual experience should have 
been permitted as it went both to her credibility and to the issue of 
consent. The allegation was that the accused had raped the complainant in 
her flat. His defence was consent. The complainant testified that she would 
not have allowed anyone but her boyfriend to stay in her flat, let alone 
have sex with her there. The accused was prevented from cross-examining 
her about a consensual sexual encounter she had had with another man in 
her flat some weeks after the alleged rape. His appeal was allowed on the 
ground that the cross-examination could have shown the complainant was 
willing to lie on oath and that it was more likely she had consented to sex 
with the accused. 
The variety of factual situations where the complainant's sexual 
experience can be relevant to her veracity and an issue is apparent. In 
the final analysis the (albeit vague) test of unfairness to the accused in 
s. 2(2) recognised this, relying on the trial judge to ascertain whether the 
evidence was logically relevant in the context of the case and whether it 
was sufficiently probative for its admission to be justified. Although the 
1976 Act was not wholly satisfactory (applying only to `rape offences' as 
opposed to all sexual offences) it prevented improper attacks on the dignity 
of the complainant while recognising the significant probative value the 
complainant's sexual experience could have in respect of her credibility (in 
a legitimate sense) and an issue in the proceedings. It therefore recognised 
the importance of the presumption of innocence and the concomitant 
desirability of allowing the accused to bring out evidence which under-
mined the case against him. The accused's rights were protected, as were 
the complainant's insofar as it was no longer permissible to cross-examine 
her with a view to tarnishing her moral credibility. 
However, in 1998 a Home Office-led interdepartmental working group, 
citing one source of data which suggested that `sexual history evidence is 
introduced in up to 75% of applications for the admission of [such] 
evidence in rape trials' (but providing no indication of the percentage of 
cases in which an `application' is actually made) came to the firm 
conclusion that evidence of this sort was being used `in an attempt to 
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discredit the victim's [sic] character in the eyes of the jury' and that `there 
is overwhelming evidence that the present practice in the courts is 
unsatisfactory' (Home Office report, Speaking up for Justice (1998) at 
p. 69). If this was the case (and the argument put forward in the report is 
anything but convincing) it could only have been the fault of trial judges 
for not applying their discretion to admit sexual experience evidence in 
accordance with the terms of the Act and the guidance provided by the 
Court of Appeal in R v. Viola [1982] 1 WLR 1138. 
The test established by the Act was as satisfactory as it could be. In 
other words, while it would have been appropriate to provide the judiciary 
with better training or guidance on how probative value was to be 
determined, and on the nature and significance of factors militating 
against admitting the evidence, there was hardly a pressing need for root 
and branch reform. Indeed, the introduction of the Human Rights Act 
1998, and with it an express reaffirmation of the principle that the accused 
is presumed to be innocent and entitled to a fair trial, militated against any 
significant change in the test for admissibility. Nevertheless, s. 2 of the 
1976 Act was repealed and replaced by s. 41 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 with effect from 4 December 2000. 
17.4 The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
In the case of R v. Seaboyer [1991] 2 SCR 577 the majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that s. 276 of the Canadian Criminal Code, a 
provision prohibiting the admission of evidence of the complainant's 
extraneous sexual experience with persons other than the accused, had to 
be struck down as unconstitutional, the reason being that it comprised a 
blanket rule of exclusion subject to just three specific exceptions. If the 
section had been upheld, logically relevant evidence which supported the 
accused's defence would have been inadmissible (regardless of its 
probative value) if it could not be brought within one of the three 
categories of relevance. There was no facility for the trial judge to balance 
probative value against competing considerations so, while the provision 
ensured that evidence of sexual experience could not be used for 
illegitimate purposes, it also prevented the accused from being able to 
rely on such evidence when it would be legitimate to do so. Accordingly, 
s. 276 violated the accused's right not to be deprived of his liberty except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice and his right to a 
fair trial (respectively ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms) and failed the proportionality test under s. 1 of the Charter 
as to what could be justified in a free and democratic society. The majority 
of the Court noted that provisions such as s. 276, comprising a mandatory 
rule of exclusion subject to specific exceptions (the so-called `Michigan 
model'), were fundamentally flawed. Specific categories of relevance can 
never anticipate the multitude of circumstances which may arise in 
practice, and the trial judge was given no latitude to determine relevance 
and probative value in the case before him. It was noted that the `category 
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of relevance' approach had been rejected as an inappropriate basis for 
determining the admissibility of `similar fact evidence' (3.3.4 ante) and, for 
similar reasons, it could not form the test for admitting evidence of the 
complainant's sexual experience. Importantly the Court also noted that in 
jurisdictions using the Michigan model the courts had circumvented the 
blanket prohibition by `reading down' and `constitutional exemption'. 
Section 276 was therefore held to be of no force and the judiciary were 
provided with guidelines explaining how the common-law exclusionary 
discretion should be applied. These guidelines were subsequently 
incorporated into a new version of s. 276 (see R v. Darrach [2000] 2 
SCR 443 (SCC)). In the light of the Canadian experience, and given the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, it is difficult to understand why 
a Michigan-type model was thought to be an appropriate replacement for 
s. 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. 
Section 41(1) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
provides that, in the absence of leave, the accused and his advocate are 
prohibited from adducing or seeking to elicit in cross-examination 
evidence relating to `any sexual behaviour of the complainant' if the 
accused is charged with a `sexual offence'. Sexual behaviour covers `any 
sexual behaviour or other sexual experience, whether or not involving any 
accused or other person, but excluding . . . anything alleged to have taken 
place as part of the event which is the subject matter of the charge against 
the accused' (s. 42(1)(c)). The relevant sexual offences are set out in s. 62 of 
the Act and include rape, burglary with intent to rape, indecent assault 
and unlawful intercourse. Thus, unlike the 1976 Act, the prohibition 
applies to sexual behaviour with the accused himself, to sexual behaviour 
with inanimate objects and in relation to allegations other than `rape 
offences'. 
The court may give leave under s. 41(2), but only if it is satisfied that 
s. 41(3) or (5) applies and a refusal of leave might have the result of 
rendering unsafe a conclusion on any relevant issue in the case. Further, 
by virtue of s. 41(6), the evidence or question must relate to one or more 
specific instances of alleged sexual behaviour on the part of the 
complainant (as opposed to evidence of reputation); and, for the purposes 
of s. 41(3) leave will not be given if it is reasonable to assume that the 
purpose (or main purpose) for which the evidence would be adduced or 
elicited is to impugn the credibility of the complainant as a witness 
(s. 41(4)). Any application for leave must be heard in private and in the 
absence of the complainant (s. 43(1)). 
Section 41(5) applies if the evidence or question would enable the 
accused to explain or rebut `any evidence adduced by the prosecution 
about any sexual behaviour of the complainant'. This would presumably 
allow the complainant to be cross-examined on the sort of evidence which 
was in issue in R v. Cleland [1995] Crim LR 742 (CA) (17.3 ante). A literal 
interpretation of the subsection suggests that, if the complainant were to 
state on oath that she was a virgin until the alleged assault, the defence 
would be unable to rebut that evidence as it would not fall within the 
meaning of `any sexual behaviour' (as defined in s. 42(1)(c)). In R v. 
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Rooney [2001] EWCA Crim 2844 the Court of Appeal therefore held, 
following a concession from the Crown, that defence counsel should have 
been permitted to cross-examine the complainant under s. 41(5) on 
whether she had performed oral sex on a youth in the summer of 1996, 
following her testimony that she had `never had a sexual experience 
before' an incident alleged to have occurred with the accused in 1997. 
Presumably, then, if the complainant testifies that she would not have 
consented to sex with the accused in the circumstances of the alleged 
offence, it will be permissible to rebut that assertion with evidence that she 
had previously consented to sex in such circumstances (as in R v. Riley 
[1991] Crim LR 460 (CA), 17.2 ante); and if the complainant testifies that 
she would never have consented to a man as physically unappealing as the 
accused, it would be permissible to cross-examine her on her consensual 
sexual involvement with even less attractive men. Subsection (5), unlike 
subsection (3), is not subject to the credibility prohibition in subsection (4), 
the reason being that the adduction of evidence to rebut the complainant's 
testimony is done for the purpose of undermining her credibility as a 
witness in a legitimate sense (rather than impugning her general moral 
credibility). 
Section 41(3) applies if the evidence or question `relates to a relevant 
issue in the case' and: (a) that issue is not an issue of consent; or (b) it  is an  
issue of consent and the sexual behaviour is alleged to have taken place `at 
or about the same time as the event which is the subject matter of the 
charge'; or (c) it is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour `is alleged 
to have been, in any respect, so similar (i) to any sexual behaviour of the 
complainant which . . . took place as part of the event which is the subject 
matter of the charge . . ., or (ii) to any other sexual behaviour of the 
complainant which . . . took place at or about the same time as that event, 
that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence'. 
Importantly for the accused, `issue of consent' in s. 41(3)(a) does not 
include any issue as to the belief of the accused that the complainant 
consented, so the defence will be able to adduce or elicit from the 
complainant evidence of her previous sexual behaviour (of which he was 
aware) if it has a bearing on whether the accused mistakenly believed that 
she was consenting, so long as the judge is satisfied that to refuse leave 
might render unsafe a finding on that issue (s. 41(2)(b)) and the evidence or 
questioning is not prohibited by subsection (4) or (6). Accordingly, it is 
not permissible to cross-examine the complainant on her reputation or 
general character as a sexually promiscuous woman (s. 41(6)). In R v. A 
(No. 2) [2001] 2 WLR 1546 (HL) (at p. 1573) Lord Hope opined that 
s. 41(3)(a) would also permit cross-examination to show that the 
complainant was biased against the accused, that there is an alternative 
explanation for the physical conditions on which the prosecution rely to 
establish that sexual intercourse with the accused took place, and that the 
detail of a young complainant's account could have come from sexual 
activity with a person other than the accused. If s. 41(3)(a) does indeed 
permit cross-examination of the complainant on other sexual behaviour to 
show bias (that is, her motive for lying), there can be little doubt that the 
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questioning will be prohibited if that motive can just as easily be shown 
without reference to her sexual behaviour (R v. Mokrecovas [2002] 1 Cr 
App R 226 (CA)). 
The trial judge has a discretion as to whether the evidence of extraneous 
sexual experience should be admitted under s. 41(3)(a) (where the issue is 
not consent) and under s. 43(5) (where the evidence is aimed at impugning 
the complainant's credibility in a legitimate way), the governing criterion 
in each case being whether exclusion might lead to an unsafe conviction 
(s. 41(2)(b)). The problem with the scope of s. 41 lies in the test to be 
applied in cases where the issue is consent, as it is most likely to be in 
practice, for the only routes available to the accused are those provided by 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of s. 41(3). 
Paragraph (b) is unlikely to be utilised much in practice, given the very 
narrow window provided by the phrase `at or about the same time' as the 
alleged sexual assault. The explanatory notes provided by the Home Office 
suggest that this should be interpreted `no more widely than 24 hours 
before or after the [alleged] offence' (in line with the wording used in the 
original Bill). This res gestae exception would permit cross-examination 
on, for example, the complainant's consensual sexual activity with another 
man soon after the alleged assault (as in R v. Viola [1982] 1 WLR 1138 
(CA), 17.3 ante) or her consensual foreplay with the accused himself just 
prior to the alleged assault. However, it would not permit the admission of 
evidence such as that the accused and complainant had consensual sex a 
few days after the alleged offence or a lengthy sexual relationship prior to 
the alleged offence (if the last relevant act occurred a few days before the 
alleged offence) even though such evidence would have a logical bearing 
on whether the complainant consented during the incident in question. (In 
the latter case cross-examination might be permissible under s. 41(3)(a) if  
the accused is able to run a concurrent defence of mistaken belief in 
consent.) Read literally the exception in paragraph (c) is also very 
narrowly drawn, representing a resurrection of the sort of `striking 
similarity' test originally proposed in the Heilbron Report (17.3 ante). It 
permits questioning on extraneous sexual behaviour only if that behaviour 
is so similar to any sexual behaviour which `took place as part of' or `at or 
about the same time as' the incident which gave rise to the allegation ± but 
only if that similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence. 
This exception was not included in the original Bill, but was incorporated 
during its passage through Parliament following concerns that there was 
no provision permitting cross-examination on the complainant's pecu-
liarly similar behaviour (such as re-enacting the balcony scene from 
Romeo and Juliet prior to intercourse). 
In short, paragraphs (b) and (c) recognise that the complainant's 
extraneous sexual behaviour may indeed be logically relevant to the issue 
of consent, but (read literally) limit the test of relevance to two extremely 
narrow categories which apply even if the behaviour in question was with 
the accused himself. The only safeguard provided by s. 41 is that where the 
accused is also able to run the defence of mistaken belief in consent the 
evidence will be admissible for that purpose under s. 41(3)(a). Thus, if the 
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accused is charged with indecently assaulting the complainant it will be 
permissible (subject to s. 41(2)(b)) to adduce or elicit evidence of their 
lengthy relationship involving consensual sex to show it was reasonably 
possible that he mistakenly believed she was consenting but not to show 
that she was actually consenting. It should not be assumed that it will 
always be possible to run the two defences concurrently, however, for the 
complainant may allege that she was violently raped and the accused's 
defence may be that it was nothing other than straightforward consensual 
intercourse during which the complainant took the initiative. 
Section 41 was considered by the House of Lords in the case of R v. A 
(No. 2) [2001] 2 WLR 1546. The allegation against the accused was that 
he had raped the complainant, and the issue was whether she had 
consented to the admitted sexual intercourse with him or, in the 
alternative, whether he had believed that she was consenting. To this 
end counsel for the accused had wished to adduce or elicit evidence of the 
consensual sexual relationship between them, which had ceased about a 
week before the incident forming the subject of the allegation. The trial 
judge ruled against the accused on the ground that the evidence fell within 
none of the three categories of relevance in subsection (3) and was 
therefore absolutely prohibited. The Court of Appeal, following a 
concession from the Crown, held that the evidence was admissible under 
s. 41(3)(a) in relation to the issue of mistaken belief in consent but not the 
issue of consent itself, noting in the course of its judgment that the 
direction to the jury would `have more of a flavour of Lewis Carroll than a 
rehearsal of the matters of jurisprudence'. It was also felt that, as a matter 
of common sense, a person who had previously had sexual intercourse 
with the accused might, on the occasion in dispute, have consented to 
sexual intercourse with him (see R v. Y (2001) The Times 13.2.01 (CA)). In 
the House of Lords it was also accepted that a prior consensual sexual 
relationship between a complainant and the accused himself might well be 
logically relevant to the issue of consent in situations not covered by (a 
literal reading of) paragraphs (b) and (c) of s. 41(3) for, as Lord Steyn 
noted (at p. 1557), what `one has been engaged on in the past may 
influence what choice one makes on a future occasion'. Lords Steyn, 
Slynn, and Hutton concluded that, if read literally, s. 41 was incompatible 
with Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, but felt 
that it was possible to construe s. 41(3)(c), in accordance with the 
interpretative obligation under s. 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, so 
that it would permit evidence of the complainant's extraneous sexual 
experience to be adduced or elicited if its probative value was sufficiently 
high in relation to the issue of consent that the accused would be denied a 
fair trial if it was excluded. Although the appeal before the House of Lords 
was concerned with the relevance of sexual activity between the accused 
himself and the complainant, as a matter of logic and fairness the same 
interpretation must apply in relation to logically probative evidence of the 
complainant's behaviour with persons other than the accused. Section 
41(3)(c) has therefore been judicially rewritten to represent the general 
common-law rule that the accused may adduce or elicit any evidence 
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which is relevant to his defence unless its probative value is insufficiently 
high when weighed against competing considerations, the most important 
of which in this context is the importance of protecting the complainant 
from indignity and preventing the accused from misleading the jury. 
Although there is nothing in s. 41 to suggest that the accused is able to 
cross-examine the complainant on whether she has previously fabricated 
an allegation of sexual assault, in R v. T, R v. H [2002] 1 WLR 632 the 
Court of Appeal held that questions or evidence about the complainant's 
false allegations of sexual assault (or about her failure to complain about 
the offence allegedly committed by the accused when complaining about 
sexual offences allegedly committed by other persons) would normally be 
admissible at common law on the ground that such evidence or questions 
would not be `about any sexual behaviour of the complainant' for the 
purposes of s. 41(1), but there must be a proper evidential basis to support 
an assertion of this sort. One further point is whether it would be 
permissible to cross-examine the complainant on the alleged sexual acts if 
she denies the falsity of her allegations. The rule on the finality of answers 
on collateral matters will not necessarily apply given that the complai-
nant's credibility may be inseparable from an issue in the trial (R v. 
Nagrecha [1997] 2 Cr App R 401 (CA), 16.5.3 ante), so it might be possible 
for the accused to rely on s. 41(3)(a) if the issue is not consent and on (the 
judicially rewritten) s. 41(3)(c) if the issue is consent. The problem here is 
that s. 41(4) (as it stands) would prohibit cross-examination along these 
lines, and the subsection may therefore need to be given a restrictive 
interpretation under s. 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 if its 
application would deny the accused a fair trial. Support for this approach 
lies in Lord Hope's view in R v. A (No. 2) [2001] 2 WLR 1546 (HL) that 
s. 41(3)(a) would permit cross-examination to show that the complainant 
was biased against the accused, notwithstanding the prima facie 
exclusionary rule in s. 41(4). It should be noted, however, that in R v. 
Mokrecovas [2002] 1 Cr App R 226 the Court of Appeal felt that s. 41(4) 
reflected a desirable policy and expressed concern that s. 41(3)(a) might be 
misused to ride a coach and horses through it; and in R v. Darnell [2003] 
EWCA Crim 176 the Court of Appeal had difficulty reconciling Lord 
Hope's observations with the clear terms of the prohibition in s. 41(4). 
Whether the rule on the finality of answers to questions on collateral 
matters is applied (in cases where the complainant's credibility is 
inseparable from an issue) would now seem to be governed by a somewhat 
pragmatic test (see 16.5.3 ante). If the complainant has made a previous 
complaint of sexual assault against a person other than the accused, and 
the accused's advocate wishes to cross-examine her on it with a view to 
demonstrating that it was a false allegation, in the first instance the 
questioning must be limited to whether the allegation was made and 
whether it was true. If the complainant maintains that she was indeed 
abused by that other person the judge will have to determine whether the 
rule on the finality of answers should be applied to prevent further cross-
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examination aimed at showing that the allegation was false, and this will 
depend on whether the falsity can be easily demonstrated or whether it will 
in effect necessitate an additional trial within the present one. In R v. 
Brownlow [2001] EWCA Crim 3042 the Court of Appeal, relying on the 
decision in R v. T, R v. H [2002] 1 WLR 632, held that the accused's 
counsel should have been permitted to cross-examine the complainant on 
whether she had made a complaint of sexual abuse against a man other 
than the accused, but further held that, if the complainant had maintained 
that the allegation was true, any further questioning could only have 
extended to whether the other man had ever been charged as a result of 
that allegation. 
The prohibition on cross-examination as to credit in s. 41(4) of the Act 
was relied on in R v. Singh (No. 2) [2003] EWCA Crim 485 ± which 
concerned very similar allegations by two teenage girls of stranger rape by 
the accused in 1997 ± to prevent cross-examination on the fact that one of 
the complainants (C2) had lied on oath about her sexual experience. C2 
alleged that D had raped her in December 1997, when she was 16 years 
old, and D was convicted following a trial in 1999. His conviction was 
quashed on appeal, however, when it transpired that C2's evidence that 
she had been a virgin prior to the alleged rape was false. At the retrial in 
2001, where no such assertion of virginity was made, D's counsel applied 
to cross-examine C2 on the fact that she had lied on oath during the first 
trial, as it went `to the issue of whether she gave truthful evidence' (that is, 
her credibility as a witness). The judge refused to give leave and D was 
again convicted. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge's ruling because of 
the prohibition in s. 41(4). It was therefore argued that the trial judge 
should have allowed the cross-examination on the alternative ground that 
C2's earlier act of intercourse was relevant to the issue `whether or not the 
Defendant had had sexual intercourse . . . with the . . . complainant', his 
defence being that they had engaged in consensual sexual activity short of 
intercourse, and that the doctor who had examined her, if questioned on 
the matter, might have given an opinion that she had been penetrated on 
no more than one occasion. This argument was also rejected, because of 
the speculation involved and, further, because it was regarded as nothing 
more than another argument that the cross-examination should have been 
permitted to impugn C2's credibility. Given the nature of the case and the 
totality of the prosecution evidence against D, this was not a surprising 
outcome. The decision does not mean that s. 41(4) will always prevent 
cross-examination on lies involving sexual activity. If, unlike the instant 
case, an allegation depends solely on the credibility of the complainant, 
because there is no medical evidence of forced intercourse or other 
violence, no evidence of distress, and the only issue is whether she 
consented, the accused will almost certainly be permitted to cross-examine 
the complainant on her perjury even though it relates to her extraneous 
sexual behaviour. 
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Chapter Summary 
.	 The complainant's extraneous sexual behaviour may be logically relevant to the 
accused's defence to an allegation of sexual abuse by tending to show that 
someone other than the accused committed the offence or that the complainant 
consented to the (admitted) activity with the accused or that the accused 
genuinely believed that the complainant was consenting or that her testimony is 
not worthy of belief. The relevance of the evidence is not based on the argument 
that complainants who have other sexual relationships are more likely to be 
untruthful. Nor is it based on the argument that a complainant who has been 
sexually involved with other persons is more likely to have consented to sexual 
relations with the accused at the material time. 
. Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 provides that if 
the accused is charged with a sexual offence against the complainant the court 
may give the accused's advocate leave to adduce or seek to elicit evidence of the 
complainant's extraneous sexual behaviour (whether or not it involved the 
accused) only if the evidence relates to specific instances of her sexual behaviour 
and refusal of leave might result in the jury's reaching an unsafe conclusion and: 
± the evidence would enable the accused to rebut prosecution evidence about 
the complainant's sexual behaviour (or the complainant's claim to have had no 
other sexual behaviour); or 
± the evidence relates to an issue and the purpose is not to use it to impugn the 
complainant's credibility and:± the issue is not (actual) consent; or the issue is 
consent and the evidence comprises res gestae evidence of sexual behaviour or 
the probative value of the evidence is sufficiently high in relation to consent 
that the accused would be denied a fair trial if it were to be excluded. 
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362

miscarriages of justice 310±13

photofits see Photofits and sketches

previous consistent statements 495±6

qualified identification 329±30

Turnbull guidelines 313±17

circumstances 314 
`fleeting glances' 314, 316 
`frame-up' 317±18 
inanimate objects 320 
photographs 320±1 
police officers 318, 320 
recognition 317 
`reverse Turnbull direction' 320 
submission of no case to answer 319 
supporting evidence 314, 321±2 
undisputed presence 318±19 
weaknesses 310±13 
Voice-identification evidence 330±2 
Voir dire see Trial process 
Vye direction see Accused 
W 
Witnesses 
competence and compellability 481

accused 481±2

accused's spouse 482±3

children 483±4

mentally-defective persons 483±4

credibility

accused

bad character of 35±7, 44±86, 106,

114±36

good character of 94±7

complainants in sexual offence cases 
good character of 89, 490 
sexual experience of 533±40, 542±7 
expert evidence 358 
of witnesses 89, 489±90, 516±20 
cross-examination 10, 25, 343, 508±11 
accused 
bar to cross-examination on bad 
character 106±14 
permissible cross-examination on bad 
character 113±36 
rule on finality of answers on collateral 
matters 511±13, 546±7 
exceptions 515±16: bias 517±19; 
convictions 516±17; dishonest 
reputation 519±20; physical or 
mental incapacity 520 
visual-identification evidence 311

demeanour 15, 348±9

examination-in-chief 10, 25, 484±5

hostile witnesses 498±501 
memory-refreshing notes 485±9, 499 
rule against narrative 208, 489±90 
exceptions (admissible previous 
consistent statements): accused's 
exculpatory statement 494±5; 
complaint of a sexual offence 490±3; 
memory-refreshing notes 490; 
rebutting an allegation of recent 
fabrication 493±4; previous 
identification 495±6; statement 
forming part of the res gestae 496 
unfavourable witnesses 497±8, 498±9 
expert witnesses see Opinion evidence 
oaths and affirmations 481 
previous inconsistent statements 513±15 
re-examination 521 
unreliable witnesses 343±6 
supporting evidence 349±51 
vulnerable witnesses (criminal 
proceedings) 501±7, 532 
Wednesbury unreasonableness see 
Discretion 
Weight see Cogency 
